Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
Department of Conflict Resolution Studies Theses
and Dissertations

CAHSS Theses and Dissertations

1-1-2015

Threads and Stitches of Peace- Understanding
What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace?
Hippolyt Akow Saamwan Pul
Nova Southeastern University, hippolytp@gmail.com

This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of
Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, please click here.

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd
Part of the African Languages and Societies Commons, African Studies Commons, Demography,
Population, and Ecology Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Economics Commons, Family,
Life Course, and Society Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Infrastructure
Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Place and Environment Commons, Political
Science Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Race and Ethnicity Commons, Regional
Sociology Commons, Religion Commons, Social Welfare Commons, and the Sociology of Culture
Commons

Share Feedback About This Item
NSUWorks Citation
Hippolyt Akow Saamwan Pul. 2015. Threads and Stitches of Peace- Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace?. Doctoral
dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Retrieved from NSUWorks, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences. (23)
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/23.

This Dissertation is brought to you by the CAHSS Theses and Dissertations at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Conflict
Resolution Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace?

By

Hippolyt Akow Saamwan Pul

A Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Nova Southeastern University
2015

Copyright © by

Hippolyt Akow Saamwan Pul
May, 2015

Dedication

To my Grandfather, Norbert Guribie, who taught me the joy and dignity of hard
work, dedication, and gave me the gift of multi-tasking. Without all of the above, I would
have walked the single lane of life without the courage and motivation to take on more
than one thing at a time.
To my mother whose sacrifices of self and unquestionable devotion to us, your
children, gave life beyond expectations to my siblings and me. Where many a young
widow would have jumped off the boat, you stuck through the storm just so you could
give us a hope and a life that you never had. The glory is yours.
Uncle Philip of blessed memory, you had faith in me and sponsored my education
from the secondary school to my first degree level. You did what many would have
turned away from. The honor of this work is yours.
To my wife Florence, and children Victor, Annette, Albert and Reuben, you anchored me
in life and served as the compass for my journey in life.

Acknowledgments
“The cow does not say thank you to the pasture or the salt lick.” This Dagara
proverb, my native tongue, translates at two levels. The first, the common one, says the
cow feels it cannot and should not be expressing gratitude to the pasture or the salt lick
each time she visits because she knows she will definitely come back, again, and again,
for the same nourishment. How many times, then, can she say she is grateful? The second
rendition of the proverb says the cow’s stance is that, even if this visit to the pasture or
the salt lick were a one-time affair, she is nonetheless so deeply grateful for the
nourishment so freely given that she cannot really express her gratitude in words. Silence
and the interiorized gratitude is more expressive of her appreciation than any amount of
words can ever express.
I have seriously considered borrowing the wisdom of the cow and keeping mute
on this page because there are so many people to thank for their generosity of time and
knowledge shared that it might be better not to attempt saying thank you; lest I fail to do
so profoundly enough. Worst still, I fear the risk of omitting to reach out to all the
numerous people whose front and/or back stage support has made my venturing into
academia after such a long sojourn in the world of work so fulfilling. But a log does not
become a crocodile, no matter how long it stays in the water. Hence, no matter how much
I wish to be a cow, human I am, and unto humans I must return. Therefore, the words of
thanks, no matter how inadequate they are, must I offer.
My decision to venture back into academia would not have been possible without
the support of family and colleagues at work who had faith in me and offered their
unwavering support as I took on the task. To Florence, my wife, I would probably go

with the wisdom of the cow and not attempt to express my gratitude for your love and
support. Victor, Annette, Albert, and Reuben, you were already used to having me as an
absentee dad, as work kept me out of the house for much of the time over the last 25
years. In the last four years, you have had to further tolerate my unavailability even when
I was home, as I locked myself up with books, headphones, and other academic
accoutrements that made me unapproachable. Thank you for the love and support. Your
own strides in your studies gave me the energy to trudge after you. To all members of my
extended family, young and old alike, without your prayers and support, I may have
dropped the ball along the line. Your cheers worked. In particular, but for the hospitality
and mail delivery services that Dr. Valerian Nakaar and his wife, Laetitia Nakaar offered
from the US side, this venture would have gone nowhere. Not only did you open up your
home to me when I was in the United States, you religiously received and re-mailed
every single book I required for my course work to me.
Many are my supervisors and colleagues at work who prodded me onto this path
and sustained me with their words of encouragement. To William (Bill) Rastetter, you
did not only enthusiastically support my decision to take on this challenge; you created
the opportunities and supported me to make the dream happen. Your initial leadership
paved the way for your successors, Jean Maire Adrian, David Orth-Moore, and Paul
Townsend, to stay the course and encouraged me along. Rev. Fr. William Headley
(CSSPs), you mentored my interests in postgraduate studies in peacebuilding, and created
the opportunities for me when you could. I am forever grateful for being there for me
since we first worked together on peace in Ghana in 1997.

Many on the faculty and administrative body of the Department of Conflict
Analysis and Resolution of Nova Southeastern University have been very influential in
shaping my thinking and direction since I enrolled in the PhD Program of the Department
in January 2010. I am grateful to all. In particular, am eternally grateful to Dr. Muvingi
who, as Chair of my Dissertation Committee, nudged and goaded me on when fatigue
and work schedules nibbled away motivation and will power; especially when the
preliminary stages of the field work for the dissertation research were taking longer than I
anticipated. I am most grateful for your faith in me and all the guidance I received. To Dr.
Robin Cooper and Dr. Elena Bastidas, you both agreed to serve on my Dissertation
Committee, even though I did not get to take courses with you at DCAR. Nonetheless
you found value in my research topic and had enough faith in my commitment not to
disappoint you to accept to be on the Committee. Thank you for your trust and support.
I committed to protecting the identities of the 1,460 individuals across Ghana
whose views and voices, as research interviewees, created the pool of reflections and
ideas for this dissertation. I shall respect my promise to you. Nonetheless, each of you
must know that if this piece of work has any value to society, it is because you had faith
in it to participate in interviews. In a country that is either overzealous or overly cynical
about its state of peace, answering a series of questions on why Ghana is peaceful is
probably not the most interesting conversation you would like to have. Yet, you gave off
your time and your ideas to inform the outcome of this research. You spoke, but I take
full responsibility for how your views have been represented in this dissertation research.
Thank you.

Collecting data from 50 Polling Areas that constituted the study sites across the
country for the quantitative component of this study is daunting enough. Having to
grapple with different local languages; navigate different terrains to get to sometimes
difficult to reach study sites; managing cultural nuances related protocols for gaining
entry into and acceptance in the study sites; as well as, getting access to and gaining the
confidence of the interviewees, are all part of the multiple layers of challenges, for
carrying out the field work. In a country where most communities are already fatigued
from similar research assignments from state and nonstate actors and institutions, some
handholding was essential to gain admittance into the selected study sites and the
participation of the interviewees. To Ms. Irene Angbing of the University for
Development Studies, Tamale, and Andrew Asamoah of Catholic Relief Services, I am
very grateful to you for separately introducing to me the students and field agents from
different parts of the country who guided me into the communities and facilitated access
to respondents for the survey interviewees.
Transcribing 31 hours of audio interviews all by myself would have taken me
several more months to get through it for the analytical work to begin. Mr. Thomas
Sentu, I am profoundly grateful for putting at my disposal your professional verbatim
audio to text transcription skills that enabled me to speed up the transcription of the
interviews from the key informants. Without your help, I would not be where I am today.
Thank you. To all others who gave me a hand here and there over in the course of my
adventure into academia and in the course of the research for this dissertation, I express
to you the eternal gratitude of the cow – my inability to mention you specifically is not a
sign that I am not grateful; the gratitude is eternal.

Table of Contents
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... v
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... vi
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ viii
Naming the Oasis of Peace ............................................................................................. 1
Questioning the Peace................................................................................................... 22
Statement of Research Problem .................................................................................... 22
Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 24
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 28
Explaining Ghana’s Peace – theoretical challenges .................................................... 28
Goals of Research ......................................................................................................... 56
Contribution of the Research to the Field of Peace Studies and Peacebuilding .......... 56
Chapter 3: Methodology .................................................................................................. 58
General Thrust of Research .......................................................................................... 58
Choice of Approach to Research................................................................................... 60
Data Collection and Study Architecture ....................................................................... 63
Sampling and Sample Size considerations .................................................................... 67
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................. 73
Data Collection Process ............................................................................................... 74
Procedures for Data Capture and Preparation for Analysis ........................................ 76
Encounter and Resolution of Field Level Challenges ................................................... 77
Ethics and reflexivity section ........................................................................................ 83
Results or Analysis ........................................................................................................ 85
Reliability and Validity ................................................................................................. 88
Chapter 4: Findings from Field Research ........................................................................ 91
Profile of Respondents .................................................................................................. 91
Study Results from Hypotheses testing and Key Informant Interviews ......................... 97
Chapter 5: Discussion And Implications Of Findings Of The Study ............................ 246
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 246
Grappling with the Yins and Yangs of Ghana’s Peace ............................................... 249
Super Ordinate Categories, Categories, and Subcategories of findings .................... 260
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Emerging Theories ............................................................ 359
i

General Conclusions ................................................................................................... 359
Emerging Grounded Theories From Study ................................................................. 383
Abducted Meso Theories Emerging From The Study ................................................. 385
Directions for Overarching Theory Development ...................................................... 391
Suggestions for further studies .................................................................................... 394
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 399
Appendices...................................................................................................................... 432
Appendix 1 Table of Presidential results from 2000-2012 ......................................... 432
Appendix 2: Cluster Sampling Methodology and Determination of Sample Size ..... 433
Appendix 4 Sampling Frame for Key Informants Interviews ..................................... 444
Appendix 5 Questionnaires Used in the Quantitative Survey ..................................... 451
Appendix 6 Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews ....................................... 475
Appendix 7 Map Showing Distribution of Survey Interview Locations .................... 485
Appendix 8 Matrix Of Hypotheses, Variables And Indicators ................................... 486
Appendix 9 Significance Levels of Factors Influencing Ghana’s Peace .................... 504
Appendix 10: Significance of Economic Development on Ghana’s Peace ............... 505
Appendix 11 Significance of Respect for Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace ............. 506
Appendix 12: Significance respect for the rule of law on peace in Ghana ................ 506
Appendix 13: Gender Perspectives on Respect for Rule of Law on Peace ................ 507
Appendix 14: Significance of the Freedom of the Press to peace in Ghana ............... 508
Appendix 15: Significance of the Independence of the Judiciary to peace in Ghana . 508
Appendix 16: Significance of Gender-related factors to peace in Ghana ................... 509
Appendix 17: Elections and Democratic Participation ............................................... 510
Appendix 18: Significance Levels Of Religion To Peace In Ghana ........................... 511
Appendix 19: Significance of Traditions and Culture to Peace .................................. 512
Appendix 20: Summary of Agreements on Contribution of Education to Peace ....... 513
Appendix 21: Significance of Personal Attitudes, Behaviors and Practices for Peace 514
Appendix 22: Network View - Type of Peace ............................................................ 515
Appendix 23: Network View - Effect of Culture on Peace in Ghana ......................... 516
Appendix 24: Network View - Contribution of Religion to peace ............................. 517
Appendix 25: Network View - Exit Strategies ........................................................... 518
Biographical Sketch. ....................................................................................................... 519

ii

List of Tables
Table 1: List of Variables and Associated Hypotheses for Quantitative Study
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3. Case Selection of Respondents 35 years old or younger
Table 4. Age Statistics of Respondents
Table 5. Distribution of Respondents by Region of Residence and Region of Birth
Table 6. Primary Occupation of Respondents
Table 7. Degrees to which Respondents Agree that Ghana is a Peaceful Country
Table 8. Within and Between Age Variations on Perception of Peace in Ghana
Table 9. Effect of Age of Respondents on Perception of Peace in Ghana
Table 10. Significance Of Socio-Economic Characteristics Perception Of Peace in Ghana
Table 11 Significance Levels of Respondents’ Perceptions on Type of Peace in Ghana
Table 12. Means for Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace
Table 13. Construct of Mean of responses on Effect of Economic Development on
Ghana’s Peace.
Table 14. Effect of Respect of Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace
Table 15. Effect of Respect for the Rule of Law on Ghana’s Peace
Table 16. Effect of Free Media on Ghana's Peace
Table 17. Perceptions about the contribution of the Judicial System to the Peace
Table 18. Views on Women’s Participation in Parliament by Age of Respondents
Table 19. Women’s Contribution to Peace In Ghana
Table 20. Responses on why Electoral Disputes do not lead to national level violence
Table 21. Reasons Why Disputes Over Presidential Elections Do not lead to Violence

iii

Table 22. Effects of Democratic Systems and Practices on Ghana’s Peace
Table 23. Perceived Contribution of Economic Development to Peace in Ghana
Table 24. Importance of Religion in lives of Ghanaians
Table 25. Respondents’ Profile and the Perception of the Importance of Religion in
Ghana Table 26. Means Of Responses On Contribution Religion to Peace in Ghana
Table 27. Respondents’ Profile and Perceived Contribution of Education to Peace in
Ghana

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1.

Percentage Of Respondents Who Said Ghana Is An Oasis Of Peace

Figure 2.

Summary of Responses on Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace

Figure 3.

Perceptions of Contribution of Economic Development to Peace in Ghana

Figure 4.

Distribution of Responses on Women’s Contribution to Peace in Ghana

Figure 5.

Responses on Effect of Democratic Practices on Ghana’s Peace

Figure 6.

Reponses on Government’s Role in the Peace of Ghana

Figure 7.

Perceptions on How Culture Contributes To Ghana’s Peace

Figure 8.

Case Selection: Contribution of Cultural Factors to Peace in Ghana

Figure 9.

Mean Scores Contribution of Ghana’s Educational System to Peace

Figure 10

Construct of Means: Education Factors in Ghana That Contribute to Peace

Figure 11.

Effect of Personal Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices on Peace in Ghana.

Figure 12.

Relationship of Categories of Factors that Weave Ghana’s Peace

Figure 13.

Mapping of Identity Dissolution Through Intermarriages

Figure 14.

Multiple Identity Dissolution and Miscegenated Generations

Figure 15.

Maps of Spatial Connections of the Kotoko Alliance

v

List of Acronyms
AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
BBC

- British Broadcasting Corporation

CADA - Center for African Democratic Affairs
CBC

- Catholic Bishops’ Conference

CCH

- Christian Council of Ghana

CDRs - Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
CEPA - Center for Policy Analysis
CPP

- Convention Peoples Party

CRQ

- Core Research question

CSOs

- Civil Society Organizations

DCAR - Department of Conflict Analysis and Resolution
FBOs

- Faith-based Organizations

FGD

- Focus Group Discussions

GIBA - Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association
GJA

- Ghana Journalists Association

GNA

- Ghana News Agency

IPAC

- Inter Party Advisory Committee

KII

- Key Informant Interview

KPC

- Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage

NAL

- National Alliance of Liberals

NDC

- National Democratic Congress

NLM

- National Liberation Movement,

vi

NPP

- Northern Peoples Party;

NPP1

- Northern Peoples Party

NPP2

- New Patriotic Party

NUGS - Union of Ghana Students
PDCs

- Peoples Defense Committees

PNDC – Provisional National Defense Council
PRINPAG -

Private Newspapers and Publishers Association of Ghana

PSA

- Polling Station Agents

SPSS

- Statistical Package for Social Sciences

SRQ

- Sub research questions

TCP

- Togoland Congress Party,

UGCC - United Gold Coast Convention
UN

- United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UP

- United Party

vii

Abstract
Ghana is considered an oasis of peace despite having the same mix of ethno-political
competitions for state power and resources; north-south horizontal inequalities; ethnoregional concentrations of Christians and Muslims; highly ethnicised elections; a natural
resource dependent economy; and a politically polarized public sphere, among others,
that have plunged other countries in Africa into violent and often protracted national
conflicts. Use of the conflict paradigm to explain Africa’s conflicts glosses over positive
deviance cases such as Ghana. This study used the peace paradigm in a mixed method,
grounded theory research to examine Ghana’s apparent exceptionalism in staving off
violent national conflicts. From the survey of 1429 respondents and 31 Key Informants,
findings indicate Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They
are equally divided on classifying the state of peace in Ghana as negative or positive.
Instead, they have identified sets of centrifugal and centripetal forces that somehow selfneutralize to keep Ghana in a steady state of unstable peace. Among the lift forces are
strongly shared cultural and Indigenous African Religious values; symbiotic interethnic
economic relationships; identity dissolution and cultural miscegenation due to open
interethnic systems of accommodation and incorporation; and the persistence of historical
multi-lateral political, sociocultural, and economic relationships. On the drag side are the
youth bulge; emergent religious intolerance; elite exit from the state in using private
solutions for public problems; and highly politicized and partisan national discourses that
leave the country with no national agenda. In sum, Ghana is no exception to the rule. The
four interconnected meso theories that this study identifies provided pointers to what
factors Ghana needs to strengthen to avert descent into violence.

viii
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of the Research Problem

Naming the Oasis of Peace
Amidst the proliferation and protraction of intrastate conflicts that have earned
Africa the accolade of being “…the continent of conflicts” (Golaszinski, 2007, p. 5),
poverty and disasters, Ghana has won praise as “…an oasis of peace, harmony and
tranquility” (UNDP, 2012; GNA, 2012); a beacon of democracy (Asante-Antwi, 2013;
BBC News, 2013); and an icon of economic progress “in a subregion perpetually in
turmoil” (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). Businessmen and politicians
compete to acclaim that “… the best thing going for Ghana is stability and peace [as it
has managed to remain] an oasis of peace in a turbulent continent” (Gadugah, 2012, p. 1).
However, a review of Ghana’s evolution as a nation-state would show the country shares
the same historical fates that have underscored conflicts in other countries. Indeed, its
image as a peaceful country disguises a multiplicity of fractious points inherent in its
historical and contemporary political set up.
For starters, it should be noted that the territories that constitute Ghana today
were, until 6th March 1957, four disparate political entities independently administered
by the British as the coastal colony (covering what is the Western, Central, the lower part
of the Volta region comprising Keta and Denu (Bening, 1973, p. 21); and all of the
Greater Accra region today); the Ashanti Protectorate (including the present day Ashanti,
Eastern, and Brong Ahafo regions); the Northern Territories (covering present day
Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions); and the Transvolta Togoland, covering
much of the current Volta Region, which the British managed under a UN Trusteeship
after World War I. These territorial units “…that were tied to this entity [called Ghana],
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… had little in common apart from being part of the British Empire” (Weiss, 2005, p. 2).
In other words, like many other states in Africa, Ghana is equally an amalgam of
disparate peoples lumped together as a nation-state by the colonial act. Ghana therefore
has the same history of being an artificially erected state at the dawn of independence as
all African countries have. Hence, there is nothing inherently unifying that predisposes it
to peace more than others.
Additionally, this amalgam of a nation-state did not come into being without
resistance from its constituent members. When Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples
Party (CPP) pushed for “independence now” (Morrison, 2004, p. 423) in the late 1940s,
the majority of the people of the Northern Territories, under the leadership of the
Northern People’s Party (NPP) opted to stay out of the independence movement and
union with the other constituent territories of the emergent state, citing unequal states of
development between the north and the south (Soeters, 2012). Accordingly, the chiefs
and political elite of the north sent a delegation to petition the Queen to have the North’s
independence delayed to enable it catch up with the south developmentally. The
delegation, led by S.D. Dombo failed in its mission and the north was compelled to
participate in the pre-independence elections (Ladouceur, 1979). The political leadership
of the Ashanti Protectorate, on its part, also opposed the idea of joining the colony for
independence. It preferred a separation at best, and at worst a highly decentralized federal
system that would preserve Ashanti’s autonomy and control over its natural resources
(Bourret.1960; Brukum, 1998;Morrison, 2004). To the east, the conglomerate of ethnic
groups in the Transvolta Togoland had to resort to a highly contested plebiscite to decide
whether or not to join the colony for independence (Kwaku, 1976). Even after a decisive
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majority vote to join the emerging union that became Ghana, “a violent uprising took
place in Transvolta Togoland [compelling the Governor) to send the Ghana army in to
quell the disturbances” (Williams, 1984, p. 358) as the celebrations of independence went
on. The lingering discontent with the absorption of the transvolta into Ghana produced
agitations for secession of the Komkombas (Bening, 1983) and the Ewes (Amenumey,
1989; Brown, 1980) from Ghana. These threats of secession heightened in the 1970s
through the early 80s. To the south west, the Buem ethnic groups have always expressed
their wish for secession from the union (Bening, 1983). To date, groups exist that demand
the decoupling of the Transvolta Togoland region from Ghana so that it can be
recognized as a “sovereign state” (Western Togoland General Assembly, 2015).
In addition to the initial resistance to the union and subsequent threats of
secession, Ghana also has the same geo-political and economic disparities that have
plunged Nigeria and La Cote d’Ivoire into protracted civil conflicts and wars (Langer &
Ukiwo, 2007). Historical and contemporary political and economic inequalities largely
define the north south divide, as all communities in the north share a common history of
political and economic marginalization under colonial rule and thereafter. Deliberate
colonial policy kept the north economically underdeveloped and preserved it as a labor
pool for the mineral mines and cocoa farms in the south (Bening, 1990) for the simple
reason that the north was economically too unproductive to merit any investment of
resources for its development. In the words of Governor Hodgson:
…in place of pouring the small surplus revenue that there is every
indication that the Colony is now likely to obtain, into such an absolutely
unremunerative country as the Northern Territories is, and I fear always
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will be, I should like to devote it to the development of districts within the
colony and which are ripe for development and every penny expended on
which would come back again in the shape of increased revenue (Bening,
1990a, p. 251)

For this reason, “The colonial administration undertook almost no infrastructural
or human capital development in northern Ghana” (Langer, 2007, p. 8). The resultant
deficits in infrastructure and human resource development have ensured that the north has
remained “much poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical
services …” (Armin, 2007, p.9). These historical tensions and regional inequalities have
underscored the political evolution of the country. Even before it attained independence,
the country grappled with ethno-political and regional conflicts that threatened to tear it
apart (Anglin, 1958; Meredith, 2006, Sakyi, 2013b). In particular, Anglin chronicles a
number of events that threatened to break up the country within the first nine years of its
independence. He recalls, for instance, how the National Liberation Movement (NLM),
the main opposition party based in the Ashanti hinterland had “…resorted to violence,
intimidation, dynamiting of houses and even political murders” (Anglin, 1958, p. 43), as
its “Action Groupers [in Ashanti sought to counter the CPP’s] Action Troopers [that
equally] terrorized political opponents in the South” (Anglin, 1958, p. 44). The creation
of the Action Troopers of the CPP and Action Groupers of the NLM effectively initiated
the institutionalization of a culture of violence in Ghana’s body politic.
The historical differences between the geopolitical blocks that constitute Ghana
today have continued to have relevance in the geo-ethnic politics of the country and her
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attempts at democratic rule. Unlike La Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, once peaceful countries
with no histories of military coup d’états, but which suddenly found themselves under
siege of violent conflicts, Ghana has witnessed four successful and often violent military
coup d’états in 1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981. This is in addition to several unsuccessful
counter coups (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), and at least one successful palace coup (Adofo,
2012 Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012). Hence, from 1966 till January 1993, Ghana
lived much of its political life after independence under military rule. In comparison,
Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya never experienced coup d’etats; and yet they descended into
violent national level conflicts or civil wars.
Military interventions derailed civilian rule as each attempt at democratic
transitioning of power “…lasted only for a few years before they were aborted” (African
Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). All the coup d’états had thinly veiled ethnopolitical divisions undergirding them (Adofo, 2012 in Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012;
Agyeman-Duah, 1987). The period witnessed various forms of summary executions,
murders, and disappearances of people that instilled fear and a culture of silence among
the population (Oquaye, 1995; Chazan and Le Vine, 1978). Indeed, between 1979 and
1992, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Provisional National
Defense Council (PNDC), both under Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, legitimized and
institutionalized the use of violence in politics when Rawlings declared the
“democratization of violence” (Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Boafo-Arthur, 2012). In
fulfillment of this declaration, the period between December 1981 and December 1992
saw the systematic training and arming of civilians under the umbrella of the Peoples
Defense Committees (PDCs) which mutated into the Committees for the Defense of the
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Revolution (CDRs) in the late 1980s through the 90s. This militarization of civil life was
considered necessary to contain internal dissent and rebellion. In particular, the PNDC,
which emerged from the December 31, 1981 coup d’état, needed these ‘revolutionaries’
to counter the multiple counter-revolutionary military coups and other forms of civil
discontent and agitations that challenged its legitimacy. Rawlings would later admit that
the leadership of the PNDC had to “devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our nation's
security instead of being there with the people” (People's Daily Graphic, Accra, 6 April
1987 cited in Agyeman-Duah, 1987).
Besides military coup d’états, Ghana has all the other ingredients that have
plunged other countries with similar mixes of challenges into violent national clashes. A
highly heterogeneous population of 24 million people divided into at least 52 different
indigenous ethnic groups sets the stage for intense inter-ethnic rivalries for political
power at the local level (chieftaincy succession and parliamentary elections) and national
level positions (presidential elections, ministerial appointments, and positions in civil and
public services). It is also the basis for interethnic contestations over access to, ownership
of, and control over economic resources. Consequently, Ghana has been home to many
violent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts around the issues of landownership,
chieftaincy succession disputes, and competition for political power within and between
ethnic groups (Arthur, 2009; Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Boafo-Arthur, 2011;
Nambiema, 2012; Pul, 2003), especially in the northern half of the country. Notable
among the protracted violent conflicts are the Mamprusi-Kusasi conflict in the Upper
East Region; and the Bimoba-Konkomba, Gonja-Nawuri, Konkomba-Nanumba,
Dagomba-Konkomba, and the intra-Dagbona chieftaincy succession conflict, all in the
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Northern Region. The Upper West Region has the intra-Wala Chieftaincy dispute which
adds to the list of protracted violent conflicts in the north of Ghana that have histories
dating back to the pre-colonial and/or colonial times, but which have periodically erupted
violently onto this day. Elsewhere in the country, the violent conflicts between the
Nkonyas and Alavanyos, and the Pekis and Tsitos, both in the Volta Region also date
back close to a hundred years or more (Ghana News Agency, 2009; Yakohene, 2012).
The Techiman-Tuobodum conflict in the Brongo-Ahafo region also has roots dating back
several decades. Nonetheless, like volcanoes that run different cycles of dormancy and
activity, they continue to simmer and explode periodically in violent forms.
Overlaying the inter and intraethnic conflicts are politico-economic policy
challenges that perpetuate the north-south, and rural-urban poverty divides in the country.
For instance, despite various attempts in the postcolonial era to bridge the north-south
wealth gap,

the general trend in national development planning has been “an

‘endogenous’ tendency to favour the south over the north in terms of the location of
economic activities” (Langer, 2007, p. 9). Consequently, the north has remained “much
poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical services …” (Langer,
2007, p. 8). To date, there remains a “… very high incidence of poverty in the northern
parts of the country” (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008, p. 107). More than half of the
country’s poor are concentrated in the three northern regions where the poor are also
much poorer than in the rest of the country (World Bank, 2010).
Recent economic progress and poverty alleviation interventions have done little to
reduce the poverty disparity between the north and the south of the country. National
poverty reduction initiatives since the late 1980s have higher impact in the south than in
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the north. This is partly because of the large historical development deficit in the north
and the quantum of investment required to bridge the gap or sustain minimal investments.
For instance, while the proportion of the population in the urban north that is poor moved
from 45.4% in 1992 to 31.3% in 2006 (a drop of 14.1 percentage points); their
counterparts in the south that started from 25.7% of the urban south population being
poor dropped to 8.9% by 2006 (a 16.8 percentage point). The differences in rural poverty
between the south and the north, and the impact of efforts to reduce them are more
staggering. The proportion of the poor in the rural north stood at 74.2% in 1992, moving
down to 68.5% in 2006 (i.e. a 5.7 percentage point reduction). In contrast, the proportion
of the poor in the rural south started at 60.6% in 1992 and moved to 28.2% in 2006 – a
large 32.4 percentage point drop in poverty over the same period (World Bank, 2010).
Indeed, the north-south poverty gap is set to grow as “… geographical inequalities
further widen: by 2030, poverty could be broadly eliminated in the South, while still
affecting two-fifths of the North‘s population” (World Bank, 2010, p. 10).
The persistence of this north-side divide in the poverty profile of Ghana has
geopolitical, religious, and ethnic connotations. Within the north, it heightens the sense of
political and economic marginalization and therefore increases the stakes in interethnic
competition for access to and control over political power and natural resources such as
land. Underscoring this interethnic competition for political power and economic
resources in the north is the colonial legacy of indirect rule that institutionalized political
inequalities under the chieftaincy institution, which have been maintained in the
administrative systems of the postcolonial state. Consequently, the north of Ghana is
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highly volatile, with several violent clashes every year on issues of land, chieftaincy, and
belongingness (Lund, 2003).
The persistence and continued deepening of poverty in the north has prompted the
voicing of concerns that resonate with the fears of the founding political fathers of the
north in respect of the Northern Territories’ joining the rest of the country for
independence. As one young northern politician recently put it, the North’s participation
in the political space that Ghana constitutes has not brought it the much needed
development. All the northerners “have gotten is hunger, chieftaincy conflicts, illiteracy
and ignorance” (ThinkGhana.com, 2012). The increasing awareness of the north-south
poverty gap among the youth, coupled with an equally widening youth bulge due to high
levels of unemployment in the north, especially in the urban centers, creates conditions
for potential violent north-south confrontations. This puts “…into doubt the vaunted
cohesiveness and unity of the Ghanaian society” (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 49).
Superimposed on this geo-economic divide is a religious dimension, as
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northern part of the country has a predominantly Muslim population, as is the case in
Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire (Assefa, 2001). In all, 97.3% of Ghana’s Muslim population
are found in the three northern regions of the country, with the Northern Region alone
accounting for 35.2% of the national Muslim population (Ghana Statistical Service,
2012). While most of the conflicts in Ghana are not about religious rivalry per se, religion
[has nonetheless] played a role in reinforcing the fault lines in the conflict[s]” (Assefa,
2001, p. 167). In the interethnic conflicts of northern Ghana, for instance, ethnic identities
of the belligerent groups are often confounded with the dominant religious affiliations of
the members of the ethnic groups. In some cases, communities at war consciously invoke
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the emotive force of their dominant collective religious identity as the mobilizing force
for fighters and the glue that holds them together against their common enemy (Kirby,
2006-2007).
In addition to the geopolitical and ethnic tensions that keep Ghana’s peace fragile,
Ghana also has a history of civil resistance to state rule or misrule. Such mass actions
date back to the protests by the Aborigines Rights Protection Society of West Africa
organized against the colonial government through to violent agitations that the
Convention People’s Party organized as it championed the strikes and demonstrations in
the struggle for independence (Morrison, 2004). Strikes and protests against military rule,
especially in the 1970s through the 80s, were also instrumental in forcing military
governments to change their courses on crucial national issues. In 1979 alone,
professionals, university lecturers, students, and politicians of all political affiliations
joined hands to organize more than 80 separate strikes in the spade of four months to
demand political changes from the military junta of the Supreme Military Council
(Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1982). Similarly, spades of strikes and demonstrations by
students and other professionals triggered and propelled the decision of the PNDC
government to initiate a return to constitutional rule in the late 1980s through the early
1990s, despite its initial resistance to the idea of ever handing over power.
As a sequel to these civil actions the PNDC government initiated the
decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other
local government structures, in the hope that “…the democratisation of national politics
may diffuse the incessant security threats, unify the people, and give the P.N.D.C. the
domestic support required for social transformation” (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 625). The
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decision was also designed to address the perceived lack of legitimacy of the PNDC
government, which fueled the incessant attempts by armed groups to overthrow it.
Several of the otherwise peaceful demonstrations and strikes in the country’s
history turned violent as governments and state functionaries resorted to the use of force
to quell them. In the 19970s, for instance, “…the excessive use of force by the
government in subduing demonstrations on secondary school and university campuses”
(Chazan & Le Vine, 1979, p. 187) became the norm anytime the students took to the
streets to protest against one issue or the other. In the 1980s, the PNDC government had
frequent running battles with students, most of which turned violent. The government
repeatedly closed down the country’s universities in an effort to break the organizational
capacity of the students, keep them at home, and off the streets (Akonor, 2006). Similar
violent government-civilian confrontations continued into the early days of the return to
democratic governance in the 1990s. In 1994, a peaceful march to demand the liberation
of the broadcast airwaves by supporters of Radio Eye, a private radio station set up in
defiance of the reluctance of the government to license private FM broadcast radio
stations to operate, turned violent when unidentified assailants, believed to be associated
with the government, attempted to block the demonstrations (Nketia, 2013; Public
Agenda, 2005). In 1995, popular discontent and protests against the introduction of the
Value-added Tax system culminated in the Kumepreko (i.e. “just kill me”) and
Siemepreko, (i.e. just burry me) demonstrations. These turned violent with several people
killed (Osei, 2000).
Student activism on the political front has been an epicenter of civil unrest in
Ghana. Starting off from a position of non-engagement, it witnessed increasingly super-
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active engagement over time. Finlay (1968) remarked that before the 1980s, “…unlike
[…] in many developing nations where students have been a significant force in making
or breaking governments” (p. 51), Ghanaian students remained largely apathetic to the
political life of the country. Even when students engaged the state on political grounds, it
was usually the government that initiated the engagements (Finlay, 1968). Finlay
attributed the absence of student activism in the 1960s, in part to “…the strong Ghanaian
tradition of deference to authority [which had] mitigated against student hostility and
protest” (Finlay, 1968, p. 55). It would seem, however, that cooptation in a suffocating
political environment rather than deference may have explained the seemingly apathetic
response of students to political life in the 1960s.
Since the 1970s, students have been at the forefront of political agitations that
have made and unmade governments. While students were part of Nkrumah’s support
structure (Hettne, 1980; Chazan & Le Vine, 1979), they were in the forefront of civil
society opposition to the Union Government concept of the Acheampong regime (Hettne,
1980). Similarly, under the auspices of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS),
they championed the agenda of Rawlings’ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
; constituted the base for the June 4th Movement; and led the demonstrations against the
Limann regime that paved the way for, and gave a legitimate voice to the junta that
constituted the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to overthrow the Limann
government in 1981(Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Kpessa, 2007). The students were,
ironically, also pivotal in the demonstrations that eventually forced the PNDC to launch
the processes of returning the country to constitutional rule (Kpessa, 2007). In these
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strikes and demonstrations some lives were lost and organizers were subjected to human
rights violations of all kinds, especially under the military regimes.
In recent times, contestation for political space and power in Africa has shifted
from the battle grounds and the use of coups d’états to the ballot boxes. Consequently,
geo-ethnic politics have triggered election related violence in several countries in Africa
since the re-introduction of democratic rule in the 1990s. Recourse to violence has been
unavoidable, especially in many instances where results of presidential polls have been
too close to call or the potential for interethnic or interregional transfer of political power
is eminent. In Togo the sudden death of the northern political strongman, Gnassinbge
Eyadema, while holding onto power, and without a clear successor, had revived the hopes
of the longtime political rivals in the south to recapture power. In the compromised
elections that followed the forcible imposition of Faure Gnassigbe as a successor, up to
800 people died in the post-electoral disputes of the results and the violence that followed
the declaration of Faure Gnassingbe as the winner (France24, 2010; Noyes, 2013). In
Madagascar, similar elections in 2013 led to incidents of violence with some loss of life
(Today's Newspaper, 2013). In the 2011 elections in Nigeria more than 500 people died,
another 17,000 people were internally displaced, and 360 others were injured in postelection violence in eight northern states (BBC News, 2011a; CNN Wire Staff, 2011). In
Cote d’Ivoire’s election of 2000, disputes over the winner of the elections culminated in
the first civil war in 2002 that split the country into two for eight years. Earlier in 2000, at
least 170 people died in electoral related violence in October with another 42 recorded
dead in the December of the same year (Skogseth, 2006). Attempts to resolve the crisis
through another presidential election in 2010 deepened the political and social rift in the
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country. The Independent Electoral Commission declared Alassane Ouattara as winner of
the elections, while the Constitutional Court routed for Laurent Gbagbo as the winner
(BBC News, 2011b; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011). It took another civil war, with the
backing of the French army on the pro-Ouattara side, to oust President Gbagbo, at the
cost of 3,000 lives, 200,000 refugees, and thousands more internally displaced (Djoman,
2013). Kenya’s election in 2007 ended in violence when Mwai Kibaki was declared
winner. Similarly, Mugabe’s win in Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential elections also ended
in violence (Amnesty International, 2008).
Violence has been part of Ghana’s, hotly contested and contentious elections
since 1992 (The Center for African Democratic Affairs, 2012) as well. The country’s
return to multiparty democracy compelled the PNDC to shed its military image and
transform itself into a political party christened the National Democratic Congress
(NDC). Other members and sympathizers of the PNDC formed other political parties that
all retained Flt Lt J. J. Rawlings as their presidential candidate. To ensure victory for the
PNDC coalition, the electoral process was tightly controlled with legal limitations on
funding amounts and sources for political parties (Oquaye, 1995a). The scheduling of the
elections was similarly configured to make the presidential elections come several weeks
before the parliamentary one. After Rawlings was declared winner of the 1992
presidential elections, all the major political parties, except those affiliated to the PNDC,
boycotted the parliamentary elections over protests of perceived manipulation of the
electoral process and the attendant rigging of the presidential race in favor of J.J
Rawlings. The boycotts nearly derailed the redemocratization process.
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The 2000 elections marked a crucial turning point when the constitutionally
imposed term limit mandated the exit of J.J. Rawlings, whose name and face had
dominated the national politics for nineteen years. With the eminent exit of Rawlings,
however, came the prospect of transfer of power from the hitherto dominant political
force, the Ewe supported PNDC/NDC (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), to a different party - the
Akan-based New Patriotic Party (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). This eminent change in the
political landscape increased the stakes in the elections, especially when J.J Rawlings
declared that should the NPP win the elections, “…there would be a 'fight' because he
was not prepared to hand over to 'rogues and thieves” (Oquaye, 1995, p. 263). When the
NPP did win, the transfer of power from the NDC to its arch rival political party, the New
Patriotic Party, was also almost aborted. A plan to fake an invasion of the country as the
pretext for placing it under a state of emergency, and thereby cancelling the results of the
elections was hatched. The country escaped a return to military rule only by the
intervention of one brave military officer who reportedly sprang a surprise visit on the
coup plotters and ordered that they abandon their scheme (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012; The
New Crusading Guide, 2012). In 2008, the election was won by the slimmest of margins
– 40,000 votes. The country was brought to the brink of war when the NDC, fearing they
would lose the elections, began to mobilize its supporters and “troops …to make the
country ungovernable” (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012).
Of the six successive elections since the return to democratic rule in 1992,
however, the 2012 elections was the one that brought the country closest to war. Two
political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the Convention People’s Party, refused to
recognize the results of the 2012 Presidential elections that the Electoral Commission
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declared. They alleged that the results were flawed by massive and systematic fraud
perpetrated by the collusion of the Electoral Commission and the ruling National
Democratic Congress. To prove their case, the NPP went to the Supreme Court, as the
Constitution prescribes, to demand the annulment of the results (Daily Guide, 12
December 2012; Jale & Antwi, 2012) on the grounds that some “…1,340,000 votes cast
for Mr Mahama - enough to swing the outcome in favour of Mr Akufo-Addo” (BBC
News, 7 January, 2013) were illegitimate votes or votes wrongly assigned to John
Mahama from the votes of other parties. Subsequently, the NPP amended its writ to call
for the annulment of results of the presidential elections in “11,916 Polling Areas…
instead of the 4,709 in the original petition” (Owusu, 2013, p. 3). If granted, this would
have been enough to reverse the declared results to “bring John Mahama’s total valid
votes cast to 39.1% (2,473,171) and Akufo-Addo’s to 3,775,552; making him (Akufo
Addo) the clear winner by 59.69%” (Owusu, 2013, p. 3).
Few believed the NPP would actually go to court to seek to reverse the results of
the elections. However, when the party executed its intent and actually filed the petition,
that act raised political tensions and the stakes for peace in the country. The outcome of
the court decision would be pivotal for Ghana’s peaceful and democratic credentials,
since this was the first time ever that a legal challenge tested the limits of Ghana’s
constitution, the electoral laws, and election management systems. Many feared the
outcome of the petition, whichever way it went, would not be accepted by the losing
party.
The televised election petition travelled eight (8) months in the Supreme Court,
with FM radio stations across the country providing coverage of the actual proceedings as
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well as soliciting and broadcasting views and comments from all parties in court. The
contending political parties took advantage of this unbridled media coverage of the trial
to take their case to the court of public opinion, as various spokespersons on both sides
freely dished out their personal opinions or made statements that were sometimes
prejudicial to the legal process. The trade in insults and prejudicial statements inflamed
passions and heightened tensions in the country (Ofori, 2013; Yayra, 2013) . The
Supreme Court had to invoke its power to convict and sentence people for contempt of
court before it could rein in the press court phenomenon (Joyonline, 2013).
So tense was the situation that before the date for judgment was announced,
media houses brimmed with calls for peace. Mosques, churches, and other faith-based
organizations launched prayer sessions; civil society groups organized meetings and
workshops to call for peace; traditional rulers and all recognizable groups seized every
opportunity by the minute to call for peace before and after the verdict was given.
Nonetheless, media coverage of the fear of violence created so much panic that some
people started to withdraw their monies from banks; make plans to travel out of the
country; or stock up provisions in anticipation of a war (Adom FM, 2013). Airlines
operating in the country to foreign destinations were alleged to be all fully booked as
people scrambled to leave the country before or shortly after the verdict was read (The
Herald Newspaper (2013). The government took the cue and put 32,000 heavily armed
Police Officers and several thousands of military patrol personnel into the streets across
the country, with particularly heavy presence in anticipated flashpoints such as Accra,
Kumasi, and Tamale (Myjoyonline, 2013b).
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When the Supreme Court justices delivered their verdict, a split decision saw the
petition thrown out by a majority vote of the judges. The lead petitioner, the Presidential
Candidate of the NPP, immediately called President Mahama, whose election he was
contesting, to congratulate him. At a Press Conference, he announced that even though he
disagreed with the judgment, he would nonetheless accept it, and foreswore his option for
seeking a judicial review on the matter. Although this gesture doused the tensions, it was
far from abetting anxiety and fear of war, as several factors contributed to keep tensions
high. First was a report that the judgment delivered in open court was amended in
chambers to correct an error that gave a 6-3 ruling on one of the issues at trial. Media
announcement of the correct ruling of 5-4 raised concerns about the accuracy of the entire
judgment. The legality of correcting a judgment in chambers was also debated
passionately (Baneseh, 2013).

Second, public perception that the judgment was

politically influenced received support from no less a person than the lead counsel for the
third respondent in the case, the National Democratic Congress. The counsel said in a
post-trial television program that one of the judges was politically blinded in his
judgments because he was appointed under President Kuffuor. Kuffuor was President of
Ghana on the ticket of the NPP, whose members were the petitioners in the case. The lead
counsel for the NDC accused the cited judge of consistently siding with the petitioners
(Public Agenda, 2013). This accusation triggered counter accusations that three of the
judges who consistently threw out all the cases of the petitioners were also appointed
under the NDC regimes.
Allegations of corruption of some of the judges who sat on the case heightened
when a member of the legal team of the NPP also said on a hosted radio program that the
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judgment was corrupt (Otchere-Darko, 2013; Radioyzonline.com, 2013). Another
allegation in one of the private media that the Asantehene, the paramount chief of the
Akans was implicated in the bribery of some of the Supreme Court judges to deliver
judgment in favor of the ruling party (Myjoyonline, 2013c, 2013d) further fueled
perceptions that the judgment was not without political influence. Subsequent allegations
in a leaked tape recording from a Deputy Minister of Communication that a Minister,
whose husband happened to have been the lead counsel for the President in the election
petition, played an influential role in securing the pro-government judgment from the
judges re-ignited the perception of collusion and corruption between the government and
the judges in the determination of the case (Daily Guide Reporter, 2013; New Statesman,
2013). This prompted the NPP to file a request for probe into the Supreme Court’s
handling of the election petition case (Essel, 2013), despite denials put out by the person
who was alleged to have mediated the collusion on the case (The Chronicle, 2013).
Be that as it may, the trade in allegations of political bias among the judges who
heard the election petition did not only give political colors to the judgment and thereby
erode public confidence in the legitimacy of the judgment; it extended the polarization of
the country beyond the frontiers of the last bastion of democracy – the judicial system.
The refusal of Tsatsu Tsikata, Counsel for the NDC, to apologize for his statement that
one of the Supreme Court Justices was biased by his political colors (T. Tsikata, 2013), as
well as Gabby Otchere Darko’s insistence that the supreme court judgment was corrupted
(Otchere-Darko, 2013) sparked speculations on both sides about the ability of the
judiciary to be neutral and objective in their judgments in future electoral disputes. Some
interpretations of the verdict in the media concluded that the Supreme Court’s rejection
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of the petitions gave the impression that the judiciary had actually sanctioned the alleged
irregularities as non-issues, and therefore, such malpractices can be accepted as valid
electoral practices (Odoi-Larbi, 2013). Regardless of the validity or otherwise of these
perceptions, the trades of accusations and counters in respect of the perceived collusion
and corruption in the election petition case tarnished the image of the judiciary as an
impartial arbiter in electoral disputes. Some commentators averred that the judiciary
could no longer be trusted as the last arbiter in future electoral disputes (Adofo, 2013).
This view further undermined public confidence in the judicial process (Adofo, 2013;
The New Statesman, 2013).
While the worst for Ghana in respect of the 2012 election petition seems to have
passed without violence, concerns over the import of the remarks by the legal experts on
both side of the election petition pose grave questions for the future conduct of elections
in the country. If the statement that the judgment was corrupted could be substantiated,
what would it mean for subsequent elections? Would that mean the judiciary is to be
ignored in the future in electoral disputes? Does this mean going to court is no longer an
option for deciding electoral disputes? If so, what is the final arbiter in electoral disputes,
if the judiciary cannot be trusted to deliver justice fairly?
Away from the national capital, election related violence is common, especially in
locations where local politicians have ridden on the back of pre-existing chieftaincy and
land conflicts to further their political interests (IRIN News, 2008a). The Bawku conflict
between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, for instance, has served as the pendulum that
determined the political fortunes of all political leaders in that constituency since 1992.
Candidates from all political persuasions “capitalise on the Bawku conflict for political
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gains” (Dramani, 2009). In December 2001, sixty people were reported dead, 2,500
displaced, and at least 190 houses burnt down when the conflict erupted in relation to
local government elections (Ghana Review, 2001; Lund, 2003). Other localities have
reported similar recurrence of election related violence. In 2008, supporters of the two
major political parties in the country “…vandalised registration centres on 2 August and
gun shots were heard in Tamale, the capital of the northern region, during voter
registration” (Ghana Elections, 2008). Similar clashes four days later in the Volta Region
left one person wounded. In September of the same year, the re-eruption of the electoral
violence in Tamale left several houses in char, with “…walls riddled with bullets, and
burnt cars [marking the extent of the] violence in the Northern Region's capital of
Tamale” (IRIN News, 2008b). In election years, the use of violent language in the form
of threats, harassments, and actual calls to violence in the print and electronic media
across the country is common. However, such violent language is more pronounced
before the launch of political campaigns and shortly after the conduct of the elections. In
2012, supporters of the two main political parties, the NDC and the NPP, accounted for
74.6% of the reported cases of use of election-related violent language and threats of
violence in the media (Amponsah, 2013).
In sum, Ghana has all the internal geopolitical contradictions and political
tensions that have prone other countries to the eruption of violence as conventional
theories on conflict predict. It shares the same historical, ethno-demographic, as well as,
inter and intra-ethnic confrontations that have triggered very violent and protracted
conflicts in many African countries. Yet somehow, the country has successfully staved
off sustained violent conflicts at the national level. She has managed to keep her
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protracted and violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts localized rather than escalated into
national level ones. Electoral disputes brought the country to the brink of war in 2008 and
2012, but the country managed to pull back from descending into the outbreak of full
scale national level violence.
Questioning the Peace
Despite this achievement, Ghana has been through and still is going through
multiple challenges with keeping the peace. The country is rated 71st on the 2012
Positive Peace Index (PPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), with a score
of 3.021. While this is below Bostwana (rated 43rd with a score of 2.561), South Africa
(51st, with a score of 2.684), Namibia (53rd with 2.783) and Tunisia 62nd with a score of
2.915, Ghana tops the West Africa list, ahead of Senegal ranked 88th, Mali 98th, Burkina
Faso 102nd, and Nigeria 106. This notwithstanding, Ghana is still counted among the
“…top ten positive peace deficit countries [which are defined as being] relatively
peaceful but lack the institutions to adequately deal with external shocks” (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 89, Table 3.4). In other words, Ghana’s peace is very
fragile as the country can easily descend into violence, given the right shocks. Yet,
somehow, Ghana has always managed to pull back from the cliff of descending into
national level violence right where other countries have taken the plunge.

Statement of Research Problem

The foregoing shows that contrary to the perception of Ghana as a peaceful
country, it has had its fair share of confrontational politics (Finlay, 1968) and national
level political agitations. Ghanaians are neither apathetic nor shy of confrontational
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engagements in the public sphere. On the contrary, “…it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent Ghanaians from openly and forcefully expressing themselves on
important political issues” (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The localized frequent outbursts of
violent conflicts around the country only suggest that Ghana may have been quite
successful in containing such violent conflicts. However, such successful suppression of
conflicts from escalating into national level violence is neither an indication of nor a
guarantee for peace. In contrast, Ghana’s peace is neither secured nor can be taken for
granted. There are enough reasons for it to have descended into war; and the potential
violent national level conflict remains real.
Ghana’s outlier position triggers a need to find out what kinds of threads have been
so successful at holding the stitches of nationhood together. Hence some explanations on
why and how Ghana has managed to remain relatively peaceful despite its internal
centrifugal ethnic, political, economic, and socio-cultural challenges are required.
Questions that require answers are: What has made it possible for Ghana to avoid violent
national conflicts, despite having all the ingredients that have plunged other countries
with similar mixes of economic, social, and ethno-political challenges into violence?
What has enabled Ghana to more successfully manage its internal centrifugal ethnopolitical and geo-economic forces of division than other countries with the same or
similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and political
challenges? What are the constitutive elements of the threads and stitches that seem to be
holding Ghana together? Are these threads and stitches peculiar to Ghana? If so, what
makes Ghana’s case special, given that it has similar ethnic groupings with its neighbors,
Cote d’Ivoire and Togo, both of which have witnessed sustained national level political
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violence? Are Ghana’s threads and stitches replicable in or exportable to other politicocultural settings? If not, why not? If yes, why has the osmosis of these values across
national boundaries, especially those contagious to Ghana, not happened?

Research Questions

The Core Research question (CRQ) that this research seeks to answer is: What
makes it possible for Ghana to avoid violent national conflicts, when other countries with
the same or similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and
political systems of exclusion, deprivation, and disparities have descended into violent
conflicts? Under this core question, the research uses four sub questions to guide its
probe of the views, perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of participants on what keeps
Ghana from descending into national level conflicts. The sub research questions (SRQ),
which are further detailed through survey questionnaires and the guides for the key
informant interviews, are:
SRQ1asks: What factors have enabled Ghana to keep the peace, when it has the
same or similar mixes of factors that have plunged other countries into violence?
SRQ2 asks: What systems have prevented local conflicts from escalating into
violent national level confrontations?
SRQ3 asks: What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into
national level electoral violence?
SRQ 4 asks: To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and
between Ghana’s 52+ different ethnic groups?
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The CRQ and SQRs provide the broad framework of inquiry in this study. The
survey questionnaires and interview guide for the Key Informant Interviews use further
sub questions to explore answers to the CRQ and the SQRs under the following broad
levels of enquiry:
1.

Socio-economic and political force fields level of enquiry: What

factors

and

forces have enabled Ghana to keep the peace despite having similar contextual issues that
led other countries into violence? Sub questions to be pursued are:
a.

How differently have the same historical and contemporary factors played

together to avert violent national conflicts in Ghana but not in other countries?
b. What approaches has Ghana used to more effectively manage the same balance
of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts?
2.

Systems level of Enquiry: In the absence of a sustained constitutional order for

much of Ghana’s life as an independent state, and amidst the proliferation of violent local
conflicts across the country, as well as, the widespread distrust of state actors,
institutions, and processes:
a.

What systems could have been in place that regulated interethnic

engagements to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into violent national level
confrontations?
b.

What contributions, if any, have individuals and/or institutional actors

(local, national, or international; governmental, civil society, or religious) made to the
maintenance of peace in Ghana?
c.

What kinds of threads (rules, regulations, shared values, cultural mores,

etc.) have held together the stitches of peace for Ghana?
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3.

Elections and Contested Arenas level of Enquiry: Successive elections without

widespread violence since 1992 have been used as a major indicator of peace in Ghana.
Yet, elections in Ghana and their outcomes have been split along regional, ethnic, and
religious lines. All but one have been keenly contested and largely won by very slim
margins. Despite contestation and/or rejections of the outcomes, elections have not
triggered widespread violence at the national level in Ghana.
a.

What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into full scale

national level violence before, during, and after elections, despite:
i) the contestations and local violence associated with electoral disputes?
ii) the regionally/ethnically partisan nature of electoral processes and their
outcomes?
b.

How have aggrieved political parties managed their dissents on elections and

electoral processes to prevent them from escalating into national level violent conflicts?
c.

What restrains aggrieved political parties from taking their grievances to the

street?
4.

Culture and Values level of Enquiry: The tendency towards violence or peace are

said to be learned behaviors.
a.

To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and between

Ghana’s 52+ different ethnic groups?
b.

What role, if any, do traditional leaders play in maintaining Ghana’s peace?

5.

Contribution of Formal Education
a. What contribution, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in
creating a culture of peace?
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b. What tenets of the formal educational system of Ghana may have contributed to a
culture of peace in Ghana?
c. What behaviors could the formal education system in Ghana have fostered that
promotes a culture of tolerance in Ghana more than in other countries?
A much detailed set of questions is provided in the Appendices 5 and 6.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Explaining Ghana’s Peace – theoretical challenges
Various theories have tried to explain why Africa is trapped in some of the world’s
most violent and protracted conflicts. Theories of ancient hatreds (Kaplan, 1993); outgroup resentments (Petersen, 2002); fear-induced self-protection initiatives (Lake &
Rothchild, 1996; Posen, 1993); or the manipulation of ethnic identities for political ends
(Gagnon, 1994; Kaufman, 2001), among others, have been used to explain the prevalence
of violent conflicts in some countries, especially those in Africa that have suffered violent
and protracted unrests. Africa’s rich natural resource base has also offered a theoretical
frame for explaining the prevalence of violent conflict on the continent (Collier, 2007).
Others have argued that relative political and economic deprivations are the sources of
intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts (Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Stewart,
2005).
Generally, relative deprivation theorists focus on the horizontal political and
economic inequalities afflicting Africa’s multi-ethnic population groupings as the source
of the conflicts. In particular, economic deprivation theorists emphasize a vicious cycle in
which “… poverty begets conflict and conflict begets poverty” (Stewart and Brown,
2007, p. 219; see also Rice, Graff, & Lewis, 2006). However, “it is not absolute poverty
but relative poverty” (Stewart and Brown, 2007 p. 228) they argue, that instigates violent
reactions as segments of population groupings compare their economic fortunes and
opportunities to what their compatriots have. Political deprivation theorists, on the other
hand, focus on political inequalities as they contend that political exclusion in the postcolonial state in Africa is the source of conflict (Levy, 2007). According to this view,
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after African states fought to obtain their independence “…segments of some of these
states now fight …to make sure that their destiny is in their own hands” (Zartman, 2001,
p. 219).
Building off the theories of relative political and economic deprivation, other
theorists attach a religious dimension to the conflicts in Africa by pointing out that across
Africa “… more heavily Muslim regions are often relatively marginalised economically
and politically and that leaves plenty of ground for radicalism to sprout” (Tostevin, 2011,
p. 1). This argument on the pauperization of religious communities has become a popular
framework for explaining the conflicts in Nigeria (Adesoji 2011; Herskovits, 2012;
Tostevin, 2011), and Cote d’Ivoire (Collett, 2006; Dabalen, Kebede, & Paul, 2012). In
both Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire the transposition of geo-ethnic poverty disparities over
religious identities along the north-south boundaries led to the transformation of
“religious polarization … into identity polarization [which] made civil war inevitable
due to the religious fault lines” (Dabalen et al., 2012, p. 3).
Fearon & Laitin (1999) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004), however, argue that there is
little evidence to support the ancient hatred, relative deprivation, and collective grievance
theories of civil wars and protracted internal conflicts that the foregoing theories have
proffered. In their view, ethnic diversity, ethno-geopolitics, and deprivation theories do
not seem sufficient to explain the causes of civil wars, especially since they do not broach
the topic on why some countries with similar or the same mix of ethnic and economic
factors do not experience civil wars whilst their neighbors do. Instead, they believe that
weak states create opportunities for insurgencies, especially where dissent groups have
access to commercial natural resources that can fund their rebellions. This weak state
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theory finds support in Galtung (in Augsburger, 1992) and Wehr (1998) who consider the
process of state formation in post-independent Africa as the genesis of much of its
conflicts. It also finds support in Mamdani (1996) who faults colonial rule for much of
post-independence Africa’s conflicts. In particular, Mamdani chronicles how colonial
administrators used territorial and institutional segregation and the active promotion of
“decentralized despotism” (1996, p. 39) to derail the evolution of Africa’s governance
and development trajectory, thereby creating the conditions for interethnic resentments
and rivalries.
Ametewe (2007) builds on Mamdani’s proposition and points out that pre-colonial
interethnic relations often “…tampered with values of mutual respect and rules for
accommodating one another” (p. 27). However these values were often destroyed through
the deliberate acts of the colonial administrators. Hawkins, (1996) and Lund (2003) both
lend support to this theoretical frame when they point out that in pursuance of the system
of indirect rule, colonial administrators tinkered with significant differences in the
sociopolitical organization of the different ethnic groups to create the conditions for inter
and intraethnic conflicts that have projected into the national politics of the postindependence state. In recent times, competition for land, political, economic access, and
religious rivalries have compounded the nature of these conflicts (Weiss, 2005).
Taking the debate beyond the colonial legacy theories of conflicts in Africa,
Horowitz (2000) introduces the nature and structure of political contestation in the
modern state as the source of conflict in much of Africa. He discusses the interplay
between ethnic parties and political systems based on political parties and argues that
“societies that are deeply riven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage …tend to throw up
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party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291). According to this
frame of thought, increasing competition between ethnic groups within the postindependence states for access to political power, economic resources, and other socioeconomic opportunities trigger and reinforce ethnic cleavages that become the footholds
for individuals and groups seeking space and opportunities in the public sphere. As such,
the public sphere becomes a highly contested arena where ethnic groups try to “outdo one
another in the struggle for the scarce resources of society; be it power, wealth, status and
prestige, education, access to land for housing and other economic ventures” (Ametewe,
2007, p. 28). In other words, interethnic competition for footholds in the public space and
for access to resources is the basis of conflict in Africa. Toft (2003) agrees with this line
of reasoning and argues further that the concentration of ethnic groups in defined
geopolitical spaces heighten the stakes and accentuates the conditions for turf wars
between ethnic groups.
While these theories offer some explanation on why Africa is the continent of war
and violence, they fail to account for the fact that several countries in Africa that have the
same ingredients of historical, economic, and political inequalities; natural resource
dependency; and asymmetric religious configuration of their populations have not
descended into violent national conflicts as the theories predict. Ghana, for one, has all
the ingredients that have plunged other countries, such as La Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya,
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Togo, to name a
few, into violent national level conflicts. Ghana also hosts similar historical interethnic
hostilities and “horizontal inequalities”(Stewart, 2005, p. 6), some of which still throw up
violent confrontations periodically (Brukum, 2000-2001; Pul, 2003) or become manifest
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in the struggle for political power in the electoral arena (Chazan, 1982; Craig, 1969;
Morrison, 2004). Brown (1982) recalls that the existence of “…deep socio-economic and
cultural cleavages between interacting communities produce mutual resentment and
thence political confrontation [an argument that] has been frequently used to explain the
north-south tensions which have dominated the politics of Ghana's eastern neighbour,
Togo” (p. 46). Within Ghana, the same argument has been used to predict a north-south
confrontation, with the “…assertions that, even if north-south confrontations have not
occurred so far, they are surely inevitable and imminent […] north-south conflict is
merely 'latent' and about to explode” (Brown, 1982, p. 46; see also Ladouceur, 1979).
With respect to the natural resource dependency theories, it is noteworthy that since
independence Ghana has remained “… dependent on primary resource-based products of
gold, cocoa and timber” (Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2011, p. 126; see also Bank
of Ghana, 2010; Williams, 1966). When foreign exchange earnings from timber and
wood products and other minerals such as manganese, bauxite, and diamonds are added,
Ghana’s reliance on natural resources for its foreign exchange earnings comes to 82% as
of mid-2011 (Center for Policy Analysis, 2011). This is more than thrice Collier’s (2007)
threshold of 23% as the tipping point for resource-based violent conflicts. Yet, Ghana has
not succumbed to national level violence on account of its dependence on natural
resources.
Several theorists have suggested that the existence of horizontal political and
economic inequalities is not enough to trigger violence. On the contrary, it requires the
presence of agents of war who are capable of mobilizing the collective grievances of the
marginalized into war efforts (Hamon, 1965; Stewart and Brown, 2007; Vreÿ, 2010). The
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prevalence of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts; the visible, persistent, and ever-widening
poverty gap between the north and south of Ghana; and the bitter political rivalries
between various parties in the country certainly provide plenty of fodder for predatory
agents of war to use to foment national level conflicts. Hence, if the postulation on the
role of agents of war in Africa’s conflicts is true, what explains the absence of any such
opportunistic leaders in Ghana capable of turning the fault lines of Ghana’s geoethnic and
economic relative deprivation and horizontal inequalities into motives of war? In
particular, why have conflicts in the north, the poorest part of the country, not spilled
over into the rest of the country? Why aren’t there aggrieved regional groups, especially
from the north and other deprived parts of the country, that articulate a northern agenda to
stake claims to greater entitlements from the rest of the country?
The argument that political parties that articulate their agendas and claims for
access and space in the public sphere on the basis of their ethnic constituencies tend to
“deepen and extend” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291) the pre-existing ethnic divisions finds little
support in Ghana, as well. For, while it is common knowledge that political parties tend
to have their strongholds in certain ethnic enclaves; and that ethnic affiliations play
crucial roles in the voting patterns of most Ghanaians (Craig, 1969), these facts have not
exacerbated the interethnic conflicts to the point of widespread violence as witnessed in
countries such as Burundi, La Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda. Not even the military
coup d’états that had ethnic connotations nor the overt stacking of important positions in
the army and other public services along ethnic lines (Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Hettne,
1980) have succeeded in polarizing the country to the point of triggering open interethnic
violence at the national level. Hence, why Ghana’s manifest inter-ethnic competitions in
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politics have not resulted in national level violence as in other countries on the continent
still requires explaining.
Ancient hatreds and historical interethnic relationships usually infuse ethnopolitical
competition and serve as the identity marker for ethnic mobilization in the political space
of the modern state. Even when the political elite tend to be cross-ethnic in the
composition of their party affiliations, social relationships, and economic ties, ethnicity
nonetheless remains a strong and emotive rallying point for their supporters who tend to
have more homogeneity in their geographical enclaves (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010;
Skogseth, 2006). Hence, in Cote d’Ivoire, Gbagbo’s invention of the ivoirité concept,
later embraced by Konan Bedie, was an effective rally cry for “the baoulisation’ of the
political system, the economy and the army [and the concomitant marginalization and
political exclusion of the] predominantly Kru and northern Mande” (Meehan, 2011)
ethnic groups. In Kenya, ethnicity has been a critical factor in the country’s democratic
transition from the post Kenyatta-Mwoi eras in the late 1990s (Ndegwa, 1997). This
ethnicized politics would culminate in the political violence that pitched Raila Odinga’s
coalition of the Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba and Luhya, among others on the one hand, against
Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu political base in the 2007 elections (Hawke, 2013; Human Rights
Watch, 2008; Roberts, 2009). Ironically, five years on, it is the same ethnicized politics
that would create the “tyranny of numbers” (Kimemia, 2013, p. 1)from an unusual
alliance of Kalenjin and Kikuyu politicians to stave off a repeat of the 2007 violence in
the 2012 elections (Ngunyi, 2013; Kimemia, 2013). While political leaders would deny it,
Zimbabwe’s political crises are equally mired in ethnic competition, as local politics
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continue to be read through “ethnocentric prisms” (Dachs, 2009; Phiri, 2013; Sithole &
Makumbe, 1997).
As already noted, Ghana has its fair share of similar historical and contemporary
interethnic competition for political power, with ethnicity defining membership of or
support for political parties and the voting lines to a large extent (Fridy, 2007; Nugent,
1999; Nugent, 2001). Historically, the Ashantis, the single dominant ethnic group in
Ghana, have fought wars of domination with the Dagombas and Gonjas to the north; the
Fantes and Nzemas to the south and south-west; the Akyems and Ewes to the East,
among others (Johnson, 1965). The north in particular has bitter memories of its
association with the Ashantis, as the Dagomba and Gonja chiefs were bonded to provide
1,500 and 1,000 slaves each respectively in annual tributes to the Ashantis for a hundred
years or more. Doubtless, such slaves were supplied through raids among the other ethnic
groups in the north (Arhin, 1967; Johnson, 1965). In some cases, “'the Ashanti often sold
into slavery a whole village full of his people, and […] no-one's life or property was safe
when the Ashantees were in the country” (Gouldsbury cited in Johnson, 1965, p. 39). The
memories of these humiliations are kept alive through traditional oral historians who pass
them on from one generation to the next in the form of songs such as the one recounted in
Salaga to the effect that “'Every year we had to send 1,000 of our brothers to the Kumasi
knife, and to the Kumasi King all our money without grumbling'” (Glover cited in
Johnson, 1965, p. 39). But somehow, these memories of ancient humiliations have not
pitched the people of the north against the Ashantis in revenge battles; neither has it
dragged Ghana into violent national confrontations in direct or diffused proxy wars.
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The political split between the northerners, the Ashantis, the transvolta groups, and
the coastal grouping in the run up to independence has already been discussed in Chapter
1. Since independence, political allegiances have been split along ethnic lines. In the
early years of state formation, northerners coalesced around the Northern People’s Party
(NPP); while the Ashantis rooted for the National Liberation Movement (NLM). The
Convention People’s Party was the only party that provided an umbrella for a coalition
of some of the coastal and other ethnic groups in the country (Nambiema, 2012). It is
noteworthy, however, that of all the historical interethnic competitions for political space
and power in post-independence Ghana, the “Ashanti-Ewe rivalry is [the one that has
lasted into the modern state system and has become] one of the major political divides in
Ghana” (Nambiema, 2012, p. 32). Consistently, the two ethnic groups have tended to
veer towards diametrically opposed political axes since the country came together as one
unit. And this happens under all the civilian and military regimes the country has
witnessed. We have noted how the political elite of Transvolta Togoland opposed the
Nkrumah regime from start. After the overthrow of the CPP in 1966, the military regime
of the National Liberation Council rapidly descended into the Ashanti-Ewe split when
Kotoka, an Ewe, was killed in a counter-coup and Afrifa, an Akan, took over as head of
state (Nambiema, 2012). When the country returned to civilian rule in 1969,
Gbedemah’s Ewe-dominated National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) pitched battle against
the Akan-led Progress Party with Busia as its leader (Craig, 1969). When Flt J.J Rawlings
took over power after the 1981 coup, the dominance of Ewes in the affairs of government
gave rise to “…the widespread perception that the P.N.D.C. had become the preserve of
the Ewes” (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a, p. 624).
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With the return to civilian rule since the 1990s, Morrison (2004) has argued that
ethnicity is not a major factor in Ghana’s political discourse, when viewed against
election results from 1992 to 2008. He points out that the electoral fortunes of the two
dominant parties in the country, the NDC and the NPP, have swung with the moods of
voters in different regions, with both parties making significant inroads into the
traditional strong holds of their counterparts. Inchino and Nathan (2012) further contend
that ethnic geographies are more important than ethnic demographics in the
determination of electoral outcomes, even in remote rural communities, where “theories
of instrumental ethnic voting” (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) do not seem to work, at least in the
case of Ghana. According to this view, in multi-ethnic localities, the choice of candidate
is largely based on voter perception of which candidate is more likely to deliver “nonexcludable” (Nathan, 2012, p. 1) public goods and social services such as roads, schools,
healthcare, etc. Under such circumstances, voting for “co-ethnics as an instrumental
action” (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) is not a valid proposition, since voters tend to migrate
towards the candidate that is more likely to deliver development services, even if that
candidate is not of their ethnic group. This view affirms in Morrison’s (2004) observation
about the lack of generalizable and discernible patterns across all regions in Ghana in
voting outcomes. He argues that differences in stability and fluidity in voting patterns
between regions make “ethnicity …more difficult to determine, although Volta and
Ashanti are often deemed to reflect the phenomenon” (Morrison, 2004, p. 429).
Morrison’s argument is hard to sustained, given that the Volta and Ashanti regions
have epitomized the ethnic tendencies in voting patterns in Ghana since the return to
constitutional rule in 1992, with the NDC attracting the label of being Ewe-based while
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the NPP takes on the Akan-based label (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). Morrison’s view would
only hold true when the criterion for making the discernment is the aggregated regional
votes. However, this aggregated data blurs the picture. This is because discerning ethnic
tendencies from aggregate votes of regions, especially those that have more cosmopolitan
natures, is tricky given the masking effect of different levels of migration into the
regions. For instance the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, and Greater Accra Regions have been
net recipients of permanent and cyclical migrants from the Eastern, Northern, Upper East,
Upper West, and the Volta regions of Ghana, as well as, from other countries further to
the north such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger since colonial times. In contrast, the Eastern,
Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and the Volta regions are net losers of migration
(Anarfi, Kwankye, Ababio, & Tiemoko, 2003; Kwankye, Anarfi, Tagoe, & Castaldo,
2009). Hence, the clearest way to deduce any ethnic tendencies in voting patterns is at the
constituency levels, as ethnic groups tend to congregate around geographical enclaves at
the micro-level.
Viewed from this angle, it becomes obvious that the ethnic concentration of
populations around certain geographical areas sets boundaries for electoral success of
political parties; a phenomenon that has become known as the electoral “world banks” in
Ghanaian political parlance (Anebo, 2001; Ghana News Agency, 2004). Political parties
associated with the Ashantis have had very hard times winning majority votes in the
Volta Region. Similarly, parties perceived to have Ewe dominance have had a hard time
as well getting majority votes in the Ashanti Region. In the 1969 elections, for instance,
the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by Gbedemah, an Ewe, won 14 out of the 16
seats in the Volta Region, while the Progress Party, which was associated with the
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Ashantis, won only two seats in that region (Craig, 1969). Overall, “…83.5 per cent of
Ewe voters supported Gbedemah, and Busia got 77.7 per cent of the votes in the
predominantly Akan regions of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Central” (Brown, 1982, p. 58).
As Morrison, writing in conjunction with Hong (2006) would later admit, “Ethnic-based
regional cleavages show much more complex varieties of electoral support for the two
major parties” (Morrison & Hong, 2006, p. 623).
This entrenched system of “ethnic block voting” (Jockers, Kohnert, & Nugent,
2009, p. 2) in the two regions have persisted through the elections of 1980, 1992, 1996,
2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Since 1996, “three regions remain one-party-dominant
(NDC): Upper East, Upper West, and Volta [with the Volta Region being virtually]
noncompetitive, with the opposition [obtaining] under 13 percent in three polls”
(Morrison, 2004). This trend has prompted the observation that the world bank
phenomenon and the “…long history of fraudulent voting, amounts to a dangerous time
bomb of unresolved conflict which could explode in future elections” (Jockers et al.,
2009, p. 1; see also Sikanku, 2008).
Added to this is the intense and entrenched political rivalry between the duopoly of
the NDC and NPP, which have dominated the political field since 1992. Given that the
NDC claims its roots from the Nkrumaist tradition (Kelly & Bening, 2007), it might even
be said that this rivalry dates back to the split between Nkrumah’s CPP and the United
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) of the Danquah-Busia traditions, which subsequently
metamorphosed into the United Party (UP) tradition when the Northern Peoples Party and
the National Liberation Movement merged after the 1956 elections (Langer & Ukiwo,
2007; Morrison, 2004). However, the ever tightening competition between the two parties
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is manifested mainly in the electoral more than the ideological levels. In a field of seven
presidential candidates, in 2000, candidates of the duopoly (i.e. NDC and NPP) shared
93.2% of the valid votes between them, with the remaining five candidates splitting up
the 6.8% of the valid votes left. In 2004, in the first round of voting that had four (4)
presidential candidates; the NPP and NDC candidates garnered 96.8% of the votes
between them. The 2008 presidential race had 8 candidates, but the NPP and NDC flag
bearers shared 97.05% of the votes between them. Although the results of the 2012
presidential elections were disputed at the Supreme Court, the trend was repeated in the
declared and upheld results in which the NDC candidate was declared winner with 50.7%
of the votes, while the NPP candidate received 47.74%, giving a total of 98.44% between
the two. This means that the remaining six (6) presidential candidates shared the residual
1.56% of the votes between them – see summary in Appendix 1.
Despite this tight dualistic competition between the two main parties, Ghana has
escaped widespread electoral violence even when the two dominant parties compete over
margins of win of less than 1% of valid votes cast. In other words, Ghana although Ghana
has had its fair share of ethnicized violent conflicts in both the northern and southern
parts of the country; she has been successful in containing such ethno-electoral conflicts
within localized geo-ethnic spaces (MacLean, 2004). Somehow, “…most of the conflicts
have been limited to a particular traditional area or region and have not threatened the
stability of the state” (Tonah, 2007, p. 3). This raises questions about what makes Ghana
different. How Ghana has been able to do contain its ethno-electoral conflicts when other
countries have failed is a central question for this study. Why have ancient hatreds or
historical interethnic competition in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and other countries fueled violent
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ethno-political conflicts but not in Ghana? Why have previously suppressed groups not
sought to revenge the bondage they served under other ethnic groups? Why have the
Ashantis not used their numerical strengths and economic hegemony to try to impose
their rule on the rest of the country? In short, why has the “tyranny of numbers”
(Kimemia, 2013, p. 1) not worked out for the Akan ethnic group, which needs only 3%
more votes from other ethnic groups in presidential elections to add to its 47.5%
command of the national population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012) to win outright in
any national elections?
In apparent response to these pertinent questions, some analysts have suggested that
rather than engage in open and violent confrontations in the political arena, Ghanaians
have actively chosen to avoid violence because they have lost faith in the state system.
According to this view, the “…great accumulation of unfulfilled promises” (Bush, 1980,
pp. 86-87) of freedom, justice, and accelerated economic development that many
expected from independence have bred cynicism and apathy among Ghanaians towards
politics. In other words, due to state failure to deliver the dividends of independence, the
majority of Ghanaians have retreated into their shells in their “…desire for a peaceful
life” (Goody, 1968, p. 339; also see Bratton, Lewis, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) to avoid
further disappointments with politicians. This withdrawal from the public space has
created a culture of silence that has effectively stifled open political dissent among
Ghanaians. As a result, a “… community of dissent” (Goody, 1968, p. 339) capable of
turning personal and collective grievances into war efforts does not exist. But if political
disconnection, apathy, and a desire for peace through conflict avoidance were the only
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things that keep Ghana from having violent national level encounters, should that earn it
the accolade of being an oasis of peace?
Be that as it may, the available evidence does not support the notion that Ghana’s
peace can be attributed to the avoidance of conflicts. On the contrary, Ghanaian’s are
politically active and willing to engage with governments, even in violent confrontations,
to assert their rights and demand accountability from public office holders. Indeed, active
and assertive political engagement is what enabled Ghana to emerge as the first country
south of the Sahara to attain political independence. Notably, Nkrumah’s declaration of
“positive action” (Sakyi, 2013b) against colonial rule triggered a series of strikes,
boycotts, and other forms of mass action that culminated in the shooting of ex-soldiers on
a peaceful march to the seat of government to demand better post-service conditions. A
desperate act of the colonial government, this 28th February, 1948 killing further fueled
the mass political activism that culminated in the British decision to grant Ghana
independence (Austin 1964; Tordoff 1997). In the post-independence era, students,
workers, professional associations, and groups of ordinary citizens have not hesitated to
embark on strikes and demonstrations to press home their demands for responsive
governance and attention to their particular needs (Finlay, 1968; Osei, 2000).
In respect of elections as a form of civic engagement, “Ghanaians have not yet
become so politically disillusioned that they stay away from the polls” (Bratton, Lewis, &
Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). On the contrary, active interests and participation in elections have
often brought the country to the brink of national violence (Center for African
Democratic Affairs, 2012). Voter turnout in elections has steadily risen from a low of
53.75% in 1992 to more than 70% over the subsequent five elections (Electoral
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Commission of Ghana, 2000; Ghana News Agency, 2008); with the 2012 elections
registering a turnout of 79% (Institute for Democrarcy and Electroal Assistance, 2012).
Intense public interest and participation in these elections have occasioned localized
electoral violence in several places since 1992 (Ochill, 2012).
Chazan (1982) takes a state-centric view to explaining why Ghana is peaceful and
attributes Ghana’s peace to the central role the state has played in creating space for civil
society actors to engage in building peace in the country. She highlights in particular,
civil society participation in facilitating the peaceful transitioning of political power
between the major contending ethnic groups in the country. However, Chazan’s view
begs the question whether state action is the only thread that keeps Ghana together, since
the centrality of the state in the political space is not peculiar to Ghana. The state plays an
omnipresent and directive role in all African countries. Ghana is therefore no special case
in that respect. Indeed, Ghana shares historical and structural colonial legacies with
countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Why has the state machinery in these
countries not played the same neutralizing role to prevent national level conflicts in
them? What makes Ghana different? Besides, civil society groups have been equally
active and engaging in political transition processes in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire,
Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, to name a few. Nonetheless, these countries have
experienced violent national level conflicts during political transitions. Why has civil
society engagement resulted in peace in Ghana and not in these other countries?
Hopp-Nishanka (2012) takes an institutional approach to explaining the peace in
Ghana and attributes Ghana’s success at averting violent national level confrontations to
the presence of “peace infrastructure [that brings together diverse agencies to work on]

44

…promoting cooperative problem-solving and institutionalizing a response mechanism to
violent conflict” (p. 1). Like Chazan, Hopp-Nishanka credits the government for creating
the peace infrastructure through engineering civil society participation in the public
space. Hopp-Nishanka’s view is, however, at odds with the historical realities that
underscore Ghana’s evolution as a nation. First, the peace infrastructure that HoppNishanka credits for Ghana’s peace is but a recent creation, having coming into existence
only in the post 1992 democratic era. Hence, it does not explain why Ghana did not
descent into violent national conflicts prior to 1992. Second, the history of contestations
between civil society groups on the one hand, and sitting governments since
independence, on the other hand, for entry into and engagement in the public sphere
abounds (Sagoe, 2011). In accord with the Westphalian concept of the State as the only
and principal actor in the public sphere, Governments throughout the history of Ghana
have tried to keep civil society groups out of the public sphere. In reverse, these groups
have had to battle the State to assert their right to be in and to engage actively in the
public space. The Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference; the Christian Council of Ghana;
the National Union of Ghana Students; the Professional Bodies Association of Ghana,
which once comprised the Ghana Bar Association, the Ghana Medical and Dental
Council, the Nurses and Midwives Council, the Ghana National Association of Teachers;
to name a few, have all jointly or severally engaged sitting governments on different
contentious issues (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The Catholic Church, in particular, had
head on coalitions with the Nkrumah regime (Pobee, 1988) on issues of governance and
human rights. Similarly, the PNDC regime of Flt Lt. Rawlings had a running battle with
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and organs of the church for daring to condemn the
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military brutalities of the regime and calling on it to hand over power to a transitional
civilian body (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a). Apart from direct attacks on the persons and
characters of leading members of the church (Oquaye, 1995b), the Catholic Standard
Newspaper had its “…licence […] withdrawn when it became a major channel for the
publication of news which was politically unfavourable to the PNDC” (Rockson, 1990).
Other faith-based organizations, especially the Christian Council of Ghana, faced
similar challenges of their own. The PNDC would later promulgate the Religious Bodies
(Registration) Law 221 and its amended version, Law 2989 in 1989, as instruments for
muzzling the mainstream Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church, which was
its most ardent critic at the time (Effah-Yeboah, 2012). In particular, PNDC Law 221
required that all religious bodies, new or old be registered under the law within three
months of its promulgation or cease to operate thereafter in the country (Human Rights
Watch, 1990). Registration under the law would have meant submitting to regulation of
the activities of the religious bodies by the state. Predictably, the religious bodies refused
to comply with the law.
Ayee (2003), on his part, credits Ghana’s success at averting violent national
confrontations during elections to her ability to build “elite consensus” (p. 214),
particularly through the institutionalization of the Inter Party Advisory Committee
(IPAC), which provides a forum for political party leaders and officials of the Electoral
Commission to dialogue on and iron out issues that would otherwise have provided the
flares that spark violent confrontations. While the IPAC’s interventions may have helped
to avert electoral disputes in the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, it
appears to have failed to do so for the 2012 one, whose results have been disputed. At
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any rate, the tensions that push Ghana towards the abyss go beyond electoral disputes;
and the IPAC is only a post-1992 invention in Ghana. Therefore, its existence and role
cannot fully account for why Ghana has managed to avoid descent into national violence.
In brief, the various theoretical frames that seek to explain why Ghana has avoided
descent into national level violence do not fully account for Ghana’s peace. Hence,
alternate explanations are required to understand how and why Ghana has managed to
escape the fate of ancient hatreds; the resource curse; inter-ethnic competition for power;
acrimonious ethno-political contestations; ethno-regional inequalities in socioeconomic
development, among others, to maintain a face of peace.
Part of the reason for the failure of contemporary theories to account for Ghana’s
peace is the fact that much of the literature on why Africa fights within its countries is
based on the use of the conflict paradigm, which unduly focuses the search for the
negative generators of conflict rather than the positive elements that keep otherwise
conflictual groups and communities within states from escalating their conflicts into
national ones. In other words, contemporary theories neglect to examine the cases of
positive deviance in which “…intentional behaviors that depart from the norms of a
referent group in honorable ways” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004, p. 832) provide
explanations of why some countries are able to keep themselves from descending into
civil wars or other forms of violent national conflicts. Accordingly, not much attention is
given to positive deviant cases such as Ghana, “…whose uncommon behaviors and
strategies enable them to find better solutions to problems than their peers, while having
access to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges” (Positive Deviance
Initiative, 2013, p.1).
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The limited scholarship on behaviors that promote peace in some settings under
circumstances that would have led to war in other contexts is also due to the fact that
peace research has focused mainly on three theoretical frames, namely, integration,
competition, and polarization (Schmid, 1968). The point of departure for such theories is
that human interactions are generally centrifugal in nature; hence, ways must be found to
either integrate conflicting parties, regularize the competition between them, or help them
acknowledge and work with their polarization, which may be static or dynamic (Schmid,
1968). However, managing conflicts or making peace through successful programs of
integration, constructive competition, or nonviolent polarization do not constitute peace.
Such conceptions lead to an emphasis on the maintenance of law and order or stability as
the means for achieving peace. Under this conception, as long as law enforcement
agencies can keep the incidence of violence low, peace is presumed to exist. This
conception of peace will “…obviously be in the interest of the status quo-powers at the
national or international levels [who constantly seek ways to maintain their power, keep
the status quo unchanged, or manipulate] the underdog so that he does not take up arms
against the topdog” (Schmid, 1968, p. 223).
The peace that obtains from such suppression constitutes “Negative peace [which]
is ‘the absence of organized collective forms of violence’ or the absence of war”
(Schmid, 1968, p. 223). In other words, true “...peace is not merely and (sic) absence of
direct violence (negative peace) but also absence of structural violence (positive peace)”
(Grewal, (2003, p. 2). Nonetheless, it is this conception of peace that has underscored the
focus on safety and security concerns in the definition of the Global Peace Index
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012). Hence, this view of peace as the absence of
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violence is what has ensured that much of “peace research has been organized around the
value of negative peace” (Schmid, 1968, p. 224). But as Schmid argues, “…one of the
important tasks of peace research is to give the concept of peace a more precise meaning”
(Schmid, 1968, p. 224). Hence, peace research “…should explain not how manifest
conflicts are brought under control, but how latent conflicts are manifested” (Schmid,
1968, p. 219) and managed before they explode into violence. In other words, peace
research must move away from the conflict paradigm to embrace a peace paradigm that
offers insights into how and why some communities are able to manage or transform their
latent conflicts to prevent them from escalating into violence.
The progression from the concept of negative to positive peace provides a broader
framework for investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst
others with the same or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about
the conflict management systems of the countries in question. Ironically, the concept of
positive peace, which has been developed as the counterpoint to negative peace, defies a
single definition, as it is “…an umbrella concept, devoid of meaning of its own, which
people fill with their own subjective values.” Given is elastic scope, “positive peace
means something equivalent to ‘the good life’ or ‘the best state of things’” (Schmid,
1968, p. 223). The Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), however, “…defines
positive peace as “the set of attitudes, institutions and structures which when
strengthened, lead to a more peaceful society” (p. 69). This definition offers a framework
for examining how peace happens in some contexts but not in others, as it provides
indicators of “…appropriate attitudes, institutions, and structures which when
strengthened lead to a nation’s capacity to harmoniously and non-violently resolve
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conflict” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 70). It offers a peace paradigm as
an alternative to the conflict paradigm that has dominated research in peace and conflict
studies. The peace paradigm emphasizes the fact that “…peace research shouldn’t merely
deal with the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence at a direct or structural level
but seek to understand conditions for preventing violence” (Grewal, 2003, p. 4) or
resolving violence conflict. Secondly, unlike research on conflicts, peace research
“…values theoretical consistency of norms and values more than empirical validation”
(Grewal, 2003, p. 2) of some externally determined criteria. In other words, it enables us
to look beyond the tangible causes of conflict to see the underlying intangible values and
norms that hold otherwise fractious societies together.
Byrne and Keashly (2000) use the theory of Social Cubism to provide a
comprehensive six dimensional approach to examining the interrelationships of factors
that affect the generation or resolution of conflicts, especially those deriving from a
protracted and interethnic or inter-territorial nature. This multi-dimensional approach
compels analysis to move away from the single-strand explanations that often
characterize the description of the causes of conflicts and the solutions that are usually
prescribed. It also enables researchers to look across time boundaries to examine how the
ever changing interactions between historical, economic, religious, demographic,
political, and psycho-cultural factors interplay to sustain intergenerational conflicts in
particular. The theory brings out the point that conflicts are not static, but dynamic; hence
explanations of any one conflict must adopt non- static perspectives.
Besides providing a multidimensional view of the issues at stake and how they
interrelate to create and perpetuate the conditions that fuel and sustain conflict or promote
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peace, the social cube approach recognizes that conflicts are dynamic and the different
factors affecting any conflict “…will interrelate in dynamically different ways” (Satya,
2004, pp. 21-22) to influence the evolution of new phases of the conflict. This is because
the issues that drive them may take on different meanings and levels of emphasis from
one period to another. In other words, conflicts do not happen in a vacuum, neither do
conditions of peace exist out of context; conflict and peace are both creators and creatures
of the social cube constructed of the six inter-related dimensions of “history, religion,
demographics, political institutions, non-institutional behaviour, economics, and psychocultural factors” (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1). Hence, given the same set of
circumstances, the gravitation towards violence or peace is a function of how the mix of
factors is managed. Managed in certain ways, these factors underscore the triggers and
sustenance of conflicts. Managed differently, they constitute the basis for peaceful
coexistence of otherwise conflictual groups.
Social cubism therefore forces us to “… isolate key factors to show how they
combine to form complex patterns of ethnic politics” (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1) and by
extension, its impact on conflict or peace. This acknowledgement of the multidimensionality and dynamism of conflicts sits well with the progression of the perception
of peace from negative to positive peace, as it provides a broader framework for
investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst others with the same
or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about the conflict
management systems of the countries in question. It brings into focus the nature and role
that various actors play in the conflict management system of the country since, from a
systems perspective, conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play
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different roles in initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). It is
within this framework that it is pertinent to ask in what ways have the interaction of the
same factors of historical and contemporary relevance played to keep Ghana from
degenerating into violent national conflicts? What has Ghana done differently in
managing the same balance of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts when
other countries have succumbed to the same pressures?
Consideration of the conflict management systems in Ghana and other countries is
critical because, from the perspective of systems theory, conflicts are perpetuated or
resolved only when members of the conflict system cooperate in some way or the other to
keep the chain reactions or feedback loops functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007) or alter
them for an alternate desirable outcome. By extension, change in the conflict pattern
such as gravitation towards violence or peace has to be initiated by one or several of the
parties. Otherwise, the system will keep feeding itself, as “…patterns, interlocking
sequences, function of the parties, and methods of processing information” (Wilmot &
Hocker, 2007, p. 179) all work together to influence the dynamics of the conflict. In such
cases, either a “morphostatic system designed to sustain the status quo or no change”
(Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 181) prevails, or a process to move the conflict toward
“…the runaway spiral” (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 180) or peaceful resolution emerges,
depending on the nature and direction of the interactions between the factors.
In respect of Ghana’s image as a peaceful country, it is essential to be reminded that
peace is fragile (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012), given the persistence of
multiple flash points of historical, economic, and geographical inequalities, as well as the
contentious competition for political power in an electoral system that is the subject of
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suspicions of collusion and fraud. Hence what is perceived as peace in Ghana may in fact
be “…negative peace which is essentially the absence of violence” (Galtung in Baruch,
2012, p. 1; also see Bloomfield, 2003; Schmid, 1968). That notwithstanding, the question
that arises is – how has Ghana managed to create and maintain its negative peace when
others with the same or similar mixes of factors have failed to keep this semblance of
national peace? What factors stitch and hold together Ghana’s negative or fragile peace
system?
Since systems, including systems of protracted conflicts or those of negative peace
function synergistically, it is essential that we use a holistic approach to understand “how
the different parts of the system work together”(von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39). But
systems are either resilient, with an “…ability to survive and persist within a variable
environment” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or brittle. The ability of a system to withstand
pressure or breakup is, however, dependent on its capacity for self-organization or the
“capacity of a system to make its own structure more complex”(Meadows, 2008, p. 79).
This, in other words, represents the ability of the system “…to create new structure, to
learn, diversify, and complexify” (Meadows, 2008, pp. 81) by using sometimes very
simple rules. Hence, for Ghana to have maintained its fragile peace, it must have some
inherent capacity to complexify to meet the new challenges that she faced it in every
generation. What gives Ghana this capacity? Where does it derive the energy for this
capacity enhancement from?
While the systems perspective is valid for understanding what factors come into
play to stabilize, escalate, or resolve conflicts in most settings, it fails to fully explain
Ghana’s persistence for peace in the absence of durable systems of governance since its
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independence. The purpose of a system is “…deduced from the behaviors, [of its
members] not from rhetoric or stated goals” (Meadows, 2008, p. 14). States, as systems,
are founded on constitutions which are the basic laws, the point of interconnections, as it
were, between the disparate groups of citizens. Constitutions and associated laws, rules,
and regulations of the state provide the framework for regulating the behaviors of all
citizens within the territorial boundaries of the state, as well as, provide guidance for the
interactions of the state and its functionaries with other states and their members. Since
becoming a nation-state at independence, however, Ghana has struggled to establish a
basic and lasting constitutional arrangement. As previously noted, the best part of its fifty
odd years of existence to date as a nation-state were spent under military rule, as coup
d’états interrupted attempts to build a culture of democratic governance. From 1957 to
1992, military juntas that overthrew established constitutions and popularly elected
governments ruled the country by decrees. Ethnic polarizations were at their zenith
during these periods, and popular discontent with the military rules expressed themselves
through strikes and demonstrations that often turned violent. Yet, throughout these
periods, the revolts did not escalate into sustained violent national level conflicts.
Besides the military interventions, Ghana has suffered similar discontinuities in the
development of a brand of constitutionalism as its system of democratic governance. The
country has consistently flirted with various systems of constitutional rule since
independence. Starting with the inheritance of the British Parliamentary system at
independence, Ghana’s constitution changed to the Presidential system under Nkrumah in
1960; switched back to the Parliamentary system under the 1969 constitution; and back
again to the Presidential system under the 1979 constitution. Today, it runs a hybrid
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system that combines elements of a separately elected Executive Presidential system and
the parliamentary system in which the majority of ministers are chosen from parliament.
Hence, in the absence of sustained constitutional orders and practice, what systems could
have been in place that regulated interethnic engagements in the public sphere to prevent
the degeneration of the tensions into war?
This notwithstanding, an important contribution of systems theory to our
understanding of stable chaos or negative peace is the role that subsystems play in
keeping an otherwise dysfunctional macrosystem staggering along, albeit inefficiently.
The stability and growth of a system depends on the existence and effective functioning
of hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing subsystems that accept and
operate by coordinating instructions from higher level subsystems to create “stable,
resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82). The hierarchies facilitate the
work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities are, in turn, directed to help
achieve the overall goal of the whole system. Hence, to the extent that the subsystems
keep functioning, albeit inefficiently due to inadequate guidance from the central system,
some form of functionality or system performance is still possible. In this regard, it is
essential to interrogate what role, if any, state and non-state subsystems such as the
variegated traditional authority systems; religion and faith institutions and systems;
political parties and their operations; the electoral system; the judicial system; the
educational system; the family systems; systems of inter-ethnic marriages and migration,
culture and traditions, economic systems of the formal and informal sectors, among
others, have played in maintaining Ghana’s peace, however, negative.
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It is for this reason that the shortcoming of systems theory in explaining Ghana’s
peace on its face value notwithstanding, its use “gives us the freedom to identify root
causes of problems and see new opportunities” (Meadows, 2008, p. 2). In this, a key
guiding principle is that we must look for the most effective and sustainable changes in
systems at the level of interconnectedness and/or purpose/functions of the system.
Changes in elements alone will not lead to profound and lasting changes in the behavior
patterns of the system nor its outcomes, “unless changing an element also results in
changing relationships or purpose” (Meadows, 2008, p. 17). Merely changing the people
involved would not lead to any profound changes. This is why, from the experiences of
Ghana, changing the leadership of a country alone, whether through the ballot box or the
bullets of coup d’états has not led to lasting and impactful changes in the way that the
country operates nor its status as a peace deficient country. Every one of the civilian and
military regimes that Ghana has had come into office on the promise of righting the
fundamental structural and systemic deficiencies that have afflicted the country’s
governance and national development processes. Despite their best efforts, all succeeding
governments have cited exactly the same reasons to justify taking their turn in governing
the country. If these leadership changes since 1957 have not succeeded in moving Ghana
from a perpetual state of fragile or negative peace to a more positive place, what accounts
for the country’s ability to maintain a kind of equilibrium in balancing the otherwise
fractious forces that should have torn it apart? Beyond the conceptions of negative and
positive peace, is there another frame that explains Ghana’s peace?
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Goals of Research
This research is designed to contribute to the theories of peace. It hopes to create
greater insights into how and why Ghana has managed to stave off national level violent
and protracted conflicts when its neighbors in West Africa and other parts of the
continent have failed to do so. What factors have contributed to sustaining peace in
Ghana? By focusing on the example of Ghana, the research hopes to initiate the
unearthing of positive deviant factors that contribute to our understanding of why
countries that have the same or similar mixes of centrifugal historical backgrounds;
socio-demographic distributions; ethno-political rivalries and competitions for power;
and incidents of economic marginalization or exclusions from the development
processes, do not fight. What factors restrain them from fighting? How are they able to
manage their internal dissents to prevent them from escalating into national level
conflicts in the form of violent and protracted civil wars? Insights from Ghana’s
experiences should inform a search for the constitutive elements of the threads of peace
that peacebuilders can fall on to stitch together otherwise fractious communities and
countries in Africa.

Contribution of the Research to the Field of Peace Studies and Peacebuilding
Peace research tends to take statist approaches, placing emphasis on understanding
what states do or do not do right to promote peace or escalate conflicts into violence.
While this focus on how states create enabling or disabling environments for peace is
important, it portends two levels of risks. First, it risks masking how sub-state level
actions and inactions of citizens, acting as individuals or in groups, impact on a country’s
peace. Secondly, it leads to the prescription of statist solutions such as constitutional
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reforms, legal reforms, institutional reforms, organization of elections, and other statemanaged processes as the remedy for conflicts or the prophylaxis for preserving whatever
peace is in place. In the process, the contribution of nonstate processes such as the stock
of values, beliefs, and attitudes of citizens between themselves and towards the state; the
voluntary actions or inactions of groups of citizens within and outside the state
mechanism that impact, negatively or positively on the conflicts or the peace
environments are glossed over. Incidentally, the only way of surfacing such subnational
processes is to ask the people who operate outside the state system or work from the
outside into the state system to maintain or escalate conflicts or promote peace.
By using the peace paradigm to directly engage a broad range of Ghanaians to
explore their perspectives on how and why Ghana has staved off descent into violence,
this study hopes to contribute to enriching the literature on what subnational cultural,
socioeconomic, and ethno-political strands have held Ghana together. Broadening our
understanding of the sources of Ghana’s peace beyond the state centric process should
provide signals to how the field of peace research can be enriched through in-depth
contextual studies of deviant cases such as Ghana’s. For peace practitioners, insights into
Ghana’s strong and weak points in the causal chain of forces and factors that have
sustained its peace should provide pointers to other states and societies on what to look
out for in their specific contexts as potential retooled instruments for peacebuilding or
resolving conflicts. For Ghana, the findings should provide a framework for re-evaluating
her peace, and determining what can be done to sustain or enhance it. Hence, this
research stands to contribute to the literature on peace from both a theoretical and a
praxis perspective.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
General Thrust of Research
Following from the contextual analysis and the review of the literature above, this
study uses a systems-based peace paradigm as its theoretical frame for investigating
Ghana’s peace for several reasons. First, “A peace paradigm does not conform to nor
accept the status quo…” (Yesufu, 2009, p. 83). On the contrary, it pushes the boundaries
of investigation to dig into the constructive elements of peace to unveil the nature of that
peace (negative or positive); how that peace is constructed; who are its architects or
maintenance agents, among others. Hence, the use of the peace paradigm provides a more
holistic platform for understanding what keeps Ghana from descending into nationwide
conflict despite being a positive peace deficit country, with a fragile capacity to absorb
conflict shocks.
The holistic approach to this research aligns it with the use of systems thinking in
peace research. No other theoretical frame has influenced peace research as much as
general systems theory has (Mesjasz, 1988). Indeed, “Peace research has long been
closely linked with General Systems Theory” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 296). As a result, an
original and lasting “…mutual relationships [exists] between systems theory and peace
research [as] systems thinking [seems to have] been programmed into the future
directions of development of peace and conflict studies” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 327) . Hence,
the intricate “…interdependencies of systems theory and peace research” (Mesjasz,
1988, p. 327) provide a comprehensive platform, especially in peace research that adopts
a grounded theory approach, to unearthing what makes Ghana peaceful when others with
the same conditions have failed. Harnessing the “…long-standing interdependencies
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[between peace research and] systems theory, may stimulate some new solutions, and
certainly, posit new questions …” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 325) that inform our understanding
of why Ghana is peaceful.
Second, from the epistemological and methodological perspectives, the theories that
have been offered to date to explain Ghana’s peace have been based largely on
speculative theorization, rather than being empirically rooted in the voices and views of
Ghanaians to offer insights into how they have managed to keep the peace. This research
therefore differs from previous ones in its use of multiple frameworks and meta-data
from desk studies, quantitative surveys, and key informant interviews to bring in the
voices and views of ordinary Ghanaians on how they have managed to stitch together and
keep their peace, however, fragile, going.
Third, in contrast to previous research on why Ghana is peaceful, this research used
the grounded theory approach to allow the voices and views of Ghanaians to speak for
themselves on whether they agree on why Ghana is peaceful and how the country has
managed to stave off violent confrontations at the national level to keep the peace.
Consistent with the Type 3 peace research categories (Mesjasz, 1988), rooting the study
in the lived experiences of respondents allows the research to probe and explore the
deeper meanings and cultural underpinnings, as wells as, the values, beliefs, perceptions
and attitudes, that more appropriately capture and describe respondents’ views on the
subject of study. It permits the identification of “Situations in which interconnections are
cultural, situations dominated by the meanings attributed to [the] perceptions by
autonomous observers” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 302) on why Ghana has been successful in
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staving off violent national level conflicts. This would be the first time anyone has tried
to explain Ghana’s peace from the perspective of the people.
Choice of Approach to Research
This study used the grounded theory methodology because it is best suited for this
research for several reasons. First, the methodology provided an opportunity for the study
to adopt an open mind in the quest for answers on why Ghana is peaceful. Second,
grounded theory is concerned with the “fitness” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 164) of the
theory generated to the context or situation it purports to describe. Consequently, it
ensures that “the theory [that emerges from the study] should fit the data” (Glaser &
Strauss, 2010, p. 261), since they would have derived from the data. Thirdly, the existing
theories that seek to explain why Ghana is at peace are not grounded in the lived
experiences of the ordinary men and women in the country. The use of the grounded
theory approach in this study would make the findings reflect the lived experiences of
ordinary Ghanaians (Glaser & Strauss, 2010). Fourth, use of the grounded theory
methodology in this study allowed for the simultaneous processes of “generating theory
and doing social research” (Glaser in Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 159).
Though the grounded theory approach is more frequently used for the
development of substantive theory, it can also be used for general theory development
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as it allows for the generation of theory that is best “suited to
its supposed uses” (Glaser & Strauss, 2010, p. 3). It also permits the generation of new
theories, or the modification of existing ones. Hence, findings from this research can lead
to the validation of existing theories through cross-matching of the data (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998) or the emergence of new theoretical perspectives to explain Ghana’s
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apparent exceptionalism as an oasis of peace. Finally, grounded theory uses the same
sources of data as other study methodologies. More importantly, the approach is
amenable to using a wide range of primary and secondary sources of data (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998) that other research approaches may cut out. Hence, within the broad frame
of grounded theory methodology for the study, the following approaches were used for
the collection and analysis of the data:
Use of Mixed Methods for Data Collection, Analysis, and Reporting: The study
used both quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures. Mixed method research
was the best match for the grounded theory approach in this study because it allowed the
study to “…tap into participants’ perspectives and meanings” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie,
2004, pp. 17-18) on the issues under investigation in this research. It also permitted the
inclusion of “a broader and more complete range of research questions [that provided
multiple sources of data to enable the researcher to] generate and test a grounded theory”
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp. 21). Used in a grounded theory study, mixed
methods data collection techniques also provide the possibilities for the use of multiple
tools and “…documents of all kinds” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 160; see also Creswell
& Clark, 2011) as data sources, since grounded theory “…encourages the use of multiple
worldviews, or paradigms (i.e. beliefs and values)” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 13).
Mixed method research also brings out the voices and views behind the numbers that
quantitative research alone would otherwise have left out.
With respect to feasibility and validity of the mixed method approach, Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie (2004) reject the incompatibility thesis which posits that qualitative
and quantitative methods of research “…cannot be mixed” (p. 14) in the same study. On
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the contrary, mixed method research draws on “...the strength and minimize[s] the
weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies” (pp. 11-15). Hence, the
qualitative component of this research highlighted the context for the responses to the
quantitative questions. In sum, it provided more evidence for the research findings than
only either of the methods would have done standing alone.
Choice of Mixed Method Research Design: Creswell & Clark (2011) identify two
approaches to designing mixed method research. The “typology-based approach”
(Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 55) stresses the cataloging of mixed method designs that can
be useful to the research before choosing or adapting one to suit the research goal. The
dynamic approach to mixed method research design, on the other hand, picks and
chooses from an array of mixed method typologies to suit the research needs. Two
subdivisions emerge from the latter approach – the “systems-based approach” and the
“synergistic approach” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 59). Systems approach is iterative and
emphasizes the interconnection between various components of the research process. The
synergistic approach, on the other hand, allows for the combination of two or more
research approaches that ensures that the end product of the research is greater than what
a quantitative or qualitative method alone would have achieved (Creswell & Clark,
2011).
With respect to the structuring of the data collection process, Onwuegbuzie &
Leech, (2006) point out that research questions can be structured to allow data to be
collected concurrently, sequentially, or iteratively. Creswell and Clark (2011), also,
suggest there are three timing arrangements for data collection – the concurrent,
sequential, or multi-phase combination. This notwithstanding mixed methods design for
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data collection is a continuum of processes. Hence, mixed method research may “…fall
somewhere in the middle with both fixed and emergent aspects to the design” (Creswell
& Clark, 2011, p. 55) alternating.
This study used the “cross-stage mixed-model design” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie,
2004, p. 20) or what Creswell and Clark (2011) call the “embedded design” (p.71) in
which qualitative and quantitative data were collected in the initial phase, through a desk
study to provide themes and categories that are used for a quantitative survey and a
qualitative key informant interviews. This multi-phase research process permitted the use
of multiple methods to unearth the voices and views of a cross section of Ghanaians on
how and why they have managed to keep the peace in the country. Besides providing
“convincing answers to the question that the investigation is intended to settle (Thomas,
2003, p. 7), this approach also enabled the research to generate results that are
“meaningful to both the researcher and the people in the researcher studies” (Thomas,
2003, p. 10). The triangulation and saturation of data from multiple sources in the
research provided a broader range of answers on how and why Ghana has survived the
temptations to degenerate into nationwide violent conflicts. Hence, apart from creating
“structure and flexibility” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 60) for the study, this synergistic
approach ensured that the combined outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative data are
greater than the sums of each method standing on its own (Creswell & Clark, 2011).

Data Collection and Study Architecture
To ensure ampleness, constant comparison, complementarity, and data saturation,
the study adopted the following architecture for the collection and analysis of quantitative
and qualitative data.
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i) Desk Study: The study first carried out a review of available documents on
conflicts and their management in Ghana. These included but were not imited to the
review of Reports of Commissions of Inquiry into various conflicts in the country since
the 1980s; library and electronically archived academic literature on conflicts in Ghana
immediately before and after independence; and newspaper reports from the 1980s. This
helped to establish the types and nature of conflicts that could have plunged Ghana into a
nationwide violence and what accounted for their diffusion or non-escalation.
Preliminary markers of themes and categories emerging from the desk study were used to
frame questions for the quantitative survey and the key informant interviews. In this way,
findings from the survey and key informant interviews were used to validate, drill down,
or reject emergent themes and/or categories from the desk study.
ii)

Quantitative Survey: A nationwide survey on the perceptions, knowledge,

attitudes, and behaviors of a sample of 1,429 out of the targeted 1,500 interviews
provided the quantitative data that complemented and reinforced the findings in the
qualitative data from the study desk study and key informant interviews. The survey
collected data that enabled the study to gauge the depth and spread of views, perceptions,
attitudes and behaviors of a representative sample of Ghanaians on factors that have
enabled Ghana to maintain the peace. Survey questionnaires were administered in 50
Polling Areas nationwide selected through the use of the cluster sampling methodology,
as detailed below and in Appendix 2. The survey questionnaires captured the profile of
respondents, enabling the research to establish the spread and depth of views expressed
across the demographic spectrum of respondents. On the substantive aspect of the study,
the questionnaires covered broad areas related to respondents’:
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1. Knowledge and Perceptions of whether Ghana is peaceful
2. Assessment of the role of development on the peace in Ghana
3. Evaluation of how the respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law impact on the
peace in Ghana
4. Views on the effect of the state of gender equality, equity, and parity in the country
on the achievement and maintenance of peace in Ghana.
5. Perceptions on the role of democratic participation on the peace in Ghana
6. Observations on the role of Government in promoting peace
7. Thoughts on the relationship between religion and peace in Ghana
8. Opinions on how culture, traditions, and customs impact on the peace in Ghana; and
9. Attitudes, behaviors, and practices as indicators of the presence of a culture of peace
in Ghana.
10. The role of formal education and the schooling system in Ghana in promoting a
culture of interethnic tolerance, coexistence, and peace among Ghanaians.

Hypotheses for Quantitative Survey
This study used 14 hypotheses as the frame for a broad investigation into how and why
Ghana is considered a peaceful country. Table 1 presents the statement of the null
hypotheses and their associated key variables for the study.
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Table 1:
List of Variables and Associated Hypotheses for Quantitative Study
Variables of the Study
Participants Knowledge
and Perceptions on
peace in Ghana

Role of Development on
peace
Impact of respect for
Human Rights and Rule
of Law on peace

Associated Hypotheses
Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of
respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country
Ho2
There are no differences in the level of perception of
respondents on the nature and sources of peace
Ghana enjoys.
Ho3
Disparities in the distribution of development in
Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country
Ho4 There is no difference in perception on how the practice
of respect for the rule of law by ordinary citizens and
public officials contribute to peace in Ghana
Ho5 There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial
system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace
of the country

Impact of gender
equality, equity and
parity on peace
Role of democratic
participation on peace

Role of Government on
peace in Ghana
Impact on religion on
peace in Ghana
Influence of culture,
traditions and customs
on peace
Respondents’ attitudes
and behaviors on peace
Role of formal
education and schooling
system on peace in
Ghana
Personal attitudes,
behaviors, and practices
on social cohesion and
peace

Ho6 The level of experience of gender equality and equity
has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys
Ho7

The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no
effect on the peace that the country enjoys

Ho8 There is no difference in perception of how the
freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the
peace of the country
Ho9
The role that Government plays in mediating
conflicts have no effect on the peace that Ghana
enjoys.
Ho10 Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana
enjoys.
Ho11 The culture, customs, and traditions of the various
ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace
that Ghana enjoys.
Ho12 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward
people of other ethnic or religious groups have no
effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Ho13 Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on
the peace that the country enjoys

Ho14 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of
Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups
have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
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iii) Key Informant Interviews: The findings from the desk study provided the basis
for framing questions for the Key Informant interviews. Besides providing an opportunity
to confirm or reject themes and categories from the desk study, the key informant
interviews were used to reach out to representatives of institutions and groups whose
active engagements in the public sphere may have contributed to the disturbance or
maintenance of peace in the country. The arcane knowledge of such institutional
representatives enabled the study to assess the nature and extent of the role of civil
society organizations and individual actors in developing the peace infrastructure that has
contributed to peace in Ghana. The key informant interviews also provided the
opportunity for the analysis of the role of cultural values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes
that contribute to Ghana’s peace.
The sequencing of the various stages of the study was designed to provide
complementarity and triangulation of the data and findings. The various research
instruments were therefore mutually reinforcing in their design. Qualitative data
collection was the primary focus of this study. Hence, the study deployed various
qualitative research tools to capture and categorize the information provided. The
multiple data sources allowed for the triangulation and saturation of data in the search for
answers on how and why Ghana has survived the temptations to degenerate into
nationwide violent conflicts.

Sampling and Sample Size considerations
a)

Sample Size for the Survey component: To ensure representativeness and

high level of confidence in the data generated in the survey, a multi-stage cluster
sampling approach was used to select respondents. In nation-wide surveys, such as the

68

Afrobarometer studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is usually determined to be
adequate for ensuring representativeness of the study population and validity of the
outcomes. This “…substantially larger sample size [is required] to achieve the same level
of accuracy as a simple random sample” (Murphy & Schulz, 2006, p. 6). For Ghana,
Afrobarometer’s “randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allows inferences to national
adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3
percent with a confidence level of 95 percent” (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p.).
In this study, a sample size of 1,500 (i.e., n= 1,500) was used. The sample frame
(N) was the total registered voter population for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary
elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012). Hence, the
survey used the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling. This is
because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the
population statistics per localities were not yet available at the time of design of this
study. In contrast, the Electoral Commission compiled a fairly detailed biometric
electoral register of voters, which provided population data down to community levels in
all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the country. The electoral register
and boundaries of the Polling Stations therefore provided a more accurate and up to date
database for the selection of respondents.
The survey adapted the 30-cluster sampling methodology that John Hopkins
University (JHU) developed for use in Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage (KPC)
surveys. This is a multi-stage cluster sampling approach used to select respondents for
large population groups. In this study, the methodology allowed for a fair representation
of all communities across the country. Given the wide variation in population sizes
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between Polling Areas (ranging from n < 500 to n > 150, 000), instead of 30, this study
selected a cluster of 50 Polling Areas out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas in the country as
study sites. This larger number of study sites is necessary to compensate for the
clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socioeconomic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban;
differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions;
cultural variations across regions, etc. (Murphy & Schulz, 2006). Appendix 3 provides
details of the procedures used in the selection of the 50 Polling Areas.
Level two of the participant selection process was carried out at the 50 selected
Polling Areas. The study had planned to use electoral registers for the selected Polling
Areas as the sub sample frame from which interviewees were to be selected. However,
the Electoral Commission cited legal reasons for its inability to make the register of
voters for the selected Polling Areas available to the researcher. Hence, to select the 30
respondents at each Polling Area, the researcher used the spin the bottle method (Core
Group, 2008; Espeut, 2001) to randomly select the first household from which the first
interviewee would be identified and interviewed. Details of the procedure is provided in
Appendix 3.

Sampling Precautions: Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics (Sakyi,
2013a; Citifmonline News, 2011). Given the legal challenge to the 2012 Presidential
election results that pitched the two major parties in a political battle, it was essential that
all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan bias in the selection of
the interviewees be dispelled upfront and transparently. In fulfillment of this, Polling
Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected Polling Areas were
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invited to participate in the procedure for selecting the first household for interviews as
outlined under Appendix 3. They were briefed on the purposes, as well as, the apolitical
and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all political
parties helped to eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of the
interviewees.
b)

Sampling for Key Informant Interviews: The inherent iterative processes

of data collection, analysis, and collection of more data for constant comparison that
grounded theory research demands implies that the best cutoff point for recruiting
research participants is established when no new data codes emerge from repeated data
collection. Hence, the sampling frame and procedures for the Key Informant Interviews
followed the advice in the use of “theoretical sampling” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp.
176) which holds that sample sizes and “sampling [processes] cannot be planned before
embarking on the study” (Bitsch, 2005 p. 79). Nonetheless, Creswell (1998) suggests that
between six and 30 participants would be adequate for a grounded theory study. With
respect to the purposive choice of respondents, this study followed the advice for
qualitative researchers to “…choose those interviewees who can give you the greatest
possible insight into your topic” (Esterberg, 2002, p. 93). Accordingly, the research used
the snowball sampling methodology to identify potential respondents for the interviews.
However, given the potential wide variation in the kinds of people to be interviewed in
this study, the researcher targeted interviewing a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 50
respondents across the spectrum of population groups. This provided a data range wide
enough to allow for saturation of the data for categories and themes that emerge during
the research. Appendix 4 provides a list of a broad category of institutions and
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organizations from which the 30 to 50 key informants were drawn. The categories
include the Ghana Medical Association, Ghana Bar Association, Ghana Nurses and
Midwives Council, Ghana Registered Nurses Association, Ghana Association of Bankers,
Ghana National Association of Teachers, among others. Collectively known as the
Professional Bodies Associations, these institutions have been individually or collectively
active in engaging state actors on issues of national interests. Representing the highly
educated class of citizens, their engagements in the political sphere may have contributed
to the creation of the “elite consensus” that Ayee (2003, p. 214) credits for the peace in
Ghana. Interviews with this category of respondents unearthed the reasons why they
chose to engage or not engage in the political sphere and how that contributed to the
peace in Ghana.
Similarly, the leadership of labor unions, represented by the Trade Union Congress
and its affiliates, as well as, other collective workers unions were contacted for
interviews. Collective workers groups have played very active roles in Ghana’s politics
before and after independence. Their alignments with one political grouping or the other
have often defined the boundaries of political contestations and electoral fortunes in
democratic eras. Worker agitations and confrontations with governments over conditions
of service have also been vital in determining the temperature of the political sphere, and
in some cases, have contributed to changes in governments, through coup d’états or the
ballot box. Understanding the motivations of workers in the political choices they have
made over the years, and how these have affected the peace of Ghana, was essential for
the objectives of this study.
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Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of the
governance systems of Ghana. They have championed campaigns, strikes, and
demonstrations for or against governments, with some engagements turning violent.
Their historical record of making and unmaking governments has made students a vital
part of Ghana’s body politic. Past and present student leaders were interviewed to
document their voices and views on why Ghana has remained peaceful. The interviews
sought to find answers to the following questions: What roles have students played in the
stability and peace in Ghana? How do they perceive the role of youth groups in
stabilizing the balance of power between and across political entities such as political
parties? To what extent are students bridges of peace across the ethnic divides in the
country? What makes them effective bridges, if any?
Faith-based and civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing
national Christian and Islamic Councils (i.e. The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH), the
Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference (GCBC), the Islamic Council, the Pentecostal
Council), and other affiliated faith-based organizations have been instrumental in shaping
the political space in Ghana. Representatives of these institutions, among others, were
considered useful in the study because of their i) arcane knowledge and perceptions on
why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level confrontations ii) recollections
and experiences on the role of Faith-based Organizations (FBOs) and Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs), if any, in creating and maintaining peace in Ghana iii) perceptions
on the role of culture, values, and faith in Ghana’s ability to maintain peace.
Finally, Lederach (1997, p.94) points out that localized knowledge and institutional
frameworks for change management are “the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the
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long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture”. To tap into this
indigenous knowledge base on why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level
conflicts, traditional leaders comprising of the chiefs, queenmothers, and elders of ethnic
groups were contacted for interviews. In line with the advice of Esterberg (2002), the
researcher targeted respondents from the pool of recommended participants based on
their roles and participation in managing/mediating some of the national conflicts in
Ghana; their personal knowledge and association with events that held the potential for
national level violence; their positions with the regional and national houses of chiefs,
among other criteria. From them, the research sort to understand the role that customs,
traditions, and values have played in creating a culture of peace within and between
ethnic groups. The role of traditional authorities in promoting peace and the challenges, if
any, they faced in this exercise were explored. This enabled the research to assess the
nature and role that the “sociocultural resources” (Lederach, 1997, p. 93) have played in
holding Ghana together.
Instrumentation
i) Survey: The survey component used 77 largely closed ended structured Likert
scale and multiple choice questions to gauge the respondents’ views, knowledge, and
perceptions on why Ghana has remained peaceful in spite of the challenges the has
experienced. The last 11 questions assessed respondents’ personal attitudes, behaviors,
and practices that provide insights into how individual beliefs, actions, and behaviors
might have contributed to the building of social cohesion in Ghana. Appendix 5 presents
the questionnaire that was used in the study.
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ii)

Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews: Based on the outcomes of

the desk study, the researcher developed and used structured questions to guide the
interviews with key informants. The open-ended questions were designed to tease out
respondents’ views and voices on the study topic. Appendix 6 provides the interview
guide that was used in this study. Although the guide provides a structuring of the
questions, the sequence of questioning was varied to ensure that the interviewee followed
leads in the thoughts of the respondents to provide coherence and consistency in the
responses. More critically, the interviewer probed the responses, with follow-on
questions not included in this guide, to create the opportunity for respondents to deepen
their thoughts and reflections on issues raised in the course of responding to listed
questions. In this way, the guide did not serve as foreclosure to the open-endedness of the
interviews. On the contrary, it merely provided a frame for structuring the thoughts of
respondents and the data collection process. This open-minded approach to engaging the
respondents enabled the researcher to triangulate, validate, and saturate data in order to
confirm, strengthen, or reject concepts, themes, and categories that had already emerged
from prior segments of the study or interviews.

Data Collection Process
i)

Prior Consent of Respondents: All interviewees reviewed and signed a

consent form prior to participating in the interview. Where the interviewee was unable to
read, write, and/or understand English, the pre-translated and approved consent form was
read out to him or her in a language that he or she appeared to understand. The consent
form explained the purpose of the interview and assured interviewees of the
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confidentiality of the information they provided in the course of the interview. It also
guaranteed the anonymity of their participation in the study. Interviewees were also
informed of their right not to answer any question, should they find that too invasive of
their privacy, too emotional to recount, or painful for their memories.

ii)

Data Collection Processes for Quantitative Survey: The research used the

PoiMapper comprehensive mobile geomapping, data collection, and management
software mounted on android cell phones, Ipads or Ipod Touch platforms for the
collection of data. The researcher procured the software as well as vendor technical
support services in migrating the MS Word-based questionnaires into the PoiMapper
platform. The researcher and the assistant were equipped and trained to use the devices
on which the survey forms were mounted for the collection of the data. The researchers
moved in a team into selected clusters for the selection of respondents and the data
collection process to ensure quality and integrity of the data collected. Daily uploads and
synchronizing of data on a central field server was carried out to minimize risk of data
lost due to equipment failure. The use of the PoiMapper software eliminated the need for
paper-based data collection. With the PoiMapper data collection mechanism, the data
collected was recorded electronically, and uploaded into a central database at the close of
day. This eliminated the need and cost for transporting bulky papers to the field and time
for entering data after the field work. Data entry errors were minimized and the cost of
data entry was eliminated as well.
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iii)

Recording of Data: With prior consent of the interviewees, key informant

interview data was collected using both a digital audio recording device and hand written
notes. Audio-recording was necessary not only to allow for the complete capture of the
proceedings; it also provided an opportunity for the researcher to focus attention on the
interviewee to provide positive feedback and show respect. This enabled the researcher to
capture any nonverbal data and cues (such as body language cues in the form of hand
gestures, eye movements, shifts in views, etc.) that interviewees let out in the course of
the interview, and which evinced emotional states or reactions in relation to issues being
discussed.
iv)

Field notes and memoing: The researcher took down notes by hand during the

desk study and in the course of the field work. Field notes were particularly important
during the key informant interviews, where notes on verbal and non-verbal cues, as well
as, body language of respondents were captured in note form. The handwritten field notes
from the desk study and Key Informant Interviews were typed out in Microsoft Word and
incorporated in other notes for the textual analysis.

Procedures for Data Capture and Preparation for Analysis

i)

Data Capture: Quantitative data collected using the PoiMapper software was

downloaded as Excel Spreadsheets. Questions that had been presented in table form on
the questionnaires had their responses downloaded in columns rather than rows. Hence,
considerable time was spent translating the responses from columns into rows. Due to
challenges with internet connectivity in the field, as detailed below, several of the
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interviews lost significant portions of responses during upload of completed interviews to
the cloud server. Hence, time was spent verifying completeness of interviews and
eliminating uncompleted ones. The final data set was then exported into Version 20 of
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) platform for analysis.
ii)

Transcription of Audio Recordings: The audio recordings from the key

informant interviews were transcribed, using the help of professional transcription
services. The researcher verified all transcribed texts against the initial audio recordings
to ensure fidelity of the texts to the original recordings. Verified and/or corrected
transcribed texts were then analyzed to isolate emerging categories and themes.
Additionally, the audio recordings were downloaded and converted into WAV format for
upload into the Atlas/ti software for analysis. I then used the Atlas/ti Software to code the
texts of the transcribed interviews and to generate open and axial codes, families, and
networks of data. Appendices 4S1 through 4S4 present the data maps, which served as
the frame for the scrutiny and analysis of the data.

Encounter and Resolution of Field Level Challenges

Distribution of data collection location for the quantitative survey: The country
wide cluster sampling methodology produced a wide geographical distribution of the
selected study sites. Several of these were in very remote locations with limited road and
transport infrastructure and far away from urban centers. Hence, accessing such locations
was difficult and time consuming.
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Community Cooperation: In general, community members in the study sites were
cooperative and willingly participated in the interviews. In one case, however, a
prospective interviewee challenged the motive of the interview, insinuating that it was for
political purposes. However, when he finally agreed to review the consent form and the
questionnaires, he changed his mind, willingly participated in the interview, and
apologized afterwards for his initial objections. He subsequently supported the
recruitment of other interviewees in the community through explaining the purpose of the
survey.
Internet connectivity for GPS data verification: The POI Mapper data collection
platform provided for the collection of GPS coordinates of the locations where the
interviews were conducted. This was to support the production of a distributional map of
the data collection points. It also provided a guarantee that the data is collected in the
selected study area. Appendix 7 provides a map of the distribution of locations of the
sampled clusters where the data for this survey were collected. Interviews were stored on
the cellphones and uploaded to the cloud database on return to the urban areas.
POI Mapper also allowed data to be uploaded to the service providers cloud
server. Data upload and the collection of GPS coordinates, however, required that the
data collection instrument (cellphone or notebook running on Android platform) has
internet connectivity at the start of the data collection. The only source of internet
connectivity in Ghana outside office environments is via cellphone data services. Hence,
access to cellphone connectivity was crucial for the internet access. In several cases,
however, the selected communities did not have cell phone coverage at all, or had
technical problems with the cellphone service providers at the time of visit for data
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collection. Consequently, it was not possible to collect the GPS data at the time of the
interviews for such locations.
Data Clean Up Process and Outcomes: The quantitative survey targeted to
interview 1,500 respondents in 50 Polling Areas across the country that were pre-selected
using the cluster sampling methodology. Interviews were conducted using POI Mapper
Software, in lieu of paper-based questionnaires, to electronically capture and document
the responses that participants gave. Captured responses from each interview were
uploaded using cellphone-based internet connections. Data upload faced challenges in
areas where cellphone connectivity bandwidth was small or the signal was weak. As a
result, upload error messages prompted the re-uploading of the same interviews, even
though in effect the data would have been uploaded. Consequently, several interviews
were uploaded multiple times. Multiple uploads for the same interview was traceable
using a combination of the interviewee unique data identifiers, the POI Mapper data
identifier, the date and time of the interview, and/or the GPS coordinates. This process
allowed the cleaning up of the data to eliminate the repeated interviews.
In other instances, responses to a set of questions in an interview failed to upload
to the server. This created data gaps. To resolve this, a rule of thumb decision was made
to eliminate any interviews that had responses to five consecutive questions or more
missing in the dataset. This data cleanup process pruned down the data to a fairly
complete set of responses for 1429 interviews. This represents 95.3% of the target of
1500 interviews. As indicated in earlier under considerations for sampling and sample
size determination, sample sizes of at least 1,200 are considered adequate for nationwide
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surveys. Hence, the sample of 1429 interviews was considered more than enough to
proceed with the analysis of the data for this study.
Regional representation in the dataset did not suffer much from the data clean up
exercise. The Central and Volta Regions were the only ones which had 85 and 81 per
cent respectively of their interviews included in the study. All other regions had more
than 90% of their interviews included. However, to ensure the adequacy and
representativeness of the data for a national level study, additional verification and
validation steps were used. Of the 125 variables in the study, responses to the question on
whether Ghana is an oasis of peace had the lowest number of respondents (n=1369).
Given that this is a key variable in this study, the n value for this question served as the
threshold for a test to establish how representative this sample size would be of the larger
Ghanaian population who might answer to the same question. In other words what
proportion of Ghanaians in the actual population of the country would respond to the
question on whether Ghana is an oasis of peace? To determine an estimate of the actual
proportion of the Ghanaian population that would agree that Ghana is an oasis of peace, I
generated descriptive statistics on the variable “Oasis of Peace” using SPSS Version 20.
The variable is an ordinal level one with more than four categories; hence I used the
descriptive function to generate the basic statistics for this estimation (Healey, 2012,
Kindle Edition). Table 2 presents the results.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Variable with Lowest Response Rate
N
Oasis of Peace
Gender
Valid N

Minimum Maximum Mean

1369
1414
1354

1
1

4
2

1.64
1.46

Std.
Deviation
.848
.499

Since the standard deviation of the larger Ghanaian population is not known, I used the
procedure in the formula below to compute the confidence interval based on the mean of
the sample (Formula 7.2 in Healey, 2012, Kindle Version) to determine the confidence
interval of a large sample. Table 2 provides the Mean of the sample, the standard
deviation and the sample size used in the computation. The procedure for the
computation was as follows:
Confidence Interval =

X ± Z(

s
N-1

)

From the descriptive statistics in Table 2:
i)

The sample mean of the variable belief that Ghana is peaceful = 1.64

ii)

The Standard deviation

= .848

iii)

The Sample Size

= 1369

iv)

Given a Pu

= 0.05, therefore Z = 1.96

Substituting the above in the equation,
Confidence Interval = 1.64 ± 1.96(.848)
N-1
N-1 = 1369-1 = 1368

 1368 = 36.986
1.96(.848) =
36.986

Confidence interval = 1.64 ± 0.0449

1.64± 1.96(0.0229) =
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The foregoing means if multiple samples were taken from the Ghanaian population
to gauge the extent of their belief that Ghana is an oasis of peace, in 95% of the times, the
mean will fall between 1.595 and 1.685. Since the sample mean of 1.64 falls within this
range, we are confident that the sample used in this study is representative of the
Ghanaian population. Based on this, we can say that we are 95% confident that the 94.5%
of the survey respondents who agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that
Ghana is an oasis of peace are also representative of the wider Ghanaian population. In
other words, we can say with 95% confidence that 94.5% of Ghanaians would agree to
varying extents that Ghana is an oasis of peace.
Field Challenges with Key Informant Interviews: The Key Informant Interviews
(KIIs) took place in two time slots between breaks for the conduct of the quantitative
surveys, work, and securing appointments with prospective interviewees. Lot 1 covered
fourteen (14) interviews conducted between 5 February and 5 March, 2014, while Lot 2
comprised nineteen (19) interviews carried out between 15 October and 14 December
2014. Pinning down interview schedules with identified interviewees was the major
challenge, as all interviewees ran very busy schedules.
Interview Transcriptions: Transcription of the interviews also took longer than
expected, given the emphasis I placed on verbatim transcription of every interview.
Procuring of professional transcription services to support the process became necessary.
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Ethics and reflexivity section
Ethical Concerns: This research used open and close ended questions for collecting
data. Consequently, substantial portions of the data collected came from participants’
recollection of their personal and collective lived experiences, events, and knowledge of
personalities that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. These recollections were done
through multiple lenses that included the cognitive, semiotic, experiential, ethical, and
hermeneutic ones (Fox, 2006). Hence, participants’ input into the data collection process
came from the “… fusion of both historical and fictional” (Fox, 2006, p. 47) recalls of the
events, people, and values that have shaped and contributed to the peace in Ghana.
The multi-layered data collection process and the use of triangulation in the analysis
of findings provided opportunities for interrogating data from different sources. This
enabled the research to isolate fictional accounts of individuals from the shared realities
of the generality of participants. Triangulation of data sources also provided opportunities
to isolate consensual, as well as, contested themes that emerged from the analysis of the
narratives from the interviews. It provided the forum for participants “…to dissolve [the
perceptual] boundaries [that divide their viewpoints], to break down barriers and to
reinterpret [their] two-dimensional dichotomies” (Fox, 2006, p. 56) in order to build a
common narrative of why and how Ghana finds itself peaceful.
Reflexivity: As a Ghanaian who has been actively engaged in the development and
peacebuilding field in Ghana and across Africa for more than 25 years, I had some views
and perceptions on why Ghana is at peace while other countries with similar
characteristics are not. Therefore, I was keenly aware that “the political and personal
perspectives of researchers [can] inform the intentions we have for the research” (Gilles
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& Alldred, 2002, p. 33 in Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, and Miller). Hence, my personal
knowledge of some of the people that were interviewed; their experiences of the wars or
violence in other contexts; my own perceptions of the issues being discussed; and my
reflections and discussions with colleagues on the subject of peace in Ghana, all risked
introducing biases into the selection of my sample; the structuring of the interviews; the
way interview questions were chosen and framed; and the interpretations that I put to
some of the findings. Therefore, I needed to be constantly aware of these potential
intrusions of personal views into the design and outcome of the research. Aware of these
dangers, I took care at every stage of the study design, conduct, analysis of the data, and
reporting to ensure that my personal impressions did not intrude into the data. I
constantly strove to make the data speak for itself as I bracketed my personal views.
Additionally, Ghanaians are literally split in two halves along the lines of the two
main political parties in the country – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the
New Patriotic Party (NPP). Against this polarized political arena, the caution of Gilles
and Allred to researchers against allowing our political biases to infiltrate into the
research agenda is pertinent. Hence, in dealing with research participants, it was essential
to constantly remember that research of this nature can become “explicitly [a] political
tool [that some participants would attempt to use] strategically to make political
interventions” (Gilles & Alldred, 2002, p. 32). To forestall this, I took care to make the
research process and outcomes as neutral, objective, and transparent as possible.
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Results or Analysis

Both quantitative and qualitative results were analyzed and are reported in the findings.
Quantitative Data Analysis: The quantitative results focused on aggregating perceptions,
views, and experiences of survey respondents, using descriptive statistics. This allowed
for the disaggregation of findings from the survey to isolate any differences in
perspectives that emerged due to differences in age, gender, levels of education,
geographic region of origin, ethnicity, among others, of participants. The study used the
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to analyze the quantitative data
collected from the survey. Preliminary data generated provided descriptive statistics on
the profile of respondents, as well as, on some of the non-profile responses to the
questions. This initial descriptive statistics guided more in-depth data analysis. ChiSquare values derived from the cross-tabulation of study responses with various
categories of participants helped determine significant differences in responses as a result
of demographic variations among respondents. Independent Sample t-Tests were carried
out when the independent “variable [had] exactly two categories” (Healey, 2012, Kindle
Edition, Location 7209). Although gender is the only independent variable in this study
that potentially presents two categories, the question on the gender of participants
allowed for a third gender category. However, respondents responded to only two
categories. Hence, a T-test was not conducted to determine if there were any differences
of opinion on the various dependent variables as a result of gender differences. ANOVA
tests were, however, carried out, using the remaining independent variables such as age
categories, educational levels, region of origin, and occupation of respondents, where
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necessary. This was to determine whether any differences in opinions, perceptions,
attitudes and behaviors existed within and between these categories that would help
explain why Ghana is peaceful.

Analysis of Qualitative Data: Reporting on the qualitative aspects of the study
focused on capturing and documenting the voices and views of respondents. However,
triangulation with other sources of data, such as the desk study and key informant
interviews, enabled the report to draw out theoretical conclusions reflective of the full
range of data sources. For the analysis of the qualitative data from the Key Informant
Interviews, a choice was made between the Glaserian versus the Straussian approaches to
the analysis of data emerging from grounded theory field studies. While Glaser prefers
“abstract conceptualization” which focuses on “units of meaning”(Lamp & Milton, 2007,
p. 2) derived from the data, Strauss and Corbin prefer more detailed analysis of
interviews based on “word by word analysis” ( Strauss & Corbin, 1990 in Lamp &
Milton, 2007, p. 2). Both approaches have their merits, depending on the kinds of
research being conducted. Given the focus of this study, however, the “Glaserian
approach [was] more applicable here as it [tried] to see the reality by collecting and
fixing the needed data” (Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349). It allowed data
collected at any stage to “…guide and suggest the next level data requirements”
(Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349).
In accordance with this approach, qualitative data from the desk study, key
informant interviews, as well as, field notes of the researcher, were incorporated into one
set of typed notes to provide a complete set of data for the analysis. The data was then
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analyzed using open coding techniques to sort and categorize the themes emerging from
the data. Major themes that emerged from this round of analysis were organized into
categories. The study then identified associations between categories to create “broader,
more general explanations from the categories and their relationships” (Willis, 2007, p.
307). Where applicable, the study linked emerging categories to create overarching
categories that provided a broader view of the issues participants were raising. The
triangulation of the findings from the key informant interviews with the responses from
the desk study and quantitative data enabled the research to unearth and engage any other
pieces of information that may not have emerged already.
To ensure depth and consistency in the analysis, the study used ATLAS/ti research
software for the analysis of the qualitative data. ATLAS/ti was selected because it allows
for the analysis of transcribed interview texts in ASCII format, sound in the WAV
format, as well as, graphics. The software helped to create codes, memos, and networks
of text elements using “…individual letters, words, phrases, sentences…” (Lewis, 1998,
p. 4). Coding was done manually or automatically, and once produced, codes were
grouped into families, merged or searched (Lewis, 1998). Compared to NUD*IST
software, ATLAS/ti’ offered a more intuitive coding system (Lewis, 1998). The
generation of super codes allowed for higher level analysis and the creation of networks
between coded data. Methodologically, ATLAS/ti was best suited for this study because
the grounded theory approach influenced the development of the software (Smit, 2002).
Hence, it “provides the tools to be consistent and rigorous if the user wants to follow a
grounded theory (or type of) approach” (Contreras, 2009).
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Analysis of the KII produced four (4) major nested webs of positive and negative
cultural and religious factors that, in the view of respondents, explain Ghana’s state of
peace. The family of codes related to the effect of culture on Ghana’s peace came up with
27 nodes; the contribution of religion to peace had 14 nodes, while the classification of
Ghana’s peace had 10 nodes. A fourth cluster related to the coping mechanisms or exit
strategies respondents believed have helped to maintain Ghana’s peace in its current
state. Citizens’ disengagement/resignation; recourse to using private solutions to
addressing public problems; migration out of poverty areas, either temporarily, cyclically,
or permanently; entry into politics as a means of accessing public resources, legitimately
or illegitimately; youth occupation of the streets of urban areas to sell anything they can
lay their hands on, also known as streetism in NGO parlance; and finally the recourse of
the youth to regulated or illegal small-scale mining, logging, and other forms of natural
resource exploitation constituted the unexpected finds under this category. Details of the
findings are incorporated under each hypothesis of the study. They provide explanatory
insights into the findings of the quantitative survey.

Reliability and Validity

Ensuring Data Reliability: In the use of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss have
pointed out that the process of collecting data and cross-checking it multiple times allows
the researcher to have a detached enough perspective on the issues to formulate
“…workable guides to action and therefore [provide] credibility” (Glaser & Strauss,
2010, p. 227) to the findings. The extensive nature of the data that this study collected,
coupled with the multiple levels of comparison, verification, and reworking of the data
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provided the degree of detached emersion with the data that led to the “conceptual
density” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 161) required to lend credence to the findings of this
research.
Reliability of quantitative data resides on how consistent, stable, and dependable the
data collection process is. Hence, to ensure reliability of the data in this survey, the same
set of questions was used for all the interviews. In the few cases where translators were
needed to mediate interviews, the researcher worked with the translators to develop a
lexicon of words that ordinarily do not have direct equivalents in the local languages.
These working dictionaries, where developed, were then used for the translation of such
technical words to the interviewees. In all cases simultaneous voice recording of the
interviews was taken and used later to double check the accuracy of the entries made
during the course of the interview.

Ensuring Validity in the Data: The validity of any theory is time and context
specific, as changes in the matrix of conditions under which a theory was developed
“affects the validity of [such] theories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 171). Sandelowski
(1993) further notes that validity in qualitative research outcomes is a function of
judgment. Hence, the use of standardized objective, and repeatable procedures in
qualitative research to establish scientific rigor of findings is unrealistic and
“…completely alien to the concept of narrative truth” (Sandelowski, 1993, p. 4). Willis
(2007) defines two levels of validity of research findings, namely internal and external
validity. While internal validity deals with the reliability of the data collected, issues of
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external validity raise “the question of generalizability”(Willis, 2007, p. 216) of the
findings of a study.
The overlapping use of desk studies, survey results, and key informant interviews in
this study, was designed to address the concerns of validity. The multilayered data
collection, analysis, constant comparison, and theory validation processes in this research
aimed “to build a theory that fits every set of data and thus is generalizable” (Willis,
2007, p. 306). The constant comparison of findings between data sets ensured that the
data was kept current, complete, and therefore reflective of the changing contexts in the
course of the research. This enhanced the validity of the findings from the qualitative
survey.
To ensure validity of the data from the quantitative survey, the study developed and
used a matrix of the hypotheses, the definition and operationalization of the variables,
and the statement of indicators for each of the variables tested in the hypotheses - See
Appendix 8. Each set of indicators was tracked to a question in the survey instrument.
This ensured that the questions asked in the survey collected the intended data. A pretest of the questionnaire was done to provide opportunities for revising them and their
associated variables, definitions, and indicators. This was to ensure that the quantitative
component of the research generated the data it needed to have for assessing the factors
that contribute to Ghana’s peace.
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Chapter 4: Findings from Field Research

Profile of Respondents

A total of 1429 interviews form the basis for the analysis of the quantitative
survey outcomes. However, not all the respondents answered all the questions in the
survey. Out of the 1,414 respondents who reported their gender category, 651 (i.e.
45.6%) were females and 763 (i.e. 53.4%) were males. Regionally, the Central Region
had the highest female participation rate of 51% (52/102) in the interviews, with the
Upper West Region having the lowest participation rate of 23.3% for women. The
Northern Region, however, recorded the highest male dominance in the interview at
64.8%. Age-wise, of the 1382 respondents who gave their ages, 49.3% were 35 years or
younger. The mean age of respondents was 38.88, with a standard deviation of 36 – see
Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3
Percentage of Respondents 35 years old or younger

Case Selection
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Age <= 35 (FILTER)
Frequency Percent
705
677
1382
47
1429

49.3
47.4
96.7
3.3
100.0

Valid
Percent
51.0
49.0
100.0

92

Table 4
Mean Age of Respondents
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Std. Deviation

1382
47
38.88
36.00
14.239

The majority of respondents (55.1%) had some education not exceeding the
middle school or Junior High School levels. In all, 38.8% of respondents (554/1429)
indicated that they had an education from the Primary up to the Middle School or Junior
Secondary School, while , 16.3% (233/1429) had less than six years of education at the
primary school level. Additionally, 15.5% of the respondents (221/1429) said they had
never been to school. Respondents who said they had a secondary school level education
accounted for 18.7% of the respondents (266/1429), while those who indicated they had
tertiary level education (i.e. university or polytechnic level education) represented 10.6%
of the total number of respondents in the study. While 99/1429 (6.9%) said they had a
diploma or a Higher National Diploma (HND) from a tertiary institution, 44/1429 (3.1%)
indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree from a university; 7/1429 had Master’s level
education and only 1 person reported holding a PhD Degree. By gender and educational
levels, women respondents constituted 56.4% (255/452) of the total number of
respondents who indicated that they had either never been to school or had less than six
years of primary education.
By religion, 75.7% of respondents (1068/1410) who provided information on their
religious affiliations indicated that they were Christians, while 18.5% said they were
Moslems. Adherents of Indigenous African Religion came third with 70/1410 or 5.0%.
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The remaining of respondents either did not indicate their faith tradition or mentioned
other faiths such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or combinations of different faiths. While
35.7% of respondents (504/1429) said they lived in villages or rural areas, 44.6% said
they lived in either the district capitals (18.4%); regional capitals (15.8%) or national
capital (10.5%). However, 19.6% respondents indicated that they lived in towns outside
the national, regional, or district capitals. In all, 95.7% (1367/1429) indicated the regions
they called home regions i.e. regions they consider their native regions even though they
may not have been living there at the time of the interview. Compared to the data on the
regions where interviews were actually carried out, six (6) regions (Central, Eastern,
Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta) recorded more people claiming them as
home regions than the total number of valid interviews in the study that were carried out
in those regions. This implies that respondents living in other regions were claiming the
Central, Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta Regions as their home
regions. Noticeably, Greater Accra Region, had the lowest percentage of respondents
(30%) who claimed it as their home region, even though 20.5% of all valid interviews
(293/1429) were conducted in this region. This means the majority of interviewees in the
Greater Accra Region are natives of other regions in the country – see Table 5.
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Table 5
Distribution of Respondents by Region of Residence and Region of Birth

Region
Ashanti
Brong Ahafo
Central
Eastern
Greater Accra
Northern
Upper East
Upper West
Volta
Western

Valid
Home
Interviews Callers
268
250
114
106
102
123
150
170
293
88
142
210
60
81
30
42
121
163
149
134

%
Home
Callers
93.3%
93.0%
120.6%
113.3%
30.0%
147.9%
135.0%
140.0%
134.7%
89.9%

Occupationally, respondents who described themselves as self-employed private
businessmen or women who own and manage their own businesses or persons who are
self-employed individuals in the informal sector such as Masons, Carpenters,
Hairdressers, Seamstresses, Traders, etc. accounted for 36.7% of interviewees
(524/1429). Those who said they were farmers engaged in crop production, animal
husbandry, fishing, etc. constituted 28.4% (406/1429) of the respondents in the study.
Respondents who described themselves as employed in “other sectors” represented 7.1%
(102/1429). Students in Polytechnics, Universities, or other Tertiary or Secondary level
educational institutions accounted for 4.9% (70/1429). Employment categories with less
than 5% representation in the study sample were - Academics such as

Lecturers,

Researchers, or Teaching Assistants in an Academic institution (1.6%); Civil or Public
Servants working in Government ministries, departments or agencies (3.6%); Corporate
Business Executives including Managing Directors, Managers, Chief Executive Officers
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of medium and large scale companies or businesses (0.3% - 5/1429); Elected or
Appointed Political Leaders including Members of Parliament, Government Minister of a
Sector, at the Presidency, or Region; as well as, Metropolitan, Municipal, or District
Chief Executives (0.1% - 2/1429); House wife (4.7% - 67/1429); Members of the
Security Services including the Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration
Services, Fire Service; Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services (0.8% - 11/1429);
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political
Party). Others included Professionals (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker,
Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.); Religious leaders
(Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion); Traditional chief or
queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or Village; Worker in the NGO Sector; and
employee in the Private Sector – see Table 6. Compared to the population census results,
the profile of respondents represents a cross-section of the general population of Ghana.
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Table 6
Primary Occupation of Respondents
Primary Occupation
System Missing
Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an
Academic institution)
Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry,
department or agency)
Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager,
Chief Executive Officer etc.)
Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of
Parliament, Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency,
Region); Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive
Employee in the Private Sector
Farmer (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.)
House wife
Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police
Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and
Preventive Services)
Other(specify)
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency
Executive of a Political Party)
Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker,
Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.)
Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African
Traditional Religion)
Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman
Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser,
Seamstress, Trader, etc.)
Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary
level
Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional,
or Village levels
Worker in the NGO Sector
Total

Frequency
7

Valid
Percent
.5

23

1.6

52

3.6

5

.3

2

.1

62
406
67

4.3
28.4
4.7

11

.8

102

7.1

6

.4

48

3.4

15

1.0

110

7.7

414

29.0

70

4.9

6

.4

23
1429

1.6
100.0
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Study Results from Hypotheses testing and Key Informant Interviews

The quantitative component of the study set out to test fourteen (14) hypotheses that
examined the extent to which various factors may have contributed to the peace in Ghana
– see Appendix 8. Data analysis therefore focused on testing all the fourteen (14)
hypothesis of the study to establish whether or not they can be rejected. Results of the
tests are presented in the sections below. Additionally, results from the qualitative
component of the study provide complementary insights for the assessing the issues
raised under each hypothesis. Perspectives from the Key Informant Interviews therefore
provide complementary or qualifier insights on the statistical data from the quantitative
testing of each hypothesis

Perceptions on Ghana as an Oasis of Peace
Ho1

There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a

peaceful country
Under this hypothesis, the study assessed the degree to which respondents with
different socioeconomic characteristics (age, regions of origin, gender, educational levels,
religious affiliations, occupations, and places of residence) agreed with the perception
that Ghana is a peaceful country. Table 7 shows that 90.5% of respondents (1294/1429)
agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country. In all,
52.6% of all respondents “very strongly” agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country, with
30.3% indicating strong agreement as well.

98

Table 7
Degrees to which Respondents Agree that Ghana is a Peaceful Country
Oasis of Peace
Mildly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
Very Strongly Agree
Skipped
Missing
Total

Frequency Percent
75
5.2
109
7.6
433
30.3
752
52.6
55
3.8
5
0.3
1429
100

Valid Percent
5.2
7.6
30.3
52.6
3.8
0.3
100

Figure 1 shows that more than 94% of respondents in all regions of Ghana, irrespective of
their educational levels, gender, and age categories agreed, strongly agreed, or very
strongly agreed that Ghana is an oasis of peace.
Figure 1
Percentage Of Respondents Who Said Ghana Is An Oasis Of Peace.

Region of Interview

94.5

5.5

Educational Level

94.6

5.4

Gender

94.6

5.4

Age Category

94.4

5.6

90%

92%

94%

96%

Agreed, Strongly Agreed, Very Strongly Agreed

98%

100%

Mildly Agreed

Personal experiences influence the perceptions on whether or not a country is peaceful.
Since age differences greatly influence personal experiences, and therefore, respondents’
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perception of peace, a One-Way ANOVA test was conducted under the following
assumptions:
a. Model: The data for the survey is based on Independent Random Samples
b. Interval-ratio levels of measurement is used
c. Populations are normally distributed
d. Population variances are equal (Healey, 2012, Kindle Version)
The descriptive statistics of the ANOVA test in Table 8 shows variations in the
means for all age categories are sizeable, ranging from a high of .915 for the 28-37 years
age category to a low of .558 for the 78-87 years age category, with equally sizeable
differences in the standard deviations for different age categories. This indicates that
variations within and between the age categories in their agreement that Ghana is an oasis
of peace are not small.
Table 8
Within and Between Age Variations on Perception of Peace in Ghana
Age
Categories of
Respondents
18 - 27 years
28-37 years
38-47 years
48-57 years
58-67 years
68-77 years
78-87 years
88-97 years
98 years or
older
Total

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error

95% Confidence Interval Minimum Maximum
for Mean
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
1.69
1.87
1
4
1.67
1.84
1
4
1.52
1.72
1
4
1.36
1.58
1
4
1.17
1.45
1
4
1.10
1.58
1
4
.72
2.08
1
2
.
.
1
1

313
409
290
166
93
47
5
1

1.78
1.76
1.62
1.47
1.31
1.34
1.40
1.00

.827
.915
.857
.728
.675
.815
.548
.

.047
.045
.050
.056
.070
.119
.245
.

1

2.00

.

.

.

.

2

2

1325

1.65

.851

.023

1.60

1.69

1

4

The One-Way ANOVA test of the hypothesis that age categories of respondents
has no effect on their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace produced a mean square
of 3.962 at 8 degrees of difference for an F statistic of 5.618 – Table 9. Since the
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associated significance level of 0.000 is less that the decision point of 0.05, we can reject
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the age categories of respondents
and their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace. In other words, differences in age
categories do affect the agreement among Ghanaians on whether their country is an oasis
of peace or not.
Table 9
Effect of Age of Respondents on Perception of Peace in Ghana
Source
Between
Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

31.699

8

3.962

928.112
959.811

1316
1324

.705

F
5.618

Sig.
.000

Table 10 presents the Chi Square values from the cross-tabulation of the responses
to the question on whether Ghana is a peaceful country with different socioeconomic
characteristics of respondents. Apart from results for cross-tabulation of the responses to
the question with gender categories, all scores returned two-tailed significance measures
of less than 0.05 for their respective chi square values. Hence the hypothesis that there is
no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country can be
rejected. In other words, there are differences in the perceptions of respondents of
different age categories, regions, religious affiliations, employment categories, and for
those living in different localities that Ghana is peaceful. For gender, however, the
hypothesis cannot be rejected since the Chi Square value of 8.936 has a two-tailed
significance of .538. In other words, the finding is coincidental and we cannot reject the
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hypothesis that there is no difference between the perceptions of men and women that
Ghana is a peaceful country.
Table 10
Significance Of Socio-Economic Characteristics Perception Of Peace in Ghana
Level of Measurement

Perceptions of different age categories of
people on why Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents from different
regions on why Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of different gender categories of
people on why Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents with different
levels of formal education on why Ghana is
peaceful
Perceptions of respondents of different
religious affiliations on why Ghana is
peaceful
Perceptions of respondents of different
employment categories on why Ghana is
peaceful
Perceptions of respondents living in different
localities on why Ghana is peaceful

Chi
Difference Two-tailed
Square
Significance
Value
114.419a
45
.000
580.059

45

.000

8.936a

10

.538

94.745

45

.000

364.223

50

.000

107.961

85

.047

189.253

30

.000

Analyses of responses to the same question from the key informant interviews
confirm the existence of differences in opinion among Ghanaians on whether or not the
country is peaceful. Similar to the results from the survey, while participants in the key
informant interviews generally agreed that Ghana enjoys some peace, many of them
promptly provided qualifiers to underscore that they do not “…agree a hundred percent”
(Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) with the view. On the contrary, they agreed largely that
“…Ghana is a relatively peaceful country, relative in terms of comparison with our
neighboring countries” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February,
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2014). While “to the extent that we have not had violent national level conflicts or wars,
we can say Ghana is peaceful” (interview 201, 15 October, 2014), the peace is “… also
relative in terms of when you look within the country that the country as a whole may be
described as peaceful but there are areas in the country that cannot be described as
peaceful” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In
brief, Ghana’s peace is relative i.e. in comparison to other countries and when viewed
only from the total national perspective. Otherwise, there are areas in Ghana that cannot
be described as peaceful.
Nature and Sources of Peace in Ghana
Ho2 there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of
peace Ghana enjoys.
The hypothesis is tested using two independent questions. Question 9 in the
interview protocol assesses participants’ classification of the type of peace Ghana has,
while question 10 assesses participants’ assessment of the factors that contribute to the
kind of peace they have observed in Ghana. On the type of peace, the hypothesis defined
negative peace as the absence of direct or physical violence even though there may be
other forms of violence such as structural and cultural violence that cause suffering, pain,
and death. Positive peace, on the other hand, was defined as the absence of direct,
structural, and cultural violence. In all, 79% of respondents indicated that Ghana enjoys
positive peace. For the 1409 respondents to the question who also indicated their gender
category, the Chi Square value of 1.330 gives a two-tailed significance test result of
0.514 for the cross-tabulation of responses on the type of Ghana’s peace with gender
categories of respondents. By age categories, the test result showed a Chi Square value of
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22.244 with a two-tailed significance measure of .135. Cross tabulation of the responses
with respondents’ religion gave a Pearson Chi Square value of 24.848 with a two-tailed
significance of 0.732.
Since all three measures of significance are greater than 0.05, the findings in all
three cases are insignificant and we conclude that there is no difference between men and
women, age categories, and the religious affiliations of respondents in their classification
of Ghana’s peace as positive or negative. Indeed, for gender about the same percentages
of men and women believed that Ghana’s peace is positive (79.7% for men and 78.7%
for women). Similarly, more than 75% of respondents of all age categories indicated that
Ghana has positive peace. At least 78% of respondents who declared their religious
affiliation as atheists, adherents of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous
African Religion or combinations thereof said Ghana’s peace was a positive one. It is
observable that by creed, 78.0% of Christian respondents (833/1068), 80.5% of their
Moslem counterparts (210/261), and 85.7% of believers in Indigenous African Religions
(60/70) said Ghana’s peace is positive.
With respect to the level of educational attainment and respondents’ perception of
the type of peace that Ghana has, the cross tabulation returns a Pearson Chi Square value
of 28.280 with a two-tailed significance of 0.029. Similar significant findings are
reported for cross-tabulations of the perception of the type of peace in Ghana with
respondents’ region where the interviews were conducted (two-tailed significance
measure of .000 for a Chi Square value of 49.81); and locality of residence of
respondents (Chi Square Value of 91.042 two-tailed significance measure of .000). Since
for these cases, as well, the significance values are less than the p-value of 0.05, the
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findings are significant and we can reject the assertions that there are no differences
between the level of educational attainment of respondents; respondents of different
regions; and rural/urban dwellers in their assessment of the type of peace that Ghana has.
Age and gender cross-tabulations, however, turned up insignificant findings of Chi
square value of 22.244 with p = .135 for age, and 1.330 with p = .515 for gender – Table
11.
Table 11
Significance Levels of Respondents’ Perceptions on Type of Peace in Ghana
Level of
Chi Square
Measurement
Value
Gender
1.330a
Religion
9.184a
Age Category of
22.244
Respondents
Educational Level
28.280a
Region of interview
480.850a
Locality
79.098a

Difference
2
14
16

Two-tailed
Significance
.514
.819
.135

16
18
10

.029
.000
.000

Respondents in the KII were, however, less sure about the degree to which
Ghana’s peace can be described as positive or negative. Asked to indicate whether
Ghana’s peace was positive or negative peace, the majority of participants indicated that
Ghana’s peace is such that “…sometimes it is difficult to even rule the line between the
negative peace and the positive peace” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). More than half
of the participants in the KII (16/31) said Ghana’s peace is “… a mixture of both
[negative and positive], but increasingly, in recent times, the negative dimensions are
outweighing the positive” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). To illustrate this
perception, another respondent indicated that “if I were to put a range positive 1 to 10
[and then the] negative 1 to 10 I will give positive may be 4 or 5 [out of 10) and I will
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give negative 6 or 7” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014), also out of 10. In other words,
while Ghana can be considered to be a 40-50% positive peace country, it has to be
classified as a 60-70% negative peace country.
These ratings derive from the fact that even though “seen from the outside it may
look peaceful […] there are areas in the country that cannot be described as peaceful”
(Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Hence, “even though from a national perspective you
may consider Ghana’s peace to be positive, when you look at it area by area, you will
definitely see it as negative peace” (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014). In other words,
although Ghana has escaped the ravages of war, its peace is “… a lot more on the
negative side because we do have institutions that have sort of mediated and which have
drawn the country from the brink of war” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Hence, even
though Ghanaians may not have “… taken up arms on a large scale against each other
[and] are not shedding blood, but it is an uneasy peace” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).
This is probably why another participant found “…it comfortable and easier to describe
Ghana as negative peace. Why because poverty is still very pervasive; and you can check
the figures, in fact in some instances we can even say that poverty is growing” (interview
2, 7 February, 2014). One respondent believed that whatever there is of negative peace in
Ghana it “…is largely because of weakness in the social protection thing” (interview 217
13 December 2014). This tilting of Ghana’s peace to the negative is in spite of the
cultural abhorrence of conflict and strife which mandates “…leaders in the traditional set
up [to constantly find] ways and means …to bring about peace and then reconciliation”
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). This suggests that but for the interventions of various
institutions and actors, Ghana would not have been any different from its neighbors.
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Notably, however, eight (8) out of the 31 respondents categorically stated that
Ghana’s peace is positive, since “we are able to name what is going on, [and] we are able
to struggle to overcome that” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) or because “Ghanaians
have tended to absorb them, [because of] the attitude of ooh leave it to God one day there
will be a solution” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). Access to “...an enabling
environment that allows you to exercise your fundamental human rights” (interview 213,
9 December, 2014) was also cited as a reason for classifying Ghana’s peace as positive.
On the other hand, participants who placed Ghana categorically under negative peace
cited “…structural underpinnings in the system that can easily lead the country to
explode” (interview 215, 10 December, 2014). Poverty and corruption were frequently
cited as structural and systemic roots of negative peace. In particular, persistent high
levels of poverty which make people suffer and die “…even though you may not hear of
it [because] it’s not reported in the media (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014); and the
“…injustice in the system which is leading to unnecessary deaths of children [or creating
the conditions for] many people [who are] suffering in silence” (Interview 201, 21
November, 2014) were cited to support the classification. In brief, respondents in the KII
who had an opportunity to discuss Ghana’s peace are more definite in their assessment of
the type of peace Ghana enjoys – it is more negative than positive.
Ho2 also assessed respondents opinions on the extent to which the level of civic
awareness among Ghanaians; the degree of agreement among political leaders on
important issues affecting Ghana; the presence of strong, efficient, and neutral
institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the public and civil Services; the value of
peace in the cultures of all ethnic groups; the level of influence of religious beliefs on
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peace; recourse to prayers and intercessions by religious groups; the strength of bonds of
intermarriages between ethnic groups; Ghanaians’ degree of respect for the rule of law;
and the fear of being singled out for punishment, contribute to peace in Ghana. To
ascertain the degree of convergence on the responses from the survey, a construct of the
mean of responses for all nine (9) variables was computed. Table 12 below presents the
results of the construct, which indicates that on average 55.3% of all the respondents
agreed from a moderately high to a very high extent that all the nine variables contributed
towards the peace that Ghana has.
Table 12
Means for Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace
Case Selection:
FacsCon >= 7.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing
Total

Frequency Percent
635
44.4
787
55.1
1422
99.5
7
0.5
1429
100

Valid
Percent
44.7
55.3
100

Figure 2 presents a summary of the responses on the contribution of various
factors to Ghana’s peace, filtered at  6.5 on the 9 point Likert scale to represent
responses that ranged from moderate extent to very high extent for the nine (9) factors for
the variables detailed above. The results show that more than two thirds of all the
respondents in the survey (at least 66.9%) agreed that all the nine factors contribute in
large measure’s to the peace that Ghana enjoys. Of the nine, however, prayers and
intercessions by religious groups for peace recorded the highest rate as a contributor to
peace (88.9%), while the culture of peace among ethnic groups in Ghana comes up next
at 84.5%; with religious beliefs that value peace coming close with 81.6% rating by
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respondents. The contribution of the level of civic awareness among Ghanaians attracts
the least mention of all the nine indicators (66.9%). This suggests that received or
socially engrained religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to
peace in Ghana than the knowledge of civic awareness gained from the public sphere.
Between religion in the form of prayers and intercessions and culture, however, the
former trumps as a stronger contributor to peace. Notably, the contribution of religious
leaders to peace closely matches that of culture; giving religion an overall higher rating as
a contributor to Ghana’s peace than culture.
Figure 2
Summary of Responses on Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace
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Appendix 9 presents a summary of the Chi Square test results for the individual
variables when cross-tabulated with the profile of respondents. Only four out of the 45
tests did not report significant findings. These were in respect of the cross-tabulation
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between level of civic awareness among Ghanaians and age categories of responses (p =
.067), as well as, for gender (p = .074). The cross-tabulation between the presence of
strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the Public
and Civil Services and religious affiliations of Ghanaians also turned up a two-tailed
significance level of .054, while “Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic groups”
produced a two-tailed significance level of .088 when cross-tabulated with gender. In
other words, the study cannot reject the hypothesis that age and gender differences have
no effect on participants’ perception of the contribution of citizens’ level of civic
awareness on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Similarly, we cannot reject the supposition
that both men and women respondents did not find that the existence of strong bonds of
intermarriage between different ethnic groups had an effect on the peace that Ghana
enjoys.

Respondents of different religious backgrounds did not also find that the

presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and
the Public and Civil Services had any effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Besides
these 4/45 cases, all other Chi Square test results have produced significant findings,
thereby suggesting that on the whole, other demographic factors influence respondents’
appreciation of the extent to which the nine different factors have contributed to the peace
in Ghana. Except for the nuances detailed above then, we can reject Ho2 that there are no
differences among respondents in their perceptions of the nature and sources of peace in
Ghana.
Results of the key informant interviews confirm the trends in the assessment of
the role of prayers as an anchor for Ghana’s peace. As one responded noted, Ghanaians
“…do pray a lot for the country [and] that also is very very important [in attracting] the
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mercies of God” (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014) to keep Ghana peaceful. Indeed, it
has become “…a standard practice for many years … that many people pray for peace”
(Interview 218, 14 December, 2014) during times of national crises. In the run up to
every election since 1992, “…there is an overwhelming mobilization from a religious
perspective about why the elections must be peaceful including organizing all night
prayer sessions, prayer camps, errm all manner of religious activities for the elections to
be peaceful” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This mobilization for prayers cuts all
religious divides, as Christians, Muslims, and people of other faiths are known to hold
prayer sessions to pray “…for the peaceful elections” (Interview 217, 13 December,
2014).
Praying for the nation is perhaps, the only place participants have credited women
with a frontline role in the quest for peace in Ghana. It was noted, for instance, that
“Women’s Aglow … hold a monthly intercession pray at the independence square for the
peace of this country and it’s something that we need to recognize” (Interview 203, 28
October, 2014). Another interviewee would add that “…if it comes to mobilizing people
for prayers, fasting, and all that most of them are women [and] ...most of the prayer
meetings we attend they are mainly women [because] at the end of the day they are
[concerned] more about their maternal instincts, fending for their spouses and the
children” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; see also, Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). In
brief, interviewees credited divine interventions in part for the peace of Ghana due to the
role of prayer and active engagement of faith-based organizations in intercessions for,
and the preaching of peace before, during, and after elections. The National Chief Imam
sums up this view in respect of the 2012 elections when he observed that:
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Before the 2012 general election, we cried before Allah to make a choice
for us without any bloodshed, we prayed for peace before, during and after
the election. Yes, our prayer was answered and there was no bloodshed,
no blows on the street and no insult but the dispute rather in
court.”(Sharubutu, 2013).
While the efficacy of prayers as a contributor to Ghana’s peace remains beyond
the realms of objective verification, several ancillary benefits of Ghanaians recourse to
divine interventions lend themselves to verification. For instance, respondents have noted
that joint prayers of different faiths during public functions “…helps [us] to identify
ourselves with each other and [reinforces] the bonding” (Interview 218, 14 December,
20014) among the different religious and ethnic groups in the country. Beyond promoting
interfaith tolerance, respect, and peaceful coexistence, the religiosity of Ghanaians
endows religious leaders with legitimacy that political leaders can only envy. As one
respondent indicated because “…religion plays a big role in all sectors of society in
Ghana, we still listen to our religious leaders; we listen to them when they come up with
an issue… we flock to them, and they have played [and] they do play a strong role in
promoting peace. (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). This legitimacy has served as strong
footholds that have anchored the intrusion and engagement of Ghana’s faith leaders and
institutions in the public sphere. Hence, since the coming into being of Ghana as a nationstate, faith leaders in the country have leveraged the legitimacy they have from the
population to intervene directly and proactively in matters of state to ensure that duty
bearers at all levels live up to their responsibilities in ensuring peace. At all times, “…the
religious bodies, the Catholics, the protestants have often stood up for social justice; they
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have stood up, commented on, advocated for, or supported issues on social justice but not
issues on partisan basis” (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).
KII participants strongly endorsed the adherence of Ghanaians to a culture of
peace as a major contributor to the country’s ability to stave off violent national level
conflicts. They pointed out that despite the fact that the country is made of more than 50
ethnic groups with different cultures, a certain level of cultural osmosis and
homogenization has resulted in the development of a set of shared core values that prize
peace over violence. As one respondent summed up the view:
Even though we have many different ethnic groups with different cultures,
we have over the years seen a convergence or commonalities in some
cultural values and practices; so in a way you can say we have a Ghanaian
culture, which is hospitable, welcoming. It’s part of the culture to give
whatever we cannot manage to God (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014).

Respondents cited intermarriages, the ability of Ghanaians to migrate to and settle
anywhere of their choice in the country without fear; as well as, friendships struck from
shared educational, work, and religious affiliations as indicators of the intercultural
accommodation, and even assimilation, across all ethnic groups in Ghana. This strongly
underscores the culture of peace in the country. Explaining why Ghanaians will find it
difficult to engage in widespread national violence, a respondent pointed out that
“…where you have people from different tribes mixing and they see themselves as
brothers and sisters, and not as somebody coming from the north or from the south; that
we live together, we eat the same food (smiles), if you cut me it is the same blood that I
will shed, it is the same blood that you would shed” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014); that
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is enough to restrain people from fighting. To illustrate the culture that underwrites
Ghana’s peace, another respondent recounted an incident of confrontation between the
Police and a youth group during the tensed moments in 2008, when the election results
were inclusive. The scene was set for a violent confrontation as the youth “...charged on
the Police. [But] “All of a sudden they stopped and started chanting: ‘We want peace;
we want peace; we want peace’ (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). This kind of situation,
in the view of another respondent, demonstrates that Ghana’s cultural predisposition is
“…not the culture of violence, but the culture of peace” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).
Probed on how it can be said that Ghana has a culture of peace when the country
is host to several protracted violent intra and interethnic conflicts, respondents were quick
to point out the fact that these conflicts are quickly contained and not allowed to spread.
This, in their view, is proof that the wider Ghanaian culture abhors violence and would
do anything to quell it before it engulfs the entire country. One respondent took a
philosophical twist to the question in saying in the Akan language that “ yie sie  tu a

nu na ma a yie  y d” meaning, it is the brawl at a funeral that lightens the
atmosphere. In his view such isolated cases of localized conflicts do not represent general
disposition to violence. On the contrary, “there are other factors that are coming into play
that make Ghana so solid I don’t see how we can fight the way even Ivory Coast fought”
(Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
Consistent with the findings of the survey, participants in the KIIs also placed
limited emphasis on the contribution of civic education to the peace of Ghana. This is
essentially because the state institutions, including the educational system and the
National Commission for Civic Education were faulted for failing to live up to their
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expectations of developing and prosecuting programs that would inculcate the culture of
peace among Ghanaians. Citing specifically the National Commission for Civic
Education, a participant observed that “… Ghanaians want to see them more present in
the type of civic education about elections. I don’t want to sound too critical of them, but
I thought they were absent in the [2012] election” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).
Echoing the sentiment, another respondent advocates that Ghana needs to “… find a way
either through actual peace education as we know elsewhere or strengthening civic
education, democratic education so that these can become the tools for pursuing peace”
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). In brief, the findings from the KIIs support the views
from the survey that religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to
peace in Ghana than the acquired knowledge of civic awareness. In other words, the
propensity of Ghanaians to avoid violence is more innate and socio-culturally engrained
from their cultural and faith upbringing than cognitively acquired from the state
sponsored civic and formal educational systems.

Contribution of Development to Peace in Ghana
Ho3

Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the

peace in the country
This hypothesis tested respondents’ view on the extent to which horizontal
inequalities or the geopolitical disparities in economic development in the country affect
the peace in Ghana. It examined respondents’ perceptions on the contribution of the
overall level of economic development of Ghana to its peace; perceptions of the impact
of geographical (north-south; rural-urban) disparities in the level of development on the
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peace in Ghana; the contribution of transparent and equitable contracts for natural
resource exploitation and management to peace; the effects of perceived equitable returns
on Ghana’s natural resource contracts on peace; perception of equitable allocation of
revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country; and the
perceived effects of effective and efficient use of proceeds from natural resources for the
common good or the development of the country as a whole on peace in Ghana.
The survey used six questions hinged on national policies, programs, and
procedures for development to gauge the views of respondents on the said variables.
Figure 3 summaries the 4.5 midpoint responses to the six 9 point Likert scale questions.
For five variables, more than 60% of respondents agreed very strongly, strongly agreed,
simply agreed, or mildly agreed that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the
country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government. The same
proportion of respondents also believed that transparently negotiated natural resource
management contracts contribute to Ghana’s peace. Similarly, the equitable and fair
returns to Ghana on the exploitation of her natural resources contribute to the peace in the
country. In the same way, the equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to
development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana. They also
agreed that proceeds from the exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources are used in ways
that benefit the whole country. Noticeable, however, more than 30% of respondents
disagreed on all scores. Similarly, with respect to the statement that Ghana is more
peaceful than its neighbors because it has a high level of economic development, only
51.5% of respondents agreed with the statement, while 48.5% disagreed to various levels
– see Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Perceptions of Contribution of Economic Development to Peace in Ghana
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Put together, the construct of means for all six variables shows that 68.2% of
respondents who provided answers to the questions for all the variables agreed to various
extent that the policies, programs, processes, and outcomes of economic development in
Ghana have contributed to the peace that the Ghana has – see Table 13.
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Table 13
Construct of Mean of responses on Effect of Economic Development on Ghana’s Peace.
Case Selection:
DevCon <= 4.5
(FILTER)
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

451
967
1418
11
1429

31.6
67.7
99.2
.8
100.0

Valid
Percent
31.8
68.2
100.0

Disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics of respondents and the different
variables, however, several nuances emerge. On the effect of the state of economic
development in Ghana as compared to other countries as a contributor to peace,
significant findings (p < 0.05) among respondents of different educational level, regions
of interview, and primary occupation. However, gender and age categories reported
insignificant findings (p > 0.05). A review of the data shows that while 44.3% of male
respondents (321/609) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply with the statement that
Ghana’s level of economic development has contributed to its peace in comparison to its
neighbors, only 37.9% of women (206/543) had the same level of agreement on the
subject. With respect to the impact of regional disparities in economic development,
significant findings emerged for only the educational levels and regions of residence of
the respondents. Age category, gender, and primary occupation of respondents turned up
p-values > 0.05. On the level of transparency in the management of natural resources,
significant findings emerged for all socio-economic characteristics except gender,
occupation, and educational level of respondents. Gender alone recorded insignificant
results when cross-tabulated with respondents’ perception on whether Ghana is receiving
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equitable returns on her natural resource exploitations. Similarly, it is also only gender
that came up with insignificant findings (p > 0.05) on the question on how effectively
proceeds from natural resources are used for development purposes – see Appendix 10.
In brief, the study finds mixed reactions from respondents on the notion that the
level of economic development in Ghana, and how the processes associated with the
management of its revenue base – natural resources – have contributed to the peace of the
country. While about two thirds of respondents agree in some measure that Ghana’s
peace is attributable to its level and processes of development, a third of the respondents
do not agree with this suggest. These nuances notwithstanding, since the p-values on the
Chi Square measures for the hypothesis report significance results > 0.05, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis (Ho3) that disparities in the distribution of development in
Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country.
The Key Informant Interviews provide insights on the apparent lack of agreement
among survey respondents on the role of economic development on Ghana’s peace. The
participants brought up four categories of responses to the question on whether or not
Ghana’s state of economic development is a contributor to its peace: the affirmative, the
dismissive, the ambivalent, and the false-positives. Respondents who agreed that Ghana’s
level of development has contributed to its peace (the affirmatives) cited increased access
to education and communication technology, specifically cellphones and television, as
major development factors that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. This is because
increased information flow through these media is facilitating changes in perceptions and
attitudes, especially among ethnic groups that once exhibited repressive attitudes towards
others (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Others suggested that official State
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acknowledgment of the existence of the development gap between the north and the
south, and the visible attempts of governments to bridge that gap through various
interventions are attenuating factors to the emergence of any collective grievance that can
trigger north-south conflict (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In particular,
respondents cited visible state efforts such as Nkrumah’s accelerated educational
development policy (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014); the agricultural development
initiatives of the Acheampong era , which saw the development of large scale irrigation
projects, as evidence of conscious efforts to bridge the north-south divide in
development. They also averred that recent initiatives for the accelerated development of
the north such as the proposed Northern Development Authority in the NPP era that was
subsequently rechristened the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority under the
NDC, have all signaled to northerners that there is a national intent to bridge the
development gap, even if the outcomes from the implementation of these projects have
fallen short of expectations.
Overall, respondents noted that the country’s educational systems and level of
infrastructural development seems to be ahead of many other countries in West Africa.
To emphasize the point a respondent recalled that on “…the few occasions when I had
the opportunity to travel outside … and anytime I came back to Ghana, I felt I had come
to heaven; that is the way I felt” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). And that feeling of
pride in the comparative advancement of the country, in the view of respondents, held
Ghanaians back from taking up arms at the national level. Finally, there is a heightened
awareness among Ghanaians, dating back to the pre-independence era that all the
territorial units that eventually came together as Ghana must function together for the
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survival of the country and the common good. As one respondent pointed out, the sitting
Governor had made this clear in 1951 when he said “That the Gold Coast cannot function
as a country, except the three parts come together [and that northern] Chiefs in the Gold
Coast Legislative Council, [subsequently] made it abundantly clear that the Colony
cannot stand alone. Ashanti cannot stand alone. The North cannot stand alone; our
future lies in unity” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). In the view of the respondent, this
recognition on the part of the traditional and political leadership of Ghana of the need for
unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the mutual benefit of all has
underscored the conscious effort at national integration. It engrained the consciousness of
economic interdependencies in the national psyche.
Respondents who did not agree Ghana’s level of economic development had
anything to do with its peace (the dismissives) subscribed to the view that even though
“development does influence conflicts, but [the impact is generally] not much... [because]
we have also seen situations where people are living in very deplorable conditions and
yet they are not fighting among themselves or against other people.” (Interview 201, 15
October, 2014). Another respondent would add that “…There are countries that are
stable, you don’t hear about them not because they are more prosperous [and] there also
very prosperous countries” (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014) that are trapped in violent
conflicts. In view of this category of respondents, the state of development does not seem
to be an indicator that a country will not fall into violence. They cited the counterfactual
example of “Cote d’Ivoire [which was comparatively] well-developed, and yet political
tensions erupted” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). If the state of development were a
factor for peace, “Nobody would have thought that in West Africa that Cote d’Ivoire
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would have had the problem they had” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Respondents
also cited Kenya as a counterfactual argument.
The Ambivalent among the KII participants held that with respect to the impact of
development on Ghana’s peace “it’s difficult to measure that in Ghana; it’s very difficult”
(interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the view of this category of respondents, this is
because it is not the total development of the country or the north-south divide in
development that are risk factors for conflicts; it is the perceived inequities in the
distribution of development resources at the interpersonal levels that creates tensions and
conflicts (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In the view
of another respondent:
It is very difficult to say that development has played a positive or
negative role because frankly speaking if you look at the disparity in the
development certainly there is that divide between the north and the south
and the north has been underdeveloped since colonial time… the north has
been highly underdeveloped …lagged far behind the south in development
terms; you see very little effort being made to address that” (Interview 3, 7
February, 2014).

For this group of respondents, even recent development such as the Savannah
Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) which was set up to bridge the
development gap between the north and the south has failed and poverty between the two
is widening. Hence, if “the development divide was a contribution to conflict in the
country then you should have seen a lot more antagonism between the north and the
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south [but] we don’t see that kind of antagonism…” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).
Explaining the lack of mobilized antagonisms in the north against the south on account of
the horizontal inequalities cited a number of factors. According to one of the respondents,
the lack of mobilization of the north against the south is attributable to the resignation of
the northerners to their fate of underdevelopment, as “the north has been made to accept
[…] second rate status in the country” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Another opines
that the north that could have been the “…flash point” for relative deprivation related
conflicts has not triggered the kind of geo-ethnic conflicts witnessed elsewhere on the
continent because the north is “…still caught up in the euphoria of party politics [as] the
parties have in the way blurred the lines between north-south” (Interview 4, 12 February,
2014). Besides, we “…have people in the northern elite who benefit if one’s party is in
office.” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). As a result, the opportunity to satisfy one’s
personal and family needs without having to deal with the wider question of north-south
economic disparity and deprivation has “blurred the lines and it is difficult to build
consensus within the north” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Another respondent
insinuated that northern leaders, especially the chiefs, have not been as assertive as their
counterparts in other regions who are seen to be “pushing…more assertively than the
northerners have done” (Interview 3, February, 2014) to project the needs of their citizens
and use same to mobilize their constituents for action.
Other respondents pointed out northerners, especially the younger ones have
found escape routes out of their poverty traps through seasonal migration to the south or
elsewhere during the off-farm seasons in search of jobs and income. As a result, there is
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no critical mass of angry young people who can mobilize to instigate a north-south
confrontation. Illustrating the point, a respondent in this study cites the case where:
…in Pusiga for example, you go during the harshest part of the year and
almost all the young men have migrated to the south. So you don’t then
have this group of angry young men in the community saying that this,
that, that, but they’ve found other measures to cope” (Interview 4, 12
February, 2014).

Complementing this view on the anger displacement effect of migration, another
respondent noted that the freedom of movement and settlement of Ghanaians across the
country creates opportunities for “people in the north who may be peeved or angry that
they are marginalized in terms of the economic divide” (Interview 215, 10 December
2014) to relocate and work in the south. This gives people in the north “…a stake in what
goes on well in the south because it helps to take them up; in the same way that you have
people from the south who also invest and do business in the north”. Hence, even though
the north-south divide in terms of development exists, the possibility of migration to and
from the south, and the attendant economic benefits and interests is “…an insurance that
sort of helps us to avoid conflict” (Interview 215, 10 December 2014), especially related
to violent reactions to the development gap between the north and the south. In other
words, ease of cross regional migration and access to economic opportunities in the south
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; Interview 215, 10 December, 2014; Interview 210, 21
November, 2014), is effectively a disincentive to the people of the north to mobilize to
fight those in the south, since doing so could jeopardize their ability to access the
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resources of the south. Be it as may, the combination of these factors have created the
situation where the opportunity for anyone to latch onto the “frustration-aggression”
potential energy of the north, and especially of the youth in that part of the country and
channel that into “anger-driven behavior” (Ametewe, in Tonah, 2007, p. 26) against the
south is lost. Other respondents suggested that self-complacency among those most
affected by relative deprivation attenuates their anger. According to this view, the nonmaterialistic nature of Ghanaians sets a low material satisfaction threshold for most
people. As a result, people are happy with the little that they have; they do not depend on
external others, especially government to satisfy their needs; and “they are not comparing
themselves to other people; they are satisfied with whatever they have and they depend
upon whatever they have to survive; [therefore], they are not ready to go and indulge in
violence before they survive, they are satisfied (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).
Respondents cited the activities of nonstate development actors in the north as a
major shield against this anger-driven behavior that Ametewe has indicated. As one
respondent put it, although unequally distributed, the investments of developmentfocused Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) provide substantial relief and
development services to the north. This, in the view of the respondent, has contributed to
the mollification of communal anger against the state for its failure to right the wrongs of
policy failures of the past and the present that perpetuate the development gap between
the north and the south, and for that matter other parts of the country that receive similar
non-state development support. In the words of the respondent, “NGOs have found a way
of calming [community anger]…rather than being organizations that facilitate citizens’
agency, their voices, we rather serve as a palliative, we go in and you know calm down
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things” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Citing the case of the eastern corridor of the
Northern Region, another respondent noted that the peacebuilding efforts of NGOs have
equally been effective in helping communities at conflict to contain their grievances,
without exploring the wider structural and systemic factors that may have exacerbated
their grievances in ways that lead them to violent conflicts (Interview 6, 18th February,
2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014). According to these respondents, by shielding
the state from the potential anger of marginalized citizens, development NGOs are
temporary displacing the anger of the deprived.
Beyond the north-south development divide, issues of relative deprivation exist in
other parts of the country. Even though there is some development in the south in
general, it’s not evenly distributed. Large differences exist between the rural and urban
areas, and within the urban areas as well. As one respondent noted, “over the past 20
years the gap is widening between the very poor and the very rich” (Interview 12, 4
March, 2014) as evidenced by the “…abundant display of wealth” in some areas,
especially in the urban areas, in comparison to the dire poverty in the same cities.
Consequently the incidents of violent conflicts are concentrated in and tend to be
contained within poor rural areas and urban slums. The attendant threat to the peace of
the country lies in the fact that “a country is as strong as it is able to take of its vulnerable
and I am not yet sure that we have done, (pause) we have worked sufficiently to protect
our weak and our vulnerable; and so we have social justice issues” (Interview 12, 4
March, 2014).
Respondents who believed that the contribution of Ghana’s state of development
to its peace is a false-positive essentially argued that the impact of development on peace
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in Ghana is a mirage. This is because the contribution of Ghana’s state of development on
peace in the country is “Not very much in the positive domain as far as I am concerned
… if you go to certain rural areas in this country, they still live in the same conditions,
excuse my language, huts, mud houses, errm, that our ancestors, our forefathers lived in
over 100 years ago” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). In the view of this category of
respondents, the state of development in Ghana has not been the trigger for conflicts
because of the existence of multiple escape routes that allow aggrieved citizens to mortify
their anger against failures of the state and other duty bearers. For the elite and middleclass, a conscious distancing, disengagement, or even exit from any confrontational
engagement with state institutions and officials who have failed the citizenry is the
escape route. In the words of a respondent, “…the so called middle class in Ghana [that
should have championed the collectivization of citizens’ anger against the failures of duty
bearers, have rather] opted for private solutions to public problems” (interviewer 4, 12
February, 2014). Rather than take on political leaders and other duty bearers for failures
in the delivery of social services and public goods, they disengage and try to fix the
problems privately. Hence, “… if water is not working rather than engaging to find out
what we need to do, you go and sink boreholes; … The roads are not working [you buy]
bigger four wheel drives; … no electricity, you go for a generator” (Interview 4, 12
February, 2014). Those who do not want to go through the trouble of finding their own
solutions to state failure and inadequacies simply exit the state system through migration
to other more functional countries, usually Europe and North America. Even when they
stay back, they send their children to schools outside to escape the challenges with the
educational system; when the local health insurance is collapsing, “…we are going in for
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private insurance” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) instead of engaging the system to
make sure that it functions. Those who can afford it fly out for medical attention since
they cannot rely on local health services. In parallel, “…the other social groups I think
they also have found ways of disengaging from the state” (Interview 4, 12 February,
2014) through refusal to pay taxes or resort to occasional demonstrations that have little
to no effect on changing the situation. Buttressing the point on elite recourse to the use of
private solutions to address public problems, another respondent highlights the
individualism and exclusivism that cocoons the middle class, not only from the state, but
from engagements with their peers for more effective ways of managing state failures for
a greater common good. Citing his own example the respondent notes that “I have a
borehole, it cost me GHC7,500 to do the borehole, I pump it once a week, and the water
is underground, why can’t the five of us, come together, and pump the borehole and share
the water, the cost and the water and agree on how it is managed? (Interview 217, 13
December, 2014).
A career in politics is another escape route, respondents indicated. In their view,
citizens without the means to solve their problems by themselves find refuge in politics as
the route for private wealth accumulation and exit from the poverty trap. This, according
to respondents, is why “…you see young people come [out of school] and go into politics
and within two three months he’s already starting a house” (Interview 207, 29 October,
2014). Even party activists such as the “foot soldiers” who have no direct access to power
and state resources , “have a way of benefiting” when their party is in power. For those
who cannot access the spoils of power, they take their refuge in the wanton exploitation
of any natural resource that lies in their way, without due regard for its effect on the
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environment, the communities, the economy, or any other negative consequences their
acts may wrought (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014; also, Interview 215, 10 December
2014). In parallel, the horde of unemployed youth in the urban areas latch onto any
“…type of business being labeled as lucrative …Whether it is [selling] pure water as they
call it or selling phone cards, or pushing trucks, any type of buying and selling, you see
people engaged in those things [to try to] make a living out of it” (Interview, 9, 26
February, 2014). In sum, rather than engage with duty bearers to demand that the right
things are done to improve their conditions of living, Ghanaians tend to avoid conflict by
fending for themselves, using whatever means is at their disposal.
Respondents, however, observed that the younger generation of citizens is
increasingly linking their economic fortunes and livelihood conditions, especially in the
provision of electricity, roads, and other social amenities to public policy making
processes, including elections. In election years for instance, it is common to see in some
communities protest billboards such as “no electricity, no vote; no road, no vote”
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, such community anger at state failures is not
sufficiently galvanized to have a direct and large scale impact on peace.
In sum, respondents have emphasized the geo-ethnic interdependencies as a key
factor for the accommodation and cooperation between northerners and southerners in
Ghana for the country’s peace to prevail. This economic interdependencies between the
north and the south that has served as a stitch for peace, has historical antecedents, in the
view of one respondent (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). As he illustrated, the geoecological composition of Ghana constituted natural trading blocs between the people of
the coast, the central forest belt, and the northern Savannah, dating back to the pre-
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colonial times. Being business-oriented, the Ashanti kingdom in the center took
advantage of the differences in economic resources that this natural geographical and
environmental partitioning of the country wrought to organize a unified trade system that
inured to its benefits. They leveraged their location in the center; their wedge between
the coastal areas with its access to the Whiteman and his goodies; and their access to the
northern savannah countries with their demands for kolanuts and other forest products, as
well as, their offer of woven cloth, to create economic interdependencies that greatly
benefitted the Ashantis. The same interdependencies remain today, even though the
commodities of trade may have changed in their composition and values.
Other interviewees have referenced the same regional economic
interdependencies and asserted that Ghana’s peace is possible largely because private
businesses want to have a peaceful environment for their businesses to thrive. As one
respondent noted, “…if you have property …that is [worth] about a hundred thousand
dollars you don’t want it to be destroyed; [besides] businesses know that their businesses
will prevail when there is peace, so they are interested in ensuring peace” (Interview 206,
29 October, 2014). In sum, state-initiated development interventions have not had much
impact on the lives of people. As such “the majority of Ghanaians are apathetic with
political governance or activity. Most of them will say “country broke or country no
broke we de inside” (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In other words, it does not matter
what happens to the state of development in the country, all citizens have to fend for
themselves. The best then is for peace to prevail so that everyone can try to irk out a
living (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014).
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State’s Respect for Human Rights, Rule of Law and Peace in Ghana
Ho4

The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no

effect on the peace that the country enjoys.
This hypothesis sought to establish the extent to which perceived respect for
human rights and freedoms of the citizens affects the peace in Ghana. Accordingly,
respondents were asked to state their level of agreement or disagreement on whether
Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa because Ghanaians have more
freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested; Ghana is peaceful because
Ghanaians enjoy more political freedom than their neighbors in other countries; and
Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of
political opponents are minimal.
The frequency run for the variable on respect for freedom of expression shows
that 87.7% (n=1419) of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply
agreed that Ghana’s peace is in part due to the ability of Ghanaians to express themselves
freely. An additional 7.0% mildly agreed with the statement. On whether the level of
political freedom in the country is a contributor to peace in Ghana, 83.3% of the
respondents (n=1420) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the statement.
Similarly, 87.4% of the respondents (n= 1423) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed
that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and
disappearances of political opponents are minimal. The construct of means for the three
variables with a 4.5 level cut off to include respondents who mildly agreed as well shows
that 94.4% of respondents to all three questions very strongly, strongly, simply, or mildly
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agreed that Ghana’s peace is in part attributable to respect for human rights in the
country.
Table 14
Effect of Respect of Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace
Selection of Cases
HRCons <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
74
1349
1423
6
1429

5.2
94.4
99.6
.4
100.0

Valid
Percent
5.2
94.8
100.0

In a cross tabulation of the three variables with the age category, gender,
educational level, region in which interviews were conducted and the primary occupation
of respondents, all the tests turned up significant findings with two-tailed significance
levels less than or equal to .05 – Appendix 11. This means that a the hypothesis that
there is no difference among respondents in their perception of the level of contribution
of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana has on the peace that the country
enjoys can be rejected. In other words, the findings that 94.4% of respondents agree to
vary the extents that Ghana’s peace is attributable to the level of respect for human rights
and the rule of law is a significant find. Therefore, Ho4, which posits that the level of
respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the
country enjoys can be rejected.
KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that respect for the freedom
of expression and political freedoms, as they currently exist have contributed to
sustaining Ghana’s current peace. However, this has not always been so historically. In
the view of respondents, it is the liberalization of the air waves in the late 1990s and the
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repeal of the libel laws in the mid-2000s that has created the new dispensation of
freedoms (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). Otherwise, many respondents recalled the
periods when the freedom of speech and the media were suppressed or were tightly
controlled to serve the interests of the governments of the day, especially when the
culture of silence reigned in the 1980s (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).
Respondents saw the current political dispensation as largely positive, but with
inherent dangers for the peace of the country. First, the guarantees of human rights have
not necessarily translated into the creation of opportunities for the attainment of those
rights. Hence, for example, “…there is a difference between having the space [or]
freedom of education or rights to education, however, if you are not given the means to
school, if you don’t have a school near your home, you don’t have access to it, it makes it
difficult” (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). This brings back to focus the question of
development opportunities and its impact on peace in the country. Beyond the physical
and financial ability to access their rights, however, respondents also raised a wider
question of the cognitive ability of citizens to claim their rights and live out their
responsibilities, as a result of the dearth of knowledge on such rights. As one respondent
summed it:
we talk about human rights in the system [but] people don’t even know
what that means. I do take educated people and talk to them about human
rights, even workers’ rights and sometimes I am surprised that they don’t
know even the rights of workers as spelt out in our constitution, as spelt
out in the labor act and errr, and women’s rights issues, we talk about
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them on platform but no one, they do not mean anything; it’s not acted
on…(Interview 206 29 October, 2014).

With respect to the contribution of the absence of extra judicial arrests, detentions,
torture, and disappearances of political opponents to the peace in Ghana, respondents said
it is not so much what is happening now as the memory of what happened in the past that
is contributing to Ghana’s ability to eschew national level violence. They frequently
recalled the periods of military rule in 1960s, 70s, 80s and the 90s, when human rights
abuses held sway. Accordingly to respondents, the experiences from these periods
“…have taught us lessons that it does not pay for the Military to take their guns and seize
power. That is why the average Ghanaian will go for democratic governance rather than
opting for military rule” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). In particular, they recalled “the
experiences of ’79 and early 80 [when] a lot of blood was shed in the name of the
development of the country and … have taken a lesson [that] they would not want to see
that happen again (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the words of another respondent:
…the remembrance of those times make us not want to sink into state of
anarchy where the military will take over, people will be shot; [Ghanaians
do not] want a repetition of that. So if something happens we say let’s live
together we are brothers lets live together so that we don’t go to the past
where we suffered; so yeah, the past reminds us and it informs us to live
in peace” (Interview 203, 28 October 2014).
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Added to this is the deception that Ghanaians suffered under the military, who
came to power under the cloak of bettering the lot of Ghanaians only to enrich
themselves and their immediate friends and families. People now understand that “…the
military always [had] their own reasons …people accepted it and they realized that what
the military people were telling them they saw its more easily said than done” (Interview
214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of respondents, the military in power became as
corrupt, if not more corrupt than the civilians they overthrew. Mindful of these, most
Ghanaians want to “… be careful so that we don’t create the space for the military to
come in to take us back; and so even when we get to the tipping point, we try to manage
that” (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In brief it is not the respect for human rights
as currently experienced that contributes to Ghana’s peace; it is more the fear of returning
to military rule where respect for human rights cannot be guaranteed that keeps
Ghanaians from fighting.
Private Citizens’ and Public Officials Respect for the Rule of Law
Ho5 There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for
the rule of law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana
This hypothesis tested the extent to which respondents’ perceptions on citizens’
respect for the laws of the land; public officials’ respects for the laws of the land; and
citizen’s respect for decisions of the courts, have contributed to the peace in Ghana.
Responses to the three questions that assessed the three variables constituted the basis for
this assessment. The frequency run of responses to the three variables show that more
than two thirds of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed
with the various statements in respect of their contribution to the peace of Ghana. For
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instance, 82.1% of respondents (n=1418) said Ghanaian’s respect for the decisions of the
courts is a contributor to peace. Notably, 40.1% of the respondents fell in the “very
strongly agree” response category. However, 67.0% (n=1425) said public officials’
respect for the laws of the land is a contributor to the peace of Ghana; meaning a third of
the respondents (33%) thought otherwise. On citizen’s respect for the laws of Ghana,
62.1% of respondents (n=1422) agreed from a very strong to a simple degree that this
contributes to the peace of Ghana. Again, more than a third of respondents did not agree
with the statement.
A cross-tabulation of the results for the three variables by age category of
respondents, gender, educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation of
the respondents shows non-significant findings of Chi Square Values for the following:
respect for the rule of law and age categories (p = .075); respect for the rule of law and
gender (p = .142); respect for the rule of law and educational levels (p = .155). Public
officials’ action in accordance with the law turned up a two tail significance of p = .229,
while the cross-tabulation of citizens’ respect for the laws of the land with gender also
gave a significance p-value of .285 – See Appendix 12. In other words, we cannot reject
the view that no differences exist between respondents’ assessment of the degree to
which these factors contribute to the peace of Ghana.
A closer examination of the cross-tabulated results of age categories with the
variable on respect for the rule of laws of the country shows that older respondents were
more likely to agree with the assertion than younger ones. For instance, 72.7% of persons
aged between 68 and 77 years very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed
that citizens’ respect for the rule of law accounted in some ways for Ghana’s experience
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of peace. However, only 60% of those in the 78-87 age bracket, and between 63% to
64.9% of those in the 18 through 67 years’ bracket expressed similar levels of agreements
with the role that the respect for the rule of laws has played in Ghana’s peace. Notably,
29.9% of respondents in the 28-37 years age bracket disagreed to various degrees with
the assertion on the role that the rule of law plays in Ghana’s peace.
With respect to gender differences, only minor differences exist between men and
women who agreed strongly and very strongly with the suggestion that the Ghanaian’s
respect for the rule of law contributes to the peace of the country. While the men came in
at 62.8%, the women stood at 61.12 % with n=1407. However, the differences between
men and women showed at the level of disagreement. While only 3.9% of women
strongly disagreed, disagreed, and merely disagreed with the statement, as much as 10%
of men expressed the same levels of disagreement with the statement – Appendix 13.
Overall, however, 90.5 of the respondents (n = 1426) agreed very strongly, strongly,
simply agreed, or mildly agreed with the three statements that evaluated their perceptions
on the contribution of the reign of the rule of law to Ghana’s peace, as illustrated in the
construct of means for the three variables in Table 15. This suggests that despite some
reservations along age and gender lines, the majority of respondents believed that
Ghana’s peace has a lot to do with the respect that Ghanaians in their private and public
lives have for the rule of law.
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Table 15
Effect of Respect for the Rule of Law on Ghana’s Peace
Selected Cases
RoLCons <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
133
1293
1426
3
1429

9.3
90.5
99.8
.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
9.3
90.7
100.0

KII respondents endorsed the idea that Ghanaians in general respect the laws of
the country and the decisions of the courts. This is because as part of the socialization
process in all cultures, most Ghanaians “were brought up to respect law and order, to
respect authority, [and] to respect older people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a
result, “there is a general level of law abiding sentiment” (Interview 202, 2 October,
2014) among Ghanaians. The colonial administration noted this compliant disposition of
the people and christened the land and the people that now constitute Ghana “…as the
model Colony, one because we were peaceful, generally law abiding. We were the
model colony, peaceful people, generally law abiding. And fortunately, the country was
paying for its administration. (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014).
It is this predisposition to respect law, order, and peace in the Ghanaian culture
that gives religious leaders and their civil society counterparts the legitimacy and
convening power to bring together political leaders at critical moments in the country’s
history in order to facilitate consensus building among political parties that led to the
avoidance of election related violence. Respondents cited examples of how religious
leaders who have chaired the National Peace Council, since its inception, have been
instrumental in organizing fora such as the Presidential debates for candidates in the 2008
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and 2012 elections, and particularly, the meeting of political leaders in Kumasi in 2012,
where they signed “the Kumasi Accord [in which they] all promised to be law abiding”
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and to accept the results of the 2012 elections,
irrespective of who won or lost. It is this Accord that gave the religious leaders the lien to
engage the leadership of the NDC and the NPP to ensure that they got their supporters off
the streets and into the court rooms for the resolution of the disputes over the 2012
presidential elections.
The law abiding upbringing has also been credited with the willingness of
political leaders to respect the law, accords, decisions of the courts, and the rules and
regulations governing elections. As one respondent summed it, “… our political leaders
have been very very errm (pause) understanding and they respect the laws of the land and
that has helped us because no political party has taken the law into its own hands, as far
as I am concerned” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Similarly, respondents commended
political parties for using the courts, and not the streets, to resolve electoral disputes. As a
respondent framed it, political parties would usually say “…lets go to court and let the
court decide instead of taking the law into our hands; and so because of that instead of
resorting to violence they followed the appropriate channel for addressing their
grievances” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 11, 3 March, 2014; and
Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is evident in the decision of the two major political
parties to use the courts in 2008 and then in 2012 when they had issues with the
presidential elections. Even though in both cases the decisions of the Supreme Court went
against the wishes of the petitioners, they nonetheless accepted the results. In particular,
respondents cited Nana Akufo Addo, the Presidential Candidate of the NPP in the 2012
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elections for his respect of the rule of law when, after the Supreme Court had given its
verdict on the election petition he and others brought before it, he said that even though
he disagreed with the ruling of the Supreme Court, he nonetheless accepted and respected
it. In the words of one respondent, that “…wonderful speech [he made] changed the
whole thing” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014); turning an otherwise very volatile
situation into a nonviolent outcome. This example summed the view of respondents that
the law abiding nature of Ghanaians has sustained the peace of the country. Even when
they do not agree with a rule, they nonetheless accept to work with it and to work
according to the rules to change it, if possible.
Some respondents, however, opined that Ghanaians’ respect for institutions of
state and rule of law is important for Ghana’s peace, but not sufficient to account to a
significant extent for its peace. For such respondents, it is the attitudes and actions of
people that have determined and will continue to determine the kind of peace that Ghana
gets (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Adding another cautionary note, one respondent
recalled what Governor Guggisberg once said of the law abiding nature of Ghanaians. He
paraphrased the Governor to have said that “Ghanaians are nice people, law abiding, but
malcontents, we should watch out for malcontents” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014).
Another respondent would add Ghanaians may have shown respect for the rules and
institutions of the law because “…we were not pushed to the wall enough for us to
become confrontational and become violent to get it” (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In
otherwise, the respect that public officers and ordinary citizens show for the rule of lawa
and the courts could be breached if people are pushed to the wall.
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Perceptions on Contribution of Freedom of the Press to Ghana’s Peace
Ho6 There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana
has contributed to the peace of the country
This hypothesis tested how the freedom of the print media, the liberalization of
the electronic media, and the unrestricted access to news and information from the
internet may have contributed to Ghana’s peace. The dimensions that measured freedom
of the press included the presence or absence of legal and administrative controls on
newspapers and other print media of information dissemination; the ability of the press
to carry news stories without fear of repression or censorship by the state and other
interest groups; as well as, the abolition of libel laws. Freedom of expression on radio and
television for all citizens is measured by how the liberalized airwaves for radio and TV
broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in
programs, have contributed to the peace in Ghana. Finally, unrestricted access of
Ghanaians to news and information on the internet, as well as, their unrestricted use of
social media platforms to freely access and share news and views through the internet
constituted part of the set of variables for testing the hypothesis.
The survey results show that with respect to freedom of the print media, 86.9% of
respondents (n = 1422) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the
statement that the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves in the print media
without fear of being cited for libel has contributed to peace in Ghana. Of this, 36.8% of
the respondents were in the “very strongly agreed” category. For freedom of the
electronic media, 81.8% (n= 1418) said they very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or just
agreed that freedom of expression on radio stations and televisions through broadcasts of
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news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs has
contributed to the peace in Ghana. The majority of the responses (40.4%) were in the
strongly agreed category. On unrestricted access to the internet and social media,
however, it was 78% of the respondents (n = 1419) who very strongly agreed, strongly
agreed, or simply agreed with the statement that unrestricted access to news and
information from the internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana’s
peace; with 32.2% of the responses falling in the “strongly agreed” category.
A cross tabulation of all three variables with respondents’ age category, gender,
educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation all returned two-tailed
significance p values of less than .05 for their respective Chi Square values – See
Appendix 14. Since these results are not coincidental, we can reject the hypothesis that
there is no difference among respondents in their perception of how the freedom of the
press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country. The construct of means with a
4.5 midpoint filter of responses show that 93.3% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed that
the existence of freedom of the print, electronic, and internet-enabled media have
contributed to Ghana’s peace – Table 16. In sum, most respondents believed that the
freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed significantly to the peace that the country
enjoys.
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Table 16
Effect of Free Media on Ghana's Peace
Case Selection
FreeMed <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency
96
1328
1424
5
1429

Percent
6.7
92.9
99.7
.3
100.0

Valid
Percent
6.7
93.3
100.0

Respondents in the KII however saw the current state of the media as a doubleedge sword (Interview 7, 19 February; Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; Interview 6, 18
February); as it has both positive and negative effects. Positively, the liberalization of the
airwaves and increased access to information and communication platforms were
particularly noted as being instrumental in getting Ghanaians to let off their steams in
ways that avert the build-up of anger and subsequent recourse to violence to address pentup grievances. In the words of one respondent:
I believe very strongly that in a political situation where people are not
gagged to speak their mind, when they speak and air their views I believe
that the tension, the greater portion of the tension in them is quite released
and it does not foster (sic) them to go at each other’s throats and have
violent conflicts; that’s how I see it (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

Secondly, respondents indicated that the media’s exposure of wrongdoings by
public officials has a soothing effect on the population. They get the feeling that
someone, at least, is watching the public purse on tier behalf. The ability to freely discuss
these issues also allows people to vent out their views and frustrations. Media penetration
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into rural areas, especially via the local FM Radio Stations broadcasting in local
languages, has increased access to information in those areas. This has served as a
conflict early warning mechanism, especially during elections when those stations flag
potential areas or issues of conflict (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). During elections, the
announcements of election results on the airwaves as the counts are completed at the
polling stations “…make it almost impossible for people to cheat because their reporters
are everywhere” to provide live coverage of the events (Interview 207, 29 October,
2014).
On the negative side, respondents noted that partisan reportage, sensationalism,
provocative statements, and biased or judgmental reporting often skews views and raise
political temperatures. Hence, some respondents worried that the new found freedom of
expression and the media is a potential risk to the peace and stability of the country,
especially since “…individual politicians are beginning to set up their own newspapers
and radio stations as a way” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 213, 9
December, 2014) to serve their parochial and partisan interests. In the 2008 elections, for
instance, some radio stations “almost went overboard in agitating the public towards
possible conflict” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; see also Interview 215, 10
December, 2014) or in the propagation of hate speech as was the case in 2012 (Interview
213, 9 December, 2014). Respondents fear this unbridled and unscrupulous use of the
media through the machinations of politicians is a key flashpoint of violent national level
conflict (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).
Another worrying trend is the increasingly partisan postures of most newspapers
and radio stations in the country. Most of them “…are aligned to political parties … and

144

they don’t ever see any good from any other political party apart from their party, which
is very very bad” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February,
2014). Because of this development, we now have decidedly “…pro-government press,
and we have anti-government press, which is not good for the development of the
country” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The politically polarized and partisan nature of
most media houses make them unconstructive in their contribution to the political
discourse in Ghana. The consequences of their disruptive approaches have only been
mollified by the work of other actors (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).
The irony of double negatives also operates to attenuate the effects of the partisan
press. In the view of respondents, because Ghanaians are heavily politicized, they are
quick to label and stereotype media houses and their outputs. As a result, people then
readily discount, discredit, and disregard media content coming from their ‘chosen other’
media houses. This selective stereotyping and discounting of views from the other side
has the positive effect of dousing anger and averting conflicts because people just brush
what is being said aside, “…dig in their heels and say, leave them alone […] so that has
been helpful, but if it were just left to just their messages and so on it would have become
trouble” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014).
Other respondents were worried that press freedom and the freedom of the media
is being taken to the excess to breach personal freedoms. In their view, some people are
taking advantage of the removal of the libel laws to mount radio stations or use the
internet to say or write “…certain things that is not good for public consumption”
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) or that border on outright defamation of characters
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 13, 5 March,
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2014). This has led some respondents to caution that “…the freedom of speech in Ghana
is too much [but unfortunately] …the Media Commission [has no] teeth to bite”
(Interview 213, 9 December 2014) to bring such errant persons or media houses to order.
In sum, while the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves may have
helped in preserving the peace, there are inherent dangers to the peace of the country if
the unbridled use of the press to prosecute partisan political agendas or personal
vendettas are not checked.
Perceptions on Role of the Judicial System to Ghana’s Peace
Ho7 There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a
major contributor to the peace of the country
This hypothesis assessed the perception of respondents on the contribution of the
judiciary in Ghana to the country’s peace, using three variables, namely, perceptions of
the independence of the courts as measured by respondents’ perceptions on the ability of
judges to dispense justice without interference from state officials or other influential
persons; the perceived impact of corruption in the judiciary on the peace in Ghana, as
measured by respondents’ perception on the ability of judges and court staff to administer
justice without being influenced by personal interests or gains. The third variable focused
on perceived equality of all citizens before the law and its contribution to peace in Ghana,
as indicated by the level of agreement among respondents on the equal treatment of all
citizens before the law.
The frequency of responses shows that on the perception of independence of the
judiciary, 70.60% (n = 1424) very strongly agreed (38.1%), strongly agreed (19.1%) or
simply agreed (13.4%) that the independence of the judiciary contributes to peace in
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Ghana. On the other hand, only 50.90% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed very strongly,
strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that the level of perceived corruption in the
judiciary is a contributor to peace in Ghana. With respect to equality of all Ghanaians
before the law, 62.8% of respondents (n = 1421) agreed very strongly (29.9%), strongly
(21.7%) or merely with the statement that the fact that all citizens can expect to be treated
equally before the law contributes to peace in Ghana.
Appendix 15 presents the Chi Square values and associated two-tailed
significance levels for the cross-tabulation of responses for the three variables with the
profile of the respondents. Apart from gender which showed significance levels > .05 for
the cross-tabulation of gender and judicial independence, as well as, gender and
perceptions on the corruptibility of the judiciary, all other tests turned up significance
levels < .05. Scrutiny of the results of cross-tabulation on judiciary independence and
gender shows that 71.90% of the female respondents (n = 650) very strongly agreed,
strongly agreed or simply agreed that Ghana has peace because the courts are
independent from political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or
favor. This compares to 69.3% of men who gave similar levels of agreements with the
statement. Similarly, a review of the data for the cross-tabulation between gender and the
perceived corruptibility of the judiciary, shows that while 51.90% of female respondents
(n = 649) agreed very strongly, strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that Ghana
is peaceful because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly, only
49.9% of male respondents (n=760) committed to the same degree of answers on the
question. Conversely, while 23.7% of men disagreed, strongly or very strongly disagreed
with the statement, 19.8% of female respondents expressed the same level of
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disagreement with the statement. The foregoing suggests that respondents make
distinctions between the courts as institutions and their perceptions of the actions of
judges as individual officers. Since the cross-tabulation between gender of participants
and their perceptions of the independence of the judiciary on the one hand, and the
incorruptibility of judges on the other hand both produced p-values > .05, we cannot
reject Ho7 which states that there is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system
in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country. The construction of means for
the responses to all three questions, however, indicates that 77.6% of all respondents (n =
1426) agreed in various degrees to the statement that the judicial system in Ghana is a
major contributor to the peace of the country
Table 17
Perceptions about the contribution of the Judicial System to the Peace in Ghana
Selected cases:
Judicon <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
319
1107
1426
3
1429

22.3
77.5
99.8
.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
22.4
77.6
100.0

While the judiciary is generally commended for trying to make the laws work,
some respondents in the KII have cited the increasing politicization of the judiciary,
especially through appointments and direct interference, as a critical factor to watch in
the operations of the rule of law. In the view of one respondent, “… the judiciary… have
the power to do almost everything but politics is one thing in the judiciary [as] it is also
perceived that politics plays a role there” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). As a result,
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“Respect for Courts is eroding because people do not see them as fair arbitrators”
(Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). Hence, despite the general tendency of Ghanaians
to abide by the rules and the law, respondents see a high risk that Ghana could face a
breakdown of the rule of law due to political interference and corruption in the judiciary.
According to this view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice
from the courts, they will take the law into their own hands. One respondent relates a
conversation he had with a friend who is a judge:
… I told the judge one source from personal experience that people would
find reason to fight is the breakdown of our judicial system. When they
[citizens] begin to feel that when you go for justice [and] through bribery
and corruption you cannot get justice, that’s when people will begin to
take arms for they know that they have to settle issues directly; the rule of
law would break down because the judges have broken down the rules and
the law (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

This view correlates with statements by some political parties that in the next
elections, people would seek to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level,
as they have lost confidence in the ability of the Supreme Court to be able to deliver
justice. This waning confidence in the courts notwithstanding, respondents believe by and
large Ghanaians still have confidence in the judiciary, despite perceptions of bias and
corruption. As one respondent summed it:
people have complained a lot about the judiciary, it is in favor of the rich,
it is this; but the judiciary has also played a key role; a lot of respect for
the judiciary; they still think that you can get issues resolved through
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them. For instance if the NPP had not felt confident that they would be
given an impartial hearing if they took the case to the Supreme Court and
that the case was doomed at birth if it went through the judiciary system I
don’t know that they would have been able to control their people from
taking the law into their hands and that would have errm … resulted” in
violence (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)

Ho8 The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace
that Ghana enjoys
This hypothesis tested respondents’ perceptions of gender issues on the peace that
Ghana enjoys. Specifically, the study used seven questions to assess the level of
agreement of respondents with the suggestions that Ghana is a peaceful country because
i) men and women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making
processes; ii) of the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; iii) women have
the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, markets
for their produce, etc.) as men; iv) women have the same opportunities for education as
men; v) women have the same employment opportunities in the public and civil services
as men; vi) women play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level; and vii)
the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace at the
national level is an important contributor to the peace in Ghana.
Figure 4 presents the differences in levels of agreement and disagreements on the
contribution of various gender associated factors to the peace in Ghana, when the
frequency run is filtered at 4.5 to include some of the responses in the mildly agreed
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category. More than 80% of respondents consistently agreed that all but one of the
gender-based variables have contributed to peace in Ghana. Only 63.9% of respondents
agreed that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that women occupy in
parliament.
Figure 4
Distribution of Responses on Women’s Contribution to Peace in Ghana

Role of Queen mothers in peacebuilding
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Appendix 16 presents Chi Square values and significance levels for the variables
measuring perceived contribution of gender-related factors to peace in Ghana. It shows
that insignificant findings were reported for the cross-tabulation of age category with
women in parliament (p = .393); and the equal opportunities that women in the country
have in economic life (p = .057). Cross-tabulation with gender categories also turned out
insignificant findings for gender and equal access to public fora, as well as, equality of
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economic opportunity for women (p = .181). Similarly, the cross-tabulation on whether
men and women have equal access to educational opportunities in the country by gender
gave p = .055. With respect to whether men and women have equitable access to
employment opportunities in the public sector of the country, p value was = .121.
Likewise, the cross-tabulation of the role of women in mediating conflicts in Ghana with
gender turned up a p-value of .110. Other variables reporting insignificant Chi Square
values on cross-tabulation with profile of respondents were equality of access of gender
groups to public fora cross-tabulated with educational level of respondents (p = .084);
and to the perceived role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the traditional
systems of governance to contribute to peace in the country (p = .156). All the measures
above lead us not to reject Ho8 which states that the level of experience of gender
equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Table 18 presents the results of a cross tabulation of age categories against case
selection of responses at 4.5 to include views that mildly agreed was carried out. The
results show that in general more than 60% of respondents in all age categories agreed to
some degree that the current level of representation of women in Ghana’s parliament
contributes to peace. However, more than a third of respondents between the ages of 18
and 77 disagreed that the extent to participation of women in Ghana’s parliament
contributes to the peace of the country. At least 40% of respondents in the 58-67 years
age category did not agree with the statement.
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Table 18
Views on Women’s Participation in Parliament filtered at <= 4.5 by Age of Respondents
Age Category of Respondents
Selection

Not
Selected

18 - 27
years

28-37
years

38-47
years

48-57
years

58-67
years

68-77
years

78-87
years

88-97
years

98
years
or
older

Total

112

150

114

65

41

21

1

0

0

504

34.70%

35.80%

37.70%

38.50%

40.60%

38.90%

20.00%

0.00%

0.00%

36.70%

211

269

188

104

60

33

4

1

1

871

65.30%

64.20%

62.30%

61.50%

59.40%

61.10%

80.00%

100%

100%

63.30%

323

419

302

169

101

54

5

1

1

1375

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100 %

100%

100%

100%

100%

Selected

Total

In Table 19, the construct of means for all seven variables indicate that 91.3% of
all respondents (n=1426) agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and
women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes. Other
aspects included the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; as well as the
gender equality in access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services,
markets for their produce, etc.); educational opportunities; and employment opportunities
in the public and civil services. The active roles women play in mediating conflicts at the
national level; and the role of queen-mothers and female chiefs in the promotion of peace
at the national level were also considered important contributors to the peace in Ghana. In
sum there is general agreement that women play a crucial role in the peace that Ghana
enjoys.
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Table 19
Women’s Contribution to Peace In Ghana
Selected Cases:
Gendcon <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
124
1302
1426
3
1429

8.7
91.1
99.8
.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
8.7
91.3
100.0

Under gender, respondents to the KII raised several issues related to the equality
of opportunities for men and women to participate in public decision making processes;
the participation rate of women in Ghana’s parliament; and the equitable access of
women to economic, educational, and employment opportunities. In particular, they
explored the roles that women play in mediating conflicts at the national level, and more
specifically, the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace
at the local and national levels. Findings from the interviews generally reflect those from
the quantitative survey i.e. that the women in Ghana are major contributors to the
country’s peace. However, respondents provided different types of qualifiers to explain
how and why they viewed the contribution of women to the peace in Ghana. Three
categories of responses emerged: women as peacebuilders; patriarchy and the subordinate
role of women in peacebuilding; and women as instigators of violent conflicts.
Women as Peacebuilders
On the positive side, respondents commended the increasingly visible roles that
women are taking in the national governance structure as a major contributor to peace.
They noted that women are now occupying key positions in the country: The Chief
Justice; the Attorney General and Minister of Justice; the Minister of Education; the
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Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative
Justice; and the Government Statistician, among others are all women. Additionally, there
“…are many women who are CEOs who are in charge of, you know, large industries”
(Interview 203, 28 October, 2014). In the view of respondents, these are key positions
that allow women to play important roles in the delivery of services that contribute to the
peace of Ghana.
At the community levels, gender-based development programming and donor
requirements are increasing opportunities for women’s involvement in peacebuilding.
These initiatives have helped to create the spaces for increased participation of women in
promoting peace. Through these programs, “…women are encouraged to go into political
elections; women are encouraged to [participate in the] district assembly elections;
women are encouraged to be educated so that they can also rub shoulders with men”
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Even in “…the traditional settings we are beginning to
see the role of women, either as queen mothers or whatever titles they may give them”
signaling increasingly visible roles of women in decision making.
Respondents’ views on the specific contribution that women make, aside from
these visible national and community level positions, however, ranged from the
uncertain, through the doubtful or minimalist, to the negative. Asked what role women
play in securing Ghana’s peace, one participant first sighed, took a long pause, and then
started the response rhetorically: “…have they played any role? It’s a difficult question
(laughs). I haven’t seen them play any role in pushing for conflict because traditionally
women have been in the background in terms of decision making, influencing decisions”
(Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). On the converse side, another respondent questioned the
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role of women in peacebuilding in stating that: “I haven’t actually seen women clearly
playing any serious role because we don’t see it; the way our culture is women are
usually at the background so even if they do, like exercising influence on their husbands
or many leaders and all that it’s not in the public domain and you would not actually
know” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). The respondent in Interview 4 wavered
between the potentiality and actual roles of women in Ghana’s peace in stating that:
I think they have potentially important roles to play in bringing about
peace, but whether they have actually played that role is something that I
would not be able to say for sure because within the communities, you
know, do their voices matter so that they are able to be a restraining
force?...at the national level errm most of the women’s voices that have
been heard at the national level are really those who are seen as the elite
middle class – errm you know, and the extent to which they have an
influence on […] women in the rural areas I don’t know”. (Interview 4, 12
February, 2014).

The vanguard role of women in praying for peace has already been noted in the KII
responses on the role of religion in Ghana’s peace. In addition, respondents noted that
women are usually restraining forces for their men and youth who would prefer to settle
disputes through violence. Beyond prayers, therefore, respondents who affirmed that
women do play a role, however, confined women’s role in Ghana’s peace to their
biological functions of nurturing and caring for their children; their natural disposition to
peace and nonaggression; as well as their natural peaceable instincts which trigger their
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nurturing roles of socializing and influencing their children not to engage in violence. In
the words of a female respondent, the preoccupation of a woman in crisis situation is to
do “…everything she can to keep the peace in their homes, first and foremost, and then of
course, publicly and in within both the private and public spheres” (Interview 213, 9
December, 2014). Corroborating this, another respondent held that such roles are played
behind the scenes “So the women are not really errr (laughs) neglected; they play a very
critical role in the background; they may not be seen, they may not be visible, but they
play a very significant role because men do consult them before taking decisions in most
cases” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).
This background role of women in peacebuilding is perceived to extend beyond the
household and community levels to national level – the Presidency. As one respondent
put it, “even the President when he is making appointments he listens to the wife
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). A female respondent confirmed the “behind the scenes”
nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles of women in Ghana’s peace. Women, in her
words, “support community systems any time there are community activities, they are the
ones behind the scenes who hold it together” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). In other
words, they are not seen as frontline activists for peace; instead they play the moderating,
mediatory, and conciliatory roles behind the scenes.
While playing the backstage nurturing roles, the contribution of women have
focused more on interrogating and pushing for actors to consider the future implications
of current political decisions and actions (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). However, the
reverse of backstage negative influences is also true, in the view of respondents. Queen
mothers, some of whom now have the statuses of paramount chiefs, are said “…to play a
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role, a very strong role; if they want to cause conflict they can cause conflict” (Interview
206, 29 October, 2014). Even then, respondents observed that despite this power to make
or unmake peace, queen mothers play out their roles in the form of advising the male
chiefs, rather being the direct protagonists. Similarly, within political parties, respondents
thought that the creation of “…women’s wings can be both positive and negative,
because there are tendencies to just tell the women to wait and just take positions in the
women’s wings” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014) of the parties, instead of vying for more
executive leadership positions within the parties. This is in spite of the fact that women
actually played avant-garde roles in pre-independence politics when “Women took an
early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and organize
Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement (Interview 208, 30 October,
2014). That history notwithstanding, the summed up view is that:
where women have played a role they have contributed a lot in bringing
out the substantive issues that should invite people to listen to and I have
noticed that the women have always talked more in terms of the future and
they’ve asked questions about the future of their children rather than the
ethnic group of their children and so women by and large have been major
bridge builders (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014)

Patriarchy and the Role of Women in Peacebuilding
The behind the scenes role of women in the public sphere, especially in respect of
peacebuilding is largely because “…most of our cultures are patriarchal cultures where
norms, ideas, all those things rather uphold the man and then downgrade the woman”
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). Women are particularly scared off the competitive

158

arena of politics not only because of the “…tension, the name-calling, and the abuses,
[but more because of] the culture and society seem to be harsh on women who take part
in these really competitive political game. They are given names and if you do not want
those names just stay at the back” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). At the level of
traditional governance systems, women are assigned similar backstage roles. Citing the
case of the traditional chieftaincy structure of the Dagombas, a respondent noted that in
that structure:
…we don’t have queen mothers but we have the worigyira, the first wife
concept; the first wife of the chief, and sisters of the chief, princesses; they
play a strong role in the governance structure mostly, albeit, behind the
scenes… but they play a strong role, advising on matters that bother on
community development but also peace; when they speak people listen”
(Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).

Even in the matriarchal cultures of the Akans, the women chiefs played background
roles, as they usually would transact business in the presence of, or through the
intermediation of male chiefs or linguists. Thankfully, educational policies and
interventions and donor requirements have institutionalized inclusion of gender
sensitivity and gender-based programming that have created spaces for women’s
participation in decision making in an otherwise patriarchal social system.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donor driven microeconomic development
initiatives also create economic opportunities for empowerment for women. Other NGO
and donor-sponsored initiatives are targeting empowerment of the girl child through
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educational support initiatives. Similar initiatives target reduction in domestic violence
and the promotion of women’s rights (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).
Additionally, a respondent believed that the existing women’s leadership structures
at the traditional authority level through the increasing inclusion of queen mothers, as
well as, the increasing visibility of women in the national governance structures are entry
points for engaging women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These positions are
platforms that can be leveraged to break into the patriarchal structure at the community
levels (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, respondents recognized that breaking
the patriarchal jinx to create spaces for women for frontline participation in peace work
will take some doing. A female respondent summed up the frustrations of women on
societal confinement of the role of women in public life to the background in the
following words:
Women have played a very important role, but one that has not been
recognized. I think that women have been very influential in our political
process, but they have not been given the space to be in front, to be
actually seen to be making that but behind the scenes, in the homes, in the
bedrooms, in the quite spaces, women have a voice and are able to speak
some sense. However [even] in political parties, [where] the women
leaders […] are asked to lead the women’s groups, … most at times they
are the ones doing the cooking and the singing of the praises, you know,
but when it comes to decision making, you don’t see women being given a
role (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).

160

Despite all the rhetoric of inclusivity of women in public decision making
processes, respondents believed that patriarchal world views have continued to induce
gender-blind policy formulation and implementation. To make the case, a respondent
cited the particularly poignant example of the legal framework that legitimated and
institutionalized the National Peace Council. In the view of the respondent, the
composition of the National Peace Council Act has reduced the role of women on the
Council to a token representation – by design and by default, simply because policy and
lawmakers were gender-blind in the selection of the institutional representations on the
council. In the words of the respondent, “… the Act has been done in such a way that it
does not favor the inclusion of women. People have to be nominated by the various
institutions; institutions that are usually dominated by men” (Interview 8, 24 February,
2014). Section 4(1) of the National Peace Council Law (Act 818) stipulates membership
of the Governing Council. Of the thirteen members of the Council, eight (8) are expected
to come from the leadership hierarchy of male-dominated Christian, Muslim, and African
Traditional religious institutions, with a ninth person coming from the National House of
Chief, another male-dominated institution. Of the four members left, the Law only
requires the President to mandatorily appoint one woman among them. This, obviously,
does little to ensure equitable representation of women on the Council, as men by default
and by design would dominate on the council.

Women as instigators of violence
Respondents also noted the agential role of women in instigating or fanning
conflicts (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014), especially the localized intra and
interethnic conflicts that Ghana has experienced. When the question on women’s
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contribution to peace was posed, one of the respondents first laughed and then answered
“A woman can build a house and woman can break a house. So sometimes, they start,
and they are always at the background, and when trouble starts, then they run back. So
they can be a source of conflict too (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Hence, women,
like the media, play a double-edged sword role in which “when husbands are
misbehaving it is women that can calm them down [but] when the women decide that
there should be war the men hardly resist” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Respondents
recounted “…occasions where a woman will just come and say you you are a coward;
bring your [genitals]

and take [mine]” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014; see also

Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) as a way of provoking the men into going to war with
their perceived enemies. Among the Dagombas, even though the wives and sisters of the
chiefs play background advisory roles to the chiefs, they are noted to have the potential to
“…cause conflict if they want but most of the time they try to be patient and look at the
bigger picture [as] they are seen as custodians of our customs and they want to maintain
that customs (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). Tracing the chain of causality for
conflicts and the role of different actors, another respondent recalled how his community
level engagements in a decades’ long intra-ethnic episodically violent chieftaincy
succession conflict revealed that men go to fight because women insult them. According
to the respondent, when he contacted the women, they confessed that they instigate men
to fight because they (the women) have lost contact and control over their children
(nurturing concerns) as the children, especially the young men, are out of the house in
times of crisis (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). They are therefore pushing the men to go
and fight to bring their children back home. Another respondent cited the example of
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“…places like Bungkpurugu where I know the Konkombas and the Bimobas have fought
in those communities where the women have been aggressive; they have tended to cause
very frequent outbreak of conflict” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)
In sum, although women play a role in Ghana’s peace, positively or negatively,
much of it is played out behind the scenes. Hence while the effects of their actions may
be surmised or felt, women are generally not seen as active peacemakers beyond their
backstage places in the pews, mosques, and homes. Increasing visibility of women in
public offices create opportunities for more forefront role for women in promoting
Ghana’s

peace.

However,

continued

gender-blind

policy

formulation

and

implementation, especially in ensuring equitable representation of women in
policymaking platforms, risk undermining this opportunity.

Practice of Democracy and Peace in Ghana
Ho9

The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace

that the country enjoys
Five questions representing an equal number of variables provided the platform
for testing this hypothesis. Collectively, they assessed the extent to which respondents
agree or disagree that the regular organization of elections that are said to be free, fair,
and transparent; political freedoms related to the freedom of citizens to stand for
Presidential, Parliamentary, District Assembly or Unit Committee elections; freedom of
Ghanaians to join any political party of one’s choice; and the degree of influence of
ethnic considerations in the way Ghanaians vote at elections, all contribute to peace in
Ghana.
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Responses captured in Figure 5 indicate that more than 80% of respondents
believed that Ghana’s ability to stave off violent national level conflicts is due to its
ability to organize relatively freed, fair and transparent elections; the freedom of its
citizens to stand for election at any level within the political structure of the country; the
freedom of citizens to vote in all elections, as well as, the freedom to join any political
party of one’s choice. Also, voter behavior and attitudes count in Ghana’s peace, as most
respondent indicated that they do not focus on the ethnic background of candidates when
making their choices for candidates for any given position in the political structures of the
nation.
Figure 5
Percentage Distribution Responses on Effect of Democratic Practices on Ghana’s Peace
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The study also probed the nature of Ghana’s political culture by examining why
electoral disputes have not escalated into national level violence. For this, the study asked
respondent to indicate the extent to which factors such as the fear of war; apathy towards
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who wins; capacity of the courts to handle electoral disputes effectively; and political
parties abhorrence of violence, affect the peace in Ghana. The measures also included the
extent to which lack of support for violence-mongers mitigate the spread of violence over
electoral results for parliament; extent to which the inability of political parties to
mobilize fighters; the recourse of political parties to court; intervention by traditional
leaders; intervention by religious leaders; and the willingness of Ghanaians to die for
politicians and their courses all contribute to the peace in Ghana.
Asked which factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary
elections do not spill over into national level conflicts 52.3% of respondents (n=1405)
said Ghanaians are afraid of war while 34.2% indicated it is because the courts in Ghana
are effective in handling electoral disputes – see Table 20. Five respondents who cited
other reasons for the non-escalation of electoral disputes at the parliamentary level said it
was “Because of love for the country” (2/5); “Ghanaians are God fearing”; “Ghanaians
do not like bloodshed”, and “God is merciful.”
Table 20
Responses on why Electoral Disputes do not lead to national level violence
Reasons Why Elections do not lead to national Frequency
violence
Ghanaians are afraid of war
735
Courts effective in handling electoral disputes
480
Political Parties do not support use of violence
92
Ghanaians do not really care who wins elections
65
Those who want violence are ignored
31
Other
2
Total
1405
System Missing
24
Total
1429

Valid
Percent
52.3
34.2
6.5
4.6
2.2
.1
100.0
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Similarly, when respondents were asked what factors best explain why disputes
over results of presidential elections do not escalate into national level violence, 66.9% of
respondents attributed it to the fact that political parties usually opt to take their electoral
grievances to the courts for resolution. Another 13.6% of respondents cited the
intervention of traditional rulers to prevent fighting over electoral results. A further 9.4%
credited religious leaders for intervening to mediate peaceful resolution of the conflicts –
see table 21. Four respondents who cited other reasons for the non-escalation of disputes
over presidential election results cited “Fear of losing family members”; “God is
merciful” (2/5) and “the rule of law is supreme and people are aware of that” (This Study,
20).
Table 21
Reasons Why Disputes Over Presidential Elections Do not lead to Violence
Reasons Assigned
Political parties take their case to court
Traditional Rulers prevent fighting
Religious leaders mediate peaceful
resolutions
Ghanaians won't fight and die for
politicians
Political Parties can't mobilize people to
fight
Other
Total
System Missing
Total

Frequency
939
191

Valid
Percent
66.9
13.6

132

9.4

101

7.2

37

2.6

4
1404
25
1429

.3
100.0

Cross tabulations of the responses to the seven questions with the profile of
respondents yielded Chi Square values with two tailed significance levels < .05 for all the
variables except for the cross between age categories of respondents and why disputes
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over parliamentary elections do not lead up to national level violence. For this, the Chi
Square value of 45.724 had a significance level of .810. The cross between the same
variable and gender produced a significance level of .810 for a Chi Square value of 2.275.
The cross between age categories and why disputes over presidential elections do not
escalate into national level violence also yielded a two-tailed significance level of .193
for a value of 47.512, while responses on the freedom to stand elections when crosstabulated with gender produced a Chi Square value of 11.301 with a two-tailed
significance p-value of .185. Educational level of respondents also produced two
coincidental outcomes when crossed with freedom of citizens to vote (p = .060) and
freedom to choose one’s political party (p = .110). The findings suggest that we cannot
reject a plausible hypothesis that the contributions of these components of respondents’
characteristics to the state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace
that the country enjoys.
Notably, the cross tabulation of the variable that Ghanaians do not take into
account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during elections
yielded a p <.05 for respondents of key socioeconomic backgrounds – see Appendix 17.
In other words, the finding that 90.2% of respondents agree that Ghanaians do not take
into account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during
elections is not a coincidental finding. This suggests that the voting behavior of
Ghanaians that puts little weight on the ethnic background of candidates to various
political offices does have an effect on the peace that Ghana has. Indeed, a construct of
means of responses for five of the variables (role of free, fair, and transparent elections;
freedom to stand elections; freedom of citizens to vote in elections; freedom of
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Ghanaians to join any political party of their choice; and consideration of ethnic
backgrounds of candidates in voting choices) indicates that 96.8% of the respondents
agreed in varying degrees that the foregoing elements of Ghana’s democratic culture has
contributed to the peace the country experiences – Table 22.
Table 22
Effects of Democratic Systems and Practices on Ghana’s Peace
Case Selection at
ElecDemo <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequen Percent
cy
45
3.1
1379
96.5
1424
99.7
5
.3
1429
100.0

Valid
Percent
3.2
96.8
100.0

KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that Ghana’s ability to hold
six successive general elections since 1992 has contributed to the peace in the country,
despite the imperfections witnessed in each successive election. They noted that given
“…some of the democratic closeness we have had in terms of elections, many countries
should have tipped over” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Respondents, however, cited
several reasons why these very tight elections did not spill over into violent national level
conflicts. First, they credited Ghanaians’ early embrasure of the use of the ballot box to
decide who governs them for creating a culture of democracy in the country. According
to this view, the colonial administration’s use of elections, referenda, and plebiscites to
enable Ghanaians “determine whose idea prevails and who therefore should form
government [or how they should be governed made Ghanaians see] elections to be a
conflict resolution mechanism” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is why all military
dictatorships had to confront and eventually cave in to popular demands for the
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organization of elections as the means to choose who rules them. Second, having
embraced elections as a decision making tool, Ghanaians developed “the political psyche
that once the elections are well organized we would accept the results” (Interview 12, 4
March, 2014). Hence, political leaders have adopted the mindset that even though “…we
are fighting for political power, you have won, if I do my homework well, I can come
back to power the next time; so why destroy what we are looking for (Interview 13, 5
March, 2014). As a result, the politicians in Ghana “…have exhibited good leadership,
rallying their people behind them all in the hope that if they lost this time, they could win
the next time; that has kept us together” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).
Thirdly, Ghanaians recognize that their democratic experimentation since 1992 is
a piece of work in progress. They understand that “If we’ve all learnt anything from the
last election, we have learnt that the system is not foolproof; it must be more equitable,
more just, more transparent, and we believe that we can work towards a cleaner and
better elections” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Besides, they have witnessed the
efforts the Electoral Commission has made since 1992 to make the electoral process more
transparent, free, fair, and inclusive. As a respondent recalled:
From 1992 when we had the Voter ID with just thumbprint; when we had
the Ballot Box which was not transparent; situations where the 10th person
goes to vote and the ballot box is full; we have move to having transparent
ballot boxes, to having picture Voter ID Cards in the cities; to biometric.
You cannot get anything better than that. There may be a few infractions,
a few disagreements, but the Electoral Commission has done very well,
collaboration with stakeholders like the donor community, and the IPAC,
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the Political Parties Forum (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014) to improve
the credibility of the electoral processes.
Much of these reforms, in the view of respondents, have happened because of the
agential role of the leaders of faith-based organizations of all creeds who proactively
engaged with all duty bearers to ensure that elections do not become the excuse for
violent encounters. As one respondent framed it, “…our faith-based organization in
Ghana have never shied away from involving, proactively engaging in the electoral
process with the view to containing peace and broad acceptance of the population of the
election results, and as much as staying nonpartisan. (Interview 2, February, 2014). As a
respondent recalled, the late President Evans Fiifi Atta-Mills officially commended
religious leaders for intervening in electoral disputes to ensure peace prevails. With
reference to the tensions surrounding the 2008 elections in which he was eventually
declared winner, the late President is reported to have “… said that he knew the role that
the church played, especially the Cardinal (Peter Kodwo Appiah Turkson) to have that
election being peaceful and not Ghana going to war” (Interview 14, 5 March, 214). As
noted earlier, irrespective of the contribution of religion to Ghana’s peace, all the direct
engagement was in parallel to the FBOs preaching peace to their congregations and
mobilizing their faithful to pray and act for peace, and to seek God’s divine interventions
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).
Political education by the churches and politicians also played a role to keep
citizens from over reacting to the result of the elections. As respondents noted, politicians
are keenly aware that, win or lose, they need a peaceful environment to govern or
reorganize themselves for the next round of elections. Therefore, in the tense moments
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before, during, and after the elections, they are heard crying at the “…top of their voices
and calming people and telling people that to be a political opponent doesn’t mean you
are enemies” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). This political education, coupled with the
significant role the churches and mosques “…play in preaching and teaching members of
the churches that peace is very very important” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) helps to
douse the political passions and keep aggrieved groups from taking up arms.
With respect to the role of ethnicity in voting behavior and its contribution to
Ghana’s peace, respondents recognized that in Ghana, “….ethnic differences are strong,
they’re quite high, let us recognize that” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). However,
Ghana’s interethnic animosities are not as intense and divisive as in other African
countries. Referencing the north-south divide in Cote d’Ivoire; “the competition between
the Ibos, the Hausas and the Yorubas for supremacy” in Nigeria; and “…the divisions
between the Americo-Liberians and the native Liberians in Liberia”, among others, a
respondent argued that “…yes, we do have ethnic differences, yes we do have ethnic […]
competitions in Ghana but it is not at the same level as those other countries.” In his
view, whereas the interethnic “…hostility has been very high in all those countries”
(Interview 3, 7 February, 2014), Ghana is blessed to have cross-ethnic voices of reason
that champion the cause of peace any time the potential for violent conflicts emerge.
This, in part, is attributable to the Constitutional requirement that political parties
be representative of all regions. This has served to minimize ethnic exclusivity in the
composition of any of the political parties in Ghana. Hence, while the NDC may consider
the Volta Region as its World Bank, it is not an exclusive party for people of that region.
Similarly, “even the NPP which has been criticized or been tagged as an ethnic party has
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a lot of key members coming from the other ethnic groups” (Interview 3, 7 February,
2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; Interview
202, 27 October, 2014, and Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
Added to this is the high degree of interethnic settlements, integration and
incorporation across all regions of the country. As a respondent remarked, the reality in
Ghana “… is that we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of
where we actually come from” (Interview, 19 February, 2014). As a result, no region in
the country is a pure enclave of any particular ethnic group. Therefore respondents cited
fears of reprisal actions, should any one group decide to use violence to redress electoral
grievances. This, in their view is a sufficient deterrent for people to “…handle the
situation coolly, in the hope that my brothers and sisters also living there will be treated
likewise” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). A layer of restraint in this respect is the
intermarriages across ethnic groups, which creates the situation where in the event of a
war I could be “…fighting against my in-laws, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and so on
and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).
Successful alternation of power between the two main political parties has
reinforced a culture of acceptance of electoral results, if clarity and credibility can be
demonstrated (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). In general, Ghanaians are willing to accept
the defects of a system, defer their perceived gains, or conversely accept their perceived
losses, and work towards the improvement of the system, rather than fight for immediate
gains. That notwithstanding, respondents noted that losing elections with very narrow
margins does not make the acceptance of the results easier for the losers. There is a lot at
stake down the chain of party activists when a party loses elections. For it is usually
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“…not just a matter of somebody losing political power, but it is losing my economic
means of living as well” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).
For this reason, respondents cited the practice of the Winner Takes All approach
to the access and control of political power as a risk factor, especially since margins of
win have been so narrow and constantly narrowing over electoral seasons. In their view,
this is the reason for the “Do or Die” approaches that sometimes breach the peace, since
it essentially means that “…if I lose, we are going to lose our jobs”. This is what
underscores the notion that “It is better to be a messenger in a party in power than to be a
Chairman of a Party in Opposition” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). To manage this
risk, some respondents have advocated for a more inclusive system through proportional
representation, especially at the local government level to ensure that there is dispersion
of power and allocation of political resources among different political groupings to
increase the sense of belongingness. It is also a way to create space for smaller political
parties to cultivate, grow, and showcase their capacities for governance at the national
level. This is the way to help break the duopoly in the country. This is also a way to
attenuate the building and perpetuation of the negative consensus phenomenon (Interview
12, 4 March, 2014), which respondents say has come to characterize Ghana’s political
landscape.
The Saving Grace of Ghana’s Democracy
A saving grace for Ghana, respondents noted, is the presence of a conjunction of
forces between faith-based organizations, civil society, and the media that creates a
powerful coalition of convening forces and organizing agents for peaceful elections. This,
incidentally, is not part of the formal institutionalized national peace architecture. On the
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contrary, it is merely a coalition of the willing; a group of peace-loving individuals using
their personal commitment to peace and their respective institutional platforms to create
the spaces and processes of dialogue and engagement between the political parties and
other duty bearers in the electoral processes. This coalition becomes yet stronger than any
political party when the National Peace Council grafts its initiatives onto this platform to
create a much bigger voice that can speak for citizens, convene political leaders, and
construct alternative pathways for overcoming the electoral disputes (Interview 8, 24
February, 2014). In 2012, when one party unilaterally declared victory, this coalition, led
by the Chairman of the National Peace Council was able to make a counter
announcement to annul the declaration and by that act, calm the nerves of members of the
other party and citizens at large. This platform was then able to convene a meeting of the
two contending political parties and got them to agree that the Electoral Commission
would exercise its mandate of announcing the results, and when that is “…announced and
somebody is not happy, they should use the courts instead of violence (Interview 8, 24
February, 2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to seek redress for their grievances.
This, in the view of respondents, paved the way for the use of the courts instead of the
streets to resolve the electoral impasse in 2012.
Role of Government in Ghana’s Peace
Ho10

The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the

peace that Ghana enjoys.
Criteria for assessing this hypothesis consisted of five elements, namely, the role
of government in creating peace in Ghana; collaboration between government and civil
society for peace; successful resolution of conflicts by government before they escalate;
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neutrality of Government in managing ethnic and communal conflicts; and collaboration
between Government and faith-based organizations in securing the peace of the country.
Asked to indicate to what extent they agreed that it is the deliberate and proactive
actions of government that has created the peace that Ghana enjoys, the case selection at
4.5 on a 9 point Likert scale question indicates that 68.8% of respondents (n = 1418)
agreed from a partly moderate to a very high extent with the statement. The remaining
31.2% of respondents did not agree with the statement from a partly moderate to a very
low extent. For all other variables, more than 90% of respondents agreed that
government’s actions and engagements have contributed to the peace in Ghana – see
Figure 6.
Figure 6
Reponses on Government’s Role in the Peace of Ghana

GOG engagement with FBOs to resolve conflicts
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The construct of means of responses with a 4.5 cut-off for a 9 point Likert Scale
questions confirms the trend, as illustrated in Table 23. While 68.2% of the respondents
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agreed in various degrees that government’s engagement in activities that promote peace
have contributed to the peace in Ghana, 31.8% of respondents disagreed. In other words,
about two thirds of the respondents agreed that the government of Ghana has deliberately
taken actions that have created the peace the country enjoys. It also consciously created
identifiable platforms for civil society groups and organizations to engage in building a
culture of peace in the country; as well as, taken deliberate and proactive actions to
prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. The government has also been neutral in
the way it intervened in ethnic or communal conflicts. It has also actively engaged faithbased organizations to resolve or prevent conflicts at all levels from degenerating into
violence. However, a good third of the respondents did not agree with these statements.
Table 23
Perceived Contribution of Government Actions to Peace in Ghana
Case Selection for
EconDev <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
451
967
1418
11
1429

31.6
67.7
99.2
.8
100.0

Valid
Percent
31.8
68.2
100.0

KII findings provide some insights into the split in views among survey
respondents on the role of government in Ghana’s experience of peace. Respondents
spoke to the intentional policies, programs, and actions of the executive arm of
government in promoting the peace of Ghana. Among others, their responses touched on
the collaboration between government and civil society for peace; successful resolution
of conflict by government before they escalate; neutrality of Government in managing
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ethnic and communal conflicts; and the collaboration between Government and faithbased organizations in securing the peace of the country.
Natural and Legal Reality Checks
Respondents observed that ensuring geo-ethnic equity in participation in
governance is one way governments have contributed to peace in Ghana. Be it under
military or civilian rule, all governments have made visible efforts to ensure that all geoethnic regions of the country are represented in the governance structure. Reality and law
have ensured this national orientation. At the level of reality, respondents pointed out that
the ethnic composition of the country is such that no one ethnic group has a numerical
dominance to annex power. Even “the Akans [who] constitute about 48% [and are
therefore] the largest ethnic group […] cannot form a government and impose themselves
on all the others”. Assuming all Akans voted en bloc for a given party, they would still
need other ethnic groups to make the 50% plus one cut off for annexing the Presidency of
Ghana. As a result, “it has become part of our political culture, [and] people realize that if
you form a political party you will have to form alliances, you have to form interethnic
alliances” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
In addition to this structural reality, the constitution of Ghana mandates equitable
representation of all geo-ethnic regions in the composition of political parties, as well as,
in government appointments. Observance of this requirement means that political power
is also dispersed across geo-ethnic and religious lines by law and by convention. Hence,
all governments that have been in power since independence have endeavored to acquit
themselves well on these natural realities and legal requirements. For this reason, “when
it comes to appointments, a President is by law obliged to [to ensure that] his
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appointments [--] have a national character addressing all regional needs, [hence] the
effort has been made to preserve the national character of us as a people even though
these ethnic and religious undertones are there” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). On the
religious front, in particular, all political parties make overt efforts to showcase manifest
presence of Muslims and members of other minority faith groups at the top of their party
hierarchy, as well as, in ministerial and other appointments when they are in power. As a
result, “You go into the government and you have Christians, you have non-Christians,
you have Ashantis, you have Ewes, you have this, you have that. So I think we have
relatively integrated” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Erratic State Engagement in Conflict Resolution
There is, however, a down side to this structural reality and constitutional
requirement for geo-ethnic representation in government. Latching onto the underlying
principles, appointing authorities in government often come under intense pressure to
appoint certain people irrespective of their competence for the simple reason that they
come from a certain geo-ethnic region. Respondents noted situations where sitting leaders
have had “…to give into certain pressure groups or kingmakers to ensure that he also
stays in power, [and Presidents have had to] meet most of these demands as part of the
package” for their own candidature in subsequent elections (Interview 13, 5 March,
2014). Under such circumstances, political patronage, party activism, and other partisan
considerations take precedence over merit in the appointment of people to key national
positions. As a result, parties in government are reluctant to reach out to qualified persons
in opposing parties who are better suited to handle certain portfolios. Apart from
fostering mediocrity in state institutions and a win-at-all-cost in elections, the practice has
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institutionalized job insecurity, as all government appointees fear to lose their jobs when
their party is out of power (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

State Response to Conflicts
On the security front, respondents note that Governments have ensured that “…
the rule of law always comes into play very strongly to ensure that people with
dissentments (sic) do not go beyond bounds and misbehave into violent conflicts; [and
where the need arises] “security officials have enforced the rule of law” (Interview 5, 18
February, 2014) even handedly. Respondents credited governments’ rapid response to
conflicts for the ring-fencing of localized conflicts to stem escalation and spread across
the country. In the words of one respondent, “the response of the Government, [is rapid,
as] they send Police and Military there quickly” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014).
Deployed law enforcement agencies were also credited with being generally fair and firm
in their dealings with the citizenry. In particular, respondents commended the neutrality
and professionalism of the security services, especially the military and the police during
moments of high tension in the country, as major institutional contributory factors to
Ghana’s peace. In the view of a respondent, “…we have been lucky to have a united
armed force, a united security service … a professional and disciplined security up to this
point… (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a result, “…their security role can be seen as
dispassionate, as objective, [and directed] towards national peace” (Interview 2, 7
February, 2014). In brief, a strong collective desire for peace has ensured localized
conflicts are contained and prevented from escalating. As one respondent put it, “… the
national agenda for peace has been very very strong … such that anytime there was a
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pocket of conflict arising out of either inter-ethnic conflict or chieftaincy or whatever, the
security agencies were very smart and swift to move to those areas to quell the conflict”
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2015).
Confirming that rapid state response has helped to stem the spread of violent
conflicts, another respondent cited a counter factual instance where delays in the
deployment of security agencies fueled conflicts. In the view of the respondent, the
escalation of the 1994/95 Guinea Fowl War in northern Ghana was precisely because
government failed to respond quickly to the rumours and later the onset of the violence.
Rather, in that particular instance, statements from government officials gave the
impression that government was “…lining up with one side against the other” (Interview
206, 29 October, 2014). Respondents also cited the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis which is so
“…infested with the interplay of competition of the two main political parties to the
extent that when you talk about Abudu, Abudus themselves will tell you that yes,
majority of us are allied to the NPP and when you talk to the Adanis, the majority of us
are allied to the NDC” (Interview 12 4 March, 2014). When this political polarization of
local conflicts happens, the hands of the government and, indeed, other political parties
are tied. Consequently, they lose their moral authority as disinterested arbiters and are
incapable then of helping the parties resolve their conflicts.
Government involvement in the resolution of local conflicts is often further
complicated when state-centric approaches are employed in the resolution process. As a
respondent captured it, “…from our independence the central government was simply the
continuation or at best the existing legacy of the colonial administration; our colonial
system always saw the center to be the provider of all solutions to the periphery so even

180

if you fought, even if you fought, the solutions lies in Accra” (Interview 12, 4 March,
2014). This Accra-centered approach to conflict management persists partly because
“…we have concentrated all our national institutions in Accra” (Interview 201, 15
October, 2014). Hence, the first manifestation of the state-centered approach to managing
local conflicts is the dislodgement of the conflict resolution processes from the natural
environment in which the conflicts occurred, as feuding parties are brought to Accra or
elsewhere to resolve the conflict.
The second is the attitude of state officials who assume the know-it-all approach
to engaging the feuding parties. Using the lenses of their training and offices, they focus
on the dyadic and legalistic conflict resolution frameworks that usually discount the use
of indigenous knowledge, practices, and resources for resolving conflicts. Accordingly,
the customs, traditions, values, and beliefs of the feuding parties seldom count. Such
practices do not only distance the conflict resolution process from those who need to
participate, it effectively alienates the people from the process and its outcomes.
Incidentally, most of these conflicts are rooted in indigenous beliefs systems, customs,
and traditions.
Several respondents cited the decades old Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict, which
“…has been going on for 91 years now” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014) for different
illustrations of the dynamics of state-centric conflict resolution. From the state
perspective, a respondent noted that “… at any given time when there is violence, it is the
security officials who go in there, they impose curfew, and after some time you see that
sanity comes back , even though the situation may not be completely resolved”
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The process is repeated as often as the violence re-
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erupts. Non-security approaches to addressing the conflict have equally been statecentric. In a recent recurrence of the conflict, another respondent cited the case where
“…the minister of interior [invited] the Alavanyos and Nkonyas to Accra for them”
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to resolve the conflict. In the view of the respondent, this
portrayed the government to feuding communities that “I am your solution”; an
impression which encourages the conflicting parties to externalize responsibility for the
search for a solution to their conflict and to look outward to the Minister, and the
government for that matter, for the solution to their conflict. Even if the Minister
managed to broker a solution, the challenge in the view of the respondent, is that these
people “are going to leave your office and go back home [without any mechanisms in
place to] support them in their own environment to talk [next time] rather than [wait for
government to come and] take them out of their environment and be the solution
provider” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).
To buttress the inutility of the state-centered approaches to conflict resolution, a
responded cited a counterfactual example of the building of local capacity for peace in
the same conflict system when “…church leaders [got] involved in committees, peace
committees, to go and speak to them” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). According to the
respondent, that initiative opened the doors for the youth to take leadership roles in
finding lasting solutions to the problem. It created the opportunity for:
the youth [who then] played a very important role in the peace process to
the extent that it is the youth who went up physically to open up the path
that had been closed to the two communities [for decades]; it is the youth
who culturally celebrated their unity and the youth said we want to go out
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in the night and look for our girlfriends on the other side; we don’t care
where the girl comes from, I am a boy and I’m at an age in which I’m
looking for love; I don’t want the barrier to stop me (Interview 12, March
4 2014).

The lesson learned, in the view of the respondent, is that a conflict that was once an
issues-based conflict (land) is now refocused on the interests of the people who live daily
the consequences of the wars. They no longer need an external body, government or its
functionaries, to provide them a solution; they generate, implement, and monitor the
solution by themselves.

Forced Spaces of Engagement
Respondents also cited the regular communication and interfacing between
government and the faith-based organizations as an important contributor to the peace of
the country. They recalled instances where the Christian Council, the Catholic Secretariat
or Catholic Bishops’ Conference and other religious councils usually come together,
deliberate on issues of national interest and present common fronts to government
(Interview 203, 28 October, 2014; Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). These open
channels of communication have effectively brought the voice of faith into matters of the
state. Respondents, however, pointed out such engagements between the State and faithbased organizations have not always been the product of mutual consensus. On the
contrary, they have not always been receptive of the interventions of the FBOs to
advance such courses. In general, governments have often been wary of the engagement
of the FBOs in the public sphere and often invoked the principle of separation of church
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and state in attempts to scare them off the public sphere. Hence, the FBOs have had to
bulldoze their ways into national discourses in order to express their perspectives on the
way forward as they deem fit. In many instances, governments have waited to act on key
public interest issues only under pressure from the religious bodies and civil society
organizations. For an example, respondents indicated that there have been cases where
sitting governments have not shown interest in pursuing proposed electoral reforms or
providing the requisite resources for the needed changes that would enhance Ghana’s
democratic credentials. They also cited government’s reluctance to send the Political
Transition bill to parliament for passage, as well as, Parliament’s feet dragging when the
bill came before it. Eventually “the Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference pushed very
strongly, had meetings with Parliament and persuaded them to pass the act” (Interview 2,
February, 2014). Similarly, the mentioned Governments reticence on the need to provide
the budgetary resources for the implementation of the biometric voter registration and
identification exercise in the run up to the 2012 elections, as the two main political parties
bickered over the issue. Again, it would take the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and other
Civil Society groups to push government into action on the matter.
Respondents further recalled that even the creation of the National Peace Council,
which has been lauded as the base for the national peace architecture, is a post hoc
reaction from government to institutionalize hitherto private initiatives of faith-based
leaders for peace; it was not an ab initio intentional creation of government. In other
words, government never conceived of and implemented the idea of establishing the
National Peace Council; it merely followed the lead of civil society and faith-based actors
who had already self-organized and were engaged in structured actions for peace in the
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country. As one respondent described it, “Certain people got themselves together and
because they did a good job, the Government saw to it that we would make it a statutory
body; and the UNDP also contributed immensely towards the establishment of this peace
architecture, peace initiative, peace council, and all that” (Interview 8, 24 February,
2014). Even then, respondents questioned government’s commitment to make the
National Peace Council functional and effective. They decried the fact that even after the
National Peace Council became institutionalized through Act 818; it has not been
adequately resourced to carry out its functions. In the words of a respondent “the Peace
Council also they have no money. I was just with [name withheld] the other day and he
was saying there is no money given to them that’s making the work difficult” (Interview
5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).
Respondents also identified several risk factors for Ghana’s peace, as a result of
actions or inactions of government. For instance, the lack of transparency and honesty in
explaining government’s persistent failure to deliver public goods and services
efficiently, in the midst of what seems to be deliberate deceit of the public, is seen as a
high risk trigger for violence in Ghana (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). In particular, they
pointed out that the major risk factors for descent into violence are economic
marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment. They made the
case that the youth have unmet needs in the midst of observable unresponsive and
unaccountable government systems and structures that seemingly superintend over the
misappropriation of public resources for private gain and at the expense of the common
good. The youth are exasperated by this and are beginning to demand accountability,
sometimes in not so peaceful ways (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 210, 21
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November, 2014; and Interview 2011, 5 December, 2014). The risk of outburst from the
youth is particularly high when they endure unemployment and other economic hardships
“…in the midst of opulence displayed by corrupt government officials” (Interview 2013,
28 October, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 213, 9 December,
2014).

Collective National Amnesia
Other respondents argued that Ghanaians have a high conflict tolerance
capacity embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people
accept otherwise intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on
with their lives. Alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that
they can’t expect anything good from governments. In a somewhat confirmation of
the concept of negative consensus rooted in the system of political patronage that
pervades the Ghanaian society, a respondent believes Ghanaians have lost hope in
the ability of their government to deliver on the common good. Instead:
What they see Government after Government doing is treating the
economy to give a semblance of improvement. But the underlying issue
leading to unemployment, better infrastructure, limited opportunities and
growth, pervasive growth that will impact on growth are still limited
irrespective of the ideological foundations of the Government that comes
into power. It becomes more or less a Government by the elite, for the
elite. It has no political partisanship. What it has is a system of political
patronage that both sides seek, whether in power or out of power
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014)
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Having witnessed the repeated failed promises of government’s, Ghanaians have
simply chosen to ignore government’s failures and inactions and move on with their lives
(Interview 214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of many, “At the end of the day the
politicians, they are the same group of people […] That may be a negative consensus
because whatever concerns them at the end of it they all know what game they are
playing (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, while the politicians can be ignored,
the dangers that loom for Ghana’s peace cannot. The caution that the National Security
Apparatus has served signals that the tendency to play ostrich has come to an end.
Recalling his engagement with the security agencies, a respondent reports that:
…One of the things we heard from the National Security, talking about
peace, they said their greatest fear in this country is not political or even a
Military Coup d’état. Their greatest concern is this socio-economic
inequality, injustice that may be the [breaking] point. When the hungry
man is angry and he takes the law into his hands, then he does not care
because his life does not mean anything to him. So when the Security
Forces said those things we asked them and I have also observed more and
more, that may be the point. This unemployment, the hardships, people
who have lost their livelihood, they have nothing to lose. So for them,
guns, bullets do not make any difference. If they can kill and eat, they will
do it (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
The reality and urgency of this concern is brought home when another
respondent referenced the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria where poorly or
under-educated, unemployed youth have served as the recruitment pool for the
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fighting forces. The respondent then remarked that even though “…we have not
experienced it [in Ghana yet] the population is growing, the population of that class
of lowly educated, school dropouts, frustrated, low self-esteem youth is growing
and that is what makes me feel that over the next five years if there was a minor
skirmish, we would get out of hand” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). In brief,
government needs to do a lot more especially in bridging inequalities and attending
to the needs of the burgeoning unemployed youth in the country. Government may
have done its best to create conditions for peace, but respondents feel whatever
government has done to date is not enough to secure the peace for Ghana in the
long term.

Contribution of Religion to Peace in Ghana
Ho11

Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

H111

Religion has an effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys
This hypothesis gauged the role that religion, comprising the faith values, faith

leaders, and faith-based organizations, has played in Ghana’s peace. It measured the
extent to which i) religious beliefs and values influence the attitudes of Ghanaians
towards the maintenance of peace; ii) extent to which Ghanaians’ observance of the
teachings of their faith promote peace in Ghana; iii) extent to which the religious nature
of Ghanaians affect the peace in the country; iv) presence or absence of discrimination on
the basis of religion in employment practices and peace; v) ability of people of different
faiths to coexist in the same spaces and its impact on peace; vi) presence or absence of
restrictions on marriages of people of different faith traditions and peace; vii) the use of
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religious differences to canvass for votes in national and local elections; viii) the effect of
leaders and agents of different religious traditions working together for peace and; ix) the
role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils such as the Catholic
bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, Federation of Islamic Councils, etc.
in promoting a culture of peace.
Table 24 presents the frequency run of responses to the question “How important
is religion in the lives of Ghanaians”. Of the 1425 respondents who answered the
question, 94% said religion was very important (81.3%) or important (12.7%) in the lives
of Ghanaians.
Table 24
Importance of Religion in lives of Ghanaians
Importance of Religion in
lives of Ghanaians
Not at all important
Not very important
Somewhat important
Important
Very important
I don't know
Total
System Missing
Total

Frequency
1
15
67
181
1158
3
1425
4
1429

Valid
Percent
.1
1.1
4.7
12.7
81.3
.2
100.0

Table 25 presents and extract of Appendix 18, which details the range of results
for the Chi Square values and significance levels for all nine (9) variables tested under
this hypothesis against selected characteristics of the respondents. Table 25 and Appendix
18 both show mixed significance levels for Chi Square values for the respective
characteristics of respondents. While the respondents of all age categories and in all
regions of interview turned up p-values < 0.05 for all the variables, respondents of all
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occupational categories also turned up p<0.05 except for gender, where p was > .0.05. All
other variables showed one or two cases where p was > 0.05. Overall, then, the
hypothesis that Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys can be rejected –
see Table 25.
Table 25
Respondents’ Profile and the Perception of the Importance of Religion in Ghana
Age Category

Region
Interview

Value
154.99

p
.000

Value
300.546

p
.000

Value
99.053

p
.368

149.903

.000

627.541

.000 325.384

.000

144.164

.000

538.724

.000 218.199

.000

140.541

.000

706.111

.000 259.800

.000

122.343

.000

588.267

.000 232.173

.000

91.196

.014

407.204

.000 211.953

.001

233.893
154.818

.000
.000

646.095
677.945

.000 277.773
.000 324.485

.000
.000

120.912

.000

598.492

.000 223.772

.000

Variable

Importance of Religion
Respect for Faith Values
and peace
Religious nature of Ghanaians
Religions discrimination in
employment
Coexistence of people of different
faiths
Intermarriages between people of
different faiths and peace
Use religion in political campaigns
Interfaith collaboration for peace
Role of religion in creating a culture
of peace

of

Primary
Occupation

Hence, for respondents of these profiles, the alternate hypothesis that religion does have
an effect on the peace of Ghana is admissible. Indeed, in a midpoint case selection on a 9
point Likert scale of the construct of means for all responses ranging from very strongly
agreed to very strongly disagreed, 98.3% of respondents (n = 1405) agree in varying
degrees that religion does have an influence on the peace that Ghana enjoys – Table 26.
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Table 26
Means Of Responses On Contribution Religion to Peace in Ghana
Case Selection with
Relicons <= 4.5
Not Selected
Selected
Total

Frequency Percent
24
1405
1429

1.7
98.3
100.0

Valid
Percent
1.7
98.3
100.0

In other words, the majority of respondents agree that the religious nature of
Ghanaians as witnessed through respect for their religious beliefs and values; the
observance of the teachings of their faith in their daily lives; the absence of
discrimination on the basis of religion in employment practices; the coexistence of people
of different faiths in the same spaces; limited restrictions on marriages of people of
different faith traditions; the nonuse of religious differences as an instrument to canvass
for votes in national and local elections are important contributors to peace in Ghana. In
the same way, the collaboration of leaders and agents of different religious traditions on
issues of peace and the role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils
such as the Ghana Catholic Bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana,
Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. in promoting a culture of peace are major
contributors.
KII respondents sided with their survey counterparts that religion in its belief and
institutional form has contributed greatly to Ghana’s peace. Preceding sections in this
chapter have already documented respondents’ views on how recourse to prayers and
intercessions; the role of religious leaders, acting alone or using the platforms of their
respective faith-inspired institutions; and religious institutions such as the Christian
Council of Ghana, the Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the National Catholic
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Secretariat, the Ghana Muslims Council, among others, have intervened directly and
indirectly, separately or jointly, to direct the ship of state towards the port of peace. What
has not been sufficiently raised so far is how religion informs and directs the attitudes and
behaviors of individual Ghanaians in their interpersonal engagements, as well as,
interactions with the public sphere to promote peace. This is the aspect this section would
focus on.
All KII respondents agreed that Ghanaians are deeply religious by nature. In the
words of one respondent “the majority of Ghanaians about 99.5% are religious. The
greater percentage claim to be Christians”. Whether they actively practice and live by
their creeds or not, the “…fact that they identify themselves with some form of religion in
itself is positive” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). From the perspective of national
psyche, respondents also noted that this religiosity among Ghanaians is manifest in the
writings on “on our Mammy Trucks and all that: “Fear God and Live”, “God Lives”,
“Give it to God” etc. These are not things people are simply saying; it is something that
stems from them” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Hence, respondents’, “… believe it is
the deeply spiritual nature of the people, in the sense that whatever their persuasions,
religious persuasions or faith beliefs, there is an underlying inherent message of peace
and a state of peacefulness and forgiveness within the faith messages which are
dominant” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) that account for the aversion to violence
among Ghanaians. According to respondents, this predisposition to forgiveness, peace,
and reconciliation is manifested in the Ghanaian maxim of “Fa ma Nyame” or “Give it to
God”, or “Leave it to God” (interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February,
2014; Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). This adage, in the view of respondents is a
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summation of the deeply cultural and religious belief of Ghanaians that it is not in their
place to avenge any wrongs done them. Rather than seek retaliation, Ghanaians tend to
adopt the typical attitude of “You have done me wrong, but I give it to God – He will be
the one to punish you”. I leave it to Him [and] that also helps and pulls [people] back”
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). For this reason, most Ghanaians “…feel that even
when a wrong is done and when they make their case they are prepared to leave the rest”
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) or let the “Fa ma Nyame syndrome take over”
(Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
Part of the tendency to avoid revenge derives from the deep seated “fear of
spilling blood” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014), because bloodletting is a
sacrilegious act that offends and affects not only the living, but the dead and the unborn
as well. Bloodshed is not something that the Ghanaian spirit really goes for (Interview 8,
24 February, 2014). Hence, “…most Ghanaians do not like spilling blood [because] in
our tradition if you spill human blood you have to cleanse the earth” (Interview 208, 30
October, 2014). It is this fear of God or fear of blood worldview that ensures that even
when Ghanaians “…are pushed up to a certain point the ““Fa ma Nyame” syndrome
takes over” and they back off” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). This is how “…religion
plays a greater part in terms of the peaceful atmosphere we find ourselves in” (Interview
8, 24 February, 2014).
Some respondents, however, believe there is a risk to Ghana’s peace inherent in
the over subscription to any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in religiosity as a pillar of
its peace. Such respondents have pointed out that other countries such as Rwanda,
Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were equally, if not more religious. And yet,
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they fell into very violent and protracted conflicts (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
Ironically, in some cases, the violent conflicts they experienced were prosecuted in
defense of religion. Hence, while the “Fa ma Nyame” mentality in itself is a very good
thing, it may actually nurture some negative tendencies as it merely postpones the
inevitable need to confront and deal with the issues that threaten Ghana’s peace. It is a
postponement “…because for how long are people going to say that?” (Interview 8, 24
February, 2014).
Yet others have argued that “…the “Fa ma Nyame” syndrome is a high digit of
the religious language [which] has not helped in some instances. It is that factor that not
only perpetuates the negative peace, but also has quote unquote helped us not to go to this
full-scale war blown…” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, as another
respondent pondered, how far can the Fa ma Nyame culture sustain Ghana’s peace:
When people feel that the system of justice only serves some,

the

economic system only serves some, and the social privileges serve some;
and that there is nothing for them, then what do I have to gain carrying on
as it is?” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).

In other words, can people continue to resign to their fate and leave it to God to
sort out their temporal needs when they see that duty bearers who should have been
creating the opportunities for them to meet their needs are rather their stumbling blocks to
any form of social advancement? For this reason, some respondents have averred that,
from the perspective of religion, the real fear is not that faith will begin to lose its
restraining influence on the people when such visible exploitation of the public purse for
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private ends continues with impunity; it will not come from the loss of legitimacy of
religious leaders to continue to engage in the public sphere on behalf of their faithful
simply because the faithful have lost faith in their power to secure for them their bread
and butter; it comes from the fear that under such trying circumstances, the “Religions
themselves [could] become hijacked and […] used for other purposes” (Interview 209, 19
November, 2014). Should that happen, religion could become the weapon that destroys
Ghana’s fragile peace; for “there are none who do evil with great abandon as those who
do it in the name of religion” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
Another weak link in the role of religion as an instrument of peace relates to the
question of reciprocity in opportunities for the practice of faith. Respondents observed
that inter-faith dialogue, especially between Moslems and Christians, is challenged due to
ongoing tensions over rights of worship of Moslem students in Church-managed schools.
Perceived unwillingness of the Moslem to arrive at a quid pro quo arrangement on the
matter of equal rights of worship of Christians in Moslem educational institutions has
been cited as the potential block to a dialogue of action between Christians and Moslems.
As a respondent remarked, the Moslems “… want their children to attend our schools,
have their own mosque in our compounds and all that but when our children are going to
their institutions it’s very difficult for them to allow them space to worship” (Interview 5,
14 February, 2014). Should an amicable reciprocal arrangement not be found, this could
proof the breaking point for Christian-Muslim relations in Ghana.
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Contribution of Culture to the Peace in Ghana
Ho12

The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana

have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
The five variables used to test this hypothesis are respondents’ perceptions on the
extent to which the values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote
peace; ways in which socialization processes in all cultures in Ghana inculcate the values
of peace in their members; extent to which cultural sanction’s for the breach of the peace
deter adherents from promoting violence; extent to which traditional rulers in Ghana
exert their authority on their members to ensure the promotion of peace; and ways in
which traditional rulers promote peace through accommodating people of different ethnic
groups, faith traditions and political affiliations within their areas of jurisdiction.
Asked to what extent they believed that the values and traditions of all ethnic
groups in Ghana openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own
citizens, 97.8% of the respondents said they very strongly believed, strongly believed or
simply believed the proposition to be true. Figure 7 below presents the summary results
of respondents on their level of agreements with the proposition that the traditions of all
ethnic groups in Ghana are openly welcoming to strangers; ethnic groups have strong
sanctions against the perpetration of violence; and traditional rulers have strong influence
over their subjects’ use of violence to resolve conflicts. The graphs show that consistently
more than 96.5% of respondents to all three questions indicate that they believed very
strongly, strongly, or simply in the propositions.
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Figure 7
Perceptions on How Culture Contributes To Ghana’s Peace
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Asked to what degree they accepted that the culture and traditions of all ethnic
groups in Ghana train people to be peaceful, 94.5% of the respondents indicated that they
believed this to be so from a very high to a high extent. Similarly, when asked how effective
traditional leaders have been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups
living within their jurisdictions feel at home, 95.6% of respondents indicated that this is done
very effectively or effectively - see figure 8. Similar trends are reported for variables measuring
influence of traditional leaders in preventing violence; the use of cultural sanctions as deterrents
for anti-peace engagements of citizens, and respondents’ belief that ethnic values and traditions
welcome strangers.
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Figure 8
Case Selection: Contribution of Cultural Factors to Peace in Ghana
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Appendix 19 presents the results of the cross-tabulation of the various cultural
variables with the profile of respondents. It indicates insignificant findings for gender
against all the variables; respondents’ educational levels against the variables for
xenophobic cultural traits (p = .501); cultural sanctions against violence (p = .268); and
the influence of traditional rulers over the war making intentions of their subjects
(p=.097). By primary occupation of respondents, p-value for non-xenophobic traditions
of ethnic groups was .550, while religion reported p-values of .206, .812, and .069
respectively for cross-tabulations with the non-xenophobic cultural traits; socialization
for peace within all ethnic groups, and the influence of traditional leaders over their
subjects. The p-values obtained for presence or absence of non-xenophobic attitudes in
Ghanaian cultures (p = .248); socialization for peace (p = .113); existence of cultural
sanctions against recourse to violence for settling differences (p = .17); preventive
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influence of traditional rulers over warmongering (p = .144); and the effectiveness of
traditional leaders in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups living
within their jurisdictions feel at home (p = .133) show the different age categories of
respondents did not affect their responses to the questions.
Age and region of interview of respondents, however, turned up p-values of less
than .05. In other words, it is a significant finding that, irrespective of their age categories
or regions in which they were interviewed, there was no difference in respondents’ belief
that the culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no
impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Differences, however, exist between gender
groups in their evaluation of all the statements. Similarly, respondents of different
educational levels also had differences in their assessment of the statements that all ethnic
groups have welcoming (non-xenophobic) customs and traditions; have sanctions against
the use of violence; and that traditional rulers have a strong control on the war making
behaviors of their subjects. People with different occupational backgrounds also
appreciated differently the statements on non-xenophobic cultures of all ethnic groups in
Ghana and the influence traditional rulers have in preventing war-making by members of
their ethnic groups. Respondents with different religious affiliations also differed in their
assessment of the statements on non-xenophobic cultures, socialization for peace, and the
influence of traditional rulers on their subjects against warmongering; contribution of
culture, customs, and traditions to peace in Ghana. Given the preponderance of cases in
which p> 0.05 for the Chi square values generated in the cross-tabulations above, we
cannot reject Ho12’s proposition that there is no difference in respondents’ view that the
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culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on
the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Reporting on the findings of the KII on previous hypotheses has already
captured different ways in which culture has contributed to the creation and
sustenance of Ghana’s peace. The views of KII respondents also provide insights
into the shades of opinions that may have guided the findings from the quantitative
survey. Five clusters of views emerge from the KII participants.

Cross Cultural Values for Peace
The impact of intercultural exchanges leading to cross-fertilization,
adaptation, and harmonization of major belief systems, values and practices across
the majority of cultures in Ghana came up for mention in discussing the findings of
the KII under hypothesis two. Even respondents who wondered
…whether 50 or 60 years is enough for us to talk about a Ghanaian culture
[nonetheless conceded that] we have cultures of the various Ghanaian
ethnic groups that largely coincide – peace loving, give it to God, etc. and
that bar a few small ethnic groups, we don’t have what you’d describe as a
warlike ethnic groups or ethnic cultures” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

As another respondent framed it, “we have over the years seen a
convergence or commonalities in some cultural values and practices; so in a way
you can say we have a Ghanaian culture, which is hospitable, welcoming”
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2015). This theme of the cultural foundations of the
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predisposition of Ghanaians to peace is taken up again under hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 8 discussed the cultural underpinnings of the role of gender in building
Ghana’s peace, while hypothesis 9 dealt with questions of Ghana’s political and
democratic culture. Hypothesis 11 raised and discussed the collective abhorrence of
blood shedding as an attribute that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. As was
noted, “…among many cultures it would be very absurd to draw blood and if you
did inadvertently you needed to atone for it in many ways” (Interview 2, 7
February, 2014). The sanctions include the possibilities of banishment or capital
punishment for the offender. Hypothesis 9 also broached the topic of the ease of
intercultural migration, integration, incorporation, and how this has facilitated the
co-habitation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in the same spaces
without fears of violence. Hence, in the view of respondents, all ethnic groups in
Ghana share certain cultural traits which have served as binding factors in their
coexistence and collective desire for peace.

African Faith Foundations of Peace
Respondents noted that “Africans from their traditional routes are a deeply
spiritual people” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). In particular, according to
respondents, Ghanaians are very religious and religious beliefs and practices
underwrite everything that Ghanaians do. This is because irrespective of their
professed creeds, the customs, traditions, beliefs, and value of Indigenous African
Religion (IAR) provides the base for this deeply spiritual nature of the Ghanaian.
Its tenets underwrite the lived values, beliefs, and behaviors of everyone. Hence,
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IAR defines the world views of Ghanaians, especially in matters of interpersonal
relationships, of which conflict management is a part.
Respondents considered IAR “…the most tolerant religion in Ghana
[because] it is a sort of personal relationship with God [with] the elders of the
family [as] the main intermediaries” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). According
to respondents, IAR is very accommodative of other faiths and traditions.
Therefore, it has a pervasive influence on the peaceable nature of Ghanaians. In the
view of a respondent, IAR dispenses this influence because all the cultures in
Ghana “…believe in the Superior Being, whether it’s God, whether it’s a Jujuman
or something […] you are actually told to love your brother, be your brother’s
keeper” (Interview 11, March, 2014). The newer religions such as Christianity and
Islam are transposed on this pre-existing belief system. The result is a mutually
reinforcing religiosity deriving from the fact that “When you add the powerful
influences of [these] dominant World Religions like Christianity and Islam, through
all their cultural mix, [to the belief systems of IAR, religion] certainly can be relied
on as one of the key factors” that constructs the worldviews and guides the
behavior of Ghanaians. Respondents, therefore, identified several peacebuilding
cultural traits and values that cut across all ethnic groups in Ghana.
This religious foundation of the culture of most ethnic groups in Ghana
underscores the second cultural trait – the Ghanaian penchant for discussions over
brawling in conflict situations. According to respondents, all ethnic groups in
Ghana encourage disputants in any conflict to talk rather than resort to violence. As
a respondent recalled, the Akan proverb which says that “Asem biara nyi ho won fa
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num ka” (to wit “there is no conflict or volatile situation that cannot be addressed
through discussions” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) has its parallels in other
languages across the country. It sums up the wisdom that talks, either by
arbitration, dialogue, mediation, negotiation or the circle process type of
community-supported problem-solving initiatives are prized over recourse to arms.
Hence, “…engagement in the Ghanaian culture which usually produces good
results has been part of the peace that we are enjoying” (Interview 13, 5 March
2014).
Closely associated with the preference for talk over war in resolving
disagreements is the cultural value for patience and tolerance. As one respondent
captured it, “tolerance is also a value that we cherish as Ghanaians” (Interview 13,
5 March, 2014; see also Interview 5, 14 February, 2015). Indigenous conflict
resolution processes take time, especially when extended parties such as relatives
and ethnic groups are involved. For this reason, patience and tolerance for the slow
processes are required. Hence, the maxim that “Abotr tutu nkokwa – to wit:
patience moves mountains” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) guides all participants in
the conflict resolution processes.

Intercultural Accommodation and Integration
For both religious and humanitarian reasons, most Ghanaian cultures
promote “…hospitality and a welcoming disposition to a person who is different
from you” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). This is because in many cultures in
Ghana “…you are expected to treat the stranger with courtesy and with respect
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because you don’t know where the person is coming from; it might even be errm, a
reincarnate god or something, you know (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; see also
Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). It is this open-arm policy among the majority of
ethnic groups that has made pervasive the internal migration, resettlement, and
incorporation of people of different ethnic backgrounds in areas outside their home
regions.
Closely associated with this open-arm, open-door policy is the readiness of
most ethnic groups in Ghana to accept intermarriages across ethnic and faith lines.
The openness of all ethnic groups to accepting cross-cultural and cross-faith
marriages has two dimensions. While voluntary intermarriages are the normal
routes for building conjugal interethnic bridges, a respondent recounted a historical
incident in which conjugal alliances transformed into military pacts, mutual defense
pacts, as well as, treaties of non-aggression between the contending ethnic groups
that, in contemporary public view, are political rivals. According to the
interviewee, the Ashantis went to war with the Anlos (or Ewes) to the east simply
because they found the women from the Eweland - statelier, fairer in complexion,
and therefore more desirable. That “…war came to an end with a settlement that
they would never ever fight again, and that each would come to the defense of the
other in the event of any attack on one” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Similar
intermarriages between ethnic groups in the north and the Ashantis have been
known to history as well.
Intermarriages, either by personal volition or conquest has a deeper cultural
value in Ghana than the immediate value of spousal relationships. All ethnic groups
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in Ghana run one of two systems of inheritance – matrilineal or patrilineal. While
the Akans, the largest ethnic category go by the matrilineal system, most of the
other groups emphasize the patrilineal system. The two systems have immense
implications for not only material inheritance, but also the right of accession to
chiefships. For the Akans, only children born to a female royal has the right to
ascend to the stool, irrespective of whether or not the child’s father is an Akan or
even a royal. Hence while it was astonishing for one respondent to find an Odikro
(a lower chief in the Akan tradition) in a village in the Western Region who spoke
fluent Dagara (a language from the Upper West Region), the subjects of the said
chief had absolutely no problems with it. They explained that the said chief’s
mother was an Akan royal, although his father was a Dagao migrant from the
Upper West Region (Interview 216, 11 December 2014). Similarly, several eminent
Ghanaians who self-identify with one ethnic group would nonetheless trace their
ancestry to other ethnic origins (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
Finally, respondents noted that in addition to the voluntary migrations and
marriage induced admixture of people of different ethnic backgrounds, there was
considerable movement of people across the country during the slave trade and/or
as a result of pre-colonial interethnic wars. People of different backgrounds
therefore were often uprooted and replanted in different locations. This has resulted
in a situation where the original stock of “…the population [that constitutes Ghana
today] got so mixed up that one can hardly identify a Ghanaian who can claim to be
purely Ga, purely Ewe, or purely Asante; and that [knowledge] makes us
reasonably humble (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
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Traditional Authority Structure and Peace in Ghana
The chieftaincy institution is one that has varied cultural origins for
different ethnic groups in Ghana. While larger ethnic groups such as the Akans,
Dagombas, Ewes, Gonjas, Mamprusis, and Nanumbas among others had
established hierarchical chiefships before the advent of colonialism, others such as
the Dagara, Gurune, Konkombas, among others, mainly in the north, ran more
dispersed authority structures. The latter were mistakenly described as acephalous
(Interview 208, 30 October, 2014; Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Based on this
classification, the colonial administration either regrouped the so-called acephalous
ethnic groups under pre-existing chiefs or replicated the hierarchical structure of
the cephalous groups among the acephalous ethnic groups. This effort to harmonize
the traditional governance system for the ulterior motives of indirect rule
culminated in institutionalization of the structured chiefship system across the
country. Hence, all ethnic groups now have chiefs after the structure of the
cephalous ethnic groups.
Even without a harmonized structure, respect for the authority and
legitimacy of traditional institutions of governance and their officers, however
organized, is another trait that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. Respondents
recalled that traditional leaders, including chiefs and clan heads once exercised “a
stabilizing, a cooling effect on the people” in times of conflicts. [Hence] in any
situation of potential conflict it is just a matter of bringing them over and they will
be able to calm the people behind them (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Although
much of this adjudicatory role of chiefs has been curtailed in the post-independence

206

governance systems, chiefs remain important reference points for the resolution of
conflicts that local traditions, customs, and practices govern.
However, unlike during the colonial period when chiefs had considerable
authority to preside over the settlement of a wide range of cases, the Constitution of
Ghana and various legal provisions have severely curtailed the jurisdictions of
chiefs and other traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution since independence.
Consequently, access to justice is distanced from the community. Even the lowest
grade courts are located in district capitals, requiring people who need to access
their services to travel long distances at their costs. Women face additional
challenges as the “court system is not friendly to them [as they are even subjected
to] sexual harassment even within the court system” (Interview 206, 29 October,
2014). As a result of this physical and psychological distancing of the courts from
the populace respondents have remarked that most communities still try to “…
resolve our differences through arbitration, through an elder” (Interview, 7
February 2014), even though they are not vested with the power to do so. Hence,
“… in this country, every day to day cases are settled out of court may be with the
chiefs, traditional rulers, with elders settling, most cases don’t go to court”
(Interview 206, 19 October 2014). In some cases, religious leaders are the ones
called in to mediate the conflicts (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Hence,
informally, traditional leaders continue to play important roles in resolving
conflicts at the community levels.
Chiefs that have been quick to redefine their roles in the postcolonial state
have retained their legitimacy, respect, and influence. Respondents noted the
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current Asantehene as one traditional leader who has set the pace for redefining the
space and role of chiefs in Ghana today for the promotion of peace and
development. Through his numerous development initiatives, he has effectively
reconstructed the role of traditional rulers by placing greater emphasis on their
developmental roles. As one respondent noted, “…when the Asantehene speaks he
says in those days as a Chief, I was supposed to be the Military Leader; leading my
people to war. Now I lead them to war against ignorance; promoting education”
(Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Because of the tangible benefits his initiatives
bring to his people and beyond, he has recloaked himself with the legitimacy that
his forebears enjoyed before the colonial and postcolonial state robbed it away. As
one respondent captured it, today, when “…the Asantehene says something, the
people listen to him even more than the government (Interview 1, 5 February,
2014). And this is because “when the chief speaks, it’s not just the chief speaking,
people see him as the custodian of everything that represents the society; so it’s not
just the human being speaking, he represents something so when he talks he has the
backing of the people (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).
Other chiefs that have emulated the Asantehene in redefining their roles
from warrior-leaders to champions of development for their people are also held in
high regard, and therefore, are capable of speaking up in the name of their subjects
in matters of national interest. Hence, in places where chiefs have held themselves
to the honor of their customs and traditions, citizens have sometimes believed
“…the chieftaincy institution is more important than who is president of the
country” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Where they have adhered to the cultural
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injunctions to demonstrate “…neutral, inclusive, and objective leadership [they
have also] played critical roles in rallying ethnic groups to support common courses
in the new state. Unfortunately, however, current partisanized leadership within
some traditional areas is posing threats to the unity” (Interview 208, 30 October,
2014) of some ethnic groups. As a result, in some places the authority of traditional
leaders is waning due to their indulging in corruption and the abuse of their offices
for personal gain (Interview 3, 7 February 2014).

Cultural Change and Peace
Respondents were also keenly aware that culture is not static; it is ever
changing, influenced by and influencing other cultures in their external
environments. In a globalized world, not only is the rate of change ever faster, the
content of change also moves in multiple and uncoordinated directions. For this
reason, respondents expressed fear that our youth are losing that cultural touch and
rather embracing the culture of the “hip hop generation” (Interview 209, 19
November, 2014) because they are bombarded with “…films that seem to reflect
western values […] and the western lifestyles that they want to bring to us”
(Interview 11, 5 December, 2015). As a result the youth are becoming “….
products of only what is hidden and seen rather than what you imbibe as an integral
part of your upbringing” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). The implications, a
respondent asked rhetorically is: “If that is not part of you, what are you?” In a selfresponse, he cautions that “We will never, no matter how well we speak English,
conducted language in international affairs; we will always remain Africans in our
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core values” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). And when the Ghanaian loses
that Africanness, the values that once restrained them from violence would have
been lost. To that extent, the restraining influence of religion and culture on people
in conflict situations is fast disappearing among the youth.

Contribution of formal Education to Peace

Ho13

Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the

country enjoys
Educational systems have a broad range of socializing and nurturing influence on
people who pass through them. In addition to the centrally determined content of
educational curricular; other characteristics of Ghana’s educational system include the
nationalized system of selection and placement of students from one educational level to
the other; the predominant role of boarding school systems in post-primary education;
the system of placement of teachers and staff within the educational system; the post
tertiary studies state-instituted national service scheme;

and the emergence of

associational forms of life such as the alumni and alumnae associations, popularly called
the “old boys” and “old girls” association, and even cross-institutional past students
associations. All these factors create cross-regional, cross-ethnic, and cross-faith
interactions and relationships among citizens who pass through the country’s schools.
Hence, questions that guide the testing of this hypothesis are: to what extent do
respondents believe the formal educational system in Ghana has contributed to the
building of a culture of peace among Ghanaians; does the content of history courses give
equal value to the history of all ethnic groups; what is the contribution of the content of
the educational curricula to peace; how does the centralized posting of students to post
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primary educational institutions contribute to peace; how does the boarding school
system contribute to peace in Ghana; specifically how does the boarding schools system
contribute to inter-cultural prejudice reduction. Other questions explore the extent to
which the existence of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations create strong
cross-cultural bonds among alumni and alumnae of the same schools; to what extent does
the practice of posting teachings to schools outside their home districts or regions
increase knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians; has the promotion of sporting
events between schools of different districts and regions increased intercultural
acceptance among Ghanaians; what role, if any, has interschool intellectual competitions
played in reducing cross cultural stereotypes and inferiority or superiority complexes
among Ghanaians; and has the compulsory national service scheme helped to create a
sense of oneness among Ghanaians?
Figure 9 presents a comparative graph of the mean responses of the participants
for the various variables filtered at  6.5, 7.5, and  8. It is observable that more than
60% of respondents credited all aspects of Ghana’s education system for contributing to
peace when the response ranges covered those who agreed to a moderate extent.
However, when case selection is restricted to respondents who agreed to “High Extent or
Very High Extent” on all the factors, only two of the variables were able to muster at
least 30% of agreement rates among respondents. This suggests that the level of certainty
with which respondents are willing to credit Ghana’s educational system as a contributor
to the country’s peace is wobbly. Indeed, between those who indicated to a moderate or
moderately low extent and respondents who were definitely sure education contributed to
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the peace of Ghana from a high to a very high extent, there is an average of 47.5
percentage point differences for all response categories – Appendix 20.
Figure 9
Mean Scores Contribution of Ghana’s Educational System to Peace
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67.8
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32.9
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34.9

42.3
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56.3

22.6
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63.6
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80.7
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21.7
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57.3
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Figure 10 presents the construct of means for the responses for all the variables
measuring the contribution of Ghana’s formal educational system to peace, filtered at
6.5, 7, and 8 on the 9 point Likert scale responses. Responses for the 6.5 cut off
point include part of responses that indicated that Ghana’s educational system has
contributed from a moderate extent to a very high extent to the peace in the Ghana. The 
7 cut off point covered responses ranging from “moderately high extent” to a very high
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extent, while the  8 cut off point represents responses that indicated that contribution
of the formal educational system to peace was to a “high extent” or a “very high extent”.
The figure shows that only a third (33.7%) of respondents were definitely sure
that all the factors enumerated above as part of Ghana’s educational system made definite
contributions to the peace that the country enjoys from a high to a very high extent, while
close to another third (26.8%) indicated that the contribution of education to peace in
Ghana was only to a “high extent”.
Figure 10
Construct of Means: Education Factors in Ghana That Contribute to Peace

100%
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Table 27 presents a summary of the Pearson Chi Square test results for the  8
point filtered responses (i.e. respondents who agreed from a High to Very High Extent)
cross tabulated with the profile of respondents. Apart from the educational level and
religion of respondents which turned up p >.05, indicating insignificant findings, all other
respondent characteristics had significant findings with p < .05.
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Table 27
Respondents’ Profile and Perceived Contribution of Education to Peace in Ghana
Responses
Characteristics

Age Category
Region of Interview
Gender
Educational Level
Religion
Primary Occupation

Pearson Chi-Square
N of Valid Value
Cases
1382
1429
1414
1425
1410
1422

27.459a
131.607a
5.325a
11.265a
9.901a
47.206a

Df

8
9
1
8
7
19

Asymp.
Sig.
(2sided)
0.001
0.000
0.021
0.187
0.194
0.000

In other words, the survey finding that only 33.7% of respondents (n-1429) are
willing to stake out that Ghana’s educational system has contributed to the nation’s peace
from a high to a very high extent is a significant find. Indeed, for respondents of all age
categories, gender, region of interview, and primary occupation, we can reject the
hypothesis (Ho13) that Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that
the country enjoys. In other words, respondents believe that Ghana’s formal educational
system has had an effect on the peace that the country enjoys (H113).
The factors within the educational system that have contributed to Ghana’s peace
include the history lessons taught in schools in Ghana and how they promote
inclusiveness and unity among Ghanaians; the curricula of the formal educational system
that teaches values of co-citizenship; and how the centralized posting of students to
secondary and vocational schools promotes inter-cultural learning among citizens. The
use of the boarding system in post-primary educational institutions has promoted crosscultural and cross ethnic friendships that have lasted into adult lives of Ghanaians. The
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boarding school system has also decreased ethnic and religious identity barriers,
stereotypes, and prejudices among Ghanaians.
Additionally, the activities of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations
have created strong cross-cultural bonds among people who attended the same schools;
while the posting of teachings within the Ghana Education Service to schools outside
their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among
Ghanaians. Furthermore, the organization of sporting events between schools of different
districts and regions has increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians; just as the
engagement of students in interschool quizzes, debates, and other forms of intellectual
competition have reduced the complexes of inferiority and superiority among Ghanaians.
Finally, the posting of students graduating from secondary and tertiary institutions to
work in regions or communities other than their own under the National Service Scheme
has helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians from a High Extent to a “Very
High Extent”.
Disaggregation of the responses by characteristics of respondents, however,
shows that they differed on the basis of their religion and levels of education as p-values
for the cross tabulation yielded p>.05. In other words, while all the other characteristics
of respondents cited above did not seem to have influenced their perceptions on the
contribution of Ghana’s educational system to the pace of the country, the religious
affiliations and educational levels of respondents influenced their perceptions on the
extent to which Ghana’s formal educational system has contributed to the peace that the
country enjoys.
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These nuances in the recognitions of the contribution of the educational system to
peace notwithstanding, the results of this study suggest that while a larger percentage of
the respondents believe that the educational system has made some contribution to the
peace of the country, they were not sure or willing to credit it with a high level of
contribution. Instead, the majority of respondents believe the contribution of the formal
educational system to the peace of Ghana ranges from a moderate to a moderately low
extent.
Parallel to the results from the survey, respondents in the KII were also divided on
the extent to which Ghana’s educational system can be credited with contributing to the
peace of the country. Several respondents eulogized the cultural assimilatory role that the
educational system, especially the boarding school system, offered as an instrument for
building social cohesion. They pointed out that the boarding school effect goes beyond
the ethnic and regional amalgamation of students; it cuts deep into and across the social
strata of Ghana, as students from rich and poor homes often find themselves in the same
dormitories, classrooms, and other common spaces within the educational establishments
(Interview 217, 13 December 2014). Boarding schools therefore were melting pots that
helped to gel and foster a sense of oneness among ethnically and socioeconomically
diverse people within and across generations.
In the view of respondents, without the boarding school system, most Ghanaians
would have gone to post primary schools in their locality or not advanced in education at
all, if there was no post-primary educational establishment in their vicinity. In such cases,
their exposure would have been limited to their ethnic group and their immediate
environments. However, with “the boarding school structure system people from
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different areas converge in a boarding school and they begin to learn about each other;
they grow to know each other; it fosters peace among them (Interview 206, 29 October,
2014). As another responded noted, “…if you are from Greater Accra and you went to
school in Sunyani where you met somebody from Wa, you met somebody from Takoradi
you realize that you became friends and after the five years [of being together] you were
able to understand the culture of that person” (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). Hence,
“…the idea of boarding houses […] encouraged interethnic mix (Interview 2, 7 February,
2014). Bringing students from different parts of the country together for several years
exposed them to different ideas and ways of doing things, including nonviolent
approaches to problem solving. It also increased the sense of stewardship and common
good; greater awareness of one’s environment; and built competencies in engagement
with the world beyond us, including globally. (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview
12, 4 March 2014). For one respondent, the boarding school system:
…has made people tolerant to each other’s cultures, each other’s
temperaments. People who have not gone to the Boarding House would
find it difficult to relate to a particular group because of certain
perceptions. If you are in a dormitory, the guy lying on top of you, and
next to your face is from one of them, of those that you haven’t from, I am
sure you realize that boardinization has helped a lot” (Interview 10, 27
February, 2014).
This gelling effect of boarding schools, in the words of a respondent is “…why I
have a passion for boarding houses. For most of us it is through the formal education
system, boarding houses that we first got real very close interaction with other ethnic
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groups and made friends.” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Lamenting the weakening of
the cohering effect of boarding schools among the younger generation due, in part, to the
reduction of the number of years of secondary school education, another respondent
observed that
Our boarding system that took children from the communities and made
them live together with other people in a neutral environment bound by
certain principles, and a sense of nationhood, created a people who had the
vision that transcended their cultural setting that they were born into..
That generation they still have the sense of nationhood in them. But if you
want a cut-off point you can easily say, most of the people who are 58 and
above are the people in which you can find such sentiments. Those who
are 30 and below for the majority of them even 40, they do not have those
sentiments because it was not inculcated through the educational system.
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).

Beyond the direct personal experiences of changes in perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviors in interethnic engagements as a result of the contacts in living, learning, and
playing with people from different ethnic groups, the boarding school system engendered
several spinoffs that have positive effects on the peace that Ghana enjoys. First, the
boarding schools create opportunities for friendships that last long after one has
graduated out of the boarding house. In particular, the “old boyism, girl old girlism” or
alumni and alumnae associations have provided a platform for extending and expanding
those friendships beyond the walls of the school and across generations, since
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membership of these associations cut across generational or cohort lines of friendships.
People who have attended the same school grow up to be like “…sisters [and the]
sisterhood, brotherhood, [that past students associations create] tend to let us live with
each other, work with each other, and support each other…” (Interview 206, 29 October,
2014). This is because “…when you meet as classmates you don’t see yourselves as Ewe,
Konkomba, Nanumba, you see yourselves as classmates who have gone to training
college, who have gone to secondary school, who have gone to university together”
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The bonds of friendship seem to grow stronger outside
the school system and in later years. As a respondent recalled,
…the sense of bonding [in such associations]; it’s like a family, I mean,
and it wasn’t like that when we were in school; I don’t remember it to be
like that; you had a few friends, but here, you know, everybody
remembers the other person, is interested in the other person” (Interview
218, 13 December, 2014).

This sense of familial bonding derived from the relationships built out of the
boarding schools “… has permeated the whole country [so much so that] before you do
something you say oh, this is my old…” school mate (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).
The implication for peace is that, in the words of a respondent:
all of that in fact socializes Ghanaians so much that even if there is a
conflict between the people of Saboba and the people of Yendi and then
you are traveling to go and fight the people of Yendi and you go and meet
your classmate [laughs] I’m just wondering how you would feel, you see?
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So that has actually brought us to understand that we are one people with
one destiny and I think that’s really very very important.” (Interview 6, 18
February, 2014)
A bonus from the boarding school systems is the “intermarriages [it has fostered]
between people from different geographical, ethnic, and religious backgrounds”
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) who were once school or classmates. This reinforces the
position of the alumni and alumnae associations of boarding schools as platforms for
peace. It is common to hear in discussions that people would say “… oh my wife comes
from there, my sister is married to this – that intermarriage thing, the old students’
association thing, the intermarriages and all that are glues that bond Ghanaians together”
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).
The creation of boarding schools effectively created concentrations of schools in
certain geographical spaces. This warranted the posting of teachers and other educational
workers from geo-ethnic regions that were more advanced educationally to the less
endowed ones. The consequential “Free movement of people to different parts of the
country for work” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) allowed “…Ghanaians to mix up with
southerners coming to the north, northerners going to the south” (Interview 6, 18
February, 2014).
Beyond the world of social engagements and work, respondents said boarding
schools also created the springboards for the formation of political alliances out of school
contacts (interview 207, 29 October, 2014). A major contributory factor in the alliance
building lies in the extracurricular activities such as sports, debates, and different learning
clubs and associations that created spaces for students from different schools to encounter
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peers from other schools. Such encounters created lifelong friendships that have spilled
over into adult life. Even for members of associations such as the Young Catholic
Students who recently discovered their members tended to shun going “… into politics,
maybe [because] they see the political environment to be too hostile” (Interview 12, 4
March 2014), there are nonetheless strong influential roles and relationships that cut
across political divides. So strong are such bridge-builder effects of their student days
experiences that when one of such persons (name withheld) recently “… died you had the
representation from all parties, because of the gravitas of the person, at the funeral”
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014).
A third spinoff is that the boarding system of “education comes with its own
culture” (Interview 1, 3 March 2014) In the case of Ghana, that culture was the nonadversarial, nonviolent, and integrative type. To illustrate the point, a respondent narrated
how
…when we were in the Pan African Parliament, it is only the Ghanaian
delegation that you could see moving together as a group. And the other
delegations would ask us how we are able to do that. Other African states
delegations you could see clearly opposition and government – you could
see; they were not mixing” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).

Another example was when in 2009 Ghana’s Ambassador to Namibia personally
went to the Airport at Windhoek to welcome a Pan African Parliamentary delegation that
the Deputy Minority (Opposition) Leader in Ghana’s parliament was leading to monitor
Namibia’s elections. According to the respondent, the scene prompted delegates from
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other countries to remark “we can never be like Ghana” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).
Not only was it surprising that the Ambassador would come to meet someone from the
opposition in his country; the cordiality the two exhibited did not indicate they were
political adversaries.

Non-intentionality of Peace Outcomes from Education
In sum on the positive side, Ghana’s educational system, in the view of some
respondents, has been very helpful in promoting interethnic integration and social
cohesion. However, other respondents observed that “…it is kind of difficult to establish
a direct relationship between education and peace in Ghana (Interview 201, 15 October
2014), especially when viewed from the angle of policy intentionality in the set up and
management of the educational system. Indeed, most respondents in the KII lamented the
lack of intentionality in the use of education as an instrument for social cohesion and
peace in Ghana. They viewed the contribution of education to peace as a coincidental or
even accidental, as most of the positive examples cited derive from the incidental spinoffs of the effects of boarding schools and the posting of teachers, rather than the
intentional acts of curriculum development and implementation, for example. In the view
of respondents, the major contribution of the educational system lies in the extra or noncurricular activities that created spaces for students from various schools and
backgrounds to encounter peers from other communities and schools (Interview 12, 4
March, 2014). Summing up the view that the contribution of education to peace in Ghana
is a byproduct, not an intentional product of the educational system, a respondent had this
to say:
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I will not sit down here and say our educational system has not played a
role in contributing to producing individuals who saw themselves as
Ghanaians rather than as ethnic individuals [but] is it the cause of
education? No. I think our system may not have been directly informed to
promote peace; the content does not promote peace, but the space and the
structures that we put in place may indirectly; it’s a byproduct of that
space (Interview 215, 10 December 2014).

Respondents attributed the defects in the educational system of Ghana as an
instrument of peace, now and in the future, to a number of interlinked factors. First, the
content of education does not emphasize the teaching of history of Ghana to provide a
shared understanding of how the ethnic groups in the country came to be together; are
interrelated; and have managed to coexist largely peacefully. Instead, some text books
distort historical facts (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014), and thereby contribute to the
protraction of inter and intra ethnic conflicts in some locales. In other words, neither the
content nor the delivery mechanisms in schools are deliberately designed to foster the
sense of oneness among Ghanaians. Hence, in the view of a respondent:
In terms of curriculum, [Ghana’s educational system] hasn’t helped much
because I think that […] the education system in Ghana has not
emphasized history. People finish a certain level of education even
university and all they know is general West African history; what they
know is European history; they have not consciously studied the history of
settlements, of relationships between the different ethnic groups, […] if
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we have to promote peace we need to know our history”. (Interview 2, 7
February, 2014).

Another respondent puts it this way:
I do not think there is any conscious effort to do that. What many of us,
people have referred to is the Boarding House Concept that has become
the melting pot. Because I wonder if there are any serious curricula that
talk about Peace and Conflict Resolution; they do not seem to be there at
the University Campuses (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

To buttress the argument on the non-intentionality of the educational system in
promoting the social gel of a nation, and the peace that Ghana enjoys, another respondent
would point out that:
you know in Ghana we don’t have peace education, in terms of it being
part of the curriculum, even in the universities there is no strong conflict
studies program in any of our universities and yet we have this peaceful
environment ok, so in that respect one would not give full credence to the
educational system of being a factor; just that we are lucky that the culture
and religion seem to be able to carry us through any such upheavals
(Interview 201 – 15 October, 2014).
In other words, religion and culture and the institutions associated with them can
take more credit for Ghana’s peace than the formal educational system. Indeed, on the
wider question of the contribution of education to the building of a culture of peace in the
country through the creation of patriotism, attitude of selfless service, and social
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conscientiousness among the citizens, there is no conscious educational program. This
led a respondent to state that:
I am not too sure we have been very intentional and deliberate in
facilitating patriotism in terms of our curricular and the pedagogic and so
on and so forth. I think that sector we need to do more. We’re studying
alright; we’re churning out scholars – but it’s not just scholars, but people
who will love the country and be prepared to die a little for their country;
people who would acquire the knowledge, the skills and will not allow
themselves to be bought because of the dollar, and would say that even
though I am not making it, I want to make my contribution. A lot of
people completed school here and they want to go out” (Interview 8, 24
February, 2014).
Ghana’s Educational System as a Source of Conflict
Respondents recalled that the missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a good
job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized academic and
character formation. Hence, the educational system at the time of independence was very
good as it focused on character formation as much as academic attainments. However,
with the passage of time in the postcolonial educational system, “…they removed certain
lessons like religious studies, […] and that hasn’t contributed a lot” to building a culture
of peace in the country (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Underscoring the need for
intentionality in the design and implementation of an educational system that supports
peace, one respondent pointed out that: “You can educate a lot of people, but if you do
not instill discipline in them, patriotism in them” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), the

225

essence of education and its contribution to peace and national development would be
lost. The fact that one is educated is not necessarily a force for good, and education
without character formation is worthless to nation building. Unfortunately, under the
current educational system, we have reached a point where “…our values, traditional
values are vanishing and they are being replaced by individualism, the desire for wealth,
acquire wealth at any cost (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), a respondent stated. This
has come about because under the current educational policies “…the principles that
should guide us are left out” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). This is the result of
government’s persistent threat to de-emphasize the teaching of religion in schools
(Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
To buttress the argument, respondents cited several examples of how the amoral
educational system has increasingly resulted in situations where the educated people are
using their knowledge and competencies to manipulate less educated co-citizens into
violence (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). With reference to the perpetuation of localized
conflicts, for instance, respondents observed that “somebody might say that the higher the
level of literacy the greater the prospects for peace; well I don’t think it is true because
who leads the non-literate sections of the population [into violent confrontations]; well, it
is the literate ones” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). In other words, in all the localized
protracted inter and intra ethnic conflicts, it is usually the literate people who are the ones
who (mis)lead the illiterate ones to initiate and sustain the recurrence of violence.
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Limited Social Dividends of Education to Society
Respondents also questioned the social dividends that education has brought to
communities from which educated people came. Beyond their immediate families, the
societal dividends of education are very limited or missing. Instead, respondents
indicated that the educational system has produced negative role models for most
communities. Hence, respondents have questioned the transformative function of
education as, in some cases, going to school has done little to transform the lives,
mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors of those who claim to be educated. Rather than use
their acquired knowledge for good, some educated people are using their knowledge to
foment troubles and mislead others into conflicts. As a respondent remarked:
On the negative side we also have people who have had education but
education has not passed through them. Their behaviors show that well, as
if they had not been to school at all; and some through the little education
they had, they try to influence others not for good but rather to take to
violence” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

In the view of a respondent, the “…educated people who are the ones, [though]
fortunately or unfortunately are occupying high positions of political power, have often
not shown good example” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Beyond indulgence in
corruption and selfishness, there are only “…isolated examples where people, educated
people, have gone back [and] given to their people, […] but largely you don’t see that
happening. [Instead] education has sometimes isolated people from […] their roots
because they are educated above [laughs] their local people”. (Interview 2, 7 February,

227

2014). In other instances, you encounter a “… well-educated, a prominent person of a
Political Party and yet [he or she] comes to say things and you wonder whether the
person is correct” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Giving specific examples,
respondents noted that in most of the protracted and very violent chieftaincy disputes
dotted across the country, you will:
…find well-educated people promoting conflict, taking very hard
positions and not negotiating; you would expect that educated people
should be better negotiators and by and large maybe they are but there are
instances that you can point out examples of educated people taking very
hard (stressed) positions in terms of chieftaincy issues which tend to
promote more community chieftaincy conflicts in those areas. (Interview
206, 29 October, 2014)

Educational System as the Epicenter for Future Conflicts
Respondents also raised a number of emerging negative trends that, if not
addressed, will make education a negative force for peace. In their view, part of the
reason why the educational system is failing to deliver high quality, employable
knowledge and skills is the constant and multi-directional policy changes the system has
witnessed since independence. As a result, “the educational sector is the sector that has
been experiencing a lot of turbulence in the sense that every regime that comes wants to
make an impact in education” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). Accordingly, they set out to
make changes in accordance with their whims or “Party Manifestoes that their own
people are not even familiar with” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). These partisan
approaches to managing the country’s educational policy framework do not create shared
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values, vision, and direction for change that would serve as the basis for continuity in the
evolution of consistent policies and programs for the sector. The policy relevance to the
consumer population of such changes is questionable, as these endless changes are:
…usually not in the interest of the thousands of youth that are going
through education” [because even though all governments] would claim
that [what they have done] is for the good of the system but at the end of
the day the products that are coming out [from these schools] become the
victims of this … constant change (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).

As a result, the first flashpoint for violence that respondents signaled is the large
number of young people spewed out of the country’s educational system with little to no
employable knowledge and skills. They recalled for instance, that tertiary educational
institutions have burgeoned since the 1980s, with well over fifty Universities now
operating in the country; up from only three in the late 1980s. Together “…they are
turning out graduates at a rate that the economy cannot absorb at all. So the mass of
unemployment is moving up not just from the literates, illiterates, semi-literates but even
to highly qualified people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014; see also Interview 209, 19
November, 2014). This, in the view of respondents is a huge threat to peace (Interview 5,
14 February, 2014). A one respondent observed: “I see a situation whereby if things do
not change, if the products of this educational system continue coming out and not
finding employment because of the way the system has trained them, yeah, we could find
ourselves in a serious situation” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).
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Respondents made reference to the comment of the National Youth Coordinator
that “Unemployment comes with national security threat” (Midley, 2014), to buttress the
danger inherent in the current educational system and its contribution to youth
unemployment. Already, the situation is exacerbating tensions with better technically
trained and equipped foreign workers in the construction and other sectors (Interview 5,
14 February, 2014). But the major security threat lies in the future, in the view of one
respondent who summarized the situation as follows:
the number of children that have increased on our streets begging and just
hawking anything and just to make ends meet has increased, just looking
with my eyes, without doing any statistical studies, yeah, is just incredible
and very worrying because I see these children and I think in 20 years
what would they be doing? They would become the stitchers (sic), they
would become armed robbers, they would become thugs because they
have to live so they would do everything that they need to do to survive
and that child, that boy who was today wiping your windscreen so that you
can get them GHC1 or GHC2, they will be breaking it in 20 years’ time to
steal. So those are the huge concerns; and that’s why we need to fix our
educational system because it is just crumbling; it is crumbling and the
evidence is what we see in the streets. Apart from these young boys you
also have those that have been half baked because they’ve had access to
basic education and that’s it. So, they’re really not skilled to take up any
meaningful employment that would give them the kind of life that is
decent (Interview 213, 9 December 2104).
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Another worrying sign in the educational sector as it relates to its contribution to
peace is the intrusion of politics into academia. Respondents noted that political parties’
invasion of the educational institutions, especially the tertiary ones, has made them the
seedbeds of partisan politics. They have become the political battlefields for capturing
and grooming young political leaders into the political parties. Respondents see both
positive and negative sides of the development. The positive dimension is that some
young members of Parliament and Ministers have emerged out of that system. On the
down side, however, respondents worried about the increasingly partisan and politically
polarized atmospheres that have taken root on the campuses of tertiary educational
institutions in the country (Interview 214, 10 December 2014). So strong are these
divisions that the National Union of Ghana Students, which used to be a strong public
policy advocate, is now sharply divided along partisan lines; all because “You have all
these groups [that] are die-hard political supporters [of the two major political parties] on
the campuses. ” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).
In sum, the boarding schools of Ghana’s educational system created spaces for
people of different ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds to get to know each other, and
thereby fostered the reduction of interethnic prejudices. However, this outcome was
never planned or intended as a direct product of the educational system. That it happened
must be due to other circumstantial factors other than the design of the educational
system itself. On the converse, respondents see that the current structure and operations
of the educational system is eroding this accidental benefit. In the stead, it is producing
young people who lack not only the knowledge and skills for gainful employment; they
are also missing the character formation and values inculcation that the educational
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systems once offered to older generations. This, in the view of respondents, makes the
educational system a potential negative contributor to Ghana’s peace.

Ho14

Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of

other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
This hypothesis offers an opportunity to explore how the personal attitudes,
behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians may have contributed or not to the existence and/or
promotion of social cohesion and peace in the country. Previous hypotheses focused on
respondents’ perceptions, beliefs, and views on observed phenomena in the general
society that they believe may have contributed to peace or not in Ghana. The guiding
questions for testing this hypothesis, however, give respondents a chance to
introspectively examine their personal beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, practices, and
lived experiences, and by extension those of all ordinary citizens, in daily encounters that
have positively or negatively contributed to the building of social cohesion and peace in
Ghana.
Social cohesion, however, is a multi-dimensional concept (Jenson, 2010;
Reeskens, 2008) whose measurement cannot be restricted to a narrow set of variables.
Berger-Schmitt (2002) defines two dimensions of social cohesion. The first is the extent
to which members of a society create and promote equal opportunities for all its members
through the reduction of disparities and inequalities, as well as, ensuring inclusivity of all
in private and public engagements. The second measures the extent to which society
manages diversities positively through the creation of operational frameworks, capacities
and opportunities for its members to interact, live, and work together across different

232

lines of diversities such as religion, ethnicity, and race, among others. Jenson (2010) adds
a third dimension of social cohesion related to citizen’s engagement with the institutions
of governance in their respective localities or country.
Kearns and Forrest however proposed five dimensions for the concept. The
attributes they evolved ranged from shared values and active civic engagement; presence
of social control mechanisms that minimize disruptions; systems and processes for
reducing economic disparities within the population; the existence of inclusive networks
that facilitate member participation in the public life of the community, and the shared
sense of belongingness and collective identity within a common geographical space
(Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Markus, on his part, views social cohesion as a “never-ending
process of achieving social harmony” (Markus, 2013, p. 13); one in which several
political, economic, socio-cultural, identity, social justice and equity; opportunities for
citizen participation in public life; inclusive and accommodative behaviors, and the
experience of self-worth are important contributory factors to achieving and sustaining
that harmony.
Building on the foregoing definitions, this study used a set of eleven (11)
variables to gauge the contribution or otherwise of personal beliefs, values, attitudes,
behaviors, and practices to the building of social cohesion and the peace that Ghana
experiences. These variables include the extent to which respondents would go to i) make
an effort to include people of other ethnic backgrounds in group discussions or
conversations; ii) ensure that others from different cultural backgrounds accept the
respondent’s values as more important; iii) ensure that their cultural views are accepted
over others in a group discussion; iv) intentionally avoid mixing with people of other
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cultures; v) ensure the views of others on national issues are considered important and
valid.
Other variables assessed in the study are the extent to which respondents will try
to understand issues and events from the perspectives of those directly affected by them;
consider the ethnic background of candidates when they vote in an election; and the
degree of willingness on the part of respondents to accept posting to any part of the
country other than in one’s home region. Measures of practices that promote social
cohesion included the extent to which respondents would accept that members of their
families marry to people of other ethnic backgrounds; the extent to which respondents
would use the legal means to address their conflicts with people of other ethnic groups;
and indications of extent to which the personality of candidates or the issues they stand
for determine the voting choices respondents make at elections. In sum, together, the
variables explored different ways in which respondents’ personal beliefs, values,
attitudes, behaviors, actions, or inactions provide insights into how the individual
attitudes and actions of Ghanaians may have contributed to the creation and maintenance
of a cohesive society and the peace of the country.
Figure 11 provides a summary of the results for each variable. The results show
that, except for the variable testing attitudes and behaviors related to cultural superiority,
all other variables returned out more than 70% response rates on positive attitude and
behaviors of respondents that may have contributed to the peace of Ghana.
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Figure 11
Effect of Personal Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices on Peace in Ghana.
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Crosstabulation of the various responses with the demographic characteristics of
respondents yielded significant finds with p- values < 0.05 for all the variables except for
the cross tabulation between Age categories of respondents and inclusive attitude, as well
as, value for other’s views; primary occupation and valuing others’ views. Similar results
emerged for religious affiliations of respondents cross-tabulated with inclusive attitudes,
cultural superiority; conflict avoidance; support for intermarriages, and accepting
postings to other places other than one’s home region. The cross-tabulation of the
variables with gender produced p-values > 0.05 for gender and inclusive attitudes;
cultural superiority; avoidance; accepting postings to places outside one’s home region,
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and support for intermarriages. All other measures had p-values < 0.05 – See Appendix
21. Overall, although different characteristics of respondents influenced their perceptions
on how personal values, beliefs, and attitudes contributed to the different dimensions of
social cohesion in Ghana, the generality of the results indicate that we can reject the
proposition in Ho14

that Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians

toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana
enjoys.
The findings from KII reported in various sections of this study have in many
ways responded to the questions raised under this hypothesis; namely, the assessment of
the extent to which the personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward
people of other ethnic or religious groups have contributed to the peace that Ghana
enjoys. We have observed, for instance, the natural tendency of Ghanaians to be tolerant
and receptive of people from all backgrounds (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). We
observed how respondents indicated that all the cultures of the ethnic groups in Ghana
“are quite tolerant of other cultures” (Interview 213, 9 December 2014). They share
common traits of “respect for human dignity, respecting the truth; respecting the
institution, respecting the rule of law [while shunning] and superiority complex [so that]
you don’t say that I’m from this [therefore] I’m better than you, no; we are all the same”
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In particular, inter-religious tolerance is high and the
relationship between Muslims and Christians in Ghana has been described as one of the
best” [on the continent, as] you don’t have that kind of religious fundamentalism”
(Interview 213, 9 December 2014) we see elsewhere.
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Respondents pointed out that this predisposition to intercultural accommodation is
essentially because most cultures in Ghana are very open, tolerant, and ready to accept
people and all circumstances easily (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). Consequently, the
socialization processes across all ethnic groups “…teach the people to be tolerant [and] to
learn to co-exist (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Hence, the pervasive and nested
influence of culture and religion on the lives of Ghanaians makes what “…may have
influenced the actions of someone […] difficult to determine whether it’s coming from
the religion or the culture (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The result of this cultural
infusion is that Ghanaians do not want to do anything to offend God and the stranger,
whom, respondents have observed, could be the reincarnation of a deity. The cultures of
all ethnic groups therefore provide support for intercultural comingling of people,
accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. Accordingly, a
respondent from the south stated that “I will not go to Tumu [in the north] and for people
[there] to say he comes from there so we will not help him […] culturally you are
accommodated until you prove yourself that you are evil and of course no society
condones that… (Interview 2, 14 December, 2014).
The attendant freedom of all Ghanaians to move to and settle anywhere in the
country has enabled them to appreciate each other’s cultures and lifestyles. Intercultural
assimilation is therefore a common practice. Many Ghanaians easily adapt to the diet,
dance, and dress codes of their host communities without hesitation; and many speak at
least one other Ghanaian language other their mother tongues. As one respondent recalled
from personal experiences:
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I speak Ga very fluently, although I am not a Ga; it is simply because I
lived there; I speak Twi but I am not an Akan; it’s simply because I lived
there; I speak a bit of Ewe, I am not an Ewe. It’s simply because I learnt
to appreciate other people’s cultures and tolerate them more than I would
have done if I had not been exposed to them (Interview 7, 19 February,
2014).

Getting to know each other through the educational system, business travels around
the country, intermarriages, or other forms of cross-cultural engagements have also
significantly reduced any interethnic prejudices, stereotypes, and superiority/inferiority
complexes among the ethnic groups in Ghana. In particular, respondents returned to how
the “boarding houses [have] made people tolerant to each other’s cultures, each other’s
temperaments. People who have not gone to the Boarding House would find it difficult
to relate to a particular group because of certain perceptions” (Interview 10, 27 February,
2014). Recounting her personal experience of the leveling effect of education, a
respondent pointed out that the fact that she sat in the same class with girls from other
parts of the country, and even did better than them in examinations, made her have no
“basis for [feeling of] inferiority complex or superiority complex” (Interview 206, 29
October, 2014).
Respondents attributed this congealing influence in part to the fact that in the run
up to independence, “… the national identity was emphasized more and the diversity less
so we felt more as one than 52 different ethnic groups” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). So
strong was this sense of oneness that cultural absolutism was virtually nonexistent. This,
in the view of the respondent, “may even explain why we do not have a national language

238

[since] …no particular ethnic group has felt so superior [as] to impose its language on the
nation.” On the contrary, “…there is that mutual respect among the ethnic groups so that
one does not exert itself too much especially against the smaller and the weaker ones”
(Interview 13, 5 March 2014).
Another respondent who had experience living in other countries in West Africa
believes the Ghanaian experience is unique because the socialization systems in Ghana
shield children from the negative stereotypes and pejorative discussions about members
of other ethnic groups. Hence, the children don’t grow up imbibing some sense of
cultural superiority or inferiority (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). In addition, past
military and political alliances between ethnic groups, as well as, the friendship and
joking relationships between ethnic groups is another equalizing factor that suppresses
ethnic bigotry and superiority complexes (Interview 206, 29 October 2014; Interview 7,
19 February, 2014).
Ethnicity does not affect the voting behaviors of respondents. Respondents
recognized that political parties in Ghana do have strong ethnic constituencies and that
the two major political parties in Ghana derive large chunks of their votes from certain
ethnic enclaves. However, in the view of respondents, this cannot be construed to mean
ethnicity necessarily influences the voting behaviors of individuals. As respondents
pointed out, political parties in Ghana are, by law and reality, not ethno-regionally based
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014). They are national in character. In reality also, all the major
political parties make strenuous efforts to ensure that they portrait this national character
in the choice and presentation of their candidates. Hence, even though the New Patriotic
party is “being tagged as an Ashanti party” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014), all its Vice
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Presidential candidates have been northerners. Similarly, the National Democratic
Congress has had either it’s Vice Presidential or Presidential candidates being from the
north or most of its key ministers are chosen from the north. For this reason, with respect
to the use of ethnicity as a criterion for voter choices during elections, respondents have
cast doubts on the idea. In their view, the multi-ethnic composition of political parties
serves as a bastion against ethnic bloc voting or mobilization for political purposes.
Respondents also cited the political freedoms such as the freedom of expression
and the freedom of association which allow Ghanaians of all creeds and ethnicity the
right to join any political party of their choice, as major contributory factors to the
country’s peace. Everyone is free to join a party of his or her choice and is free to
exercise their vote as they wish. As one respondent noted, it is common to see “…people
move from one political party to another; people from one family two brothers; one can
belong to NDC, the other for NPP, that is ongoing” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014; see
also Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). And as has been illustrated before, the political
divisions may even cut across family lines. As one respondent pointed out “… in every
community you have political opponents and nobody is ever stopped from commenting
his or her views about what is happening” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Hence, the
possibility of articulating an open ethnic agenda in Ghana’s election is very limited. As a
respondent summarized it:
our political parties may have, you know, people from certain ethnic
groups dominating but they’ve also had a strong presence of people from
all ethnic groups. So if a party wins, there isn’t that feeling that it is this
ethnic group [that has won] so people who are on the other side may be
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dissatisfied, but it has been very difficult for them to mobilize an ethnic
constituency against the other party because the party that would have
won would have a lot of elements from the ethnic groups that would have
been mobilized and so they can be a counter force to prevent the other
ethnic groups from mobilizing that is one” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)

Because of the conscious effort to ensure ethno-regional balance in the composition
of political parties, and especially in the choice of national level candidates, respondents
have argued that ethnicity per se is not the determining factor in individual’s choice of
candidates in the elections. On the contrary, people vote for political parties, not the
individual candidates representing the political parties. This is why, in their view, the
Peoples National Convention (PNC), a party that the late President Hilla Limann, a
northerner created, a party that has been led largely by northerners in all elections since
1992, has consistently performed abysmally in the north in terms of total votes accrued.
In contrast, the NDC won heavily in the north in two successive elections (1992 and
1996) with a South-South ticket.
Beyond the selection of candidates, political parties strive to demonstrate their
national outlook even in matters such as the selection of venues for their congresses and
other events. Hence, if a political party is seen to be holding its events “…in one region
the party begins to say no, we must be seen to be moving round because that’s the way
we demonstrate to the whole country that we are for everybody” (Interview 12, 4 March
2014).
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Some respondents expressed worries about recent attempts to ethnicize politics, as
they noted that “…some politicians are playing the ethnic card against the national
identity and if we do not put a halt to this it could affect us. For example somebody wants
to be elected and would say that ‘vote for me because I am one of you’ irrespective of
competence, irrespective of the person’s capabilities” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).
However, other respondents suggested that the Ghanaian voter has become so
sophisticated that even the offer of money by candidates is no longer an enticement for
their votes. As one respondent noted,
people try to influence others with monies…but I will say also people are
not stupid; if there are four candidates they also know the person who is
really qualified and so there have been cases too they take your money but
they don’t vote for you [instead] in the final analysis they would vote for a
person they feel would be able to handle” the position (Interview 5, 14
February, 2014).
With respect to the acceptance of job placements in other parts of the country,
respondents found no problems with it. It has been a normal practice, although there have
been isolated stories of people from the south resisting posting to the north. But there
have equally been stories about such people resisting posting back to the south once they
have tasted the life of the north. In particular, respondents recalled that in the
Acheampong era you had Regional Commissioners superintending regions where they
did not come from. So blended and accepted were these Commissioners that, even today
“… you go to the Volta region and they are talking about Kabore etc.; you come to the
Northern Region and they are talking about Col. Zumah; you go to the Upper Region,
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they are talking about Aquaye Nortey” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). This is the
example that the concept that we are “…one nation, one people, with a common destiny”
(Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; see also Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; and Interview
6, 18 February, 2014) has taken root in the psyche of Ghanaians.

Summary of Findings from Field Studies

The findings from the quantitative survey and key informant interviews all
confirm that Ghana’s peace is relative. It is peaceful only in comparison to other
countries in Africa that have the same or similar mixes of historical, economic, ethnopolitical, and cultural challenges but which have succumbed to violent national level
conflicts. Internally, there are parts of Ghana that would not consider themselves as
being at peace due to persisting inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts. Nonetheless, to the
extent that these conflicts have been containerized within their localities, Ghana is seen as
peaceful. Finally Ghana is also said to be peaceful from the perspective of a historical
timeline of the nation. In the view of respondents, there are certain periods of the
country’s history that cannot be described as peaceful.
Ghana therefore is a country in a state of negative peace equilibrium where a
balance of forces has successfully prevented the country from exploding into nationwide
violence. Incidentally, the same forces have not been able to lead the country toward
positive peace. On the contrary, respondents noted clusters of force fields, or action
points whose synergistic engagements cancel out the tilts towards violence or progressive
positive peace. Instead, they always manage to restore the country to the state of negative
equilibrium at every turn.
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On the positive side, the nested relationships between culture and religion
constitute the bulwark of positive forces restraining Ghana from a decline to the abyss.
The systems and networks of values, beliefs, institutional engagements, and private actors
using the platforms of religion and culture constitute the threads and weavers of peace
that constantly stitch and hold together the fraying and otherwise centrifugal parts of the
socio-political fabric called Ghana. The threads of collective beliefs, values, and practices
from religion in particular have crafted a shared sense of oneness among the ethnic
groups in Ghana. The faith-based leaders that pop up, when most needed, to weave
together the politico-ethnic and geographical divides of the country; heal wounds; and
foster reconciliation, are the weavers credited with keeping the fraying social fabric
cobbled together. The faith-based organizations that never fail to speak up and out on
national issues, when it matters most, represent the interests of the voiceless, as they
speak truth to power. In the process, they create and sustain the bonds that keep hope
alive and violence at bay.
Closely associated cultural values of hospitality and intercultural accommodation
have provided the threads for weaving the webs of inter-ethnic and cross-faith marriages;
multi-ethnic and multi-creed human settlements across the country; as well as, historical
politico-military inter-ethnic alliances that underwrite unspoken non-aggression pacts
between major ethnic groups in Ghana. Culture also underwrites the geo-ethnic economic
interdependencies arising from the freedom of movement of persons, capital, and
unrestricted access to economic resources across the country. This makes it possible not
only for business people to invest anywhere in the country; less endowed citizens are able
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to travel to any part of the country in pursuit of their economic interests. This builds
cross-ethnic stakes in the peace of any part of the country and the country as a whole.
However, the patriarchal structure of Ghana’s traditional and religious
establishments provide very limited frontline spaces for women and the youth to be
active weavers of the country’s peace. Beyond championing the organization of prayers
for peace, respondents have cited women in particular as playing largely background,
behind the scenes, nature, and nurturing roles in Ghana’s peace. Men dominate the
decision making spaces, be it in politics, at the pulpit, or in the field of business. Women
and the youth bear the brunt of poverty, especially in its relative terms, especially when
they add on responsibilities for fending for their families.
Education, particularly with its boarding school system, has been cited as a
positive thread that builds cross-ethnic bridges through the lifelong friendships and
alliances it creates among alumni and alumnae of post primary educational institutions.
However, the non-intentionality of this outcome from the design of the educational
system has come under scrutiny. Besides, respondents have also faulted the country’s
educational system for the burgeoning unemployed and largely unemployable youth who
constitute current and future peace and security threats to the country.
Similarly, respondents have positively noted individual and collective acts of
some political leaders in the country as the glue that keeps Ghana together. In particular,
Kwame Nkrumah’s ability to build cross-ethnic bridges in the political landscape did not
only disperse and diffuse ethno-centric political organization and mobilization, it sowed
the seeds for creating the political alliances that held the nation together. Ghana may be
split in the middle along the historical arch rivalry lines of the Nkrumaist tradition on the
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one hand, and the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition on the other. However, the crossethnic composition of these political blocks, which Nkrumah nurtured through his
Convention People’s Party, and decreed through the constitutional provisions that debar
ethno-political parties, have successfully intertwined inter-ethnic political elites in their
party enclaves. This makes it harder for one ethnic group to claim exclusivity of political
rights. Power is shared across all ethnic groups, when won by either member of the
duopoly. When ethnic inclusivity is construed to equate equity in participation in the
public sphere, the room for galvanizing and channeling ethnic grievances into political
conflicts is quite restricted. Chapter 5 provides more in-depth consideration of these
findings, among others.
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CHAPTER 5: Discussion And Implications Of Findings Of The Study
Introduction
Respondents in this study consistently characterized Ghana as a patchwork of geopolitically, socio-culturally, and eco-economically disparate ethnic groups that the
accident of colonialism cobbled together as a nation-state. Although this amalgam of
ethnic groups has managed to stay together for 58 years without a major national level
violent conflict, findings from the study underscore a split view of Ghanaians on whether
or not Ghana is an oasis of peace. In particular, respondents of the Key Informant
Interviews, who had the opportunity to explain their assessment of Ghana’s peace, were
quick to provide qualifiers that relativized or otherwise conditioned their assessments of
Ghana’s peace on centrifugal as well as centripetal external and internal factors that, on
the balance, have managed to hold together the unstable, precarious, and unpredictable
semblance of peace that Ghana has. This view of Ghana as a state riding on negative,
unstable peace is, incidentally, not a new development. Hansen provides a historical
capture of the fragility and unpredictability of Ghana’s peace in observing that:
Ghana seems to have a great capacity for deceiving both her admirers and
her critics. At times events move in a certain direction, and both groups
begin to imagine possible subsequent trends, but then everything changes
dramatically to confound all observers. Thus two years after colonial
administrators had described the country as a 'model colony' and a 'peaceloving' people, it was to be plunged into a violent conflict with the
colonial administration for independence” (Hansen, 1968, p. 24).
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Ghana’s capacity for deception on the nature of its peace has run through its postindependence history. Barely two years after gaining model status as the first subSaharan African country to gain independence, and to do so without prolonged violent
confrontation with her colonial masters, Ghana quickly abandoned the ideals of
multiparty democracy and plunged in for the fashionable single party dictatorship of the
time; a choice that would initiate a period of human rights abuses, arbitrary arrests and
incarcerations, and various forms of repressions that would trigger a culture of counter
violence as witnessed in the bomb throwing incidents of the 1960s (Daily Guide, 2013b).
The repressive state system would lead to a military coup d’état that set yet another
model for how the country would be governed for the next twenty (26) years. For much
of the 1970s confrontational politics that pitched governments of the period against civil
groups became the model for how Ghana would manage her political space. Studentgovernment confrontations were the norm of the period, with faith-based institutions and
civil society groups lending a hand on the side of the students in the protests over harsh
economic conditions and the demands for a return to civilian rule. Hence, during the late
1960s, “Ghana [remained] a particularly interesting case of confrontation politics because
the government, rather than the students, assumed the initiative” (Finlay, 1968, p. 51) in
the cycle of violent demonstrations that characterized the period. These studentgovernment confrontations continued into the 1970s, as students used their
demonstrations against the Supreme Military Council (SMC) government to push for a
return of the country to multi-party democracy (Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1979)
The semblance of peace and stability in the politics of Ghana that the bloody
military coup d’états of 1979 and then 1981 imposed on the country for the next eleven
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(11) years would end with little change to the status quo ante. The PNDC government
that prided itself with bringing peace, security, and stability to Ghana’s politics from
1981 to 1992 admitted that the peace it so boasted of bestowing on Ghana was neither
complete nor durable. Ironically, this was the period when JJ Rawlings declared the
“democratization of violence” (Clottey, 2008, p. 1; McDonald, 2010) as a state policy
that allowed him to put guns in the hands of non-security service personnel, ostensibly to
cow the opposition to his revolution. The attendant “culture of silence” (Agyeman-Duah,
1987b, p. 625; Sangaparee, 2012, p. 2) and fear that ensued created the semblance of
peace that his regime would pride itself in. It would turn out, however, that Rawlings was
not shielded from the illusory nature of the peace he credited to his regime, as he would
openly confess later that his regime had to “devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our
nation's security instead of being there with the people” (People's Daily Graphic).
Aware of the unsustainable nature of his kind of peace, Rawlings had to
unwillingly concede to democratization efforts to address the perceived lack of
legitimacy of his regime, which fueled the incessant public unrests and attempts to
overthrow him. As a respondent noted, “but for the pressure that was put on that Regime,
[Rawlings and his PNDC cronies] would not have even gone that way” of trying to return
the country to constitutional rule. They launched the process “…as a kind of pacification
to the people” (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014). Accordingly, the PNDC activated the
decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other
local government structures. That decision initiated the carefully choreographed and
thoroughly mined process that would lead to a return to the use of the ballot box rather
than the barrel of the gun to determine who rules Ghana.
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But since the uptake of that democratic process in 1992, Ghana’s peace has
remained as fragile and unpredictable as ever. As respondents in this study have amply
illustrated, the contemporary eulogizing of Ghana as an oasis of peace should not be
taken on its face value. If anything, attention must be given to Hansen’s caution that “The
fact that Ghana is noted for deceiving external observers and even perceptive ones like
Austin and Apter seems to indicate that the picture usually painted for us is far from
reality and that the actual situation is much more complex” (Hansen, 1968, p. 24).
Indeed, what is more predictable about Ghana’s peace is the unpredictability of what
factors and forces have kept and can continue to keep the country in this state of unstable
equilibrium of negative peace.
Grappling with the Yins and Yangs of Ghana’s Peace
What this study has tried to do is to seek greater understanding of what are the
factors or forces that have so successfully maintained this unstable peace equilibrium?
What makes it possible for Ghana to successfully wax between the descent into violence
and the maintenance of the semblance of peace? Participants in the study have provided
various perspectives on how and why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into
violent national conflicts despite the very tenuous nature of its peace. In evaluating these
perspectives, however, Smit cautions that one cannot rely on the respondents' intentions
as an incontestable guide to interpretation. Respondents or participants perceive and
define situations – including the researcher's intentions – according to their understanding
of their own motivations and of the contexts in which they act” (Smit, 2002, p. 67).
Accordingly, the factors that the study participants have isolated as contributing to
Ghana’s peace must be interrogated to explore if and how they, on their own or in
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combination with other factors and actors, have so consistently operated over the years to
keep Ghana’s uneasy peace from tipping towards the abyss.
Smit’s observation highlights the fact that far from being mechanisms for moving
toward higher levels of resolution of Ghana’s unstable peace situation, whatever factors
respondents have identified as sustaining the fragile peace of the country could be mere
sets of unstructured and uncoordinated initiatives that have, nonetheless, managed to
keep the semblance of peace, but have been unable to find higher level and lasting
solutions to the underlying causes of the fragile peace. Hence, the recurrence of the
cycles of deceptive peace, as Hansen describes it. The questions that such a situation
triggers are: Could it be that the factors and forces that have held Ghana together have
reached the ends of their creative potentials and are therefore incapable of inventing
newer and higher order solutions to break the jinx of negative and fragile peace that
Ghana seems to be trapped in? If so, what steam keeps them holding the country up, and
yet is incapable of pushing them to the next level of finding lasting solutions to the cycles
of near violence?
Meadows (2008), notes that “…if you see a behavior that persists over time, there
is likely a mechanism creating that consistent behavior” (p. 25). Meadows’ further
observation that “…the consistent behavior pattern over a long period of time …is the
first hint of the existence of a feedback loop” (p. 25), leads us to explore what feedback
loops might exist in Ghana’s conflict management system to create this state of negative
equilibrium. The concept of feedback loops as the mechanisms that hold an otherwise
fraying system together reinforces the perception of Ghana as a patchwork of peace, and
makes the analogy of the art and science of sewing or weaving an appropriate lens for
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searching for the threads, stitches, and weavers that hold this patchwork together; despite
the factors and forces that have threatened to pull it asunder since its conception as a
nation-state.
This brings into perspective the constitutive elements that give form and meaning
to the imagery of sewing or weaving as the process of building Ghana’s peace. A thread,
a principal ingredient for sewing, usually consists of a “…thin strand of cotton, nylon, or
other fibres used in sewing or weaving” (Oxford University, 2014) or to stitch, tie, knot,
or hold otherwise separate pieces of things or members of a set together. Intertwined into
ropes, combinations of threads can hold things that are not necessarily contiguous or
share any natural bonds, together. Depending on their length and strength, threads also
permit the binding of things over long distances together. In this respect, the combined
strength of threads can build bridges across geospatial and cultural spans to hold together
elements that are otherwise asunder.
In its noun form, a stitch, on the other hand is defined as “a loop of thread or yarn
resulting from a single pass or movement of the needle in sewing, knitting, or crocheting”
(Oxford University, 2014). Stitches hold things together or keep elements of a common
group together. Stitching presumes physical contiguity of the elements being stitched
together. This could be shared spatial boundaries, identities, or value systems, as in the
case of this study. While the initial stitches in surgery bind the separated parts, the
ultimate aim is to create a seamless bonding between these parts so that the binding and
the binder become no longer necessary.
The concept of a stitch then connotes the purposive use of threads to hold or bind
otherwise disparate pieces, elements, or in the case of this study, groups of people
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together in such a way that they become one piece. Purposiveness means there must be a
higher intent beyond the materials and act of stitching. It also requires an actor or weaver
who carries out the stitching process. In order words, threads and stitches alone do not
produce patches or eventual bonds; there must be an agent who finds need for the thread
and uses same to purposively craft a union between disparate entities. But the actors, be
they known or unknown; visible or invisible; conscious actors or unconscious ones; may
be credited or not credited for their acts of stitching. Regardless, their actions are what
create the binds, bonds, and bridges that bring and keep the disparate elements together.
The binding and bonding effects of stitches brings into focus the
conceptualization of social cohesion as the product of the binding, bonding, and bridging
processes that societies engage in to hold together otherwise centrifugal groups. In that
context, binding initiatives are viewed as externally engineered acts or processes that
bring and hold together otherwise distinct, standalone, or even mutually repelling
elements. What is bound together may never gel together into any inseparable form. They
require the external bind to keep them together.
Hence, in the context of this study, while a shared territorial unit, such as national
boundary or an ideological construct such as a constitution, with its associated symbols
and signs of the state, may bind disparate groups together as co-citizens in the same
geographical space; such co-citizens are not necessarily a united nation. They may indeed
be as distrustful, resentful, and alien to each than they are to members across another
national frontier. In other words, they could be “inner enemies …whose membership
within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it” (Simmel, 1908 in
Lemert, 2010, p. 185). Hence, a bond is stronger than a bind.
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Focusing on the bonding and bridging dimensions of social cohesion building,
Larsen et al define social capital as networks, norms, and trust that promote collective
action for mutual benefits. Communities with strong social bonds are more likely to
engage in joint problem-solving initiatives (Larsen et al., 2004). They recall the
distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding social
capital occurs within groups, which in the context of this study would include families in
their extended forms; ethnic groups; faith groups, among others. Bonding, therefore, is
endogenic i.e. it comes from within the group. It is natural and often derived from deeper
emotional attachments or shared values, and beliefs. It is not forced; it is free-willed.
However, as is the case with chemical bonds, social bonding also requires
something between the otherwise opposite elements to get them bonded. And, that which
comes between to facilitate the bonding must occupy an important and large enough
space to, as it were, create the attractive force that brings the opposing elements closer
together. The process of bonding must be completed with the sharing of something of
value between the opposing elements. In chemical bonds, opposing elements engage in
sharing or transferring electrons between themselves. Social bonds must function the
same way. There has to be a shared interest or the sustained transfer of valued factors that
bring and keep together otherwise disparate and centrifugal individuals or groups. The
strength of these factors is what keeps social groups together. When that is lost, they fall
apart. Strongly shared mutual beliefs and values from culture and religion are the valued
items that respondents in this case of this study have identified as the magnet and glue
that keep Ghanaians together.
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Unlike the binding and bonding processes which are intra-group by nature,
bridging takes the social cohesion process one step further to create engagements
between or across groups. This involves crossing the identity gulf to reach out to the
other. Social bridges consist of structures, institutions, and processes that create
frameworks and channels for the flow and exchange of information and actions between
otherwise disparate groups. Hence, the bridging social capital, on the other, are “…crosscutting ties [that allow] members of one group connect with members of other groups to
seek access or support or to gain information” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66). While bonding
serves intra-group interests, bridging has the effect of promoting intergroup actions that
have value for the groups involved.
Finally, even though “bonding social capital is a necessary antecedent for the
development of the more powerful form of bridging social capital […] this form of social
capital does not necessarily result in collective action” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65 & 66).
This is essentially because bonding social capital is preoccupied with provisioning and
serving the survival needs of its members. It is a coping mechanism that allows its
members “…to cobble together enough resources to survive, [but] their efforts never
extend beyond their immediate network” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66).
Be it through binds, bonds, or bridges, what is coming out from this study is that
multiple forces are at work to create and sustain the intra and inter-ethnic, regional, and
religious engagements that keep Ghana in its conditions of stable negative peace. The
findings of this study also affirm that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon that can be
neatly packaged in dyadic terms into silos of countries that are peaceful or not peaceful;
neither can peace be assigned absolutist values such as negative or positive. On the
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contrary, respondents in this study have consistently pointed out the relativism in the
consideration of Ghana’s peace; a point of view that would be applicable to any other
country. While aggregated perspectives may permit the classification of a country as
peaceful or not peaceful, the views that participants in this study have shared emphasize
the need to keep disaggregated perspectives in mind as well; and to recognize that while a
nation may not be at war, some of its citizens may well be living in war riven conditions.
Finally, the findings of this study provide field evidence that the business of
weaving the fabric of national peace cannot be the work of one actor such as government.
On the contrary, it is the work of a multiplicity of actors and institutions, working in
tandem or even in different directions. However, the net effect of their actions is what
produces the negative equilibrium that constitutes Ghana’s peace.
The concept of negative equilibrium has been applied in different fields. According
to Poulson, Mosddeq, an Iranian ideologue, applied the concept in the field of
international relations and diplomacy to advance a national policy position of neutrality
and non-alignment in Iran’s search for an independent foothold in the bipolar post World
War II environment. The policy was designed to prevent both the United States and the
Soviet Union from having any controlling influence on Iran’s internal affairs (Poulson,
2005). In the world of finance and economics, Levy, Levy, and Edry (2003) used the
term to illustrate how, even in times where economic indicators such as long term real
interest rates or “…real cost of debt” (Levy, Levy, & Edry, 2003, p. 97) tend toward zero
or even in the negative, an overall stable macroeconomic environment can still be
maintained due to the positive trends in other factors such as high inflation. In the
context of this study, negative equilibrium defines the situation where the balance of
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positive and negative forces underpinning Ghana’s peace have operated in such a way
that the net effect is the maintenance of a state that can neither be described as peaceful
or not peaceful, as respondents have observed. The relevance of the concept in this study
rests with the recognition that certain predisposing conditions must exist to ensure that
the net effect of the interactions between the negative and positive factors or forces in the
country do not tilt the country towards a downward spiral into violence or an upward
movement out of the trap of persistent tensions.
Systems theory suggests that the progression of states from negative to positive
peace or vice versa is a function of the conflict management system of the country.
Conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play different roles in
initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). The patterns of
reactions are products of the “system stock” (Meadows, 2008, p. 17) or the quantum and
nature of the stock of shared values, beliefs, and information storage and “…flows within
the system” (Meadows, 2008, p. 18) that determine the direction and rate of interactions
between the parties to move the conflict towards violence or peace. Hence, for conflicts
to degenerate into national level violence, it is necessary that “… the values of nation and
state become biologically [so] nefarious [as to] lead to war and to the killing of
innumerable human beings” (von Bertalanffy, 1969 p. 197).
A converse reaction is necessary for conflicts to resolve positively. In other words,
in all conflicts a network of processes and actors must work together to influence the
dynamics of the conflict (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). In such cases, interactions that
maintain the status quo or push the conflicts out of control are often perceptible. In other
words, conflicts are perpetuated, exacerbated, or resolved only when members of the
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conflict system act in some way or the other to keep the chain reactions or feedback loops
functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). By extension, at least one of the parties has to
initiate change in the conflict pattern, direction, scale, speed, and outcomes. Otherwise,
the system will keep feeding itself and self-maintain at the current levels of inertia.
The foregoing suggests that however incapable Ghana’s conflict response
mechanism may be in breaking the cyclical ebbs and flows of conflict that keeps it in the
state of unstable peace, there has to be some backstage organizing principles that ensure
that the unstable equilibrium is kept from tipping over to one end or the other. Hence, the
search for the elements that constitute the system stock that have enabled Ghana to weave
and sustain its patchwork of negative peace makes systems theory a valid framework to
use in this study. It “gives us the freedom to identify root causes of problems and see new
opportunities” (Meadows, 2008, p. 2) for catalyzing the pattern of reactions away from a
downward spiral towards violence or an upward one towards positive peace. This is
important because of participants’ observation in this study that while Ghana may have
succeeded to sustain a negative peace equilibrium, current challenges such as the growing
frustration among the unemployed youth pose new demands that the current system may
not be able to contain. As respondents noted, the fact that the youth are beginning “…to
identify what they think are the causes [of their impoverishment) and therefore may
choose to attack” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014), makes it imperative to delve
beyond conventional views on how Ghana has managed to pull back from the brink
(Interview 212, 9 December, 2014).
Added to the youth question are concerns about the growing distrust of the conflict
management capacity of institutions of state such as the courts and the Electoral
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Commission to guarantee justice and hold free and transparent elections respectively
(Kumbalonah, 2012). The increasing public disenchantment with perceived corruption in
public offices; state failure to sanction identified cases of corruption amidst the display of
opulence by some public officials implicated in such acts (Guide, 2014; Peace FM
Online, 2013); and the emergence of Christian-Muslim disagreements over rights of
worship in Christian administered schools (Daily Graphic, 2015), among others, all
constitute flash points for Ghana’s peace. All these cannot guarantee that the state of
negative equilibrium will not be disturbed and the tilt towards the abyss would not
happen. In other words, there is a high risk that the resilience of Ghana’s current conflict
management systems can be breached, if newer, more effective, and more sustainable
structures and systems are not evolved to deal with the emerging conflict dynamics.
As noted previously, conflict management systems are either resilient or brittle
(Meadows, 2008), depending on their capacity to self-evolve to handle new and
unexpected situations. Even though Ghana’s conflict management system may appear
stable, its ability to meet the new challenges is suspect, as it is far from being resilient.
Resilience is not the same as static stability. Stability is visible by its constancy or
changes; resilience is invisible. Hence, a long standing ability to avert violence is not
necessarily resilience, since it might actually mean doing the same thing over time
without adaptations to suit changing or newer conditions and contexts. Resilience of a
system goes beyond the ability to survive from one potentially violent conflict to another.
It requires the development of the capacity to “learn, create, design, and evolve ever more
complex restorative structures [which] are self-organizing” (Meadow, 2008, p. 76)
systems. In order words the ability of a system to adapt to changes is evidence of the
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complexity and resilience of the system. This complexity continuously resolves to
“resilience at a still higher level” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or meta-resilience where the
system of resilience evolves an ability to repair or restore disruptions wrought on a prior
system of resilience.
It is against this background that we interrogate how effectively the factors that
have been identified in this study as underwriters of Ghana’s peace have functioned,
individually and collectively, to keep the patchwork of peace that the country has from
fraying and falling apart, despite the cycles of palpable tensions that have taken the
country to the brink. What individual or networked factors and forces kept the country
from tipping over when it reached the end of the cliff? More importantly, why have
whatever web of factors and forces that have continuously held the stitches of Ghana
together failed to resolve themselves into higher order initiatives capable of moving
Ghana to the higher level of positive peace? How capable are these factors and forces for
self-reinvention to be able to confront and deal with the emerging conflicts centered on
the youth bulge, religious intolerance, and increasing distrust of the country’s conflict
regulatory institutions
This study has identified shared history, culture, and collective mindsets as
constituent elements of the system stock that have underpinned Ghana’s ability to
maintain herself in a state of negative peace equilibrium up to now. Can Ghana continue
to rely solely on these constitutive elements of its conflict management system stock to
avert a decline into the abyss, or better still, trigger an upsurge that would enable the
systems to “complexify” and take on the higher level responsibility of managing the new
challenges more positively? Meadow offers hope in suggesting that “You can use the
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opportunities presented by a system’s momentum to guide it toward a good outcome”
(Meadows, 2008, p. 24). Heeding this, the subsequent sections of this chapter focus on
examining the factors that respondents have identified as important underwriters of
Ghana’s peace with the view to isolating what aspects of that momentum can be
strengthened to enable Ghana evolve a more robust conflict management mechanism to
face the new challenges.

Super Ordinate Categories, Categories, and Subcategories of findings

The multiple iterations of the coding and categorization processes used in the
analysis of the transcripts of the Key Informant Interviews yielded two Super Ordinate
Categories, with four second level Categories that produced a total of fourteen
Subcategories. Each subcategory comes with its dimensions as well. Figure 12 depicts the
knotted relationships between the Super Ordinate Categories, their respective the
Subcategories, and between the four sets of categories and subcategories. The Cycle of
Super Ordinate Categories at the middle of the diagram presents the magnetic center that
pulls together and coordinates all engagements in the various subcategories to ensure
harmony and synergy. The religious beliefs, values, and worldviews under SOC 1
permeate the thin line of separation between religion and culture to infuse the lived
cultural attitudes and behaviors represented under SOC 2.
The constant interaction between religion and culture constitute the force field
that constantly tugs at the actions and engagements in the wider action fields within and
between Categories 1 through four. In this way, religion and culture, working together,
create the unified field of action in which the centrifugal and centripetal forces balance
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out their influences to account for how Ghana holds here peace together. Details of how
these elements pull together to produce the peace that Ghana has are presented in the
subsequent pages.
Category 1 – Trans Geo-Ethnic Social Bonds

This category groups the various factors that respondents have identified as the threads
and stitches that have woven together cultural, economic, social, and political bonds
within and across ethnic, regional, and religious lines throughout Ghana. Four main
subcategories of factors relating to sanguine and familial bonds; socio-cultural conjugal
bonds; multilayered bilateral interethnic friendship bonds; and bonds of historical
politico-military alliances bring together the intra and inter-ethnic forces of unity and
peace among Ghanaians. The constituent elements of these subcategories are discussed
below.
Subcategory 1.1 – Sanguine and Family-centered bonds and Safety Nets

Sanguine and extended family bonds are strong strands that serve as the
foundation for Ghana’s conflict carrying infrastructure. These relationships have very
strong transactional values at the social, economic, and even political levels. There are
several dimensions to this subcategory of factors.
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Figure 12 Relationship of Categories of Factors that Weave Ghana’s Peace
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Social location as footholds in the public sphere:
Socially, every Ghanaian is rooted in a web of sanguine and quasi-sanguine
relationships inherent in the intricate network of extended family systems. This web is
traceable from the nuclear family into which one is born through to the clan, lineage, and
to the ethnic level. This, in the words of one respondent is the “…basic template of social
organization” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) across all ethnic groups. And, so
seriously is this taken that “every Ghanaian belongs to a lineage; very few can say they
don’t belong to a lineage if you are a Ghanaian” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).
Indeed, even the slaves and strangers brought into any social setting had to find their
place in this “… template of our culture and social organization” (Interview 205, 29
October, 2014). Accordingly, people who find themselves in certain locations as
“…strangers had to attach themselves to lineages or they constituted themselves into
groups recognized as outsider lineages … made to belong” (Interview 205, 29 October,
2014).
So serious was this need to belong that all ethnic groups developed sophisticated
means of identifying their own, even if they came from completely different and distant
communities or even ethnic groups. Tribal marks, the structure of names, and/or recall of
family/clan taboos were important identifiers. Among the Dagara, recalls of family
histories, clan totems, clan or family eulogies, or even palmistry are used to determine the
stranger’s patrilineal or matrilineal lineage and, by extension, social location within the
host community. Even interethnic relationships are similarly traced, especially among the
chiefly ethnic groups in the north (Interview 206 29 October, 2014).
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Social belongingness has both economic and political repercussions. Membership
of a family creates rights of access to productive resources such as land. It also creates
rights of ascent to political offices within the traditional authority structure. Hence, giving
the rationale for this impulsive structuring of society, the respondent cited above
continued that “you can look at this from the Marxist point of view - because the family
was property owning, the family has always had the power, political power, first in
organizing its own people, giving them the basis of sustenance and so forth” (Interview
205, 29 October, 2014). Hence without family roots, one risked losing out in the political
and socioeconomic life of the community. In particular, the political relevance of family
belongingness is of high value as would be discussed later in this chapter.

Family Social Safety Nets and the discharged state:
Economically, family ties, even in their extended form provide the only safety net
for the majority of Ghanaians without stable sources of income and any form of
insurance. As one participant in the key informants’ interviews in this study put it, in
“…the extended family system we support one another. So somebody who is not even
working may not feel it as much as somebody in Europe would feel because the family
structure is such that if you have and I don’t have you try to take care of me; the little you
have you share with me…” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Another participant
illustrated how these family social safety nets constitute the shock absorbers that cushion
society from state failure when they create economic opportunities for the common good.
He recounted his own experiences of how he had to bail out a brilliant nephew of his who
could not go to the university because of the inability of his biological parents to cough
up the money for his fees and upkeep (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). His story
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epitomizes the experiences of most Ghanaians with some economic wherewithal.
Sizeable portions of their incomes service the payment of fees for nephews and nieces;
hospital bills for uncles and aunts; or the provision of start-up capital for the petty trade
of one relative or the other.
While there is no data available to quantify the contribution of such internal
family-based financial safety nets and transfers, data from family remittances from
outside Ghana provide proxy indications of the magnitude and importance of this
informal economy as a contribution to GDP. Sophism estimates that of the over $4.5
billion that Ghana received in 2005 from external transfers, “about 30 percent of this
amount ($1.5 billion) came from individuals” making transfers to families to support
consumption and investment needs. The steady increase of the “…. value of migrants’
remittances … from $201.9 million in 1990 to $1.55 billion in 2005 [contributed to
making remittances Ghana’s] … largest foreign exchange earner [and a] more stable than
Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)”
(Sophism, 2006, p. 165).
In a limited self-report study on Ghanaian perspectives on remittances, it is
estimated that as much as 25% of the remittances come through informal channels such
as self-carriage, friends, and relations. These informal transfers are unaccounted for in the
official records (Sam, Boateng, & Oppong–Boakye, 2013). This means the total
contribution of private remittances to families could be much higher than recorded.
Indeed, a larger study of the Ghanaian remittance transactions suggests that
“…unregistered remittances in Ghana can comprise as much as 65% of total remittances”
[which would up the Bank of Ghana’s] estimate of US$1 billion …closer to US$3
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billion” (Mazzucaw, Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2005, p. 139). In other words, the
contribution of private remittances to the GDP of Ghana in comparison to ODA and FDI
could be much higher than estimated.
Apart from buoying up the national economy, such transfers represent substantial
let offs on the social safety net responsibilities of governments. Cash savings aside, all
Ghanaians in want of some financial support for social service needs pile the pressure on
their family members, not the state, to provide the wherewithal to meet such needs.
Consequently, the anger that state failure to create the conditions for citizens to earn their
living could have unleashed in the public domain is contained within the private sphere.
It is not allowed to spill over into collectivized agitations in the public domain. This
effectively discharges the state of its responsibilities towards its citizens.

Families, Community, and Ethnic Affiliations as Launch Pads for Access to Political
Power and the Public Purse
The role of ethnicity in Ghana’s politics has already been sufficiently referenced.
At the political level, family, lineage and ethnic ties have high political values as well. In
both the formal and informal sectors, social networks are key to accessing economic
resources such as land or political power in the traditional authority systems. In the nonstate political arena, chieftaincy succession in all ethnic groups is conveyed exclusively
either via agnatic descent or matrilineally. Traditionally, one cannot become a chief or a
queen mother if one does not belong to a family recognized to have the right of ascent to
the stool or skin. Hence, strict recognition and enforcement of membership of such social
networks is central not only to one’s ability to aspire to a chiefship, but also the
conferment of the rights for one’s descendants to so do.
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The implications of this for the peace in Ghana, especially when considered in
relation to intermarriages will be highlighted in subsequent sections of this study. For
now, suffice it to say that the political import of social bonds cannot be underestimated as
a key underwriter of Ghana’s peace. Indeed, most of the intra-ethnic conflicts in Ghana
arise from disputes over rights of some individuals to occupy their local stools or skins as
chiefs.
In respect of gaining footholds in the modern state system, family ties are
important. For instance, many families make strategic calculations in the distribution of
family members across political lines. For most ordinary citizens, the postcolonial state or
aban in the Akan language, is an external entity that has little to no direct impact on their
livelihoods. What trickles down by way of jobs and benefits from state-sponsored social
programs reach those with political access or connections to power holders. For most
people then, it is logical that the State should be avoided, when one can, as in the case of
people slipping out of the tax system (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014); or exploited when
one has access to its resources, as with the case of the plunder of state resources by public
officeholders (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview
9, 26 February, 2014, and Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). What is aban di (in Akan) i.e.
what is State property belongs to none; it is a fallen elephant (wob nu lo, in Dagara) and
anybody who can must chunk off as much meat as his or her resourcefulness permits.
Under the circumstances, the struggles of families and ethnic groups for inclusion
in the state systems via representation in government is not a fight for the common good,
but a struggle for a foothold in the state for the private, and at best family or ethnic gain.
In sum, politics and political participation are all about “what I can grasp for myself and
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my family” (Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). It follows the Dagara folks logic that
bie ma mi be ko yir o di ko saab to wit, it is only when your mother is at the center of
affairs in the funeral home that you can expect to partake of the funeral meal.
To explain the operation of this principle in Ghana’s political landscape, KII
participants cited several examples where family, community, or even ethnic
participation in political parties is a matter of rational economic choice rather than belief
in the ideology and programs of a party. To illustrate the point, a participant cited the
case where in 1992 when the:
democratic system came about and people formed parties, the brothers
came together and the senior one said look, there are three strong parties,
let’s take one each; the senior brother said which party do you want; the
junior brother take one; you take one; and it’s left with this one, ok I take
that one. Whoever wins we are in it; the family will not lose; but if we are
all in one party, we may have problems (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014)

Beyond the family, entire communities or even ethnic groups make similar rational
choices and cost-benefit calculations in determining how to apportion the investment of
their political capital – manifest political allegiances and their votes. In such
computations, benefit maximization go hand in hand with risk minimization, as the
following example a respondent in this study offered illustrates:
Somebody told me he went to his home town and everybody there was
one Party, except one family. So when he went to find out [he was told]
that the community selected us to represent their opposite party, so that
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when the other Party comes they know they have some people they can
count on” (Interview 201, 21 November 2014).

The foregoing epitomizes the depth to which Ghanaians equate access to political
power to access to public resources. Chapter 4 cited the perception that being a
messenger of the party in power is better than being the head of a party in opposition to
illustrate this same point (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Manifestation of the operation
of this principle at the ethno-regional levels is evident in the posturing of political leaders
across all party lines. Operationalization of the principle became manifest in April 2014,
when a sitting Member of Parliament from the Ashanti region berated his fellow MPs
from the same region for failing to use their “huge presence in Parliament” (GNA, 2014,
p. 1) to influence public policies and programs that would inure to the benefit of their
constituents. This ordinarily legitimate and harmless concern, however, takes on a
regionalist or ethnocentric tone when the MP goes on to charge the President of Ghana of
being discriminatory in imposing what he perceived as a “stupid thing” (GNA, 2014, p.
1) on the people of his region, instead of in the regions where the President has his
political strongholds.
On the reverse side, the President received threats from the Volta Region,
considered the stronghold of his party, when he reassigned his Chief of Staff to an
ambassadorial position. The two week ultimatum that the executives of the President’s
party in the Volta region issued speaks for itself:
We give the President two weeks ultimatum to reinstate Prosper Bani else
we will not take part in any party activities…If they dare not reinstate
Prosper Bani in the next two weeks, we will advise ourselves and they
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shouldn’t forget that next year is election year and the campaign has just
started…They shouldn’t forget that if Volta region is peeved, it will be a
disaster for NDC (Manu-Quansah, 2014; Starr FM, 2014)

In sum, respondents in this study have cited the sanguine and extended family
bonds as a contributor to the peace that Ghana enjoys. However, the foregoing
discussions strongly suggest that the national level peace value of these family-based
social bonds and safety nets rest on the fact that “our culture provides safety nets, and
those safety nets are holding us together and holding us together in a way in which they
remind us that there are certain lines that you don’t cross and so people are prepared to
get to that point and to back off” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Multiple micro-level
economic and political incentives discussed later would underscore why such safety nets
constitute effective restraints on Ghanaians from pushing national level conflicts towards
escalated violence. For the macro-level, however, so crucial is this role of the safety nets
in partly underwriting the peace of Ghana that one participant suggested the family-based
social safety nets need to take on more to prop up state failures. In his words, the “family
systems must come when government is failing to help the social cohesion we are trying
to build” (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014).
Some interviewees, on the other hand, have argued that it is precisely this approach
of supplanting government responsibility with private or family-based solutions that
encourages state disengagement or abdication from its responsibilities to citizens. In turn,
state failure reinforces the kind of civic disillusionment, alienation, and disengagement
from the state that has perpetuated the negative peace that the country enjoys.

It

constitutes a dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems (Interview
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4, 12 February, 2014) which aids the displacement of the search for solutions for citizens’
economic burdens from the state to private citizens. Essentially it enables the state to
offload its responsibilities onto the traditional/family social safety net that relies on
relations and friends who have to absorb the economic burdens of family members who
don’t have.
This then shields the state from public anger, making it possible for citizens not to
interrogate and demand accountability from the state for the use and misuse of public
resources. Conversely, this approach to managing public dissatisfaction with state failures
increases pressure on public officeholders, who have access to public resources, to loot
and share with their family members. This in turn supports the creation and perpetuation
of the vicious cycle of “negative consensus” (interview 4, 12 February, 2014) behaviors
which some KII participants have credited with restraining the political elite from
pushing the buttons of war in Ghana.
In brief, while the family bonds are effective in keeping networks of individuals
together as the base fabric on which Ghana’s peace is stitched, these networks have had
no transformational effect on the public sphere to move the country towards more
positive and sustainable peace. If anything, the findings of this study are consistent with
the views of Larsen et. al., (2004) that family-based social safety nets such as those
captured above are a form of bonding social capital whose preoccupation with selfpreservation of its members do not allow them to reach out and engage the wider society
in any transformative way. While they may provide a ladder for some of their members to
reach into the public sphere, their agenda is not to engage and transform the public sphere
for the common good. Their aim is to see what their own can bring or throw back from
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the public sphere for their self-preservation. But as the competition for public resources
becomes fiercer or as the economic challenges push family safety nets beyond their
tolerance limits, the public anger that has been contained in the private sphere may boil
over into the public domain without warning.
Subcategory 1.2 Trans-ethnic conjugal bonds and bridges; identity dissolution; and the peace of
Ghana

Webs of Interethnic Marriages
Respondents in this study have made multiple references to the role that
intermarriages play in sustaining the peace in Ghana. In the world view of most
communities in Africa, marriage is probably the most important institution because of its
triple effect of creating bonds, binds, and bridges across otherwise disparate and noncontiguous groups. Consequently, in the cultures of most ethnic groups in Ghana, the
customs and rituals for its consummation place a premium on inculcating in the couple
the fact that the marriage is not between them; the couples are merely the interface points
for bonds that extend to their respective families, clans, lineages, and ethnic groups. In
particular, conjugal bonds take on an added peace value as binding cords and bridges
when the marriages are exogamous i.e. outside the immediate in-group to involve couples
of different ethnic, regional, or religious backgrounds. This is why respondents in the KII
have hailed intermarriages in Ghana as the cord that establishes relational bonds between
families, communities, and entire ethnic groups. In the words of one respondent:
One of the things Ghana has done differently is that there have been large
inter-marriages. You get somebody from Ashanti Region who is married
to somebody from the Volta Region, an Ewe. You get up to go and fight
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your in-law? The inter-marriages contributed to a very large extent”
(Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

In the view of another respondent, in Ghana:
…we are one of the few countries in which intermarriages go across
religion/ that you can have a Christian going to church, but the wife is a
Muslim and the wife is not compelled to come to church but they have
enjoyed a very healthy relationship and there have been no problem when
it comes to even their children and when it comes to the in-laws and how
they relate and how they are able to go about doing things” (interview 12,
4 March, 2014) there are no visible problems.
Asked how widespread interethnic marriages are, another participant noted that “It
is increasingly wide-spread, especially against the hitherto rival ethnic groups like the
Ashanti and Volta Regions” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Another interviewee
would note that “In Ghana you have a healthy development of inter-ethnic marriages.
What I experience as a member of the Pan African Parliament is that my colleagues in the
other African countries tell you … in other African countries there is taboo in intermarriages” (Interview 11, March, 2014). A different respondent in the KII highlighted the
cohesive force of these intermarriages and their capacity to stem the escalation of
intergroup conflicts, with the observation that, what he has “come to appreciate is the
whole mix of our interethnic relationships [since] in our country now there is no ethnic
group that has no relationship with another ethnic group, either through marriage or one
form of engagement” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).
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This reality, in the view of the participant, has cushioned Ghanaians against the
excesses of conflict because “…anybody who wants to become violent would have a
thought in his or her mind that you have relations in that group so why should that group
become a target. That has kept us abbey and I we have been able to manage it through
that channel” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). Echoing the same sentiments, another
participant pondered what would happen should he decide to participate in such a
national level conflict. In his view, “Either I am fighting against my in-laws, brothers-inlaw, sisters-in-law and so on and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) or other
close relations and friends. Yet another would buttress the point with this personal
example:

one of my sisters married in a Mamprusi family so I have a nephew and a
niece who are from a marriage that relates to the Mamprusis. So ... I
cannot do something to hurt my own nephew; so my mother might be
from one side [of the conflict] , but what about my nephew and my niece?
What about my sister who married on that side? “(Interview 12, 4 March,
2014)
In brief, intermarriages among Ghanaians have created a wide web of relationships
that constitute an effective bond between families, clans, and ethnic groups. It is
for this reason that Ghanaians do not look strictly at where they are and create
fortresses around themselves; they understand that in one way or the other they are
related with one area or the other in the country. Reinforcing that argument,
especially in respect of political conflicts at the national level, another respondent
provided the following illustration:
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Let’s take for example if you take Ewes and may be Ashantis, you may
say they don’t get on well, but if you look at the intermarriages that have
gone on between the two, it is very high; so whenever there is a problem,
you can get somebody from the Eweland who has some relations at the
Ashanti side and vice versa and it cuts across, north-south, east and west,
it’s like that; and that is also helping. That’s how I see it; that is keeping
people from fighting; otherwise looking at our situation, the elections that
we have had, these things would have happened, but always we have
people to intervene. (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).
Intercultural Osmosis
The foregoing highlights how the intricate web of social relations that
intermarriages weave in Ghana serves as an important foundational piece for the peace of
the country. However, intermarriages are not unique to Ghana. Countries like Burundi
and Rwanda that have protracted violent interethnic conflicts also have long and deep
histories of interethnic marriages. The questions that Ghana’s presumed exceptionalism
poses in respect of intermarriages are: why have intermarriages seemingly worked to
create and/or sustain peace in Ghana but failed elsewhere such as Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra
Leone, Liberia, among others? Why didn’t the intermarriages between Hutus and Tutsis
in Burundi and Rwanda attenuate their conflicts and prevent the genocides and other
forms of violent interethnic engagements? What is there in the Ghanaian situation that
makes it different from the other cases?
Respondents have already made references to how intercultural exchanges among
the ethnic groups in Ghana have led to the blending of beliefs, values, and world views
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that have made interethnic accommodation and incorporation possible. As one of them
noted in respect of the dissolution of cultural differences:
Yes, we have many ethnic groups but I don’t see that their cultural
practices are in conflict with each other. […]I don’t see strong differences
in the cultures of the different ethnic groups in Ghana. You can look, we
defer to authority, we defer to people on the basis of age, women are in the
background, we resolve our differences through arbitration, through an
elder. I’d say that the cultural practices, the values, the elements of the
different cultures are similar (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).

The intercultural borrowing and sharing that made this cultural blending had a
wider significance, especially among the larger ethnic groups, especially the Ashantis.
As one respondent recalled:
…there was this mesh that was already in place through which people
were exchanging goods, contacting persons, etc, and carrying on cultural
borrowings. It is very important to me to have been told in my own ears by
an Ashanti who said that look the Ashanti culture is a composite. When
the Asantehene sits and they are bring out the treasures, I told you I sat
with this Okyeam – he pointed to me and said “Wei y di fir Denkyira na
baa y/ Wei,  y Dagomba fo4; wei fir ha, wei fir Dormaa, wei fir so and
so” (to wit, this came from Denkyirah; that one from the Dagombas; and
that from Dormaa…) but having borrowed, they put them together and
created a synthesis that is unique in profile and content you see. So there
wasn’t only material exchanges, exchanges of ideas, exchanges of norms,
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exchanges of proverbs, exchanges of all kinds of things, political ideas.
Ashanti itself, the structure of Ashanti was borrowed. It is the Akwamu
people who went and taught them (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

The recollection of this historical borrowing from other ethnic groups for the
construction of the architecture of the Ashanti Kingdom has a sobering effect as it makes
the Ashantis mindful, and humble about their lack of ethnic or cultural purity. At the
same time, the other ethnic groups can find space within the Ashanti culture to relate with
them, as they see bits and pieces of their own culture and history in the Ashanti
chieftaincy architecture. Either way, the intercultural borrowing leads to the narrowing of
cultural boundaries, and so creates spaces for incorporation of members of different
ethnic groups into other cultures.

Ethnic Identity Dissolution from intermarriages
The cross identity marriages and the intercultural borrowings and sharing of values
have profound effects on ethnic identity maintenance for most groups in Ghana. Several
respondents have already pointed out how the uniqueness of Ghana’s systems of
intermarriages is embedded in the open systems approaches to intercultural engagements
across all ethnic groups in the country. At the material and artistic levels, high levels of
cultural exchanges have blurred identity distinctions from causal observers. As one
respondent in the KIIs noted:
…a lot of Ashantis when they are dancing the damba festival you won’t
realize that they are Ashantis; the Ewes when they are dancing an Ashanti
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dance, you won’t believe it; Y nara a sa si ni” is a song that was
composed by an Ewe, not an Ashanti, Ephraim Amu. So all of that, more
or less weaves us together” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

The identity blending of Ghanaians alluded to here, however, goes beyond the
artistic realm. At the social level, Ghanaians in principle self-classify by the ethnic
lineage of either their father or mother. However, cross ethnic marriages have led to
identity dissolution, as it blends and blurs the ethnic identities of the offspring of crossidentity marriages. We have referenced how one’s location in a social structure is
important for the Ghanaian. However, children of cross identity marriages often have
difficulty finding their loci in either of their parents’ identity group.
Several respondents shared personal stories of their own mixed ethnic backgrounds,
as well as, those of prominent Ghanaian citizens, current and past, to illustrate the point.
But the complexity of the identity question is best illustrated by two out of several of the
examples that came through in the interviews. A participant in the KII gave her life
example to illustrate the complexity of this web of relationship and its restraining force in
times of conflicts. Responding to a question on how Ghana’s state of economic
development might have influenced the country’s experience of peace, she acknowledged
the effect of development on peace, but hastened to state that:
…I would say it is intermarriages and I will give myself as an example.
My mother was a Ga, she married an Ashanti, so I am half Ga, half
Ashanti. So that’s why when you asked me where I came from it was
difficult for me to answer. I am married to somebody who is half Ewe,
half Ga-Adangbe. Our children therefore are Ga, Ga-Adangbe, Ashanti,
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and Ewe. So for example if there should be a war between Ashantis and
Ewes it’s an issue for me; it’s difficult to be part of such a war or conflict.

Figure 13 maps the complexity of relationships that emerges from the scenario
given above. It also illustrates the increasingly irreversible dissolution of ethnic identities
arising from intermarriages, as the relationships move from heterogeneity, through
hybridity to miscegenation. Step 1 in the relationship modeling represents ethno-cultural
heterogeneity. The couples on either side retain their ethnic identities. It is their mutually
sustained love that provides the only social capital or bond between their respective
families and ethnic groups. It’s a temporary bond as it can, in principle, easily be reversed
through one form or other of the dissolution of the marital bonds such as separation,
divorce, or death.
Step 2 begins the irreversibility of the interethnic bonding process. Once the heteroethnic marriage produces an offspring, ethnic hybridity kicks in, as the offspring of both
sides becomes an incorporation of the ethnicity of both parents. When step 3 involves
marriage between two hybrids, as is the case in the story above, then ethnic
miscegenation is taken to its highest level. The offspring from such a marriage take on
split identities across four cultures, at least.

Interethnic relationships become further

complicated if either of the hybrid parents have siblings who also have mixed marriages.
Then the network of cousins, aunties, uncles, and grandpas and grandmas spiral out of
control, literally. When miscegenated offspring have children of their own with other
hybrid or miscegenated persons, as a result of Step 4, identity dissolution is taken to a
higher level yet.
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Figure 13 Mapping of Identity Dissolution Through Intermarriages
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By Steps 3 and 4, even if the individual can claim nominal membership of one
ethnic group by reason of his or her matrilineal or patrilineal lineage, he or she would still
have enough diluted identity and social bonds not to feel so strongly attached to the
accepted nominal group. It will be difficult such a person to delink himself or herself
from the other constituent elements of his or her ethnic identity. This is the dilemma that
the respondent above expressed when she found it difficult to say where she belonged.
The second case we cite illustrates further the complexity of the spiraling relations
and identity dissolution for offspring of mixed marriages. It relates to a respondent who
indicated that of the family of four boys and one girl, only the female married within their
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ethnic group. All the four boys have wives from four different ethnic groups scattered
around the country – one from the Upper West Region, the second from the Western
Region, the third from the Northern Region, and the fourth wife in the family has roots in
the Volta Region. The question that arises is – what is the ethnic group of their children?
Figure 14 presents a schema of the complexity of the relationships that this family now
lives with. Actual ethnic groups are altered to protect the respondent’s identity.
The immediate and practical impact of such multilateral intermarriages and their
implications for the peace that Ghana experiences are best captured in the words of one
respondent who observed that, when you want to see the complexity at play:
...all you have to do is to sit and listen to the obituary notices being read
these days [on radio or television] and you will wonder: Hajia so and so is
dead and who are the chief mourners: Nana Kofi Ankobea [an Akan),
Togbe Dzasraku [an Ewe] through marriages, there is intermarriages; we
are marrying and so I call marriage as a chain – we are linking so that I
may be an Ashanti but I may have relatives there in the Volta Region,
there in Northern Ghana, in different places. So I think that dimension of
two ethnic groups really confronting each other is over-hyped, as far as I
am concerned” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

The term Hajia is a title for a Moslem woman who has performed the Hajj. She is
presumably from the north, as most Moslems are. However, she has an Akan and an Ewe
chiefs and their relations as the principal bereaved persons for her funeral. This one
funeral therefore brings together people from different ethnic, regional, and religious
backgrounds.
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Figure 14 – Multiple Identity Dissolution and Miscegenated Generations
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Use a foreign language (English or another local lingua franca) as the means of communication
between them.
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Respondents cited several other living examples of the capacity to invoke these
conjugal relationships as instruments for peace at the local and national levels. In the case
of the interethnic conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana, for instance, a respondent
observed that: “If you look at the Konkomba-Dagomba war you would see that one of the
things that has actually brought the tempo of conflicts [down] is the intermarriages. The
current regent in Yendi (a Dagomba); the mother is a Konkomba; his wife is a
Konkomba, can you imagine this man getting up and saying my people, Dagombas, go
and fight Konkombas?” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).
At the national level, the marriage between Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings
(an Akan royal) to Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, who has an Ewe mother and considered
an indigene of the Volta Region, was repeatedly cited. This marriage established,
politically, a significant relational bridge between the Akans and Ewes, who are known to
usually belong to opposing political divides since independence. Given the tradition that
one marries into a family, clan, lineage, and even the entire ethnic groups, Akans see and
have accepted former President Rawlings as their “Akonta” - their brother-in law. Hence,
in the run to the 2000 general elections, when it was feared that then President Rawlings
might not hand over power if his party lost the selections, the Akan-based main
opposition party invoked this relationship and churned out their campaign message on the
slogan that “Akonta b si fom” to wit, – “Our brother-in-law shall come down or our
brother in law shall give up power”.
The phrase did not only become an electioneering slogan for the opposition party;
it became, what would be termed today, a viral peace message that assured Ghanaians
that the long ruling brother-in-law from the predominantly Ewe-preferred party, the
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National Democratic Congress, shall hand over power peacefully, presumably to his
brothers-in-law in the New Patriotic Party, – an Akan-based party. The slogan did not
only serve to put a light emotional touch to the campaigns; more importantly it averted
recourse to language that could otherwise have demonized Rawlings and his party, and
set the stage for a veritable political showdown. For there were indeed signs that
Rawlings was not prepared to hand over power (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).
Subcategory 1.3 Historical Politico-Military Alliances, Interethnic Friendship Bonds, and Peace

Bonds of Interethnic Friendships and Joking Relationship
The third subcategory of trans-ethnic bonds derives from historical alliances and
friendship arrangements that continue to underpin interethnic relationships in the
postcolonial state. Respondents in this study cited interethnic joking relationships and
their contribution to peacebuilding. Examples of the joking relationships between the
Kokombas and Bimobas; Dagombas and Moshis;, Dagartis and Frafras;. the Gonjas and
Chokosis, among others were mentioned (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 206
29 October, 2014). These relationships are peculiar to the ethnic groups in the north.
A sizeable body of literature exists already on this subject (see for example
Zartman, 2001; Freedman, 1977; Hammond, 1964). In the context of this study, however,
a respondent narrates how even security officers of the state can invoke such
relationships as instruments of conflict management. However, the literature to date on
joking relationships in Ghana focuses on describing what it is, with little drilling into how
and why it works; or under what circumstances it works best. In the example that a
respondent gave in this study provides pointers to how this tool can be used even in a
state-centric conflict management framework. As the respondent recounts, the
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Commander of a Police contingent dispatched to intervene in an intercommunal conflict
in Zaare, in the Upper East region used the tool to great effect as narrated below:
…at that time the Police Commander arrived at the scene and his police
officers were in riot gear and they had gone full force to arrest and when
they were in this area…very casually the Commander said, aahh, I never
knew they are just Frafras fighting over dog meat. Useless people, and
they have wasted my afternoon […] it immediately came across to them
[the feuding parties] that this person must be a Dagao and they all started
saying ‘useless man how can this man be a Police Commander’; and right
there and then the flames were dowsed…(Interview 12 – 4 March 2014).
The example reflects the continued relevance of joking relationships beyond the
traditional settings. It points to the potency inherent in such indigenous conflict
management practices that can be and have been used as instruments for resolving
conflicts within and between ethnic groups, especially in the north of Ghana. Above all, it
gives a concrete example of how it has been used in a specific state-centric conflict
management context. However, as indicated under Chapter 6 below, further research is
required to clearly delineate the possibility frontiers for incorporating these indigenous
conflict resolution mechanisms in such state-managed contexts. Such research should
provide opportunities to fathom how and why such indigenous practices work and to
what extent they can be added to the repertoire of tools for peacebuilding practitioners.

Historical Political and Military Pacts
In discourses on interethnic relationships in Ghana, not much is said about the
existence of networks of historical politico-military bonds and alliances between ethnic
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groups that continue to influence their collective behaviors in the postcolonial state.
Several ethnic groups in Ghana lay claims to having established and managed kingdoms
prior to the colonial encounter. The demands of survival and consolidation of their
political spaces in an ever hostile pre-colonial environment warranted the creation of
mutual defense cooperation agreements between some of the larger and powerful ethnic
groups in the country. While some of these pacts were contracted in peace times, others
were sequels to wars between the contracting ethnic groups.
In an era where military expeditions were largely by foot, the only means for
institutionalizing rapid response mechanisms in furtherance of the defense pacts was to
station military outposts in each other’s backyards. Hence, among the Dagombas of
northern Ghana, this phenomenon manifests today in the presence of the Kambose unit,
headed by the Kambon-Naa, who are officially the musketeers of the Dagbon military set
up, in the smallest village chiefdom to the apical skin in Yendi. The word Kambose and
its derivatives such as Kambon-Naa, is the name northerners give to the Ashantis.
Accordingly, the Kambose units were initially made up of the Kambose people or people
from Ashanti origin that were posted to Dagbon to support the military structure of that
kingdom.
To date, the Anufos or Chokosis of Chereponi - a unique linguistic group in the
north that is akin to Akan – trace their origins to Nzema, in the Western Region. They
were posted to Dagbon as a military detachment of the Ashanti army. A similar Nzema
outpost is reported to exist in the northern parts of the Volta Region. In reverse, Bantama,
the nerve center of Kumasi’s economic and political activity, is reputed to be the home of
the immigrant Dagomba military detachment that was attached to the Asantehene’s
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military and administrative structure. The name “Bantama” is said to be a corruption of
the Dagomba phrase “Mba nti ma” which means “my father gave it to me” (Interview
205, 29 October 2014). It was used in reference to the parcel of land that the reigning
Asantehene at the time of their arrival gave to the Dagomba permanent delegation to
settle in Kumasi. In the words of a respondent who narrates a story he was told in an
interview with the Tumu Kuoro (chief):
…when they (the Ashantis) established Kumasi; for the security of
Kumasi, these northern elements who had fought with Osei Tutu, were
given that whole area to be close to him; and Bantama, is virtually the
center of Kumasi; the traditional Kumasi was given to the Dagombas. So
from that time, they have always declared, Baa nti ma, baa nti ma; and if
you look at the people […] Bantimahene who died I think during Opoku
Ware’s reign was very tall; and you look at some of their chiefs [very tall
as well] (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

In Ewe tradition, Okomfo Anokye, the spiritual founder of the Ashanti kingdom is
claimed to be an Ewe from Nortsie, who became the spiritual founder of Ashanti. On the
reverse side, the Ashantis seem to have impacted, militarily, on the formation of the
chieftaincy structure among the Ewes. Although Amenumey (1986) disputes it, Tsikata
and Seini (2004) believe otherwise and point out that the Ewe “…chieftaincy titles which
are linked to battle formations such as “dusifia” and “miafiaga” of the Anlo state, for
example, are distinctly Akan (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 15).
Be it as it may, the exchange of permanent military detachments induced cultural
and biological integrations that have come to further dilute the ethnic purity of Ghanaians
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across board. To buttress this view, a respondent recalled an interview with R. P. Baffuor,
one time Vice Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
and “…an icon of the Elmina elite [who proudly queried the respondent] “…do you know
that I am of Dagomba origin, ancestry?” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). The story
unravels that as part of the military pact between the Dagombas and the Ashantis, a
Dagomba princess was given in marriage to the Asantehene. However, rather than keep
the princess to himself, the Asantehene in turn gave the princess to a royal in Elmina,
then the trade hub between the Europeans and the local people. In this way, a tripartite
pact came into existence.
While Ashanti’s friendship with Dagomba was the product of a mutual defense
pact; its friendship with coastal peoples had a militaro-economic objective. First, the pact
with the people of the coast ensured access to the arms and armaments from the white
man, as well as, opportunities of trade with the Dutch. Second, the Elmina connection
had a military purpose because the word baffuor in Akan translates into the military
equivalence of Field Marshall (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). In other words, the
princess was given to the Asantehene’s coastal commander, ostensibly to retain his
loyalty. This marriage of the princess became the thread that tied the knots of friendship
between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis in the center, and then between the
Ashantis and the people of Elmina on the southern coast. Later, through similar
intermarriages cited in the previous chapter, the Anlos to the Southeast would be added to
the alliance. The militaro-economic pact that emerged would be known as the Kotoko
Alliance in which:
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…you have Asante Kotoko, you have Dagomba Kotoko, you have Edina
Kotoko, and you have Anlo Kotoko – the kotoko alliance – and these
were alliances that were created to give military support but more
importantly to enable the citizens of these different ethnic groups to feel
free in Kumasi. So if an Elmina person went to Kumasi to misbehave,
and I will tell you an Elmina person can even go and sleep with the wife
of the Asantehene, he cannot be killed […] that is the essence of it. So an
Nzema man, Elmina man can stand in Kumasi and even abuse the
Asantehene and if they touch him and he says “mi y Nzema ni” (I am
an Nzema) that is it. It is a privileged relation (Interview 205, 29 October
2014).

While the relationship between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis is the one
that has currency in the literature, other prominent ethnic groups had similarly had similar
mutual diplomatic relationships with Ashanti. As a respondent recalls, this persisting
historical relationship dismantles security and protocol barriers between the royals of the
north and the Asantehene. In this instance, a Mamprugu chief is reported to have told the
respondent that:
… oh when I go to Kumasi and walk into the Asantehene’s palace, I walk
in straight and talk to him. I don’t need anybody to direct me because they
feel there is some historical linkage between them, the chiefs; generally
they feel there is some historical linkage and they support each other one
way or the other and they also think that the Nayiri [paramount chief of
the Mamprusis] is recognized by the Asantehene as a prominent chief
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from the olden days back, linked up to today …. (Interview 206, 29
October 2014).
Figure 15 illustrates the spatial structure of the alliance. So strong are these
alliances to date that “…when the Asantehene dies one of the first groups of people who
should be informed are the Zongo community, the Muslim community [descendants of
the Dagomba]; they have to be informed to offer prayers before (stresses) the
announcement is made” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). This shows the depth of the
persisting pre-colonial interethnic relationships arrangements that continue to serve the
purpose of peace and unity in Ghana today. Similar courtesies exist between chiefs of
some groups in the Volta Region and the Asantehene’s palace, even if it is not to the
same elaborate extent (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).
The conflict management relevance of this historical relationship between the
ethnic groups would come to the fore, when the government had to turn to the
Asantehene, the Yagbon Wura, Paramount Chief of Gonja and the Nayiri, Paramount
Chief of Mamprugu, to “find a traditional way to resolving the [long standing
chieftaincy] conflict” (Ghana News Agency, 2004, n.p) among the Dagombas which led
to the beheading of the Paramount Chief of Dagbon and at least 40 others in March 2002.
The configuration of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs charged with the resolution of this
conflict took into account the historical relationships between the four ethnic groups i.e.
the Ashantis, the Dagombas, the Gonjas, and the Mamprusis. In particular, the
appointment of the Asantehene as the Chair of this Committee reflected the governments
knowledge of and appreciation of the relevance and the place of historical ties that bind
ethnic groups in intermediating in matters of state that lie within the realms of history,
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culture, and traditions. While the Committee of Eminent Chiefs is still struggle to keep
the mediation efforts on track and moving toward a resolution, its existence per se has
provided a safe and more neutral space for the feuding cousins to discuss their differences
and seek ways to resolve the conflict. The centrality of the Asantehene in this process
lends credence to the continuing relevance of the Kotoko Alliance, depicted in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Map of Spatial Connections of the Kotoko Alliance
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Beyond the Dagbon crisis, the alliance remains an effective reference point in
interethnic relationships among the ethnic groups that belong to it. As respondent
summed it up, the contemporary peace value of these relationships resides in the fact that
“… when you take the knife to say that you are going to kill an Ashanti or you are going
to kill a Fanti or you are going to kill a Ga, (pause) in your own consciousness, whom are
you going to kill? Probably your brother or your ancestral relations; and this is very
significant in the consciousness of Ghanaians” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).
While this “…historical matrix gives us an indication of why we are so bonded”
(Interview 205, 29 October 2014), how much of this historical memory actually
percolates into contemporary political behavior and public policy is hard to quantify right
now. For one thing, this history is not actively taught in the schools. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the younger generations of Ghanaians, who are increasingly taking over
political leadership in the country, have this historical knowledge to guide their
interethnic engagements in private and in the public sphere.
At the very least, the highly polarized atmosphere that has characterized Ghana’s
politics since independence suggests that although the binding, bonding, and bridging
force of this history may continue to be powerful at the subconscious level, it definitely
has lost its potency in the public domain. The political battle over who rules Ghana at the
dawn of independence was fought between sons and daughters of the five members of the
Kotoko alliance – Kwame Nkrumah, an Nzema leading the CPP; the Danquah-Busia
coalition led the predominantly Akan based NLM; the Northern Peoples Party had
prominent Dagombas in its forefront; and the Togoland Congress had Anlo champions as
well. One point of research would be why this history, which must have been more
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current in the pre-independence era than now, failed to unite the Kotoko Alliance in the
fight for independence. In more recent times, why has the alliance not worked to tone
down the increasingly vitriolic political discourse in the country? Why have the Ewecentric NDC and the Akan-centric NPP become the dominate features of the political
map and colors of Ghana?
Category 2 – Bonds and Bridges from Education, and Associational Life
Subcategory 2.1 – Binding and Bonding Effects of Boarding Schools

In Africa, education has been recognized as a unifier of the continent’s multiethnic
citizenry. Azam (1999) argues that the unifying force of education and its power to create
and maintain a culture of peace on the continent rests in the state’s capacity to purchase
ethnic loyalties through the cooptation and corruption of the urbanized elite. According
to this view:
Not less important is the fact that sending educated members of the ethnic
group to the city, via the education system, is a means to ensure political
participation for the group. In peaceful African countries, a sophisticated
system of inclusion of the educated people from the different ethnic
groups in various organisations (students unions, single party, etc.) has
evolved, whereby the state purchases loyalty from the groups through their
educated urbanite ‘delegates’ (Azam, 1999, p. 2).
In consonance with this view, available literature and responses from both the
quantitative and Key Informant Interviews of this study strongly credit Ghana’s
educational system, especially the boarding school system, with the peace of the country.
As one literature source noted:
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Perceived ethnic bias, while not necessarily an illusion, has been
overestimated. Ethnically diverse, Ghanaians have managed this diversity
quite well. It is widely believed that decades of interethnic marriages and
integration in boarding schools at young ages have lessened the role and
impact of ethnicity in the political discourse of Ghana (Arthur, 2009, p.
70).
According to this line of thought, so outstanding is the contribution of the boarding school system
to Ghana’s peace that it has become the envy of other countries in West Africa. As another source
noted “Even some fellow West Africans believe that a similar system may have altered

the tragic script of their own country's political history” (Sakyi-Addo, p. 2). For a
respondent in this study, however, Ghana’s exceptional peaceful nature within Africa is
such that:
Nobody has really understood what it is except for the neighborliness and
the intermarriage and the classmatism and those things that [have made]
the networks … so strong that when you are talking about something you
realize the next person you are talking to is your relative (Interview 9, 26
February, 2014).

This, in the view of respondents, is because the boarding system has enabled people
from all over the country to get to know each other. Most professionals are school mates,
dormitory/house mates, or classmates. If not, they know someone who shares a
professional or educational affiliation with another person. This leads to the emergence of
various forms of formal and informal networks that hold society together. In brief,
Ghana’s educational system, especially the boarding schools provided the spaces for
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increased cross identity interactions which led to reduction in identity-based prejudice
and stereotyping. It also facilitated cross-identity lifelong engagements such as marriages.
While the contribution of Ghana’s educational system, especially the boarding
school system to Ghana’s peace cannot be denied, the subject requires some
interrogation. Boarding schools are not unique to Ghana’s educational heritage. It is a
legacy of the British educational system that was bequeathed to its colonies, including
Australia, Canada, the United States, Sierra Leone, and other countries in Africa. Indeed,
in Sierra Leone’s pioneering role as the hub for western education in West Africa, the
church and the state joined hands in a rare show of partnership “…to create separate
villages [to host boarding schools]

as a key strategy for inculcating European and

Christian values into children ‘untainted’ by the influence of their parents” (Smith, 2009,
p. 27). The same principle of isolating children from the corrupting influence of their
pagan communities informed the establishment and operations of boarding schools in the
Gold Coast, and subsequently, other parts of that is Ghana today (C.K. Graham, 1971,
2013).
While boarding schools have played an important role in the education of Africa’s
political and civil elite, their influence as forces of social cohesion builders is not shared
in all contexts. Indeed, the record of experiences with boarding schools in all these
countries is not particularly benign. On the contrary “…boarding school experiences [in
all these countries are noted to be] particularly brutal” (Smith, 2009, p. 28) with
intergenerational traumatic experiences that have scarred lives and societies. Why then is
Ghana’s experience of boarding school an exceptional cohesive factor when the same
system failed to confer similar effects on other countries that ran similar systems?
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Second, while the contribution of boarding schools to the creation of a national gel
of civil, religious, and political elite in Ghana is not in doubt, the instrumental role
assigned to in respect of Ghana’s peace, it is questionable on a number of grounds. The
2010 Housing and Population census in Ghana, the most recent in the series, reports that
28.5% of Ghana’s population 15 years or older have never been to school. Additionally,
11.6% of the same age category had only a primary school education; while 22.5% had
an education to the Junior Secondary, or Junior High School. Another 13.6% had only
been to school up to the Middle School. All of these are the terminal points for Ghana’s
basic education system. In general, except for a very few emerging private basic schools
that offer boarding facilities, all pre-second cycle institutions in Ghana are non-residential
schools. This means that at least 76.2% of Ghana’s current population has never been
through a boarding school system (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, pp. 61, Table 22a).
Access to post primary educational institutions was much lower in the pre and
immediate post-independence era than now. In 1963, for instance, Foster estimated that
the 59 public schools in Ghana could only take in about 14,000 students. Hence, “…the
chances of any student who enter[ed] middle school ultimately to enter a public
secondary school [was] no more than 5%” (Foster, 1963, p. 155). Hurd and Johnson
would even put the chances of progression from basic to secondary school lower in their
1964 study when they noted that “…less than 2% of the output of the educational system
was passing through secondary schools” (Hurd & Johnson, 1967, p. 60). Fewer still will
progress to the universities and other tertiary institutions where boarding facilities are
offered. For this reason, therefore, attribution of the pervasive influence of a culture of
peace in Ghana to its boarding school system may be an overstatement, given the small
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percentage of the population who had direct experience of boarding schools to have
established the kinds of alumni and alumnae relationships considered as the educational
threads that weave Ghana’s peace.
In sum, while Ghana’s boarding school system, and by extension, the educational
system has been credited with being a major contributor to the peace of the country,
further research is required to solidly root the suppositions in evidence. For instance, in
the absence of direct policy intentionality in the set up and use of boarding schools as the
spindles for drawing out the threads of relationships that weave Ghana’s peace, the
boarding school systems can only be said to have provided an enabling medium for some
pre-existing, innate or acculturated, peace-centric traits to sprout and grow. Therefore,
Ghana’s boarding school system may have been one of the seedbeds, not the seed for
Ghana’s peace.
Similarly, given the lack of consistency in the structure and functioning of past
students’ associations, the contributions that old boyism, girlism or classmatism make to
the politics, and by extension Ghana’s peace, is more coincidental than intentional.
Again, the fact that these associations may have influenced Ghana’s peace may be due to
the existence of some predisposing factors that stimulate and sustain the mobilization of
peaceable political constituencies out of associations of past students of any school.
Consequently, the predictive value of its replication in other settings cannot be
established.
At any rate, the evidence so far on the contribution of education to peace in Ghana
seems to indulge in post hoc attribution of intent. A couple of issues stand out. First,
Kwame Nkrumah has been widely credited in this study and in other literature with the
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introduction of the boarding school concept and its use as an instrument for national
integration and cohesion building. However, questions that have not been interrogated in
the literature include: did Kwame Nkrumah actually create boarding schools with the
intent of making them instruments of interethnic unity, marriage, and peaceful
coexistence? Was there ever a deliberate policy objective to use boarding schools as
melting pots for blending together the disparate ethnic groups in the country or was the
boarding school concept simply a pragmatic solution to the pressing challenge of
accelerating access to secondary and tertiary education?
Available evidence suggests that Kwame Nkrumah’s role in the establishment of
boarding schools in Ghana has been overstated in the interviews of this study, as well as,
in other literature in the public domain. Boarding schools existed before the emergence of
Kwame Nkrumah on Ghana’s political scene (Bening, 1990b; C. K. Graham, 1971;
Odamtten, 1978). Kwame Nkrumah merely adopted the concept, as a matter of political
and economic expediency, to facilitate the expansion of access to post primary education
under his accelerated education program. But as has been pointed out above, even then,
the impact of boarding schools on Ghana’s peace may have been over extended, given
the relatively small percentage of the population that had the privilege of going through
boarding schools, which were mainly operational at the post-primary level of education.
In brief, however laudable the accidental contribution of boarding schools to the
building of social cohesion among the educated elite of Ghana is, there is a great risk of
over attribution of Ghana’s peace to this single phenomenon as the gel that binds Ghana
together. The risk lies in the complacent basking in an accidental occurrence without a
more intentional capitalization of the opportunities it offers deepening and expanding the
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cohesive strands that the educational system offers. More intentional approaches are
required to fully understand how and why boarding schools in Ghana have been
successful as social gels when this has not been the experience in other countries.
Unearthing the elements that make Ghana’s boarding schools fertile grounds for
nurturing social cohesion will take the discourse beyond anecdotal speculations.

Subcategory 2.2 Post educational associational life and peace in Ghana
Another area in which Ghana’s educational system has been credited with
contributing to peace in the country is its creation and sustenance of associational life
beyond the walls of the boarding schools in particular, and other educational institutions
in general. Alumni and alumnae associations, popularly known as Oldboyism, girlism or
old/past students’ associations are particularly cited as providing the locus for sustained
engagements, friendships, and consensus building in the public sphere. There is no
gainsaying that Old boys and Old Girls Associations have social, economic and even
political value. They serve as the social and political capital that members leverage to
advance their individual or collective agendas within the public sphere.
However, whether or not this was the express aim for these associations is unclear.
Similarly, the establishment of past students’ associations was never intended as
networks for political mobilization, much less as an instrument of peace in the country.
For instance, there is no evidence of state-level political agendas ever being designed and
executed by members of any alumni or alumnae association. The intent in the formation
of these associations was for the preservation of social and friendship ties and networks
gained while in a common place of learning. Beyond that, the associations were designed
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to maintain some connection with the Alma Mater, as evidenced by the organized visits
to and donations members make to their alma mater occasionally.
Indeed, questioning whether they are actually a force for the good of the country,
some respondents have argued that the concepts of Old boyism/girlism create bonds of
alumni and alumnae of schools which have become associated with political and
economic patronage and cronyism. Well-connected past students of older and better
endowed schools create and distribute opportunities of political and economic access to
their members. In other words, the past students’ associations are no more than the social
capital bonds that Larsen et al (2004) observed to be only good in promoting the private
and survival needs of their members with little to no capacity for impacting on the public
sphere.
Buying into the negative consensus theory that a prior respondent proffered,
another respondent in this study attributed the force of the negative consensus proposition
to the fact that it is founded on the old boyism and old girlism platform. In the words of
the respondent, the negative consensus “…factor has quite some merit [because] the elite
in this country are made up of groups of old school (chuckles) old school cronies or old
school, yeah, affiliations and cuts across ethnicities, cuts across religious faiths and that
helps to bring people together” (Interview 202, 27 October 2014). This convening factor
is what makes it possible for the principle of negative consensus to operate. This is
because these associations often become nodes of counter-state action that allow their
members to circumvent the inefficiencies of the state machinery in order to access state
power and resources for personal gain.
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Subcategory 2.3 Ancillary and Co-curricular educational activities and peace in Ghana
Education
Ghana’s educational system provides opportunities for cross-ethnic engagement of
students through various co-curricular and associational activities. Interschool sports,
debates, quizzes, and quasi-religious group activities such as the Ghana United Nations
Students Association, the Young Christian Movement (YCS), the Scripture Union, and
the equivalents in other creeds, periodically bring students of different educational
institutions together. One interviewee from the Upper East Region recalled that it was
one such event that first brought him into contact with the Upper West Region and
students from other parts of the country (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). Recounting his
experiences, the respondent noted:
when I was in secondary school Form 2, I went to the national congress of
YCS in Nandom … I could never have gone to Nandom secondary school
if I was just in school; it’s because I was a member of the YCS and the
YCS sent me to Nandom Secondary School; …so the YCS opened me to
the whole country …so you have a kind of an open perspective […] those
who were boys scouts, those who belonged to Ghana United Nations
Students Association, those types of inter exchanges were provided by
our educational institutions (Interview 12, 4 March 2014).

Such engagements have generated lifelong friendships and promoted cross identity
respect and recognition, especially when pupils from relatively unknown schools stand up
to and even beat colleagues from the bigger name schools in sports or intellectual
exercises such as debates and quizzes; or when girls’ schools compete favorably with
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boys’ schools in academic competitions. However, as respondent in Interview 12 noted,
such friendships have not been structured and canalized into a form of political capital
that can engage and transform the public sphere for good. Worse still, they have not been
purposefully used as instruments of peace. In many cases, they were vehicles of student
organization without specific contents for civic, political, and peace education.

Subcategory 2.3

Learning Peace Through Education

The concept of peace education has been expanded to go beyond the provision of
specific knowledge and skills in conflict resolution (mediation, facilitation, negotiation,
etc.) to include general level of formal education of a population (De Rivera, 2004). This,
however, makes the measure of the contribution of education to peace complicated and
impracticable. Hence, de Rivera (2004) uses reduction in homicide rates as the proxy
indicator of the contribution of education to a culture of peace. According to this view, an
inverse relationship exists between the level of educational attainments in a society and
homicide rates.
By this assertion, Ghana, with a literacy rate of 74.1% (Ghana Statistical Service,
2012) for people 11 years and older can be said to have an adequate level of education
that should directly impact on peace. However, equating general levels of education in a
society to the peaceable nature of its citizens without reference to the content of the
education is problematic. A cardinal principle in the evaluation of the outcomes or
impacts of social interventions is the need to be careful in the attribution of outcomes to
interventions. For, observed results that accompany any development intervention can be
the product of any of multiple matrixes of outcomes. What is observed to follow
interventions can be planned or unplanned, intended or unintended, positive or negative,
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desirable or undesirable (OECD, 2012). A four level matrix of intervention outcomes can
include, for instance:
i)

planned, intended, and desirable outcomes - t his is the zone of intentionality

ii)

planned, intended, but undesirable outcomes - this is the blind spot

iii)

unplanned, unintended, but desirable outcomes - represents positive spinoffs

iv)

unplanned, unintended, and undesirable outcomes - this is the off guard zone

Viewed against this background the contribution of Ghana’s educational system
would belong to the positive spin-off category, since the observed positive outcomes of
the educational system on the country’s peace are unplanned, unintended but desirable
consequences. This has happened because the spaces and opportunities in the educational
system that Ghanaians used to manifest attitudes and behavior traits that have contributed
to the peace of the country were not set out intentionally to create national cohesion and
violence avoidance behaviors. In other words, it was never the express objective of the
educational curricular, boarding school system, the computerized school selection and
placement system, the national service scheme, the system of placement of teachers in
schools etc., to foster violence avoidance behaviors, national unity, and cohesion for
peace among those who pass through these educational institutions. On the contrary, the
educational system simply offered white spaces that accidental groups of citizens chose
to use to live out their pre-existing values and beliefs. They voluntarily provided content
and processes that have contributed to Ghana’s peace.
In terms of intentional creation of instructional frameworks for peace, it is
noticeable that the concept of peace education is very new in the Ghana, and has been
restricted largely to the domain of post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict resolution
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efforts of the NGO community. Peace education is not integrated into the formal
educational curricula at any level. Therefore, formal peace education through the
educational system cannot be said to be an important contributor to the building of a
culture of peace among the 52+ ethnic groups in Ghana. Consequently, there is the need
to look into how indigenous non-formal cultural training and socialization processes may
have inculcated the values and attitudes for peace across the ethnic groups in Ghana.
On the converse side, the educational system, has unplanned, unintended and
undesirable consequences as well. The emergence of highly partisan political camps that
have created rifts in the hitherto united front of students that once championed the causes
of the voiceless citizens is one example. The reported emergence of occultism in
boarding schools is another. The spewing out of large numbers of unemployed and often
unemployable youth who are now considered a security threat to the country is a third
(Midley, 2014). What these examples signify is that, for the educational system to be the
incubator of peace-loving citizens, there is the need for more intentionality and directed
policies and programs that recognize, capture, and retool the white spaces in the
educational establishment to maximize the positive peace benefits while minimizing the
negative ones. Otherwise, the contribution of education to Ghana’s peace will continue to
be more coincidental than intentional.
Category 2.4 – Migration, Interethnic cohabitation, economic interdependencies, and
Ghana’s peace
An oft recalled feature of Ghana’s peace in this study is the widespread migration,
peaceful interethnic cohabitation, and the resulting economic interdependencies among
all the ethnic groups in the country. As one respondent captured it:
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… we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of
where we actually come from. You go to the Ashanti Region and you
have a large number of Ewes. You go to the Volta Region and you have a
very large number of Akan-speaking [people], especially in Worawora in
the Northern part of the Volta, the Akan areas and so on. So the fear has
been, if I victimize those from other areas in my place then my brother is
at the other person’s land too, and the person will be victimized in
retaliation. For the sake of these victimizations I tend to tone down
(Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).
The question that this view triggers is: To what extent then does migration affect
the 3Bs of binding, bonding, and bridging and socio-cultural incorporation in Ghana?
Portes and Sensenbrenner suggest that among migrant communities, bonding-in becomes
stronger than bridging-out when the migrant community faces hostility from the host
community. External confrontation does not only reinforce pre-existing in-group
sentiments and loyalties, it is actually capable of “creating such feelings where none
existed before” (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 118). Since no hostilities exist against
migrant communities in Ghana, such in-group feeling that would have created the ‘we
versus them’ attitude is dissipated. But, Portes and Sensenbrenner point out that:
…cultural differences and outside discrimination alone do not account
fully for the observed differences in the strength of bounded solidarity
among different migrant communities…The missing element seems to be
the ability of certain minorities to activate a cultural repertoire, brought
from the home country, which allows them to construct an autonomous
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portrayal of their situation that goes beyond a mere adversarial reaction”
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 119).

In other words, self-imposed spatial, social, cultural and economic identity enclaves
of migrant populations is what creates the differentness that can generate, sustain, or even
widen the gulf of estrangement between the host and migrant communities. Put
differently, migrant communities that hold unto their imported cultural preferences with
little openness to engaging in intercultural exchanges with their host communities are
more likely to estrange themselves from their host. Under such circumstances, cultural
exchanges in the form of intermarriages, beliefs and values transmissions and reception,
among others are limited. Even economic interdependencies can be curtailed. In such
cases, social cohesion between the host and the migrants remains illusionary. As
illustrated with the example of chemical bonding processes, no sharing of values or
interests means no social bonding takes place. In such places, long periods of
cohabitation are often not enough to ensure a right to belongingness. In Nigeria, for
instance, distinctions are made between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” or “strangers”
in many states such that:
…the Tiv in Nasarawa and Taraba states [have] found themselves
regarded as strangers or settlers in those states. Ironically, however, the
Gwari do not have the same problem in Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa
states. But the Hausas in Jos have the same problem as the Tiv (Adamu,
2002).
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Similarly, despite generations of cohabitation in the same political space, Liberia’s
Americo-Liberians and their indigenous counterparts still remain estranged (Frempong,
2001; Konneh, 1996). Although the mutual exchange and assimilation of some values
and the construction of a common language derived from English and the native
languages gives Liberians a unique identity (Allen, 2010), there is still much to be done
to achieve a fully incorporated society. The symbols of national identity continue to
“…reflect only the cultural and historical experiences of the Americo-Liberians” (Kieh,
2009, p. 18)
Emphasizing the role of exchange as the unifier in intercultural cohabitations,
Simmel, believes the unique contribution that immigrants, as strangers, make to social
cohesion rests in the fact that the stranger always brings something that the host
community does not have. In Simmel’s example, the stranger or “the man who comes
today and stays tomorrow… brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be,
indigenous to it” (Simmel, 1908, p. 185). These new skill sets or know-how that the
stranger brings becomes the rallying point for a different kind of social and economic
engagements in the host community. In other words, the immigrant’s facilitative role in
trade creates the catalytic and synergistic scaling up of economic activities and benefits
beyond what indigenous “…the primary producer with his more limited mobility and his
dependence on a circle of customers that can be expanded only very slowly”(Simmel,
1908, pp. 185-186) can do.
Simmel’s use of trade as the medium of interaction between the stranger and the
host community is instructive because it highlights the role of sustained and mutually
beneficial interactions as the route for gaining entry and acceptance or incorporation
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between the hosts and the stranger. Steinberger, (1981) points out that pre-existing
“communal ties magnify prior tendencies toward collective action” (Steinberger, 1981 in
Larsen et al., 2004, p. 64). However, “Social ties alone are not enough. It takes
efficacious individuals to organize and activate a public constituency” (Bandura in
Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65). More importantly, the nature and frequency of interactions
between the stranger and the host communities are key. An openness to engage and
embrace the other is essential for incorporation and peaceful coexistence to emerge and
grow.
In the context of Ghana where the stock in trade for migrants is usually their labor
services, their special contribution to the host economies is the potential for increased
production and productivity that migrants offer. For example, the contribution of migrant
labor from the north to the economic advancement of the south is self-evident. Since the
colonial times, the north has served as the “labour pool for the cocoa, railway and mining
industries in the south” (Brukum, 2005, p. 6). So important was this to the economy of
the colony that serious consideration was given to the idea of constructing a railway line
from the south to the north to allow migrant labor to more easily move to the labor points
in the south. As Cozens-Hardy recommended “...given cheap transport by rail, and fair
price for agricultural products, labour may take the same course it has taken in the colony
proper namely, to settle along and cultivate saleable produce in the vicinity of the
railway” (Cozens-Hardy, 1924 in Brukum, 2005, p. 11).
This consideration to facilitate the movement of migrant labor from the north to the
south targeted population concentrations beyond the frontiers of what is Ghana today. It
would have cut short the foot trek of the migrant labor from the hinterlands of what are
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today Burkina Faso (then known as the Upper Volta), Mali, and Niger to cocoa farms and
mines in the Gold Coast by several weeks. It would have consolidated the position of the
Gold Coast as the preferred destination of Upper Volta’s migrant labor ahead of the Ivory
Coast. However, where the British failed to take advantage of this opportunity, the
French on the other side of the border succeeded in diverting Upper Volta’s labor pool
toward the Ivory Coast. The strategies the French adopted and the consequences of that
success, however, reverberates in the nature of the social cohesion that La Cote d’Ivoire
today experiences.
Tokpa (2006) discusses the Ivorian experiences with migrant Burkinabe
communities and notes that while migration of the people from what was then Upper
Volta into the then Gold Coast was voluntary, the diversion of this migrant flow into
what is today La Cote d’Ivoire was quasi-voluntary at best. Conscious French colonial
policy designed and orchestrated the relocation of segments of the Upper Voltarian
communities to the northern eco-transitional zones of northern Cote d’Ivoire in a way
that would not disrupt their natural settlement plans and native cultures. The choice of
settlement zone served two purposes. First, it provided a resident labor pool from the
migrant community or the strangers who came and stayed (Simmel, 1908). Secondly,
they served as magnets that would attract seasonal migrant labor from the Upper Volta,
away from their hitherto preferred destinations in the Gold Coast, into Cote d’Ivoire
where they would find natural homes in the settlement communities within the zone,
when they came for seasonal work.
The voluntary nature of migrant settlements in the Gold Coast compared to the
controlled settlement patterns for the same kind of migrants in La Cote d’Ivoire would
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play out differently for the peace of the two countries for several reasons. First, the
Ivorian migrant citizenship dilemma presents a particular case that Portes and
Sensenbrenner (2001) described where cohabitation might have, by design, not translated
into incorporation and co-citizenship. For, by design of the colonial policy, the Voltarian
migrant communities settled in clusters of what became known as the colonial villages.
Tokpa notes that it was indeed the Governor of the Upper Volta who, at the request of the
Moro-Naba, initiated the creation of the Voltarian villages within Ivoirian lands. The
settlements effectively became « ilots constitués des cases voltaïques » (Tokpa, 2006, p.
21), to wit, tiny islands of Voltarian houses.
As intimated above, some authors have argued that the creation of the colonial
villages for the Voltarians was actually the operationalization of an express agreement
reached between the colonial administrators responsible for the Upper Volta and the
traditional leadership of the Moshis (Djoman, 2013). According to this view, the MoroNaba agreed to the relocation of the Moshi communities into La Cote d’Ivoire only on
condition that they are allowed to retain their cultural and ethnic identities, including the
names of their native villages. In other words, it was a strategic move to retain suzerainty
over what he considered his split empire (Ginio, 2006). In doing so, the colonial policy of
creating Burkinabe villages did not only reproduce and preserve ethnocentric political,
economic, social, and cultural enclaves separate and distinct from their host communities;
it perpetuated the identity segregation between the migrants and their hosts. It entrenched
the sense of differentness between the strangers who stayed and their hosts.
Incorporation, therefore, never happened; despite years of cohabitation and interactions
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through the trade of labor and services between the Voltarian strangers who stayed but
never became co-citizens with their hosts.
This is why in La Cote d’Ivoire today, Ivoirians still make differentiations between
the autochtones, allochtones, and allogènes (Djoman, 2013). While the autochtones are
the natives or sons and daughters of the soil, allochtones are those who have come from a
different part of the country but now stay in their host communities. The allogènes, on
the other hand, are the strangers who came and stayed – the immigrants and their
descendants. They may have been born on the soil or stayed there for a long time, but
they are not of the same ethnic stock as the natives. They are a different ethnic group
(translation from Calan et al., 2011). They include the Burkinabes, as the Ivoirians prefer
to refer to those immigrants from Upper Volta in the colonial villages.
Hence, if migration did lead to the peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians in all parts of
the country, it would not be the fact of migration per se that is the causal factor. One has
to look at deeper causes peculiar to the Ghanaian context to find answers to why
Ghanaians so easily intermingle and incorporate into different host communities. Lessons
from the Ivorian experience and what respondents have shared in this study suggest that
while the cultures and traditions of ethnic groups in Ghana seek sameness through
accommodation, integration, and even incorporation of other ethnic groups, the cultures
of ethnic groups in other countries seem to emphasize, reinforce, and even institutionalize
difference. History, traditions, and religion are important cementing factors in Ghana’s
capacity to foster interethnic accommodation and incorporation.
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Category 3: Political disillusionment, Citizen Engagement, Disengagement, And
Peace

Subcategory 3.1 Citizen Despondency, Disillusion, Disengagement, and Withdrawal from
the public sphere
Findings from this study suggest that the failure of past governments to deliver
the dividend of independence and democracy i.e. promises of rapid development in all
spheres, have created public disillusionment, disappointment, and disconnection from the
public sphere. People subscribe to political parties and engage in elections with the faint
expectation of some benefits from the politicians. They do not understand or care about
the manifestoes of the political parties. On the contrary, they see politics as a big game
not to be taken seriously (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). They really do not expect any
long term improvements in their conditions.
Hence, even though “…people are disillusioned about the way resources are being
shared” (Interview 14, 5 March 2014), the urge to stick out and fight to change the
situation is smothered because the electorate believes all the politicians are the same
anyway. They (politicians) agree only on matters that concern them; they don’t care
about the common good. Hence, citizens are not willing to “…go out and die for
somebody [who] would not do anything that would make my life comfortable” (Interview
203, 28 October, 2014). As a result of this “… disconnect between the populace and the
politicians […] people are not willing to go fanatic over politics. They would rather go
fanatic over their ethnicity and their land. Particularly when it comes to land ownership,
people would rather die for that than to go and die for somebody to get power” (Interview
203, 28 October, 2014).
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In the view of respondents, if Ghana’s political disagreements do not boil over
into violent national conflicts, it is not because there are no grievances against the
political system. It is because citizens feel it will be worthless to fight. It is also because,
in a twist of irony, respondents have developed a tolerance and negative accommodation
for the corrupt nature of politicians. They cynically credit their corrupt nature with the
peace that Ghana enjoys. As one respondent noted “…one of the things that has helped is
because of the perceived corruption of the politician. People have seen that in the long
run, they take care of themselves. So why should I die for you?” (Interview 9, 26
February, 2014). But while Ghanaians may not be willing to go to war in support of
corrupt politicians, respondents see that the persistence of corruption is what is likely to
“…trigger the country into going into conflict [as people can no longer accept to] remain
poor whilst they see people who are just becoming rich within a day” (Interview 14, 5
March 2014) after going into politics.
Respondents also identified the scavenger role of development NGOs as a key
factor in the appeasement of rural anger against the failures of duty bearers to deliver on
their mandates. The NGOs and FBOs with socioeconomic development agendas are
picking up after the lapses of the state, public, and corporate institutions by filling the
gaps in their deficient social and development service delivery. By literally cleaning up
after governments, the activities of development NGOs effectively mollify collective
citizen anger or deflect that anger away from the public sphere. Although data on the
quantum of resource investments by NGOs in Ghana is not readily available (Danquah,
2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009), one source indicates NGOs in
Ghana are estimated to manage “… annual development expenditure of between $150-
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$200 million [which, among others, is applied to] provide between 45-50 per cent of all
health-care services and over 50 per cent of all family planning services” (Danquah,
2011), among others . Similar contributions to the educational sector, agricultural
development, among others have helped to cushion the unserved and under-served rural
communities around the country.
In many places, especially in the north, NGOs and FBOs are the only providers of
development services. As a result, in such places citizens look up to NGOs for solutions
to their problems rather than engaging government and other public sector duty bearers to
demand that they live up to their mandates to provide what the communities deserve.
This, in the view of respondents, takes the Government off the hook. It also keeps the
population outside the public sphere, since they are unable then to articulate agendas for
engagement with public office holders.
Besides inducing the lull effect on citizens, subcategories of the NGOs and
international development agencies in Ghana make direct contributions of NGOs to
Ghana’s peace both at the national, as well as, community levels. In the latter case,
development initiatives create spaces of (re)engagement in dialogues of action for peace.
NGO-sponsored initiatives have encouraged members of rival communities to work
together either directly to promote peace, or through engagement in joint economic or
community development activities of mutual interests. In the process, community
members learn the benefits of interethnic cooperation and peace. This is what has
contributed considerably to the maintenance of peace in the eastern corridor of Ghana,
which is the most volatile conflict zone in the country.
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True as this may be, recent developments, however, suggest the NGOs and their
funding partners could be reaching their restraining limits in holding society at bay from
the public sphere. The emergence of groups such as the Alliance for Accountable
Governance (AFAG); OccupyGhana movement; InsideGhana; among others represents

the mobilization of the urban middle class whose development challenges are beyond the
capacities of the traditional development NGOs. Ironically, some of these movements
are gaining entry into the public sphere under the banner of NGOs or registered CSOs.
Their ability to sustain peaceful means in their pursuit of change in the governance
structure will depend to a large extent on the responsiveness of government and the
public sector to their issues and demands. Genuine corridors of dialogue and engagement
will encourage peaceful engagements. As in the case of urban youth groups recounted
below, ignoring these middle class action groups can only push them to the fringes and
lead some to consider alternate means of making change happen for them.
Subcategory 3.2 Elite and Middle Class Escapism
The contention that the middle class has chosen to exit the public sphere through
the use of private solutions to public problems provides an important frame for
examining what makes Ghana peaceful. Respondents who subscribed to this view have
pointed out that Ghanaians in the middle class often choose to fill in the gaps of state
deficiencies in public service delivery, rather than engage and demand their rights from
duty bearers. They would pay for the construction of the road leading to their newly built
house; pay for the extension of electricity, water, and telephone services to their
premises; or pay for the drilling and mechanization of a borehole to deal with their water
needs. The purchase and installation of generators to address public sector deficiencies in

317

providing regular electricity exempts them from the Dumsor phenomenon. Purchase of
private healthcare rather than use of the deficient public healthcare system; and decisions
to send their children to private schools are ways in which the middle class manages state
failures.
As a result of the middle class self-provisioning, they do not feel the pain of
public sector failures. Consequently, there is no urge for them to play the agential role of
mobilizing and leading the citizenry to demand performance and accountability from
pubic office holders. For this reason, Ghana suffers from the absence of a critical mass of
disenchanted activists who can champion protests over the non/poor performance of the
state and public sector institutions and demand that the right things be done. This
epitomizes how the escape of the middle class from engagement creates a void in the
political middle. The masses are left to the mercy of the political elite, as nobody talks
about the misgovernance or wants to do anything about it. Instead, citizens seem to have
resigned to the fate of the political system and the underperformance of the state system.
In the process, what should have become publicly expressed anger at state failures
become private concerns.
Part of the reason why the elite is missing in the fight against state failures, in the
view of some respondents, is the presence of negative consensus amongst them. In the
view of respondents, the elite only agree to disagree on the principle of “dibi na mi dibi”,
which translates into take your share of public resources and let me also have mine. In
other words, there is common agreement that political and public offices must be
exploited for private gain. Hence, there is an unspoken acknowledgement that
irrespective of who has access to power and state resources, they would practice the same
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principle of setting up alliances with political and private sector cronies “…to create, loot
and share the resources of this country as if a brigade had been set up for such an
enterprise” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1). This summation of the situation that Justice
Dotse, (SJ) gave in respect of the “… €40 million judgment debt paid to Waterville
Holdings Ltd and the GH¢51.2million (about USD14.6 million) paid to businessman,
Alfred Agbesi Woyome” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1; see also The Chronicle, 2014), when
passing judgment in the second case, resonates with ordinary Ghanaians. It encapsulates
the popular feeling that elites who can have access to state resources, have conspired not
to rock the boat of state through organizing agitations, respondents averred.
As an extension of the negative consensus escape route for the middle class,
grassroots party members who have access to such elite agree and accept the principle.
This has led to the emergence of the concept of “foot soldiers” who do all the footwork
and dirty jobs for their political patrons and parties to win. In return they expect that they
would be compensated with contracts, jobs, and other booties when their party is in
power. As a result, everyone in the party with adequate connections is either satisfied or
encouraged to close their eyes to nonperformance of the state, as long as they get their
share of the booty. Those in the losing political camp wait for their turn – fight to win the
next elections and do same.
The phenomenon has led to the entrenchment of petty crony capitalism, which
translates into jobs for the boys, irrespective of the level of their job readiness. The result
is the bloated government payrolls as a result of misfits in positions of authority simply
because they campaigned for the party (IMANI Ghana, 2015; Vinokor, 2015). Political
entrepreneurship has become the most lucrative and surest rewarding business in Ghana.
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The depth of its practice would cause the Asantehene to declare that “Politics has
substantially eroded the innate creative mind and enterprising spirit of modern day
Ghanaians as many resort to it as the surest way of making it in life…” (Myjoyonline,
2014).
In sum, political competition is about access to power to do the same thing as the
opponent has been doing. This is why the one thing that “…puts us in the category of
negative peace is corruption” (Interview 2, 7 February 2014). And several respondents
have “…talked about the negative peace [in Ghana] because of corruption” (interview 2,
7 February 2014) “which now has become a canker in the country” (Interview 5, 14
February, 2014) and it is this “…corruption and injustice in the system that could easily
open our doors for violent behavior” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). They conclude
that peace built on this ravenous situation is not peace that can be sustained.

Subcategory 3.3 Permanent and Seasonal Migration as the hatch for Rural and Working
Class Escapism
Unable to deal with the state’s failure to meet their needs, rural-urban migration
offers the hatch for rural people to escape from the traps of poverty. Such migrations are
either permanent i.e. people leave and find permanent residences elsewhere or seasonal.
In the latter case, people go through an annual cycle of leaving their rural settings to the
urban areas, usually during the off-farm season and return only for the brief periods of the
cropping season to tend to their farms and to leave again. As a result of this seasonal
migration “…people from the North can come down South and tap into the wealth of the
South and go back. People in the rural areas can come to the urban areas and tap and go
back” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).
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In between the permanent and cyclical migrants, are the fortune migrants who
may go for extended periods of time in search of resources to come back and start a
business, get married, or meet some other social commitments. Counted among these
would be people seeking startup capital for their dream ventures or funding to continue
their education. These include the exodus of mainly young girls principally from the
Northern Region to Kumasi and Accra to serve as head porters “Kayayei”. The
proliferation of street vendors in urban areas is another manifestation of this fortune
seeking migrations. For the braver ones, it is the staging ground for further migration, as
they accumulate resources for that visa and a ticket to take on their Europe, America, or
Asia bound sojourns. And if the money is not trickling in fast enough, a trek across the
desert is often an option they would consider (Daily Guide, 2010).
The peace dividend of such youth migration lies in the fact that since everyone is
busy finding an escape route out of their traps, there is no critical mass of “…angry
young men in the community” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) who will engage state
institutions and other duty bearers to demand accountability and efficient delivery of
services. Respondents, however, noted the emergence of the phenomenon in urban areas,
especially in the urban slum areas, where critical masses of enlightened and angry youth
are beginning to self-mobilize to take on the state for poor or non-delivery of services.
This marks a turning point for Ghana’s peace. If youth in the rural areas can’t organize,
they are beginning to do so once they get to the urban areas and find that their escape
hatches were false ones. Urban poverty is as bad, if not worse than the rural one. Already,
the youth demand for state attention to their plight is done violently, as witnessed in the
Ashiaman youth protests over poor road networks (Jafaru, 2013; Myjoyonline, 2013a) or
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the violent reactions of Muslim youth in Kumasi over the purported theft of a baby born
to an illiterate mother (Abdulai, 2014). Their example could be a precedent for the
emerging middle class protesters cited above, if state engagement for peaceful dialogue is
not forthcoming.

Subcategory 3.4 Humor as a hatch of escape
Jokes play important cathartic roles in every society. However, in oral societies,
they are also effective means for encoding and transmitting historical events and folk
wisdom across generations. Jokes can breach social barriers, allowing for the use of role
reversals to portray alternate realities. As Cochran recalls, in some jokes, “The message is
turned on its head, hierarchy is undone, the mighty are fallen, the would-be-emperor is a
window washer” (Cochran, 1989, p. 1). In addition, jokes are effective means for
participatory reconstruction of realities and collective narratives, since everyone who
retells the joke may add or take away from the original facts to make the joke appealing
to the current audience. The multiple recounts of the jokes makes the facts of the trigger
event fade; and with that fades also the original emotions (bitter or sweet) attached to the
trigger facts and events of the joke. Hence, jokes are ways to reconstruct or deconstruct
narratives to make what should otherwise be a painful experience turn into a light one.
They are tools for managing memories or helping to soothe and heal hurt feelings.
In consonance with these views, respondents in this study have observed that
Ghanaians have a high sense of humor that enables them to laugh at and laugh off
virtually everything, including things that should make them angry. As one respondent
noted, “We joke about otherwise serious situations and the laughter that comes with it has
a very therapeutic effect on all concerned” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014). Another
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respondent would add that: “Yes, we laugh over everything; we make jokes over
everything, you know” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). These views find support in a
recent observation that Ghanaians seem to have a penchant for “…allowing yourselves to
make serious things appear funny because it looks like one of the ways to satisfy us is to
just give us something to entertain ourselves with and we’ll entertain ourselves with it for
life” (Pastor Otabil in Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1). As a result, issues that should
ordinarily make Ghanaians angry easily become “national jokes” which dull the
collective consciousness to the evil inherent in the trigger event. Consequently there is no
critical mass of people that can be mobilized to hold to account political and civil
authority or other duty bearers that have failed their obligations to citizens in respect of
the event.
Examples of how serious national issues can be trivialized, masked, and tugged
away abound. When in 1994 long standing interethnic tensions escalated into Ghana’s
most violent and widespread conflict yet, the episode was quickly labeled The Guinea
Fowl War. Similar derisory accolades and jokes have been conferred on similar conflicts
across the country. When the management of the Savannah Accelerated Development
Authority could not account for how, after sinking Fifteen Million Ghana Cedis (Azure,
2012) - about US$4.3 million at the exchange rate of GHC3.5 - into a guinea fowl
project they could not produce a single guinea fowl to justify the investment, a joke
would be made that the SADA guinea fowls were allowed to fly into Burkina Faso to
save them from staging a coup d’état in Ghana (Dorfe, 2014).
Ghanaians also use jokes to blur lines of division when it attracts the therapeutic
laughter from all sides. Even if momentarily, such collective laughter eases tensions
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between those who partake in it. When the National Secretary of the NPP was hauled
before the Supreme Court justices hearing the Election Petition of 2012 to answer
contempt charges for making remarks that “…had the tendency to derail the country’s
peace and endanger the lives of its 24 million citizens” (Daily Graphic, 2013), counsel of
the accused resorted to jokes, including a request that his client be pardoned as a birth
day gift to he, the counsel. The trick worked in extracting leniency from the bench.
An unanswered question is whether the joking nature of Ghanaians is a conscious
strategy designed to enable Ghanaians not to remember the pain that the object of the
joke created or exacerbated. For, the joking nature of Ghanaians seems to be closely
related to their short memories as well. Ghanaians tend to forget otherwise serious
national issues or the pains they have been through once they have been able to laugh it
off. President Mahama endorsed this view when he bemoaned the fact that Ghanaians
would soon forget his good works when the power crisis, among others, are over.
Statesmen such as Dr. K.B Asante would agree that “…President Mahama is not far from
the truth for saying Ghanaians have short memories” (Ultimate Radio, 2013, p. 1); and
Nana Akufo Addo, Presidential Candidate in 2008 and 2012 for

Ghana’s largest

opposition party is reported to have expressed similar sentiments (Jackson, 2012).
Ghana currently faces its worse power generation and distribution crisis since
independence. Factories are reported to be closing down, industries are laying off
workers, and private informal sector businesses that depend on electricity for their work
are either shutting down or are facing serious disruptions to their operations. But
Ghanaians seem to be able to cope with the situation when they joke over the Dumsor
phenomenon. Coined in the Akan language, the word Dumsor, a literal description of the
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frequent and unexpected on and off power outages, is an example of the creative use of
language to comically express otherwise serious matters. The term “Dumsor”, for
instance, would soon be appropriated and used in all sorts of ways to make light the crisis
that the nation faced. As President Mahama himself would note:
We had the energy crises, which was popularly called ‘Dumsor’ and I was
appropriately labeled the “apostle of ‘Dumsor’, ‘Dumsor” and Ghanaians
in their usual humour crafted a very interesting greeting that said “Yema
mo dumsor oo,”… then another responds “Yaa Mahama” …However,
very often in Ghana we have a very short memory. [Wait till] The energy
crisis is solved and we don’t remember the darkness we were in (Addo,
2013, p. 1).

Some public officeholders latch onto the double doze effects of trivialization and
collective amnesia that jokes induce to deflect or dampen criticism against their
performance failures or to whittle away important issues into nothingness. A respondent
recalled how Members of Parliament from both the NDC and the NPP have appropriated
the term “greedy bastards”, once used by former President Rawlings to express his
exasperation at the unbridled corruption among officials of his own party that prided
itself of being a party of probity and accountability. The MPs are reported to use the term
jokingly to tease each other (Interview 26 February, 2014). The joke then trivializes the
recriminations the former President intended for them. And since it is a joke, they don’t
really have to worry about doing anything to address the concern.
In defense of the culture of jokes and joking, some observers have stated that this
tendency to make “somehow serious things [as] a joke to us” (Otabil in
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Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1) epitomizes the collective disillusionment of Ghanaians
at the persistent failure of duty bearers to address the issues at stake. Jokes therefore are
an expression of Ghanaians’ resignation to their fate. It is an essential ingredient of the
conflict bearing capacity of Ghanaians. As one respondent put it, “Yes, it’s good [to joke
over serious issues] to help us carry on; it gives us patience, and it gives us capacity for
long suffering and all that (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).
However, others believe that Ghanaian’s are taking their jovial nature to the
extreme, to the point where it is becoming a serious block to a national consciousness and
collective will to tackle important national issues with seriousness. As a respondent put it,
jokes may be good in easing tensed situations, “but where we over indulge in that we run
away from our responsibilities” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). The danger of abdication
from the collective responsibility to confront and deal seriously with national issues
would force a senior pastor to recently observe that even though joking is:
…the way we survive’ but that way we survive is killing us…“We’re
polluting ourselves. We have issues we can’t solve. We have problems we
can’t solve. We are overwhelmed all around us, yet we have a lot of time
to joke and to laugh and to act as if this is the most normal environment to
live in” (Otabil in Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1).
Whatever their forms, Ghanaians have used these jokes as important escape
hatches. They enable them bear the pain of the moment in difficult political, economic,
and even social times; granting them the space to transition to another place where the
pain would not be remembered. But as the concerns of Otabil indicate, glossing over
painful situations does not make them go away. If anything, the gloss of laughter leaves
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the wounds unattended to. Such wounds can only fester and manifest again, probably, in
worst forms sooner or later. The question that Otabil’s statement provokes is whether
Ghana’s inability to dig herself out of her state of negative peace is not precisely because
of her inability to take matters seriously; take the bulls by their horns and deal with issues
in ways that would break the cycle forever.
Subcategory 3.5 Visible and Invisible Weavers of Peace
Peace is the product of actions or engagements. Even when predisposing elements
of peace exist in a community, there is the need for “...agents for peace [who] can act to
mitigate or limit the effects of violence” (Neufeldt et al., 2002, p. 91). To be effective,
such “…key agents of change, [must have the] capacity for building vertical and
horizontal integration” (Neufeldt et al., 2002). In support of this, respondents have amply
cited examples of how individuals and institutional actors have on their own or acting in
concert with others have steered some of Ghana’s very volatile and potentially violent
conflicts towards peaceful ends. Such efforts are nested in long histories of similar
voluntary initiatives that fostered peace in the country.
A couple of examples will illustrate the point. In the mid-1970s, unarmed students
championed the campaign against the military government’s Union Government Concept
designed to entrench the military in power. Even though the referendum the government
was able to force through declared a win for the concept, the students had created enough
public aversion to the concept to provide an excuse for a palace coup that stopped the
implementation of the plan. In a similar way, students and professional bodies
championed the campaign for a return to civilian rule between 1981 and 1990, when it
was obvious that the PNDC regime under Rawlings had no intent of handing over power
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to an elected civilian government (Ameyibor, 1996; Gyamfi, 2014; also see Interview
212, 9 December 2014). The regime used the composition of the Consultative Assembly
to try to dilute, if not eliminate the influences of the professionals and other intellectuals
the PNDC considered hostile to its agenda of self-perpetuation (Gyamfi, 2014). Although
the Ghana Bar Association and other professional bodies boycotted participation in the
Constituent Assembly, certain individuals broke ranks with their peers and worked their
way into the Assembly just so they could make sure that a workable constitution was
framed. The Transitional Provisions that were inserted into the draft constitution may
have been intended to set a trap for its rejection at the referendum, and thereby retain the
PNDC in power. Again, realizing the trap that this arrangement was setting, individuals
and institutions mobilized the citizenry to vote for the constitution, irrespective of its
defects (Interview 212, 9 December 2014). Other examples of individual initiatives to
protect the common good abound.
Besides civil actors, respondents in this study have credited matured political
leadership of the two major political parties as major contributory factors to Ghana’s
peace. When the New Patriotic Party felt the 1992 elections had been rigged, it chose to
write a book - the Stolen Verdict - rather than mobilize its supporters in to the streets to
protest the alleged rigging of the elections. In 2009, the National Democratic Congress
also chose to go to court to contest the December 2008 Presidential elections instead of
taking to the streets. The NPP would use the same route in 2013, when it had grievances
over the conduct of the 2012 Presidential polls. The willingness of the political leadership
to listen to counsel from the civil society, faith-based, and traditional leaders has also
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been mentioned as yet another trait in the Ghanaian political space that has contributed to
the peace of the country.
Ghana’s transition from the 27 years of rule by a military dictator turned civilian
in 1990 is often cited as the high point of Ghana’s peaceful nature. What is little known,
however, is the plot to botch that transition and maintain J.J. Rawlings in power beyond
the two term mandate in 2000. It would take the agency of one individual, the Chief of
Defense Staff at the time, who was obviously working with a counter insurgency network
of security operatives, to uncover the plot and to botch it to ensure that the transition
process went on smoothly (Agyeman-Duah, 2012). Additionally, respondents in this
study have highlighted the fact that the much lauded peace architecture that emerged after
the 2000 transition could not have come into being without the unsolicited actions of
individuals and groups, acting on their own or on behalf of their institutions, to engage
duty bearers across partisan and institutional lines to hold them accountable to their
duties and make sure that they worked for peace.
The foregoing suggest that all the predisposing conditions notwithstanding, Ghana
may just have had a certain crop of individuals who at the most critical times of the
nation’s evolution, where willing to step out and up from their comfort zones and take on
the challenge of steering the country away from the descent into violence. The question
that begs to be asked is what has Ghana’s political, religious, traditional, and civil society
leaders done differently from their counterparts in other countries that have descended
into violence for the same or similar reasons that threatened Ghana’s peace? What pushes
Ghanaian leaders to act the way they do to stem the descent into violent conflicts?
Answers to these questions will provide pointers not only on how Ghana might
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strengthen her capacity for peace; other countries could learn a thing or two from such
experience sharing.
Category 4 – Constitutionalism, The National Peace Architecture and peace in
Ghana
Category 4.1 The Constitutions of Ghana and Peace
Respondents in the quantitative survey heavily endorsed the constitutions of
Ghana since independence as major contributors to Ghana’s peace. In the words of one
respondent, “Ghana is a country where the constitution holds us all together” (Interview
6, 18 February 2014). Collaborating this, other respondents in the key informant
interviews cited the constitutional provisions that debar ethno-regional or religious
political parties by requiring that all political parties have representation in all regions of
Ghana; and by extension, provide opportunities for all ethnic groups to be members of
the party. The preference for the unitary state system as against the federalist structure
has been commended for fostering a sense of unity among Ghanaians. The constitutional
requirement on regional balance in the appointment of Ministers and other public officers
also improves cross-ethnic inclusivity in the public sphere.
The fact that members of the same family can belong to different political parties
reinforces political freedoms and reduces the tendency for regionalism and exclusionary
ethno-political organization and political divisions along ethnic or regional lines. These,
in their view, are concrete ways in which the constitution has contributed to establishing
social harmony, minimizing political polarization, and fostering national unity and peace
in Ghana. In the words of one respondent “…the national constitution has epitomized
everything to the extent that Ghanaians moving to any part of the country would not see
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themselves as visitors or strangers anywhere. I believe that it is one of the strong reasons
there has been so much peace in this country” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).
Despite these positive traits of the constitutions of Ghana, respondents identified
several challenges, especially in respect of the 1992 Constitution that is currently
operational. They noted various aspects of the 1992 constitution as polarizing society and
being destabilizing factors or threats to the stability of the country. First, they point out
that the Rawlings led PNDC regime which superintended the drafting process of the
constitution, carefully managed and mined the process and the outcomes to suit the
persona of Rawlings. They find support in the view that “Ghana’s 1992 constitution is
‘Rawlings phobic’ the articles in it are raw and was crafted to suit Rawlings’ persona”
(Akwa, 2014, p. 1).
Indeed, “Throughout the drafting process the PNDC retained the right to insert
and alter the constitution as it saw fit. The PNDC exercised this right when, at the end of
the process, they added a blanket indemnity clause for PNDC members” (Princeton
University, 2014). Not surprisingly, respondents cited the inclusion of the Transitional
Provisions which preclude any form of holding to account former military officers who
used “…brute force that kept us in check” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014), as one of the
defects of the constitution. Knowing that “Ghanaians would call for accountability to
justify their actions one day [the PNDC had to] plant these mines to prevent it [and to
make the possible review of these clauses so difficult that] by the time you get to
amending these things, most of the players would have left the scene” (Interview 212, 9
December 2014). The entrenched constitutional clauses that ensure that such people
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cannot be held to account for their acts and omissions that infringed on human rights has
bottled up grievances that could explode in different ways.
Also, the winner takes it all political arrangement in particular has been singled
out as the most dangerous threat to political stability (Interview 214, 10 December 2014;
Interview 217, 1 December 2014; Interview 206, 29 October 2014, among others). The
concentration of power in the Executive to the exclusion of the other arms of
government, especially when the margins of win are less than 1% heightens the stakes at
the polls and increases the chances of electoral violence.
The Constitutions have also entrenched inherent contradictions in their forms. In
particular, the place and role of traditional rules in the governance structure will be
discussed later. For now, suffice it to note that for periods that Ghana’s has been under
constitutional rule, the provisions of the constitutions have not been exceptional in
comparison to what obtains in other Africa countries. Indeed, the basic organizing
principles, frames, and content of the constitutions that have been in force in Ghana were
imposed or imported from those of the British or American constitutions; both of which
also provide guidance for the framing of the constitutions of other countries.
Additionally, Ghana has not had one type of constitutional arrangement for any sustained
period of type. The country now runs on its fifth constitution. Between the Constitutions
of 1957, 1960, 1969, 1979, and 1992, she has flirted with different constitutional models.
The immediate post-independence era saw a switch from the inherited Westminster
system of government to an executive presidency under the 1960 Constitution, when
Kwame Nkrumah transitioned from Prime Minister into President. The country then
switched back to the Westminster system when constitutional rule was re-established
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under the 1969 constitution. Ghana would return to the executive presidential system
under the 1979 constitution; and then back to a hybrid between the executive and the
parliamentary system with the 1992 constitution.
From the constitutional point of view, therefore, what may be working for Ghana
is not in the letter of the constitutions, but in the spirit that its citizens have breathed into
it. Constitutions are social constructs, deriving their essence, principles, and values from
the collective experiences and will of the people who adopt them as their rule books. To
that extent then, constitutions are only as good as the people want and accept them to be.
Once written, people can choose to abide by them or not. We have noted how the
constitution making process for Ghana’s current constitution was carefully managed to
protect the interests of some people. Defective as it was, 92% of Ghanaians voted to
approve it at the referendum. In a comical turn of events, both the opposition and the
government campaigned for the acceptance of the draft constitution, but with different
motives. From the opposition’s point of view:
if you rejected the Constitution, it means that you are prolonging the stay
of the Government and anything than nothing at all which can later on be
looked at. You have been under the yoke of an Authoritarian Ruler for
near 19 years. Yes, you just wanted anything that would take them off.
That was the idea. [Even though they noticed] some of these flaws [in the
constitution] were noticed but to go back and have changed would meant
prolonging the process; and people will be eager to get back to Multi-Party
Democracy. We have, so to speak, the shell of what will takes us there;
we can fill in the blanks later (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).
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That spirit of partial solutions, abandoning the quest for perfection by accommodating
and working with the imperfect in the hope that time will heal or provide the opportunity
for correction, is perhaps, an attribute that makes Ghana sustain its negative peace
equilibrium. For the Ghanaian, rather than push the limits for the perfect solution, they
adopt the attitude that “whatever that they cannot control we don’t go further to explore
… we just revert to God; leave it to God” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). The origins
and import of this philosophical orientation of the Ghanaian to politics and public life
would be taken up further in the subsequent section of this study. Suffice it to say, to the
extent that the 1992 Constitution is an embodiment of this spirit of accommodation and
tolerance, it has served the peace of Ghana, even if tenuously.

Subcategory 4.2

Peace Architecture and Peace Infrastructure

a) The National Peace Council
The concepts of peace architecture (Ojielo, 2007), peace infrastructure (HoppNishanka, 2012), and peace support structures (Berghof Peace Support, 2010) represent
overlapping and sometimes interchangeable terms that describe a set of actors,
institutions, systems, and processes that directly influence the management of conflicts to
prevent their escalation into violence. In particular, peace infrastructure has been defined
as the “structured, systematic” (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012, p. 2) network of international and
domestic actors or the “dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms,
resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to
conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society” (Kumar 2011, p. 385 in HoppNishanka, p. 2). They comprise of “…anything from a rugged shed housing a local peace
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council in a remote South American village, to the elegantly designed high-rise office of
a national truth and reconciliation commission in the capital of an African country [with
the sole object of assisting parties in conflict] in the process, or the implementation of
process results” (Hopp-Nishanka, p. 2) from conflict resolution efforts. In other words,
peace infrastructure represent intentionally created institutional frameworks that facilitate
the management of conflicts.
In Ghana, the National Peace Council (NPC), is the pyramidal structure that
embodies the peace architecture or infrastructure, which has also been credited with the
peace in the country (Ojielo, 2007). However, the NPC became a legal entity only in
March 2011 under Parliamentary Act 818, which provided for national, regional, and
district structures for the promotion of peace. Since coming into being, the NPC has been
instrumental in intervening in some conflicts, especially those related to electoral
disputes, to prevent them from escalating into widespread violence. It has provided a
canopy under which all faith-based and civil society initiatives for peace and good
governance can come to confer, strategize, and act in synergy. At the regional and subregional levels, the decentralized structures have been active, in some places, in
intervening in local conflicts as well. But as noted in Chapter 4 of this study, resource
restrictions due to inadequate budgetary allocations have constrained the decentralized
deployment and operations of the NPC.
Influential as the NPC is becoming in securing Ghana’s peace, it is essential to
recognize that given the recent nature of its creation, its existence and operations as
Ghana’s peace infrastructure does not and cannot explain the historical consistency with
which Ghana has been able to avoid violent national level conflicts in the country since
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independence. Indeed, we have noted elsewhere that its coming into being was merely a
regrouping and christening of the efforts of various faith-based and civil society
individuals and organizations that championed the course of peace since Ghana’s
independence. Therefore crediting the national peace infrastructure in Ghana with
Ghana’s peace since independence overstates the contributions of this infrastructure.

b) The Traditional Authority System
Historically, the chieftaincy institution presented the veritable locus of any form
of peace infrastructure in the pre-colonial and colonial times. Chiefs were the major
dispensers of justice and mediators in conflicts. The colonial administration recognized
and harnessed this to effect under the native courts systems where chiefs had explicit and
legally backed jurisdiction over certain cases. For instance, the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance of 1910, made “…local chiefs' courts the first compulsory step in the judicial
system” (Sutton, 1984, p. 42). The arrangement consolidated the pre-existing role of
chiefs as the adjudicators of conflicts within their jurisdictions, in concert with the
councils of elders. This function has however been restricted to original and appellate
jurisdictions over chieftaincy succession conflicts only under the 1992 Constitution.
Nonetheless, in the rural areas, people still take their cases to the courts of the chiefs for
adjudication.
Going by the above, the traditional authority systems are, in principle, are
important constitutive institutions of the governance structure of the post-independence
state through various constitutional arrangements. In recognition of this, all the
Constitutions of Ghana since independence have upheld the relevance of the chieftaincy
institution in the governance of the country. This has been a major source of recognition
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and appeasement for some ethnic groups, and has helped to secure their allegiance to the
state. In practice, however, the evidence suggests that the postcolonial state has
persistently tried to hook and containerize the traditional authority system from playing
any direct role in the affairs of state. Accordingly, all the constitutions of Ghana since
independence have either directly sort to eliminate the chieftaincy institution or applied
the principle of exclusion by inclusion to significantly diminish their roles in the affairs
of state. Hence, while recognizing the importance of chiefs in their respective
communities, the constitutions very adeptly and purposefully confined their roles in
affairs of the state to ceremonial ones, at best.
For instance, the restriction on the role of chiefs in partisan politics has been cited
as effective instruments of Ghana’s peace. However that restriction also means chiefs
have limited functional powers in the administration of the state, irrespective of their
professional competencies. Besides, chiefs have legitimacy, influence, and even authority
that most elected and appointed state officials can only envy. Most politicians will have
to align with the chiefs in their constituencies if they want to win their elections.
However, as Kofi Kumado noted in his preface to a recent book on peacemaking
in Ghana (Darkwa, Attuquayefio, & Yakohene, 2012), the import of this constitutional
duality that co-occupy the public sphere in the country – the traditional and the modern
state systems - is masked and often overlooked in the political discourse on Ghana.
Chapter 22 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the existence and operation of Chiefs, but
Article 276 of the constitution debars chiefs from actively engaging in politics or
presenting themselves for election to any public office (Constituion of the Republic of
Ghana, 1992). This effectively hoodwinks chiefs in the public sphere. Unless
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Government appoints them to a post for which they are qualified, they have limited
public role in the formal state system.
But as one respondent remarked, despite the attempt to circumscribe the role of
chiefs in public life, the reality, however, remains that “…our nation has two levels of
political organization – you have the traditional system and then you have the national
constitutional body at the top” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). This has in effect
created the dual state system that literally translates Ekeh’s “two publics” (Ekeh, 1975,
p. 91) into two republics; the postcolonial and the pre-colonial or vestigial colonial
traditional authority systems. They command considerable legitimacy from their
respective ethnic populations, as well as, wield considerable influence and power in
matters of the state. However, they are only nominally integrated into the governance
structures of the state. They also have little to no accountable responsibilities to anyone
beyond what the customs and traditions of their respective jurisdictions mandate.
Ironically, because of the constitutional cocooning of the functional role of this
second tier of political authority in the executive affairs of the post-colonial state that
Ghana is, chiefs find themselves in a political limbo in respect of the management of the
affairs of state. It is also a contradiction in itself in respect of the roles of chiefs in the
development and peace in the country. Even though they have custodial responsibilities
over the land and natural resources in their jurisdictions, they do not control their
exploitation and use. They have influence over their people, but the country’s ability to
fully leverage the legitimacy and grassroots connections of this institution for national
unity and development is restricted. Other official policies of state or ruling political
parties reinforced this seclusion of chiefs from public life even where their role and
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influence in the promotion of development and the maintenance of peace are recognized.
For instance, chiefs are not allocated any resources of state for any community actions
that could enhance their status and spheres of influence among their subjects. Hence, the
effective capacity of chiefs to be instruments of peace is greatly minimized.
Ghana’s relative peace has been attributed to the localized and containerized
nature of recurrent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. Oddly, most of these
conflicts have to with issues related to this second tier of power. For, the issues that
generate, sustain, and episodically trigger the outbreak of violence are chieftaincy
succession, land ownership and tenure, and disputes over ethnic boundaries. All these
squarely fall within the cocooned space of the traditional authority systems.
Paradoxically, also, Ghana’s ability to withstand the political stresses in her
history and to rebound from the brinks of violent conflicts is attributed to the rootedness,
stability, and trust that these same traditional institutions bring to the body politic of the
nation. More than half of Ghana’s 57 years of independence has been under military rule,
where the preceding constitutions were suspended or otherwise rendered non-operational.
Therefore, much as the constitutions over time have elements that reduce interethnic,
inter-regional and political tensions, they cannot be said to be the sustaining and
stabilizing factor in Ghana’s ability to avoid national level violent conflicts since
independence. Conversely, for all the times that the constitutions have not been
operational, the traditional institutions have provided the only form of stability and hope.
As a respondent noted, “…when coups happen you see the constitutional body collapsing
but the substratum [the traditional authority structure] is firmly in place; the same applies
to our economy; when the formal economy is not doing too well, Ghanaians are able to
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exist (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) because of the strength and rootedness of the
informal economy.
Super Ordinate Categories (SOC)

The discussion of the findings thus far illustrates the extent to which each of the
four categories of factors and their subcategories have contributed to Ghana’s current
state of peace. We have also highlighted the limitations of these factors as standalone
categories for explaining why Ghana has avoided descent into violent conflicts. Each
category with their associated subcategories constitutes systems of engagement in and of
themselves. But as noted, none of the categories can lay sole claim to creating and
sustaining Ghana’s peace.
Hence, the current state of Ghana’s peace is the product of the net effect of the
interactions within and between the four categories and their sub components. In other
words, the four categories must be interconnected in some way to be able to produce a
result that is greater than the sum of the results of the individual subcategories
(Bertalanffy, 1969; Meadows, 2008). This “interconnectedness, [is] the relationships that
hold the elements together” (Meadows, 2008, p. 13) and ensures that the yins and yangs
of their interactions nonetheless produce the “steady state” (von Bertalanfy, 1969) of
negative peace that Ghana finds herself in. This state of steady negative peace must be
such that “… the composition of the system remains constant in spite of continuous
exchange of components” (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 159).
In other words, even if one set of categories of actions slip in and out of the action
matrix over time, the net effect should still be the same, since the other components will
be able to make compensatory adjustments to the loss of contribution from the
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component that is out of service. For instance, if conflict regulatory subsystems of the
state such as the Electoral Commission and the Judiciary are failing to uphold the peace
of Ghana in one way or the other, other components of the peace sustenance mechanism
will compensate for this temporary dissonance to ensure the state of peace is maintained.
For this to happen, however, definable values, rules, and regulations or the “system
stock” (Meadows, 2008) must be capable of providing adequate and timely “… signals
that allow one part to respond to what is happening in another part” (Meadows, 2008, p.
13).
These values, rules, and regulations that comprise the intangibles of the system,
are traceable to the religious and cultural foundations of the Ghanaian society. These two
components, then, constitute the Super Ordinate Categories of the combination of factors
and forces that govern Ghana’s ability to maintain its state of negative equilibrium of
peace. The constitutive elements of these Super Ordinate categories and how they operate
to provide effective governance to Ghana’s state of steady negative peace equilibrium are
taken up next.
Super Ordinate Category 1: Polyroute, polyvalent monotheism

Respondents in this study have consistently highlighted the centrality of religion
in the lives of Ghanaians. Ghana, they emphasize, is a religious country, with more than
90% of its population subscribing to one faith tradition or the other. The acclaimed
religious nature of Ghana is consistent with what obtains in other countries on the
continent. As one writer has observed, “Everywhere on the continent, the bond between
religion and society remains strong” (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67). The foundations
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of this bond are to be found, not in the new forms of religion that now dominant the face
of Africa, but in the beliefs, values, and traditions of Indigenous African Religions.
Indigenous African Religion – The Base for Ghana’s Spirituality
Christianity and Islam, which together account for 88% of Ghanaians as their
adherents, are both imported religions that did not come to meet a faith vacuum in their
host communities on arrival. On the contrary, they have been grafted onto deep rooted
and very vibrant faith foundations of indigenous African Religions (IARs). Belief in a
Supreme Being who can only be approached through the intermediation of objects of His
creation or objects of nature considered as lesser gods; recognition of the vivant
interconnectedness between the material and the spirit worlds; constant awareness of the
sustained interest of the dead in the temporal affairs of the living; and the ability of the
ancestors to exact punishment and confer rewards for current behaviors, among others,
constitute the fundamental tenets of faith for all IARs. These beliefs underwrite the
values that govern individual and collective behavior in all societies.
Hence, Christianity and Islam have not supplanted these tenets; they are
superimposed belief systems that often serve to clarify or justify the beliefs and practices
of IARs; or in other ways, reinforce the relevance and validity of their creeds and
practices. Alternatively said, Christianity and Islam, and all foreign religions, for that
matter subsist very strongly on the sap of Indigenous African Religion (IAR), which still
wields paramount influence on the lives of Ghanaians. This is in consonance with the
reality that irrespective of the religion of practice that Ghanaians, and all Africans for that
matter, profess their values and worldviews are still grounded in and governed largely by
the tenets of IAR. As Houphouet-Boigny is noted to have remarked, all Africans, “From
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African archbishops to the most insignificant Catholic, from the great witch doctor to the
most insignificant Moslem, from the pastor to the most insignificant Protestant, we all
have an animist past” (Houphouet-Boigny cited in Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67).
This animist past or innate religious tenets of IAR creates a common base from
which Africans engage in and with the world around them. Its tenets are the first
principles that guide action, voluntarily or involuntarily. Indeed,
The existence of this common base is so real that some anthropologist
question whether imported religions – Christianity and Islam – have really
affected African ancestral beliefs or given Africans different ways of
understanding the contemporary societies in which they live (EtoungaManguelle, 2000, p. 67).

At any rate, for the open-minded adherents of any of the modern faith traditions,
the tenets of IAR are often not considered incompatible with those of the imported faiths.
For instance the belief of Catholics in the intercessory powers of saints on behalf of the
living equates to the intercessory role of the ancestors in IARs in mediating with the
Supernatural Being or lesser beings for blessings, rewards, or the warding off of evils.
The belief of other Christian sects in the power of pastors to invoke blessings, healing, or
ward off imminent evil, mirrors Muslims’ recourse to Mallams and Imams for similar
celestial interventions in temporal affairs. In turn, and both the Christian and Muslim
practices map directly onto the IAR’s use of its priests and mediums for similar
interventions.
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Under such circumstances, boundaries between the fundamentals of the three
major faiths – Christianity, IAR, and Islam - are either dissolved or rendered so porous as
to permit joint or cross-faith consultations for celestial favors. As one respondent in the
key informant interviews noted:
If you look at Dagbon for instance which is very strongly Moslem the
influence of tradition in the practice of Islam among Dagombas make
them not very much different from the non-Moslem ethnic groups that
surround them. So their values, their way of life have been the same
(Interview 3, 7 February, 214).

Among the Dagara of the Upper West Region, also, Tengan points out that
Christianity, particularly Catholicism caught on rapidly with them because they found
strong similarities between the tenets of that faith and their own indigenous religion.
Above all, it was easy for them to pick out and incorporate elements of the Catholic
belief system into their cosmology centered on their indigenous belief systems (Tengan,
2000). Indeed, one of the pioneer missionaries sent to convert the Dagaaba would later
indicate that:
It was not difficult to speak to them about God because …they believed in
Him and had always done so as far back as they could remember in their
collective history. […] The idea of God as Creator was not new to them
either. He was the All-Powerful Supreme Being, Master of all Creation,
whom they respected … (McCoy, 1988, p. 63)
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Ghanaians therefore see nothing wrong when Christians and Muslims pray for
peace of the nation because in the minds of Ghanaians, institutional religion creates no
barriers for the practice of the deep seated faith, which is the vertico-horizontal, personal,
and ritually unrestrictive faith that IARs instill. Under this world view, there is one God,
but there are many ways to getting to Him; and all ways are covalent, depending on your
situation at any time. Therefore, irrespective of debarment by their official adopted faith
traditions, most Ghanaians believe it is valid for a Christian seeking answers to a life
question to consult an Imam or a traditional spiritualist, just as it is valid for a Muslim
seeking healing for an ailment to go to a healing service led by a Christian pastor. Hence
it is common at mixed faith functions and meetings, from the community to the national
levels, to have Christian, Muslim, and traditional African religious prayers said serially;
with all present responding to the prayers in the manner of their respective religions. In
times like this both Muslims and Christians would bow down their heads and respond to
the prayers of either faiths with the Amen or Ameen; and, as the Muslims lift up their
palms to their faces to make the sign that concludes their prayer, the Catholics make the
sign of the cross.
Under the circumstance, not only is it possible for practitioners of the two faiths
to cohabitate in the same space; religious tolerance becomes a matter taken for granted.
This implies religious absolutism is suppressed. Instead, interfaith inclusivity and
accommodation is the norm. Hence what dyadic thought systems would label as
syncretism, the polyvalent thought systems of the Ghanaian society finds very normal
expressions of their belief in one Supreme Being who can be approached through many
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routes. Each and every institutional religion then is seen as one of the means, but not the
only means to an end.
This concept of polyroute monotheism – belief in one Supreme Being, but many
routes to reach out to him or her – means in the IAR worldview, there are no societal
restrictions or compulsions to adhere to any one faith. Traditionally then, just as members
of families are free to join political parties of their choice, they are also free to practice
any faith of their choice. Hence, despite the emergence of some degree of family
intolerance to religious pluralism as a result of the newer religions, many Ghanaians are
still able to freely choose and follow the faith of their choice. In short, “…we do not have
what I will call religious fanaticism or bigots in this country - people that hold strong
views of their religion; [that] apart we see ourselves as brothers first” (Interview 212, 9
December 2014).
This is what has made intermarriages between people of different faiths possible,
as respondents have reported in this study. Religious tolerance remains a cherished ideal
among Ghanaians. This is why recent events around the demand of Muslim students for
rights of worship and the right not to attend Christian religious services in Christian
schools have not garnered widespread support. On the contrary, religious leaders on all
sides rallied round in attempts to find non-confrontational solutions to the issue, under the
auspices of the National Peace Council. Many have cautioned calm as they describe the
issue as alien to the Ghanaian politico-cultural and religious landscape.

Values of Faith as the Foundation for Peace in Ghana
In chapter 4, several respondents captured the fundamental principle of the
Ghanaian religiosity encapsulated in the axiom of “Fa ma Nyame” – give it to God; the
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saying which epitomizes the total dependence on God to provide everything. It is
essential, however, to emphasize that spirituality must not be confused with religiosity, or
the ritualistic aspects of being spiritual. Spirituality goes beyond ritual religion to include
the belief in the innate disposition of all persons to be good and to demonstrate that
through a willingness to sacrifice their own desires in order to be good to others. The
respondent in Interview 210 provides a good summary of the Ghanaian spirituality
behind this apparent self-abandonment to or refuge in the divine that is embodied in the
“Fa ma Nyame” philosophy when he notes that:
In Ghana we say “Fa ma Nyame;  b y yie”, to wit, let us give it to God;
it shall be well. That has also been a very important cultural practice in
our system – [the attitude] that God will deal with it in his own time.
[…this is] the issue of the spirituality aspect which grounds people in
something beyond this world. These are some of the things I will say we
need to watch. So far these are what has held us together.
Interview 201 already referenced, this God-centered “…attribute of Ghanaians”
conditions total reliance on God for answers to whatever they believe they cannot control.
Rather than rely on their human capacities and “…go further to explore, we don’t want to
get any scientific explanation; we just revert to God, leave it to God and that shows the
extent to which religion has influenced the attitudes of most Ghanaians. That [attitude] is
very important in looking at why Ghanaians have been seen generally to be peaceful”
(Interview 201, 15 October 2014).
This total reliance on divine providence to fill the gaps in their human needs
dovetails into another foundational spiritual principle of “n ny hwee” –literally
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meaning, this is nothing; it does not matter. Under this principle, Ghanaians are consoled
or entreated to let whatever has happened go, even if there is no hope of divine
interventions to right wrongs for them. Closely associated with this is another principle
that exhorts patience and forbearance -

huru

a b dju, to wit, whatever boils will

definitely cool down.
Rather than representing attitudes of fatalism, hopelessness, helplessness, or
abdication from personal responsibility, recourse to these exhortations have considerable
significance and impact on how Ghanaians individually and collectively deal with crisis
situations that they encounter. First and foremost, invocation of these principles has a
therapeutic effect on those minded to accept them as ways of managing the crisis that
confront them. For instance, rather than take matters into their own hands or rely on
human means to resolve a conflict, the recourse to divine intervention under the Fa ma
Nyame principle takes the conflict resolution process out of human hands and places it in
that of the divine. Leaving it to God in this way places no obligation on the offended to
seek redress, by whatever means, on this earth. In this way, Fa ma Nyame fosters
disengagement from the conflict situation and has the potential to elicit reciprocal
disengagement and abandonment of the course of violence or reprisals to the divine from
the opposite side. In other words, the “Fa ma Nyame [principle] … leads us to adopt the
let sleeping dogs lie attitudes and mindsets; making us not to pursue things that which
otherwise would have escalated conflict situations” (Interview 218, 13 December 2014).
Hence, recourse to any acts that can escalate the violence is averted in this way.
The “n ny hwee” principle, on the other hand, characterizes a predisposition to
forgiveness, or the “… willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, condemnation,
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and subtle revenge toward an offender who acts unjustly” (Enright & Human
Development Study Group, 1996, p. 108). Faith is the foundation of this principle since
“…persons initiate and choose to forgive because granting forgiveness is congruent with
their personal or religious beliefs” (Amour and Umbreit in Umbreit & Armour, 2011, p.
233). This predisposition to forgiveness is closely linked to the other two spiritual
principles, the first of which has been discussed above.
The last principle invokes patience, tolerance, and forbearance in times of
conflict. Rather than use violent confrontations, Ghanaians are exhorted to use the
gradual incipient approaches to change – based on the principle that “ huru a b dju” –
to wit, whatever boils will definitely cool. huru a b dju then invokes patience as it
literally points out that since whatever boils will definitely cool at some point, all one
needs to do is to patiently wait for the right time for the right temperatures that ensure
situations have calmed down before one can engage in any effort at reconciliation.
The Akan renditions these principles have their equivalence in the other 50+
languages that coexist in Ghana. For instance, among the Dagara of the Upper West
Region, “ huru a b dju” principle finds expression in the symbolic and ritualistic use
of water and ashes in conflict mediation and trauma healing processes. These elements
have very strong symbolic significance that convey the import of the Akan articulation of
the same principle. Water douses fire and cools down anything that is hot, including
tempers and anger. It is therefore the symbol of pacification; and its ritual use is always
designed to convey and inculcate this reality among the feuding parties or for the
traumatized person. Ashes are the products of fires that have cooled down. Their ritual
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use in conflict mediation and trauma management convey the same principle that
whatever is hot can and will eventually cool down, like the ashes.
These worldviews are counterintuitive to the principle of striking while the iron is
hot. For attempting to solve conflicts that way can only knock the process out of shape
into an escalating spiral. Nonetheless, they have informed the way Ghanaians choose to
manage their personal and national conflicts. We have cited the examples of how
Ghanaians have chosen to play by and use the rules, however defective, to make change
happen, rather than fighting the rules; the overwhelming vote for the 1992 Constitution,
despite its defects being an archetypical case to cite.
Respondents, however, cautioned that while such faith foundations remain very
critical to Ghana’s peace, there is a danger coming for the newer religious sects which are
preaching the gospel of prosperity to the neglect of the transcendental rootedness that
faith traditions such as IAR and the original tenets of both Christianity and Islam
preached. One respondent believed that as long “As we reinforce these things [IAR
values] then we can hold the peace together. The moment we do not (jumps), for
instance, some Churches are preaching prosperity and people are having faith more in, if
I prosper, if I have material things, then I am ok” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).
This, indicated, is dangerous. Probed on this view, he pointed out that the danger
inherent in the gospel of prosperity is that:
The message going out now is rather preaching anti-Christ, anti-Religion,
i.e. you are blessed when you are prosperous. It does not matter which
means by which you make it. Some of the Church Leaders themselves
and their opulent life styles, and some people now get the sense that they
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are just fleecing the poor. The moment people begin to lose faith and trust
in these Institutions; where else do you turn to? If I do not take matters in
hand, there is nobody else to do it (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).

In brief, religion may have held Ghanaians together and enabled them to navigate
through challenging political and economic times without recourse to violence. However,
that faith foundation is under erosion from the individualistic gospels of prosperity that
are undermining the traditional emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. If that
view supplants the traditional values of we before I, then the structural integrity of a
critical pillar of Ghana’s peace would have been seriously compromised. When that
happens, the peace that Ghana has, however, tenuous, cannot be expected to hold for
long.

Faith in Practice - Religious Leaders Following the Lead
IAR is a lived religion; not an occasional, closet ritual that one goes through. It is
not a dichotomized private affair devoid from one’s public life; faith must manifest in the
public lives of its adherents. Consequently, adherents are expected to live out the tenets
of their faith, as embodied in the values, beliefs, and practices it espouses, at all times. In
the view of IAR, “Every activity [is] a religious exercise and the individual [is] left to
relate to his or her maker according to how it satisfied the spiritual and material life”
(Quashigah, 2009). Indeed, because “…religious beliefs and practices permeate all
aspects of life of the Ghanaian [the] ... homo ghaniensis (a Ghanaian) is a homo
radicaliter religiousus - a radically religious man – religious at the core of his being”
(Quashigah, 2009).
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This influence of IAR is carried into the newer religions – Christianity and Islam.
Social dissonance occurs when belief is not mapped onto practice. To minimize this, it
becomes incumbent on religious leaders not only to preach what they belief; they must
also practice what they believe and lead their folk to do the same. Therefore, if peaceful
coexistence of different people, accommodation, patience, tolerance, and peace is what
they preach, they feel the pressure of duty to step out of their pulpits and prayer bays to
intrude into the public sphere to speak truth to power on behalf of their followers, and to
engage the public sector actors in ways that create the enabling environment for their
congregations to live out their beliefs. In this world view, the concept of separation of
church and state is considered a false dichotomy that should be jettisoned in toto. Little
wonder then that Church leaders and some scholars have reiterated the inalienable right
of the church to participate in national politics, arguing that “We are clear in our minds,
that the church has a valid case to be involved in the affairs of the State in all aspects
including national politics.” (Kudajie & Mensah, 1991, p. 33).
The demands to make faith manifest in both the private and public lives of citizens
mean religious leaders in Ghana can only follow the lead of their congregations in the
quest for peace and harmony in a multicultural, multi-faith environment. Subcategory 3.5
already highlighted the role that religious leaders played, overtly or covertly, to direct the
ship of state towards nonviolent resolution of national crisis. As one respondent noted,
“…in fact the least provocation in the country [and] quickly you find the Christian
Council, the Moslem Council, all these other groups, bishops and others coming to
register their concerns and all that and making appeals left and right for peace to prevail”
(Interview 201, 15 October 2014). Giving more specific examples, a respondent from the
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civil society network who has been very closely associated with the leadership role of
faith leaders in national crisis would emphasize this critical role when he noted that, in
this incessant search for peaceful means of resolving conflicts, especially the political
ones:
There are life players involved - Cardinal Turkson, [and other] Eminent
[religious] people who are part of the National Peace Council, the kind of
work they did behind the scenes, is unknown to most Ghanaians. He
[Cardinal Turkson] is interested in the work. Even from the Vatican he
calls to find out where we are with what we are doing. He is championing
the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC); how far we had gone.

Faith leaders have the courage to enter into and exercise such leadership functions
in the political realm, which normally should not be their arena of play, because they
know they have the backing of their congregants and that they have the responsibility to
speak truth to power on behalf of not only their sects, but the entire nation. It is this
knowledge that gives the National Chief Imam the grounding to address all Ghanaians in
the period leading up to the announcement of the Supreme Court verdict in respect of the
Election Petition that the opposition brought against the 2012 Presidential Polls. His
exhortation to the nation was:
Fellow Ghanaians, let us all be calm and kneel before Almighty Allah
again as we did in 2012 for peace after the final verdict at the Supreme
Court and as we are waiting for the verdict we should try to make up our
minds to accepting whatever comes out of the court and also know that
Ghana is first always before anything else” (Sharubutu, 2013).
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When he addressed the nation in this way, the Chief Imam knew that it is not only
members of his Islamic sect, nor Muslims of all sects alone who would be paying
attention; he was assured that the Christian majority in the country as well would listen
and heed that call. Similarly, when Christian leaders speak, they speak to all, not their
own alone. And, Ghanaians heed the exhortations of their religious leaders because they
see the prophetic voices of the religious leaders as a guide to moral behavior for public
officeholders. But as Interview 210 cautioned, this moral legitimacy that religious leaders
derive from the entirety of the Ghanaian society will last only as long as they are seen to
be championing the collective interest. That legitimacy will self-erode if the current trend
towards the gospel of prosperity paves the way for faith leaders to lead opulent lifestyles
at the expense of their poor and suffering congregations (Interview 210, 21 November
2014).
Ghanaians “…have a lot of trust in what their religious leaders say, […] and …
there is a lot of trust in the faith-based organizations and institutions” (Interview 4, 12
February, 2014) that they represent. Therefore, religious leaders have been and continue
to be key bastions to Ghana’s democracy and peace. In the main, they are seen as honest
brokers, even if some of them have been labeled with political colors of one party or the
other. They must do everything to retain the legitimacy and trust that their followers have
in them. Above all, they must justify this trust through active, non-partisan, and proactive
leadership and guidance to their folk in how they might constructively engage with the
state to ensure that faith inspires actions in the public domain and guides the ship of state
towards the fulfillment of the common good. If religious leaders in Ghana lose their
neutrality, credibility, and get sucked into the highly partisanized and politicized public
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discourses, Ghana would lose a central beam of its peace architecture. At that point, its
ability to resist a descent into the abyss can no longer be guaranteed.

Super Ordinate Category 2: Intercultural
Incorporation, and Identity Dissolution

Openness

to Accommodation,

The predisposition to war or peace in any society is a function of the values,
beliefs, behaviors, and practices of the society. Hence, the peace architecture must be
built on a solid foundation or sub structure that has a high conflict bearing capacity. That
capacity lies in the psycho-social infrastructure such as faith, culture, social networks,
intercultural accommodation and other intangibles that constitute the elements that create
and sustain the conflict bearing capacity. Without this, no amount of investments in peace
infrastructure can stand.
Adams (1995) defines a culture of peace in the following words:
A culture of peace consists of values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of
life based on nonviolence, respect for human rights, intercultural
understanding, tolerance and solidarity, sharing and free flow of
information and the full participation of women (Adams 1995, p. 16 in
Ratković & Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 11) .

Boulding (2000) adds that this culture also depends on the contextual or
“…institutional arrangements that promote mutual caring and well-being as well as an
equality that includes appreciation of difference, stewardship, and equitable sharing of
the earth’s resources among its members and with all living beings” (p. 1). This culture of
peace also includes larger concerns for the environment, collective security, the creation
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of safety nets for the weak and vulnerable in society. A culture of peace is an active, ever
changing process that requires the cultural participants to constantly engage in the
“…shaping and reshaping of understandings, situations, and behaviors in a constantly
changing lifeworld, to sustain well-being for all”(Boulding 2000, p. 1 in Ratković &
Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 12).
Ghana is blessed to have these characteristics engrained in the collective psyche,
values, and beliefs of the ethnic groups that constitute the country. These in turn
underwrite the personal and collective attitudes, behaviors, and practices of the
individuals that move the country towards peace more than toward violence. Though
weak, Ghana’s public institutions strive to live by these tenets as well. Hence, Ghana’s
successful management of the ethnic, regional, religious, economic, and other forms of
political and social diversities of its population is founded on the culture of peace
inherent in the socialization processes of all ethnic groups, as well as, the commitment of
its institutions to play by the rules, even if imperfectly.
Additionally, respondents in this study have frequently cited the spontaneous and
successful incorporation of ethnic groups in Ghana through intermarriages between
ethnic groups, faith traditions, regions, etc. as attributes of the culture of Ghanaians to
embrace the other. We cited the existence of family or friendship safety nets used to
mollify the effects of the failure of national economy and by extension, government’s
failure to cater for the weak and vulnerable in society as important ingredients of Ghana’s
culture of peace. The gelling effects that the freedom of movement of people and capital
within Ghana brings to the incorporation of Ghanaians into any community they choose
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to settle in are examples of how Ghanaians cherish and embrace diversity. All of these
constitute the intangible threads of the culture that help weave the peace of Ghana.
This study highlights the fact that there are many contributory and interacting
parts that account for Ghana’s ability to maintain the steady state of negative peace.
Therefore, any attempt to isolate any of the elements as the major contributor;
proportionately attribute Ghana’s peace to the elements in isolation of each other; or
establish some rank ordering of the relative importance of the contribution of each
element to Ghana’s peace can only obfuscate the nested and mutually reinforcing nature
of what makes Ghana peaceful. Above all, there is a great risk of missing out on how that
peace is actually created. For it is not the elements standing or acting alone that create the
peace; it is the totality of the synergistic interactions between the elements that create
something bigger than the sum of the parts of the elements.
Consequently, no one component can adequately explain Ghana’s peace. As von
Bertalanffy points out, the essence of the saying that “‘the whole is more than the sum of
parts’ is simply that constitutive characteristics are not explainable from the
characteristics of isolated parts” (1969, p. 55). For instance, to isolate the separate effects
of religion, culture, or education on an individual religious leader’s decision to wade into
the public sphere, as it were, and engage in actions, solicited or unsolicited, that have
helped to create the peace in Ghana will be misleading at best. For, the action of an
individual may be the product of that person’s cultural, religious, and educational
upbringing that makes his or her predisposition act in the way they do greater than any
one of these factors alone could have produced. This is what would explain, for instance,
why people who have been through the same school system; are members of the same
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faith group; or members of the same ethnic group with the same kind of cultural
upbringing would, nonetheless, find themselves on different sides of the positive and
negative field forces that have sustained Ghana’s state of steady negative peace.
Additionally, the process and rate of development of the collective trait of
peacefulness among Ghanaians can be masked when the contributions of the different
elements are viewed separately. As von Bertalanffy (1969), observes, “While we can
conceive of a sum as being composed gradually, a system as total of parts with its
interrelations has to be conceived of as being composed instantly” (p. 55). Hence, we
cannot periodize the development of the different moments when the traits of Ghana’s
peace-loving or conflict aversion nature congealed into the culture of peace that seems to
hold Ghana together. In other words, for any individual or group that has been engaged in
the search for peace in Ghana, it will be difficult to isolate and categorically say which
factor came first as the initiator and which one came last as the capping factor for the
peace in Ghana - is it culture, religion, influences from the educational system, or the
practical dictates of economic interdependencies that triggered or sealed the development
of Ghana’s culture of peace? The congelation process of these elements must have been
instantaneous, practically sprouting out from the different seeds of peace inherent in the
various elements that respondents have identified as sources of Ghana’s peace.
The foregoing suggest that those studying the peace that Ghana has must be
careful not to over attribute it to the recently established peace architecture, or the direct
actions of the state. Conversely, state actors must be careful not to over ascribe the peace
of Ghana to their policies, programs, and actions and thereby take the peace of the
country for granted and behave in ways that would threaten the foundations of the values,
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systems, and private actions that have shielded public anger from the state. On the
contrary, they must strive to understand how the different elements have worked together
to create the peace that Ghana has. This understanding must inform how leaders in the
state system, traditional authority system, FBOs, CBOs, CSOs among others, can work
together to uphold and strengthen the centerpieces that bind and bond Ghanaians
together, namely, their faith and their culture. The day these pillars are left to collapse,
that would be when Ghana would know no peace.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Emerging Theories
General Conclusions

Available literature holds out Ghana as an oasis of peace in a continent beset by
violent and protracted conflicts. Findings from this study, however, indicate that
Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They see Ghana’s
peace only in relative terms – relative to other countries and/or when viewed from a
global perspective without taking into account the violent and protracted conflicts that
beset various parts of the country. Respondents were also reluctant to classify Ghana’s
peace as positive or negative, arguing that Ghana’s peace can be seen as neither positive
nor negative because it is difficult to tell the difference between negative peace and
positive peace in the case of Ghana (Interview 207, 29 October 2014). In the view of
respondents, there are a host of factors in a force field, some of which are pushing Ghana
towards the abyss, while others are propping her up from descent into violent national
level conflicts. Somehow, these forces always manage to self-neutralize, leaving Ghana
in a steady state of negative equilibrium of peace – neither descending into violence nor
progressing into sustainable positive peace. As respondents saw it, the range of forces
falls into one of three categories – the positives, the negatives, and the grey.
Among the positive factors, respondents hold that religion and culture provide the
backbone support for the other reinforcing positives. Indeed, respondents gave religion
and culture more credit for Ghana’s peace than the formal educational system, which
conventional literature has extolled as being the backbone of Ghana’s peace. In
particular, they exalted the influential role of Indigenous African Religion to the peace of
Ghana, given its personalized, peaceful, open, and therefore accommodative overture to
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other faiths and traditions. Its beliefs, values, and practices, are ample and tolerant
enough to accommodate those of other faiths.
Although adherents of Christianity and Islam numerically outnumber those who
profess to the IAR, the latter still has pervasive influence on the world views of
Ghanaians of all faiths as its tenets still underwrite social values, beliefs, and behaviors.
In the view of respondents, the overall influence of religion on peace derives precisely
from the fact that Ghanaians find a lot of congruity between the deeper spiritual values of
their respective current imported faiths – Christianity, Islam, or others – and the
foundational values of African spirituality rooted in the Indigenous African Religious
beliefs and practices. They debunked the belief that Ghana’s peace is attributable to the
dominance of Christianity and/or Islam with pointers to the fact Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among others, have predominantly Christian
populations as well, and yet they experienced some of the most brutal and protracted
violent conflicts in Africa. Similarly, most of the conflict hotspots currently ravaging in
Africa are either in countries that self-identify as Islamic or ones that have significant
Moslem populations.
Set in a nested relationship with religion, shared cultural values across all ethnic
groups in Ghana were also cited as key pillars to Ghana’s peace. Family, clan, and ethnic
bonds retain strong transactional value in the socioeconomic and political lives of
Ghanaians. Socio-political and economic organizations of all ethnic groups emphasize
collective property ownership, and shared responsibility for ensuring the common good.
Traditional values frowned on private gain at the expense of the public good. Hence
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traditional social safety nets ensured that those who have, support those who do not. This
serves as a natural bonding factor within and between families.
At the interethnic level, the openness of the cultures of all ethnic groups in Ghana
to embracing ethnic and religious diversity have reinforced the automatic integration and
incorporation of ethnic groups across cultures, especially through the practice of crossidentity conjugal relationships. This openness to others has not only encouraged
extensive permanent and cyclical migration of persons and capital across all regions; it
has enhanced economic interdependencies between ethnic groups. This, in itself, has
become a stitch for the peace of Ghana.
Respondents repeatedly voiced that Ghanaians, for practical and spiritual reasons,
are welcoming to strangers. They also abhor the shedding of blood. Put together, these
two factors have promoted intercultural comingling of people, interethnic
accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. In furtherance of
these, the traditional palaver concept, with its emphasis on let’s sit down and talk
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014), has also been recognized as an important cornerstone of
Ghana’s cultural preference for the use of dialogue over violence to resolve conflicts.
This attribute has projected itself into the public sphere in the modern state system.
Culture is rooted in history, and that history continues to guide interethnic
engagements in the postcolonial state. Historical interethnic social relationships and
politico-military and security alliances have been cited as an important stitch for Ghana’s
peace. In particular, the existence of pre-colonial military alliances between ethnic groups
located in the key cardinal points of the country – the Dagombas in the north, the
Ashantis in the center, the Anlos in the south east, the people of Edina (Elmina) in the
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south-central, and the Nzemas in the south west, is a factor cited as an important
historical thread that still functions to keep the participant ethnic groups bound together.
The concomitant conjugal alliances often transformed into mutual defense pacts, as well
as, treaties of non-aggression between the key ethnic groups that, in contemporary
popular view are political rivals, retain their subtle but powerful force of unity.
Within this frame, the centrality of Ashanti as the organizing and unifying factor
in creating military and conjugal alliances between the dominant regional blocs of ethnic
groups has been key in building a network of crossethnic alliances between large ethnic
states in the pre-colonial era. In other words, rather than using its military might to be a
dispersal force, antagonizing the other ethnic groups, Ashanti practiced and promoted
intercultural integration and incorporation within its militaro-security structures, enabling
all to be part of its greater empire without overt coercion. These historical memories of
alliances, reinforced by intermarriages, have run as the background rules and regulations
or software that govern interethnic engagements in the public sphere. This is what has
given confidence to the view that no matter how much Ashantis and Ewes yell at each
other in the public domain, they will never get to the point of going to war against each
other (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).
Other bilateral and multilateral interethnic relationships on the basis of chieftaincy
lineage across regions in the north, such as exists between Dagbon, Mamprugu, Nanung,
Wala, and some groups in Upper East Region, all claiming descent from Mamprugu, are
important historical threads as well that tie these groups together underneath the surface.
A shared ancestry, history, and socio-political organizational structure – the hierarchical
structure of chiefs rotated along the systems of gates – are historical bonds that still have
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contemporary relevance to them. Other interethnic threads such as the joking and
friendship relationships prevalent largely in the north are key to maintaining a sense of
sameness rather than difference among the ethnic groups in this part of the country. This
helps in the interethnic incorporation, as people settle in different places across the
country. Leaders seeped in this history find strength and reason from these deeper sources
to enable them step up and out to champion the courses of peace in times of crises.
The agential role of some political, religious, and traditional leaders in birthing
and nurturing Ghana’s peace has also been highlighted. Very neutral, inclusive, and
objective leadership of the chiefs in all regions played a critical role in rallying ethnic
groups to support common courses in the legislative deliberations leading up to
independence. In particular, the early recognition of the economic interdependencies that
existed between all parts of the country led to the creation of a leadership that
championed the need for unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the
mutual benefit of all. Hence, starting with willful unions between ethnic groups, as
described in the various alliances that emerged, the immediate pre-independence era
witnessed the striking of political concessions, especially between the north and Ashanti.
This eventually led to the merger of the political parties representing the two geo-political
spaces into what is today the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition in Ghana’s politics.
In the run up to independence, the nascent nucleus of confederates of ethnic states
that the aforementioned pre-colonial politico-military alliances created, and the interethnic consensus building that was emerging in the Legislative Assembly came under
strain, when separatist ethnic independence movements threatened to tear it apart. The
singular efforts and statecraft of Kwame Nkrumah in avoiding this break up stood out for
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respondents in this study. Not only did he succeed in bringing Ashanti, the Northern
Territories, and the Transvolta Togoland, into a unitary state structure with the Gold
Coast; he successfully suppressed, through legal and constitutional means, the nascent
attempts to erect political parties based on religion (the Moslem Association Party) and
ethno-regional blocs such as the National Liberation Movement, (NLM) for Ashanti; the
Northern Peoples Party, NPP; and the Togoland Congress Party, TCP.
Though controversial in some respect, his redrawing of intra and interethnic
boundaries in the post-colonial state served to disperse ethnic power bases and create the
relevant spaces and distances that helped to mollify conflicts. For instance, the creation of
the Brong Ahafo Region in 1959 separated the Brongs and the Ashantis, while the
creation of the Upper Region in 1960 also split the Mamprugu state, resulting in the
separation of the Kusasis from the Mamprusis. While these redefinition of ethnic
boundaries did not altogether eliminate the conflicts, and in deed, those conflicts still
exist, the effect of the creation of jurisdictional boundaries was to separate the influence
of existing ethnic overlords over large portions of the country. This pre-empted the
entrenchment of ethnic states, which would have hampered the creation and sustenance
of the spirit of a unitary state.
Since independence, other leaders have striven to keep the unitary state concept
intact. In particular, the role of religious leaders from both Christian and Islamic faiths in
proactively engaging in the public sphere, jointly or severally, to speak truth to power and
demand that the right things be done to keep the peace of the country, stand out strongly
in this study. Backing this are leadership roles of military and other security forces in
creating and maintaining a professional and largely neutral security services that have not
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lent themselves to political manipulations. Conversely, since 1993, citizens’ memories of
military brutalities in the past, when they stepped in to govern the country under the
banners of redeeming, liberating, revolutionizing, or otherwise provisionally leading the
country out of chaos, have served as deterrence to any acts that would give the military
course to re-enter politics via coup d’états.
While women are recognized as playing important roles in securing the peace of
Ghana, respondents believe such roles are largely behind the scenes and restricted to the
nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles normally reserved for women in traditional
patriarchal settings. Hence, women are not seen as frontline activists for peace, except
when they champion intercessory prayer sessions seeking divine intervention for the
peace of the country. Otherwise, they play the moderating, mediatory, and conciliatory
roles behind the scenes. For this reason, their roles in the peace of Ghana are not seen in
the public domain. Consequently, respondents had difficulties pinpointing what specific
roles, if any, women have played in Ghana’s peace. This is in spite of the fact that women
took an early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and
organize Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement.
Although accentuated ethno-regional economic disparities can be the cause of
violence, in Ghana, however, the existence of regional economic inequalities are not
seen as deliberate acts of neglect, punishment, exploitation, or exclusion. On the contrary,
the disparities are largely seen and blamed on colonial policies and natural or
environmental disadvantages. Besides, the freedom of movement of persons from the less
endowed areas to the richer natural resource zones of the country affords people from the
poorer parts of the country – the north and the rural areas – access to the economic
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resources of the more naturally endowed south of the country. This happens directly or
indirectly through homeward income transfers from migrant workers. Additionally,
though limited in scope and impact, there are nonetheless visible efforts of central
government to redistribute resources in favor of the poorer areas. Therefore, the poorer
segments of communities see no reason for regional or ethnic mobilization for violent
inter-regional confrontations on the basis of perceived horizontal inequalities or
interethnic deprivation.
Finally, Ghana also benefits somewhat from the looking-glass self effect (Cooley,
2010) . Her poster child position as a peaceful country predated the colonial era. Hence,
right from colonial times, Ghana has been regarded as a model in different ways. It
became the reference point for British colonial administration in Africa. The fact that she
is even considered an oasis of peace is yet another model role conferred on her. In the
view of respondents, this positive international perception of Ghana as a role model, and
the respect she and her illustrious citizens have earned in international circles, makes her
leaders and people want to behave in ways that conform to the expectations of the
international community. Hence, Ghanaians feel some pressure to keep up this model
image. In the view of respondents, it is this “noblesse oblige” (Interview 205, 29 October
214) factor which makes Ghanaians not want to mar their positive reviews to date.
On the negative side, respondents see contemporary politics, especially political
exclusion, as posing a higher risk for pushing Ghana towards violent national level
conflict than the horizontal inequalities in the distribution of development across geoethnic regions. The duopoly that the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic
Party enjoy in the country has so highly polarized the political environment that no single
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issue of national significance can be discussed without evoking entrenched partisan
positions. Consequently, politicians have failed to forge a unified range of national
policies that would guide the governance of the country. On the contrary, the manifestoes
of political parties have become the guide books for setting and pursuing the
development agendas of the country in all spheres. As such, no sooner has a political
party lost power than its manifesto and associated policies and programs are jettisoned,
often in totality.
Besides, appointments to ministerial positions and other public offices are carried
out on partisan lines, and often without regards to the competence of the appointees. Even
the allocation of development resources to different parts of the country are usually made
through partisan lenses. These approaches do not foster unity, respondents observed.
Hence, while political parties nominally provide the space for the jellying together of the
interests of like-minded people from different ethnic groups, and to that extent, can be
considered unifiers within the political sphere of the country, their modi operandi are
sources of worry for Ghana’s peace. Consequently, across parties and at the national
level, the posturing of political parties is not considered a major unifier, since there is no
national agenda that provides a common base for consensus building on national
programs. As a result, political accountability is nonexistent as there is no nationally
accepted standard for judging the performance of political parties in power. Instead,
political parties in and out of power judge themselves by their own standards – their
manifestoes and what they claim to have achieved. This only serves to further polarize
and even trivialize important national discourse as the parties merely bicker over who has
done or not done much of anything.
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Additionally, respondents felt political parties are incapable of impacting
positively on Ghana’s peace because they lack the organizational presence and depth
across the country. The majority of them are organizationally weak and operationally not
good examples of adherence to the democratic culture that they profess to champion. Of
the 23 registered political parties in the country, only two, the NDC and the NPP have
met the constitutional requirement of having physical presence and functional offices in
two thirds (2/3s) of the districts in the country; are able to prepare and submit annual
audited accounts; and are able to furnish the Electoral Commission with the expenditure
returns on each candidate after every elections and furnish same with their locations, and
physical addresses, within 90s of the conclusion of an election. The rest are noncompliant
with the law and therefore, technically, should have been taken off the roll. Many exist
only in name, and resurface only during elections. They are unable to sustain the
articulation and championing of their own political agendas. Their officers often jump on
the bandwagons of or get coopted to champion the agendas of one or the other main
parties. Consequently the duopoly that has literally partisanized the country to crippling
levels will continue for a long while.
Beyond the parties, respondents have also faulted the political elite for failing to
champion the common good of the country and the fostering of peace on a number of
grounds. In particular, respondents cited the tendency of the elite to seek private
solutions to public problems. This, respondents averred, is one of the challenges to
galvanizing the citizenry in ways that would move Ghana beyond the trap of negative
peace equilibrium in which the country cyclically manages to stave off violent national
level conflicts, while being incapable of finding more sustainable solutions that would
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promote positive and sustainable peace. Beyond the procurement of private resources and
services to circumvent the failure of the public sector to deliver same, a more insidious
dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems resides in the situation
where citizens’ discontent against inefficiencies and perceived raging corruption in the
public domain is individualized. According to this perspective, public outcries of civil
society and faith based organizations against corruption have not translated into
mobilizing the individual discontents into collectivized and purposive outrage. This is
because ordinary citizens see no stake in the state, which is seen as an external entity to
avoid or exploit.
Besides, Ghana remains trapped in corruption partly because national discourses
on corruption are quickly politicized and partisanized. This stifles the emergence of any
form of unified leadership that has an agenda or mechanism for championing the fight
against corruption. In the process, any possible group action against corruption is snuffed
out. The individual Ghanaian resigns to living and let live those who have access to
resources of the state to plunder as they can – a tacit subscription or reinforcement of the
negative consensus ideology. It also reinforces political patronage as the means for
redistributing national resources, as the foot soldiers and those who cannot directly access
state resources wait for their patrons to kickback what they choose, to feed those who
wait in queues to vote them into office.
The foregoing surfaced the concept of negative consensus among explanations
respondents offered for Ghana’s peace. According to this view, the political elite condone
corruption because they are wont to indulge in same when they have access to state
power and resources. For this reason, respondents believed another elite consensus to
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keep out the military from returning to power supersedes the initial negative consensus as
the primary organizing principle for elite agreement to avoid political conflict that might
give the military an excuse to re-enter the political space. In other words, the elite have an
agreement not to rock the boat so that they can have access to state resources when they
can. As a respondent in the key informant interviews framed it in respect of the issued
“…raised about the elite consensus, the elite believes in that and so the people who are
leading political parties, who can use political parties as organizations to cause conflict
are people who also believe in maintaining the status quo…” (Interview 9, 26 February,
2014).
The combination of the effects of elite consensus and the use of private solutions
to manage public problems has produced the phenomenon of political entrepreneurism,
since having access to political power is a sure way to get rich enough to circumvent the
public problems. Consequently, people are willing to invest their money and time into
making sure that they or their parties win the elections so that they can gain access to
national resources from which they can benefit personally, ethnically or otherwise. This,
respondents explained, is one of the reasons why young people coming straight out of
school with no professional experience choose to go directly into politics. The pay-off is
rapid and substantial as within months of accessing State power and resources such
young people flaunt their wealth in houses in ostentatious lifestyles while his mates in
school still have no job at all (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). Such political careerism
do not only stifle initiative, innovation, and the urge to achieve among the youth, it
reinforces the sense of hopelessness and helplessness among those youth who cannot or
do not want to get out of their poverty through this route. The frustrations that is
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mounting among such youth, accordingly to respondents, is one of the “kegs of gun
powder” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) visible around the country that is waiting
to explode (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014; Interview 219 – 14 December, 2014;
Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).
For the middle class citizens and young graduates from the educational system
who do not have the wherewithal to purchase private solutions; cannot access political
office and national resources directly; or do not have the connections to do so indirectly;
resignation to the fate of the situation and disengagement from the affairs of the state is
what they resort to. For the adventurous ones, state exit through migration are the options
open to them. Those who stay resort to what has become known as “kpa kpa kpa” – the
phenomenon of being in constant movement around one’s environment, looking for
anything to do, except stealing, to survive the economic hardships (Joy News, Nov 11,
2014; Myjoyonline, 2015).
Although in recent times, the middle class is beginning to engage in the public
sphere to demand more responsive governance, accountability, and the economic
dividends of the democratic dispensation, the depth, scale, and sustainability of such
engagement remains suspect, given the demonstrated intransigence and recalcitrance of
government in responding to the demands of the new middle class. Under the
circumstances, apart from physical exit from the battle ground through migration, a
return to the status quo ante - finding private solutions to public problems - remains the
fall back option for the frustrated elite. As respondent in Interview 9 captured it, “…
people get frustrated about the system and either they leave the country or they say let me
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stay in my own corner and do my own thing and make exactly the same thing … I drill a
borehole, I buy a tanker, I buy water, etc.” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014)
A greater danger that this phenomenon engenders is the growing feeling among
the youth that hard work and honesty do not matter; one only needs to engage in politics,
get access to political resources, and make the most of the opportunity to enrich oneself,
as noted above. This moral degradation, which is leading to a collective conscience
defamation that holds that getting rich is good, irrespective of the means, has some
respondents and national figures worried. They fear that this could be the break point for
Ghana’s peace. Coupled with the winner takes all electoral system that Ghana has, and
the tainted confidence in state institutions to guarantee free, fair, and transparent
elections, respondents fear this approach to managing national resources can only lead to
more intensified and violent contestations of polls – a development that can only break
down the restraints that have kept Ghana peace.
While regional economic disparities are not considered a high risk factor, other
forms of economic disparities are. For instance, respondents have cited the economic
marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment in the midst of
opulence displayed by political leaders and government officials as high risk factors for
Ghana’s descent into violence. While they youth struggle with their unmet basic needs,
they are equally aware of the unresponsive and unaccountable government systems and
structures that facilitate or condone the misappropriation of public resources for private
purses. They are increasingly exasperated by this and are beginning to demand
accountability, sometimes in not so peaceful ways. Respondents cited examples of
violent demonstrations in Ashiaman and elsewhere to illustrate this.
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The political elite are aware of the security threat that the persistence of this
situation poses to the country. The State therefore needs to demonstrate a higher level of
commitment in managing the existing structural and systemic imbalances in the economy
to eliminate the poverty-related violence in the social, economic, and political arenas. In
the view of respondents, policies and programs that specifically target the growing
number of unemployed and largely unemployable youth that are taking over the streets of
the country in desperate search for means of survival, is crucially important to averting
the descent into violence. Additionally, the ever widening gap between the few rich and
the majority poor poses a danger for the emergence of a class-based violence. However,
respondents did not see this taking the form of organized armed conflicts as in
conventional or guerrilla wars any time soon. Rather it would manifest in increased rates
of violent crimes, such as armed robbery, which would nonetheless undermine national
security and the peace of Ghana.
Finally, public confidence in state institutions to deliver non-partisan services is
fast eroding. Despite continued public faith in Ghana’s governance structure, respondents
noted that the institutions of state are weak, heavily politicized, and highly partisan in
their management of public policy. Respondents cautioned that citizens’ resignation to,
and tolerance of the weaknesses of public institutions does not amount to an indication of
the strength of the institutions in maintaining the peace of the country. Paradoxically, it is
rather the high degree of citizens’ tolerance for the failures of State institutions that must
be credited with the semblance of peace the country has. In particular, respondents
expressed fears about the breakdown of the rule of law due to corruption of the judiciary.
In their view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice from the
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courts, they will take the law into their own hands. They expressed similar sentiments in
relation to the capacity of the Electoral Commission to reignite public confidence in its
operations. Specifically, they expressed fear that in the next elections, people would seek
to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level, as they have lost confidence
in the ability of the Electoral Commission and Supreme Court to administer what they
believe would be transparent and impartial decision on elections or deliver fair judgments
should any electoral disputes wind up in court.
With respect to the grey areas or risk factors that respondents identified as
predisposing Ghana to the potential descent into violent conflicts; education came in for
strong mention. While the contribution of education to Ghana’s peace is recognizable, the
evidence suggests that its proportionality to other factors that have also contributed to
Ghana’s peace seems to have been over hyped in the conventional literature. As
respondents observed, it is kind of difficult to establish a direct relationship between
education and peace. They noted that missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a
good job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized both
academic and character formation. However, the evolution of the educational system
after

independence

gradually

de-emphasized

religious

and

moral

education.

Consequently, much of the contribution of education to peace in the postcolonial state
derives from incidental spin-offs of the effects of boarding schools; activities of students’
associational lives and, to a limited extent, the posting of teachers across ethnic
boundaries, rather than the intentional acts of curriculum development and
implementation.
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The absence of any concrete policy or structured programs of peace education in
schools lends credence to the non-intentionality of the educational system in building a
culture of peace in the country. Perhaps the only evidence of a direct and intentional
policy action that aimed to use the educational system as a unifying force for Ghanaians,
according to a respondent, was Nkrumah’s debarment of the establishment of religious
denominational schools meant solely for adherents of the particular faith. According to
this viewpoint, Nkrumah forbade the setting up of such schools in order to liberalize
access to education across faith lines. This ensured that the fostering of strong and
compartmentalized religious identities did not emerge to supplant efforts at constructing a
national identity or Ghanaianness that brought all citizens together, irrespective of region
of origin, ethnicity, religion, or the type of school one attended (Interview 205, 29
October 2014). Beyond this, educational policymakers did very little else in the area of
intentional educational policies and programs to carve out an inclusive national identity.
As respondents pointed out, the real history of the people of Ghana is either not taught in
the school, or when it is, the content is so skewed as to produce imbalanced views of
what makes Ghana what it is. Rather than promoting peace, such biased historical
accounts have been the triggers of violent conflicts in the hotspots around the country.
Even in the case of boarding schools, the fact that only a small percentage of
Ghana’s population ever goes through the boarding schools system casts doubts on the
leveraging effect of this subset within the educational sector as the catalyst for the peace
that Ghana has. Conversely, respondents identified the “old boys and old girls”
phenomena embedded in the post educational association life of alumni and alumnae of
certain schools as a major contributor to the existence of the culture of negative
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consensus among the educated elite. This, in their view, makes crony politics and
political horse-trading behaviors the bane to the building of transparent and efficient
governance institutions, systems, and procedures. Additionally, education that was once a
social leveler is gradually losing its egalitarian effect due to the increasing differentials
between the private and public school systems. People who attend the relatively more
expensive and better equipped private schools are getting uneven head starts in life over
children who are condemned to attend the poorly equipped and poorly managed public
schools. Hence education which once created a level playing field for all, and gave equal
chances of social mobility to all according to their innate abilities, is now becoming a
social divider on the basis only of one’s conditions of birth, place of origin, social status,
or financial abilities. This portends a risk for destroying the social cohesion that has held
the country together.
The failures of the educational system have also occasioned the youth bulge
phenomenon, which presents a huge human and environmental security threat. Limited
employment and income-earning opportunities for the poorly trained and ill-equipped
youth exposes them to political exploitation. This then predisposes them to the use of
violence as a route to meeting their economic needs, as referenced above. A greater
danger, respondents fear, lies in the risk that unscrupulous persons could easily exploit
the poverty of the youth and use them as avant-gardes to import and deploy
fundamentalist politico-religious conflict models into Ghana, to advance their personal
agendae. This is highly plausible as the hope for better times, which once kept the
tolerance levels of the youth high and restrained them from recourse to violence, is fast
waning due to repeated unmet promises from political leaders. Hence, there is genuine
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fear that the throngs of youth begging or hawking in the streets of Ghana’s cities today
could become the violent adults of tomorrow. In the view of respondents, this is because
while Ghanaians may have been patient and tolerant, their stress bearing capacities,
especially for the youth, are being overstretched and the breaking point is very close.
Concrete results from state policies and interventions must justify hope; otherwise hope
dies, giving way to despair, and the recourse to violence as a way to manage differences.
Religion that set the foundation for Ghana’s peace could well be its undoing as
well, if incipient trends of religious fundamentalism are left to take root. Indeed,
respondents in this study have debunked any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in
religiosity. They have pointed out that other countries are equally, if not more religious,
and yet, ironically, some of the most violent conflicts these countries have experienced
have been prosecuted in defense of religion. Cautioning Ghana against any complacency
that their religiosity and prayers can protect the country from those who wish to import
violence, one respondent paraphrased an unknown source to state that, “they are none
who do evil with great abandon as those who do it in the name of religion” (Interview 9,
26 February 2014).
In other words, given the right kind of retooling of their faith, those same people
who “flock to the churches” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and mosques could be the
same ones wielding the guns and machetes against their co-citizens. Hence, apart from
the fear established earlier in relation to the potential hijack and mercenarization of the
desperate youth for political ends, respondents have cited the increasing voice and
influence of the gospel of prosperity that newer versions of Christianity are preaching as
a potential negative factor for Ghana’s peace. Similarly, they have cited recent agitations
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from the Muslim community over rights of women to wear Islamic head gear while
taking facial identification photographs or in public work places as inklings of incipient
extremism.
In the course of this research, media reportage and discussions on the demands by
some Muslim youth to skip mandatory morning assemblies or prayer events in Christian
schools they are attending have sparked considerable interfaith debates uncharacteristic
of the culture of religious tolerance that Ghana has known. In particular, the presentation
of these issues in various fora in the format of fights for religious freedoms portends a
feeling of long accepted suppression that must now be thrown off. The foregoing
episodes have raised fears of incipient religious fundamentalism on both Christian and
Muslim fronts that could pose challenges to Ghana’s peace.
Respondents observed that Ghanaians have a high conflict carrying capacity
embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people accept otherwise
intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on with their lives. An
alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that they can’t expect
anything good from governments. Therefore, they simply ignore government’s failures
and inactions and move on with their lives. However, respondents have also cited this
collective short memory and amnesia as a long term risk for violence. In their view, as
long as serious defects in the governance institutions and systems are not dealt with but
are swept under the carpet, they can only sustain a state of negative peace, at best. At
worst, the issues would fester and blow up in more violent forms without warning.
Finally, respondents have viewed the media in Ghana as a double-edged sword
because it has the capacity to socialize people for peace or violence. Overall, the media
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has played a positive and responsible role thus far. Ghana’s free print and electronic
media, especially the airwaves, are serving as vents for public anger. However,
respondents fear the unbridled and unscrupulous media reportage that some media houses
carry out under the machinations of politicians creates highly flammable flashpoints of
violent national level conflict. The growing use of vulgar and violent language by
politicians and their suffragans runs the risk of socializing the youth towards violence.
The converse is also true; if only politicians can retool their use of language in the media
to promote peace, violence can be avoided. Unfortunately, under the current trend of
events, “…Ghana could be next in line for a state of political unrest if excesses in the
Ghanaian media landscape are not checked” (Dadzie, 2014, p. 1).
The foregoing all suggest that Ghana’s state of peace, however qualified, cannot
be attributed to any one cause or set of causes. On the contrary, there are multiple
centripetal and centrifugal factors in a field force that are acting for and against peace.
Indeed, the same factor that promotes peace can also instigate a descent into violence,
depending on how it is instrumentalized. The examples of religion, education, and the
media, to give a few cited in this study, provide insight into the multiplicity of uses to
which such social instruments can be used for peace or for war. This is a pointer that the
conventional unidimensional view of the instrumental role of such phenomena on peace
and conflict risks missing their multi-alternate potentialities and how they might be
retooled for peace or violence.
Fortunately, this study points out that these instruments for social engineering are
not metal-cast instruments; instead they are themselves malleable products that can be
reworked and retooled to achieve purposes otherwise unimaginable. Similarly, they
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should not be understood to be stand-alone instruments, totally different from other
makes of the same instrument or even of other categories of instruments. As respondents
have adduced, there is considerable congruence between the values of Indigenous African
Religion and those of imported cultures, even if their scripts and rituals differ in form.
Likewise, the congruities between cultural the beliefs and values of the different ethnic
groups in Ghana are what have facilitated interethnic miscibility and incorporation.
In the same vein, the study points out that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon
under which countries can be neatly classified as peaceful or not peaceful; nor can the
nature of the peace be simply dichotomized as negative or positive. Peace is a relative
construction embodying different shapes and hues, depending on the time, space, and
perception of those who feel or do not feel it. In other words, peace perceived from the
outside is not the same as peace perceived from within. In every context, there are bound
to be nuances, localized or generalized, that caution against dyadic generalizations or
categorization of countries as peaceful or not peaceful.
Like a deep, calm, flowing river, peace is not built from a single source. It gathers
its strength and vivifying force from the trickles of water from drains, rivulets, creeks,
and streams that run into the tributaries that feed the mightiest of rivers. The waters from
these various sources bring with them their flotsam and jetsam, as well as, the life giving
minerals eroded from the soils and rocks on their way. The flora and fauna along the path
of the river draw their livelihoods - water and minerals for their sustenance and growth –
from the river as it meanders by, weaving together a beautiful vegetative landscape of
peace for those who have an opportunity of a bird’s eye view. Its cleanliness is as much
a source of strength as its dirt. Both give life to the environment that feeds on the passing
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river. But the degree of cleanliness or dirt may never be discerned from looking at the
river from the banks. Only the flora and fauna within can tell, if they had a chance.
In this study, Ghanaians, perhaps, for their first time, have had a chance to talk of
the peace that they experience. And the respondents have unequivocally stated that this
peace has its hues and contours that the outsider may not fathom. It is culture and faith,
not the state or its sponsored policies and programs, that constitute the two major
tributaries that feed the river of peace; a river not so pure and not so dirty but whose
inadequacies, nonetheless, sustain an environment of peace not so positive and not so
negative. While those looking from the outside see peace flowing calmly along,
Ghanaians do not agree that they are a peaceful nation or that peace is a calm and
graceful one. The semblance of peace is tentative and fragile. There are lots of tensions
and kegs of gun power concealed everywhere, to borrow the words of the respondent in
Interview 212 that can flare up easily and plunge the country into national level violence.
A common agreement, though, is that drawing their inspirations and motivations from
both the positive and negative forces that underscore Ghana’s peace, individuals and
institutions in Ghana have successfully managed to hold the fragile and unpredictable
negative peace in a steady state since Ghana’s existence as a nation-state.
This study has highlighted the centrality of culture and faith and their associated
systems of belief and values, as well as, institutional actors that constitute the cords that
hold Ghanaians together, given the failure of the state to do same. Whether via reliance
on traditional safety nets to cushion each other from the effects of state failure; the use of
private solutions to address public problems; escape from the failures of the public
system through migration; or recourse to political entrepreneurism to find the means to
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beat the hardships that state failure imposes on citizens, the evidence is that citizens are
not waiting for the state to solve their problems. They have revived and retooled the
essence of their indigenous knowledge systems and practices to circumvent the state’s
inability to serve them. Directly or indirectly, citizens’ disengagement from the state
undermines the legitimacy of the latter while reinforcing that of the traditional systems of
socio-economic and political organizations.

The paradox then is that citizens’

disengagement from the public sphere to manage their affairs in the private realm seems
to keep the machinery of state afloat, albeit in a precarious state.
For ordinary citizens, therefore, the relevance of the Westphalian state system as
the principal guarantor of social, political, economic, and human security for its citizens
is called into doubt, as they can subsist beyond the bounds of its actions, using the
multiple and different exit routes available to them, according to their situations in life.
However, the escape hatches have their limitations, and indigenous crises management
systems have their breaking point as well. Hence, as state failure continues and worsens,
without a matched citizen re-engagement to get it back on track to fulfilling its
responsibilities, the extended family systems will be hard put to manage the increased
offloads of state responsibilities into the private realm.
At that point, the strains of family reliance on members with some economic
wherewithal could lead to increased individualism, as they abandon the social capital
bonds of communitarianism, in favor of self-preservation. Between ethnic groups,
increased competition for natural resources could lead to ethnic protectionism of their
resources. The consequential escalation of the Darwinian situation of survival for the
fittest in the competition for control of political power and the public purse, will
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destabilize the fragile peace, as political conflicts escalate. At that point, what has been
the central cords for Ghana’s peace, religion and culture or ethnicity, may well become
the rallying point for mobilizing the fighting forces. This is the fear and the warning that
respondents in this study have expressed.

Emerging Grounded Theories From Study

This research tries to understand how and why Ghana is considered peaceful
based on the expressed views and experiences of participants in the research, as well as,
supplementary data on the subject from other sources. Charmaz (2006) identifies two
categories of grounded theory – the constructivist and the objectivist categories. While
the constructivist method follows the interpretive approach to theory generation, the
objectivists lean on positivism as the frame for theory making. The analysis and synthesis
of the various views and shades of opinion that the participants gave, and the comparison
of same to other sources of data, including the researcher’s interpretation of the meanings
the data from participants and other sources sought to convey, place the theory making
for this research squarely in the domain of the constructivist tradition.
While the research has made every effort to ground the emerging theories in the
quantitative and qualitative data generated in the course of this research, as well as, in the
supporting literature accrued along the line, ultimately, the theoretical perspective derived
from the data “…depends on the researcher's view; it does not and cannot stand outside
of it” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130). Since the emerging theories are interpretations of
participants’ perceptions of how and why the various factors and forces they unearthed
are crucial to Ghana’s peace, the theories offered below are by default larger and much
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broader, perhaps, than how the research participants would have framed their
perspectives in the form of a grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).
Timmermans and Tavory recall that the “…ultimate goal of grounded theory [is]
the construction of new theories [using] creative process of producing new hypotheses
and theories based on surprising research evidence” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p.
170). To achieve this, however, requires a departure from the constraints of traditional
inductive and deductive theorization processes, which generally begin with rules or cases
that guide the theory making process. Instead, they invoke Peirce’s conception of
abductive approach, which is “the only logical mechanism that introduces new ideas into
a scientific body of knowledge” (in Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 170). The approach
provides both a theory-based and atheoretical approaches to research that requires that
“researchers should enter the field with the deepest and broadest theoretical base possible
and develop their theoretical repertoires throughout the research process” (p.180). With
its emphasis on looking out for surprise findings in research, “Abductive analysis
specifically aims at generating novel theoretical insights that reframe empirical findings
in contrast to existing theories” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 174). Thorough
knowledge of the theoretical frames around the research question often lead to situations
where “empirical contradictions” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, 175) emerging from the
data as matched to existing theories provide the window for generating new, and
previously unforeseen theories.
The broad range of issues explored in this study lends themselves to both
theoretical and atheoretical approaches to embracing surprises in the findings. The
findings from the study have highlighted a number of cases where respondents’ views

385

discredited or otherwise devalued standing theories that have been used to explain why
Ghana has defied the norm in Africa to remain largely peaceful. First, respondents
expressed considerable ambivalence about whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country.
Next, for those who affirmed that Ghana is peaceful, the reasons ascribed for this peace
have discounted existing theories of why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into
national violent conflict, despite having the same or similar historical, socio-political,
economic, religious, and geo-ethnic tensions. In particular, respondents of the study point
out that the institution of the national peace architecture is too recent to explain Ghana’s
historical trail of avoidance of national level violence since the country came together as
a unitary state.
Similarly, respondents and complementary data available to the research both
suggest that Ghana’s educational system that has been touted as a major contributor to the
country’s peace lacks the evidence of policy intentionality to make it a deliberate
instrument of peace. In particular, the evidence undermines the credibility and validity of
the purportedly singular contribution of the boarding school component of the
educational system to Ghana’s peace. Incidentally, the literature has exalted this
component as an envied backbone of peace in Ghana. If the evidence effectively
challenges the validity of the explanations of how Ghana’s peace has been achieved;
what alternative theories then can emerge from the various insights respondents gave for
Ghana’s peace?
Abducted Meso Theories Emerging From The Study
Following the abductive model that Timmermans and Tavory have proposed, and rooted
in the findings of this research, four tentative grounded theories pop up for this study.
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The logic for their proposition and the tentative framing of the theories are detailed
below. The specific theoretical formulations are italicized.

Emerging Theory 1: Sprouting the seeds of culture and faith in multi-identity
relationships:
We have seen how Ghanaians of different ethnic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, and political backgrounds tend to cohabitate and cooperate within the same
physical, socio-economic, cultural, and political spaces for mutually beneficial ends.
Faith-based institutions, civil society organizations, citizens’ associations, among others
have all provided platforms outside the state system for mutually beneficial economic
engagements or collaborative efforts for engaging the state to ensure it creates the
enabling environment that further the interests of the parties. Such ultra-state spaces also
provide the platforms for consensus building among different groups for sustaining
opportunities that enable them to make the best out of their private endeavors. It would
seem then that When cultural and religious norms and values of different identity groups
are mutually tolerant and accommodative, citizens find it easier to create, move into, and
use collectively inhabited physical, socioeconomic, and political spaces, among others, to
minimize the propensity to use of violence to resolve conflicts, while promoting
cooperation, incorporation, and interdependencies that would uphold peaceful
coexistence.

Emerging Theory 2: Construction of cross-identity value-neutral culture of peace:
Respondents in this study have attributed the aversion of Ghanaians to violence to
the fear of blood or abhorrence of murder; fear of retribution from God or the gods for
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any acts that spill human blood; and the fear of desecrating the earth through the spillage
of human blood. It is considered particularly abominable to spill the blood of a relation,
no matter how distant that relation might be. At the same time, the roots of Ghanaian
hospitality have been traced to the need to take care of strangers, as they might actually
be gods on a visit. Plus, the very extended systems of relationships are such that the socalled strangers are really never strangers in the strictest sense; as some form of
relationship - sanguinal, affinal, or historical - can always be traced to link the stranger to
the hosts. These sacro-cultural attributes are so internalized across all ethnic groups in
Ghana that valuing diversity and peaceful coexistence is almost second nature to most
Ghanaians. As a result, Ghanaians seem to have a nag for searching out for opportunities
to validate, reinforce, and operationalize attitudes, behaviors, and practices that put a
premium on peace. Whether through engagement or disengagement from the public
space; use of private solutions to public problems; exit from hardship or conflict
situations through migration or any of the other forms of managing conflict that this study
has reported, peace is always the ultimate objective.
A plausible theory for explaining this is that groups in multi-identity environments
that find common grounds in their cultural and religious beliefs and values, create and
use voluntary channels of engagement and incorporation that lead to identity disillusion;
the identification and intensification of shared interests; and the development of a value
neutral culture of peace that radiates from the private engagements into the public realm.
This makes aversion to, and avoidance of violent national level conflicts that could
destabilize the achievement of their personal and collective interests and priorities. The
value neutrality of this culture of peace rests in the fact that participants may choose to
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engage, disengage, escape, or do anything that would minimize opportunities for the
occurrence of violence that affects them or maximize their noninvolvement in any form of
violence that might disturb their personal and collective peace.

Emerging Theory 3: Perceived Economic interdependencies between otherwise
centrifugal groups:

Respondents in this study have emphasized the role that the freedoms of
migration, settlements, and trade across all regions of Ghana have contributed to the
creation of the sense of We-ness or Ghanaianness among citizens of this country. This
highlights Simmel’s revelation of the integrative force of trading activities or expanded
economic opportunities that the stranger brings to the host community to the building of
social cohesion. Where intermarriages between the stranger and host communities are
permissible, they can help enhance trust, transparency, and identity conflation between
the hosts and their guests or settler communities.
In the case of Ghana, also, the homeward transfers of incomes and economic
resources from the migrants to those left behind provides a strong motivation for both the
migrant and their families to keep good relationships with their host communities.
Beyond securing livelihood and health security needs of communities, the intensity and
the perceived direct and indirect benefits of economic engagements would seem to be a
strong unifying force for building social cohesion and promoting the culture of
nonaggression between groups engaged in such exchanges.
A meso theory that this research offers for explaining Ghana’s peace is that
perceived strong economic interdependencies embedded in the open and equitable access
to natural resources across ethnic boundaries enhances the sense of belongingness and
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shared symbiotic worldviews between the host and stranger community. This in turn
promotes greater awareness among all the parties of their co-responsibility to protect the
relationships that feed them and the peace that makes the pursuit of their economic
engagements possible.
Emerging Theory 4: Biological, Cultural, And Economic Incorporation And The
Disarming Of Potential Ethnic Hegemons

The 2010 Housing and Population Census results show the Akan ethnic group
constitutes 47.5% of the population. This ethnic group also happens to be located in the
most natural resource endowed parts of the country. They have a proud history of empire
creation through conquests and the building of cross ethnic alliances that span the entire
country. They are therefore well positioned to exhibit hegemonic tendencies within the
postcolonial state. To the contrary, respondents have recounted the unifying force of the
Akan, and the Ashantis in particular, who are the dominant subgroup of the Akan. First,
the maintenance and respect of the historical alliances with ethnic groups dispersed
across the cardinal points of the country keeps a semblance of oneness, at best, among the
major ethno-regional blocs of the country. Second, the Ashantis’ preference for trade as
their economic mainstay enjoins them to seek peace and peaceful relationships at all
times to create the enabling environment for their businesses. Third, the sheer demand for
extra hands to work their farms and other businesses makes the Ashantis mindful of the
need to keep labor inflows from other ethno-regions coming in, not only cyclically, but as
permanent residents as well. Fourth, and most crucially, the matriarchal structure of
socio-political organization of the Akans places considerable emphasis on the role of
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women to produce offspring that would ensure continuity of the political community, be
it at the smallest village level or at the apical seat of the Asantehene.
Closely associated with this duty of women to ensure the continuity of political
succession within the matriclans of the Akans is the cultural liberty granted to Ashanti
royal women to have children out of wedlock to guarantee the contention of their lineage
to political power through the birth of children. In the performance of this duty, they are
do not have to be saddled with the constraints of marriages that may not be reproductive.
In the Ashanti worldview, “a queen mother is not required to be married, [but] is
expected to have children, and is permitted to have male friends…” (Stoeltje, 2003, p.
12). This permissiveness is considered critical for the role of the queen mother in Akan
culture “…to make sure that the royal lineage remained intact… since a particular royal
lineage remained [a contender for the chiefship of their political community] so long as
female progeny existed in the lineage” (Boaten, 1992, p. 91). This means that the
paternity of children born into an Ashanti matriclan could come from any ethnic group
that the queen mother chooses. This fact is the basis for the proverb cited in Interview
205 that “obi n kyere obia si” or “one does not reveal the origins of another person” (29
October, 2014).
What this cultural trait does then is to open up the Akan, especially the Ashanti
sub clan, for the admission or incorporation of people who share identities with other
ethnic groups, into the respective lineages. And since some of the hybrid or even
miscegenated products of such unions could end up on chiefship positions at any level
within the Akan socio-political organization, ethnic purity is decimated and identity
disillusion takes root. Under the circumstances, the accommodative overtures of the
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historical, geographical, cultural, and economic centrality of the Ashantis has become a
coalescing factor for the creation of the culture of aversion to violence that underscores
Ghana’s peace. A theoretical perspective that can be adducted (Timmermans & Tavory,
2012) from this situation then is that where culture and economic interests of a potential
ethnic hegemon disposes it to accept and incorporate, biologically, culturally, and
economically, members of the other ethnic groups within the country, enlightened selfinterests, and increased awareness of shared identities and interdependencies dissuades
mobilization for violence against the out group.

Directions for Overarching Theory Development

The current formulation of the four theoretical frames offers them as stand-alone
theories for explaining Ghana’s peace. However, as highlighted above, no single theory is
capable of fully accounting for why Ghana has managed to stay peaceful, given the
multiplicity and divergence of factors that seem to work together in diametrically
opposing directions to create the web of tensions that self-regulate to produce the tenuous
but time tested peace that Ghana has experienced to date. Hence, each of the four
theoretical frames effectively provides insights into how different subsets of action zones
contribute in their own way, some of the forces that feed into the network of factors
holding Ghana together.
The preliminary disaggregation of the explanation into these four theoretical
components is, therefore, useful in breaking down the “…undifferentiated wholeness [of
what makes Ghana peaceful] to differentiation of parts” (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) of
that whole. Identifying these components in their own states and how they “…become
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fixed in respect to certain action” (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) then permits a greater
understanding of how the parts work together seamlessly to hold Ghana together in one
piece, when they are progressively mechanized (von Bertalanffy, 1969). It sheds more
light on the chain of causality and feedback loops between the different components and
how they self-regulate to return to the state of negative peace equilibrium, even when the
system is significantly jolted, as in the case of the disputes over the results of the 2012
Presidential Polls, which in any other context would have sent Ghana into the abyss of
violent conflict. In the case of Ghana, this did not happen.
Self-regulation between independent or loosely related entities of a system is,
however, only possible if the these components answer to a higher level or superordinate
system from which they take instructions that override their internally generated
instructions that might be at conflict with each other. To be effective, systems must
function synergistically, as “…the dynamic interactions of parts [makes] the behavior of
parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole.” Hence, it is essential that
we use a holistic approach to understand “how the different parts of the system work
together” (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39).
The stability and growth of a system, in turn, depends on the existence and
effective functioning of a hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing
subsystems that accept and operate by coordinating instructions from higher level
subsystems to create “stable, resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82).
The hierarchies facilitate the work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities must
be directed to help achieve the overall goal of the whole system. System brittleness,
rigidity, failures, or suboptimization occur when the achievement of a “subsystem’s goals
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dominate at the expense of the total system’s goals” (Meadows, 2008, p. 85). Conversely,
overcentralization of control in the hope of achieving overall goals of the larger system
can stifle the effective functioning of subsystems. To avoid this, the system has to have
“…elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose” (Meadows, 2008, p. 11) which
work together to keep the system alive and functioning.
This “hierarchical order [or] hierarchical structure and combination [of lower
level, independent components] into systems of ever higher order” (von Bertalanffy,
1969, p. 4) is an essential part of socio-cultural phenomena that ensures that order is
created and maintained out of the divergent forces of society. Hence, while the four
theoretical frames that this research offers may explain, individually and jointly, how
Ghana’s peace is created and maintained, it is essential to look for the higher level order
of structures, rules, and regulations that have ensured that the subsystems that these
theories represent actually worked together to produce the wholeness that portrays Ghana
as an oasis of peace. The four theories identified in this study, therefore, serve as meso
level theories whose interrelationships can only be more fully explored beyond the limits
of this study. Further research and reflections on the interrelations of these theoretical
subcomponents outside the scope of this study should lead to the establishment of a more
comprehensive and overarching explanation of how and why these factors interact to
keep Ghana peaceful.
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Suggestions for further studies

Being more or less an exploratory research, this study has raised a number of
interesting issues that warrant further enquiry to deepen the findings here or provide
alternate perspectives that would enrich insights into how and why Ghana has managed
to stay relatively peaceful in the midst of crippling conflicts in neighboring states. The
list of research leads is fairly long. However, the following present key entry points for
sequel research on the issues that this study has tried to understand:

Use of Axiological Approaches to understanding the bonding and bridging effects of
intergenerational ethno-communication and education systems in fostering peace:

This study used a combination of a national quantitative survey and key informant
interviews as the principal instruments for data collection. However, Ghanaians, like
most African communities, are oral societies. Historical knowledge and indigenous
wisdom are often coded and transmitted across generations using a repertoire of
indigenous knowledge accumulation, management, and sharing devices that include
songs, proverbs, riddles, and other oral communication techniques. In such oral
traditions, it is often easier to communicate volumes of information or to explain very
complex phenomena with one proverb than an entire textbook can hope to do.
In the course of this research many respondents used some of these devices to
articulate and express views in their respective local languages to better express ideas that
they wished to communicate. In this way, they were able to better explain what they
intended. In some cases, use of the indigenous communication devices actually kicked up
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important issues requiring further probing that would ordinarily not have come up if the
normal conversational language in English were used. Despite the onsite probing that this
study did, several of the views and ideas captured in the proverbs and adages could be
more deeply explored using other qualitative data gathering methods.
One way, therefore, to explore the deeper insights into some of the issues raised in
this research and to unearth the cross-ethnic, interfaith, and interregional perspectives on
some of the critical factors that respondents identified as the pillars of Ghana’s peace will
be to use the axiological method of enquiry. In particular, use of the axiological approach
to create space for respondents to explore the deeper historical, cultural, spiritual, and
socio-political significance of the thoughts they wished to convey. Findings from this
kind of research could greatly enrich our knowledge how and why Ghanaians have
managed to construct and maintain their state of steady negative peace. Besides
advancing knowledge on the why part of the question on Ghana’s ability to stay relatively
peaceful, such a study could also lead to the amassment of an arsenal of stories, proverbs,
axioms, and other folk wisdom that local peacebuilders can use in community
peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes.

Exploring extent of validity of culture and indigenous conflict management systems in
promoting peace:

The study has highlighted the role that shared cultural and religious beliefs,
values, and traditions have played in creating and sustaining Ghana’s peace. Ironically,
one reason why respondents characterized Ghana’s peace as negative or unstable is
because of the presence of pockets of protracted violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts
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around the country. Nearly all governments that have ruled Ghana have had to deal with
most of these conflicts. And yet, several Commissions of Inquiry and/or court cases after,
these conflicts remain as entrenched as ever; and groups that invariably share the same
ethnic spaces or boundaries, cultures, religious traditions, and socioeconomic fields of
transactions such as farms and markets, have proved incapable of resolving their conflicts
using their shared values and beliefs.
Questions that require further explorations are a) why has intercultural
incorporation seem to have worked at the national level to foster peace among Ghanaians,
but has failed to do same at the local levels? b) Why have these groups not been able to
use their shared histories, cultural and religious values, as well as, their indigenous
conflict resolution mechanism in resolving their conflicts? c) To what extent has recourse
to state-centric approaches to managing these conflicts affected the ability of the feuding
ethnic groups to find lasting resolutions to their conflicts? d) What needs to happen to
enable these ethnic groups regain control of the processes for resolving their conflict and
to ensure that sustainable peace is found?

Exploring The Effects of sub-state level Economic Independencies within and between
ethnic groups as cords of peace:

The study has also highlighted how economic interdependencies, embodied in the
free movement of goods, persons, and private capital across ethnic boundaries seem to
have encouraged Ghanaians to avert descent into violent national level conflicts. This
brings into focus Simmel’s seminal works on the role of the stranger-trader as an
economic, social, and even cultural integrator. However, conventional literature in the
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studies of peace and conflict has not adequately explored the peace dimension of
economic engagements and trade-related interethnic migration and incorporation. While
literature abounds on the role of trade and economic interdependencies in building
détente and peace between states, not much exists to illustrate how the creation of
mutually beneficial economic interests can promote peace at the subnational levels. This
research provides some pointers. However, further works in this area could help unearth
the binding, bonding, and bridging force of interethnic trade in goods and services, and
the existence of economic interdependencies as the foundations for interethnic peace.
What elements in these exchanges provide the glue for the multi-ethnic settlements in
Ghana?

Understanding the role of women in building Ghana’s peace:

Although respondents of all gender categories have acknowledge that women do
play a role in Ghana’s peace, they have qualified such roles as restricted largely to
prayers, advisor services, and other “behind the scene” functions. Women are not seen as
frontline players in promoting Ghana’s peace. Similarly, respondents in this study made
observations in relation to the willingness of women to take front stage in other political
spaces such as in local government structures i.e. the District, Municipal, and
Metropolitan Assemblies. Several respondents alluded to the male dominance of the
Ghana political space as the plausible reasons why women take the backstage in Ghana’s
peace.
A question that requires further interrogation is - is patriarchy the only factor
preventing women from step up and out in the political space, especially in the matters of
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peacebuilding, which respondents say is the preoccupation of women? Further research
of the role of women in building Ghana’s peace in particular and in politics in general
will create greater understanding of the obstacles that block the participation of women in
Ghana’s public spaces. In particular, a listening project that solicits and brings in the
voices and views of women on how and why the choose or do not choose to engage in the
public sphere visibly should provide the foundational blocks for initiatives that foster
women’s participation in politics and peacebuilding.

399

Bibliography
Abdulai, I. (2014, 31 March 2014). So Where Is Suweiba’s Missing Baby?,
Spyghana.com. Retrieved from http://www.spyghana.com/suweibas-missingbaby/
Adamu, A. (2002, Sunday, 27 January 2002). Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria. Speeches
Retrieved 4/10/2005, 2005, from
http://www.abdullahiadamu.com/speeches/2ethnic.htm
Addo, K. E. A. W. (2013, 17-Dec-2013 ). If Ghanaians Vote For Mahama in
2016…Then Indeed They Have Short Memories, Peacefmonline.com.
Adofo, R. (2013). The Repercussions Of The Supreme Court Verdict, Modern Ghana.
Retrieved from http://www.modernghana.com/print/486926/1/the-repercussionsof-the-supreme-court-verdict.html
Adom FM. (2013, 9 August, 2013). Ghanaians stuffing food & withdrawing monies prior
Supreme Court Ver... . Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?...
African Peer Review Mechanism. (2005). Country Review Report of the Republic of
Ghana: African Peer Review Mechanism.
Agyeman-Duah, B. (1987). Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the P.N.D.C. The Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol. 25(No. 4, Dec., 1987), 613-642. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/160947
Agyeman-Duah, B. (2012). My Ghanaian Odyssey: A Rendezvous with History. Tema,
Ghana: Digibooks Publishers.

400

Akonor, K. (2006). Africa and IMF Conditionality: The Unevenness of Compliance
1983-2000: Routledge,Taylor & Francis.
Akwa, F. (2014, 29-07-2014 ). Ghana's Constitution is ‘Rawlings phobic’ – Presby
Moderator Myjoyonline. Retrieved from
http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/july-29th/ghanas-constitution-israwlings-phobic-presby-moderator.php#sthash.Nw4ka6Kr.dpuf
Allen, W. E. (2010). Liberia And The Atlantic World In The Nineteenth Century:
Convergence And Effects. History in Africa, 37 (2010), 7-49. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40864619
Amenumey, D. E. K. (1989). The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History. Accra:
Ghana Universities Press.
Amenumey, D. E. K. 1986. The Ewe In Pre-Colonial Times. Accra: Sedco Publishing.
Ameyibor, E. (1996). Ghana-Politics: From the Uniform to the Political Platform, Inter
Press News Service. Retrieved from http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/10/ghanapolitics-from-the-uniform-to-the-political-platform/
Amnesty International. (2008). Post-election violence increases in Zimbabwe Retrieved
16 October 2013, from http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/postelection-violence-increases-zimbabwe-20080418
Amponsah, P. N. (2013). Emergent Confrontational Political Subculture: A content
analysis of Media Coverage of Violence in the 2012 General Elections of Ghana
A media Monitoring Report of Penplusbytes “Enabling Peaceful Transparent and
Credible Elections in Ghana Using New Media Project” Retrieved from

401

http://www.starghana.org/userfiles/files/publications/
Ghana%20Election%202012%20Violence%20Coverage_Feb%202013.pdf
Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S., Ababio, O.-M., & Tiemoko, R. (2003). Migration from and to
Ghana: A Background Paper Migration, Globalisation and Poverty: Development
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S., Ababio, O.-M., & Tiemoko, R. (2003). Migration from and to
Ghana: A Background Paper Migration, Globalisation and Poverty: Development
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
Anebo, F. K. G. (2001). The Ghana 2000 Elections: Voter Choice and Electoral
Decisions African Journal of Political Science 6(1), 69-8
Arhin, K. (1967). The Structure of Greater Ashanti (1700-1824). The Journal of African
History 8(1), 65-85.
Arthur, P. (2009). Ethnicity and Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Africa
Today, 56,(2, Winter 2009), 44-73.
Asante-Antwi, S. (2013, Tuesday, 13 August 2013). ‘Let’s pray for Supreme Court
Justices’, Daily Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
Assefa, H. (2001). Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana. In
M. Abu-Nimer (Ed.), Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence (pp. 165-186).
London: Lexington Books.
Asunka, E. J., Attoh, D. A., Selormey, E. E., Gyimah-Boadi, E., Logan, C., Bratton, M.,
& Mattes, R. (2008). Afrobarometer Round 4: The Quality of Democracy and

402

Governance in Ghana, 2008. ICPSR 33883
doi:http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR33883.v1
Azam, J.-P. (1999). The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa. Paper presented at
the Annual Conference of the Norwegian Association for Development Research
(NFU) ,September 1999, Oslo.
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-03text.pdf
Azure, M. (2012, Tuesday, 22 April 2014). Fmr SADA boss ‘fumbles’ over guinea fowl
fiasco, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=3069
23
Baneseh, M. A. (2013, 31 August 2013). Supreme Court corrects error in election petition
judgment, Daily Graphic. Retrieved from http://graphic.com.gh/archive/GeneralNews/supreme-court-corrects-error-in-election-petition-judgment.html
BBC News. (2011a, 24 April 2011). Nigeria election violence 'left more than 500 dead
Retrieved 11/15/2013, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13184298
BBC News. (2011b, 8 December 2011). Q&A: Ivory Coast parliamentary elections
Retrieved 11/15/2013, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east16069569
BBC News. (2013, 29 August, 2013). BBC: Ghana court to rule on John Mahama win
after NPP challenge, Myjoyonline. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201308/112288.php
Bening, R. B. (1983). The Ghana-Togo Boundary, 1914-1982. Africa Spectrum, 18(2),
191-209.

403

Bening, R. B. (1990). A History of Education in Northern Ghana 1907-1976. Accra:
Ghana Universities Press.
Bening, R. B. (1973). The Regional Boundaries of Ghana 184-1972. Institute of African
Studies Research Review, 9(1). Institute of African Studies
Berghof Peace Support. (2010). Strengthening Support Structures for Peace Negotiation,
Mediation and Dialogue. Short Introduction to the Work Programme. . Berghof
Peace Support. Retrieved from
www.berghofpeacesupport.org/publications/MED_Peace_Support_Structures_Int
ro.pdf
Boaten, N. A. (1996). Gender Relations In Traditional Administration: The Case Of
Discrimination Against Women. Research Review, 12(1&2). Retrieved from
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20Afri
can%20Studies%20Research%20Review/1996v12n1&2/asrv012001&2005.pdf
Bratton, M., Lewis, P., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2001). Constituencies for Reform in Ghana.
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, (No. 2), 231-259. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557263
Brown, D. (1980). Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of
Western Togoland. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 18(4 Dec., 1980),
575-609.
Brown, D. (1982). Who Are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in
Ghana. African Affairs,, 81(322), 37-69.

404

Brukum, N. J. K. (2005). Sir Gordon Guggisberg And Socio-Economic Development Of
Northern Ghana,1919-1927. Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, New
Series(9), 1-15.
Brukum, N. J. K. (1998). Underdevelopment And The Dilemma Of Independence:
Northern Ghanaian Nationalist Politics, 1946-1956 Institute of African Studies,
14(1). Retrieved from
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20
African%20Studies%20Research%20Review/1998v14n1/asrv014001003.pdf
Bush, R. (1980). What Future for Ghana? Review of African Political Economy, 19
(Consciousness & Class (Sep. - Dec., 1980), 86-91. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3998127
Byrne, S., & Carter, N. (1996 ). Social Cubism: Six Social Forces Of Ethnoterritorial
Politics In Northern Ireland And Québec. Retrieved from
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/bryce.htm
Calan, D. d., Catach, L., Durand, M., Laporte, L., Leblanc, C., Lucet, C., . . . Rey, A.
(Eds.). (2011) Dixel Dictionnaire. Le Robert.
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through
Qualitative Analysis. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington
DC: Sage Publications Inc.
Chazan, N., & Le Vine, V. T. (1979). Politics in a "Non-Political" System: The March
30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana. African Studies Review, 22(1, Apr., 1979), 177207. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/523434

405

Clottey, P. (2008, Tuesday, 9 September 2008). NPP Dismisses Accusations by
Rawlings, Ghanaweb Online. Retrieved from
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?ID=149730#
CNN Wire Staff. (2011, April 19, 2011). Widespread election violence erupts in Nigeria.
CNNWorld, from
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/19/nigeria.election/
Cochran, R. (1989). "What Courage!": Romanian "Our Leader" Jokes. The Journal of
American Folklore 102(405 (Jul. - Sep., 1989)), 259-274. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/540637
Collett, M. (2006). ‘Ivoirian identity constructions: ethnicity and nationalism in the
prelude to civil war. Nations and Nationalism, 12(4), 613-629.
Cooley, C. H. (2010). Looking Glass-Self. In C. Lemert (Ed.), Social Theory: The
Multicultural and Classic Readings (Fourth Edition ed.): Westview Press.
Core Group. (2008). Lot Quality Assurance Sampling (LQAS): Protocol for Parallel
Sampling T. C. Group (Ed.) Retrieved from
http://www.coregroup.org/storage/documents/Workingpapers/LQAS_Protocol_fo
r_Parallel_Sampling.pdf
Craig, J. A. (1969). Ghana's General Election. The World Today, 25(10), 428-436.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394201
Dabalen, A. L., Kebede, E., & Paul, S. (2012). Causes of Civil War: Micro Level
Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire HiCN Working Paper 118: Households in Conflict
Network, The Institute of Development Studies-at the University of Sussex.

406

Dachs, B. (2009, Tuesday, 06 October 2009). Shona/ Ndebele ethnic rivalry needs to be
addressed, The Zimdiaspora. Retrieved from
http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
1962:shona-ndebele-ethnic-rivalry-needs-to-be-addressed&catid=38:traveltips&Itemid=18
Dadzie, E. A. (2014, Friday, 7 March 2014). Media will start 'war' in Ghana if... Historian predicts, Ultimate Radio. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=3027
09
Daily Graphic. (2013, Friday, 16 August 2013). Ayikoi Otoo's humour, maturity saved
Sir John, Daily Graphic.
Daily Graphic. (2015, 4 March 2015). Religious discrimination: Muslim leaders call for
calm among members Daily Graphic Online. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php
Daily Guide Reporter. (2013, November 8, 2013 ). Victoria Hammah Drops Bomb; ‘Oye
Lithur Saw Judges Before Verdict’
Daily Guide. (2010, 9 August 2010 ). Good News For Bussiness Community, Daily
Guide Newspaper. Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/newsthread1/288404/4/
Daily Guide. (2013a, Friday, 21 June 2013). Judges blast NDC looting brigade, Daily
Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2775
55

407

Daily Guide. (2013b, 24 August 2013). We’re not bomb throwers - Mike Ocquaye, Daily
Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php
Daily Guide. Retrieved from http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=101261
Daily Guide. Retrieved from http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=101261
Danquah, R. P. (2011). Opinion: Are Civil Right Societies or NGO essential to Ghana’s
development? Retrieved 8 March 2015, from
http://opinion.myjoyonline.com/pages/articles/201110/74236.php
Daily Guide, (2014, December 10, 2014). GII Doubts Mahama Over 300 Corrupt Cases,
Daily Guide. Retrieved from http://www.dailyguideghana.com/gii-doubtsmahama-over-300-corrupt-cases/
Darkwa, L., Attuquayefio, P., & Yakohene, A. (2012). Peacemaking in Ghana: Lessons
Learnt, Options for the Future. Accra: Imagine Communications Limited.
Djoman, J. (2013). Situation Socio-Politique En Côte D’ivoire De Décembre 1999 A
Janvier 2013: Département Développement et Promotion Humaine, Caritas Cote
d'Ivoire.
Dorfe, M. (2014, Tuesday, 2 September 2014). Dr. Mensa Otabil And The Sada Guinea
Fowls, Ghanaweb.com. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=3238
45
Dramani, A. R. (2009, 13 August 2009). Comment: Why the NDC may still lose Bawku
Central, Myjoyonline. Retrieved from

408

http://opinion.myjoyonline.com/tgopinion/print/index.php?url=http://opinion.myj
oyonline.com/pages/feature/200908/33924.php&contentid=33924
Effah-Yeboah, F. (2012, Friday, September 14, 2012). At The Crossroad: Should The
Mouth Of The Church Be Muzzled Over Political Issues (Part I). Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/news/417658/1/at-the-crossroad-should-themouth-of-the-church-be.html
Eifert, B., Miguel, E., & Posner, D. N. (2010). Political Competition and Ethnic
Identification in Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 54(2), 494-510.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25652219
Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1), 91-112. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500007659
Electoral Commission of Ghana. (2000). Voter Turnout In General Elections From 19922000 Retrieved 11 November 2013, from
http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/voterturnout%2092%2096%20_%2000%20ELE
CTION%20RESULTS%281%29.pdf
Electoral Commission of Ghana. (2000). VOTER TURNOUT IN GENERAL
ELECTIONS FROM 1992-2000 Retrieved 11 November 2013, from
http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/voterturnout%2092%2096%20_%2000%20ELE
CTION%20RESULTS%281%29.pdf
Enright, R. D., & Human Development Study Group. (1996). Counseling within the
forgiveness triad: On forgiving, receiving forgiveness, and self-forgiveness. ,, .

409

Counseling and Values, 40, 107-122. Retrieved from doi:10.1002/j.2161007X.1996.tb00844.x
Espeut, D. (2001). Knowledge, Practices, and Coverage Survey 2000+ - Field Guide
August 2001 Retrieved from http://files.ennonline.net/attachments/314/annex-4kpc-survey-field-guide-%28care%29%281%29.pdf
Essel, I. (2013). NPP wants election petition ruling probed; says Hammah’s tape true,
factual Retrieved 08-11-2013, from
http://news.myjoyonline.com/politics/2013/November-8th/npp-wants-electionpetition-ruling-probed-says-hammahs-tape-true-factual.php
Etounga-Manguelle, D. (2000). Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program? In L.
E. Harrison & S. P. Huntington (Eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape
Human Progress: Basic Books.
Finlay, D. J. (1968). Students and Politics in Ghana. Students and Politics (Winter, 1968),
Vol. 97(No. 1), 51-69. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20023798
Forrest, R., & Kearns, F. (2001). Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood.
Urban Studies, 38(12), 2125-2143.
Foster, P. J. (1963). Secondary Schooling and Social Mobility in a West African Nation.
Sociology of Education, 37(2), 150-171.
France24. (2010, 15 November 2013). Togo votes amid fears of 2005 electoral violence
repeat. International News Retrieved 11/15/2013, from
http://www.france24.com/en/20100304-togo-votes-amid-fears-2005-electoralviolence-repeat

410

Freedman, J. (1977). Joking, Affinity and the Exchange of Ritual Services Among the
Kiga of Northern Rwanda: An Essay on Joking Relationship Theory. Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 12(1), 154-165.
Frempong, K. D. (2001). The Liberian Civil War: The Tubman Factor. Transactions of
the Historical Society of Ghana, New Series(4/5 ((2000-2001)), 123-130.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406660
Fridy, K. S. (2007). The Elephant, Umbrella, And Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating
Partisanship In Ghana’s Fourth Republic. African Affairs,, 106(423), 281-305.
doi: 10.1093/afraf/adl040
Fridy, K. S. (2007). The Elephant, Umbrella, And Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating
Partisanship In Ghana’s Fourth Republic. African Affairs,, 106(423), 281-305.
doi: 10.1093/afraf/adl040
Ghana Elections. (2008). Pre-Election Violence And Irregularities Worries Watchdogs
Retrieved from http://ghanaelections2008.blogspot.com/2008/08/pre-electionviolence-and.html
Ghana News Agency. (2004, Sunday, 11 July 2004). Volta Region Is Still NDC World
Bank. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/artikel.php?ID=61441
Ghana News Agency. (2004, Sunday, 11 July 2004). Volta region is still NDC World
Bank. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/artikel.php?ID=61441

411

Ghana News Agency. (2008). Voter turnout drops in Election 2008, ModernGhana.
Retrieved from http://www.modernghana.com/news/194284/1/voter-turnoutdrops-in-election-2008.html
Ghana News Agency. (2009, 4 April 2009). Efforts by Peki, Tsito to smoke the peace
pipe, ModernGhana. Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/news/209696/1/efforts-by-peki-tsito-to-smoke-thepeace-pipe.html
Ghana Review. (2001, 11 December 2001). Sixty killed, 2,500 displaced in Bawku
conflict, Ghana Review. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanareview.com/int/bawku.html
Ghana Statistical Service. (2008). Ghana Living Standards Survey Report Of The Fifth
Round (GLSS 5 ed.): Ghana Statistical Service.
Ghana Statistical Service. (2012). 2010 Population & Housing Census: Summary Report
Of Final Results. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service Retrieved from
http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/2010phc/Census2010_Summary_report_of
_final_results.pdf.
Ginio, R. (2006). French Colonialism Unmasked: The Vichy Years in French West
Africa: University of Nebraska Press.
GNA. (2014, Monday, 7 April 2014). Mahama is discriminating against Ashantis - Kofi
Jumah, Ghana News Agency. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=3054
34

412

Graham, C. K. (1971, 2013). The History of Education in Ghana: From the Earliest
Times to the Declaration of Independance: Routledge.
Gyamfi, E. A. (2014). Socioeconomic and Political Development in Ghana under the
1992 - Republican Constitution of Ghana. Journal of Power, Politics &
Governance, 2(1). Retrieved from
http://aripd.org/journals/jppg/Vol_2_No_1_March_2014/2.pdf
Hammond, P. B. (1964). Mossi Joking. Ethnology, 3(3), 259-267. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3772882
Hansen, E. (1968). Ghana: Background to Revolution. Transition, 35(Feb. - Mar., 1968),
24-28. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2934684
Hawke, S. (2013). Kenya’s Elections in 2013: poverty, ethnicity, and violence. Retrieved
from http://socialjusticefirst.com/2013/03/04/kenyas-elections-in-2013-povertyethnicity-and-violence/
Hettne, B. (1980). Soldiers and Politics: The Case of Ghana. Journal of Peace Research,
17 (2 ), 173-193. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/423423
Hopp-Nishanka, U. ( 2012). Giving Peace an Address? Reflections on the Potential and
Challenges of Creating Peace Infrastructures Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 10,
Human Rights Watch. (1990). GHANA - Official attacks on religious freedom. Human
Rights Watch Report of May 18, 1990, (May 18, 1990). Retrieved from
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/ghana/ghana905.pdf
Human Rights Watch. (2008). Organized Violence in the Rift Valley Retrieved 17
October 2013, from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/8.htm

413

Hurd, G. E., & Johnson, T. J. (1967). Education and Social Mobility in Ghana. Sociology
of Education, 40(1), 55-79.
IMANI Ghana. (2015, Wednesday 14th January, 2015). IMF, Development Partners and
GoG: Fix Messy Mechanized Payroll before IMF Programme Citi FM Online.
Retrieved from http://www.citifmonline.com/2015/01/14/fix-messy-mechanisedpayroll-imf-programme-imani-govt/#sthash.zP13bCSL.dpuf
Ichino, N., & Nathan, N. L. (2012). Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and
Voting in Ghana. (4 September 2012). Retrieved from
http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~nichino/Papers/IchinoNathan_localethnicgeo_2012
0904.pdf
Institute for Democrarcy and Electroal Assistance. (2012). A bird’s eye view of Ghana’s
2012 elections, from http://www.idea.int/africa/a-birds-eye-view-of-ghanas-2012elections.cfm
Institute for Economics and Peace. (2012). Global Peace Index 2012 - Quantifying Peace
And Its Benefits Retrieved from http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/2012-Global-Peace-Index-Report.pdf
Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2011). COTE D' IVOIRE - Assemblée nationale (National
Assembly), from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2075_E.htm
Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2011). COTE D' IVOIRE - Assemblée nationale (National
Assembly), from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2075_E.htm
IRIN News. (2008a, 21 November 2008). GHANA: Police gear up to prevent election
violence. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/81613/ghana-policegear-up-to-prevent-election-violence

414

IRIN News. (2008b). GHANA: Pre-election violence escalates Retrieved 15 October
2013, from http://www.irinnews.org/report/80250/ghana-pre-election-violenceescalates
Jackson, M. (2012). Akufo-Addo Says Ghanaians Have Short Memories,
VibeGhana.com. Retrieved from http://vibeghana.com/2012/10/25/akufo-addosays-ghanaians-have-short-memories/
Jafaru, M. Y. (2013, 26 June 2013). Govt urges Ashaiman youth, drivers to exercise
restraint - See more at:, Graphic Online. Retrieved from
http://graphic.com.gh/news/politics/1707-govt-urges-ashaiman-youth-drivers-toexercise-restraint.html
Jenson, J. (2010). Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion Retrieved from
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/170C271B7
168CC30C12577D0004BA206/$file/Jenson%20ebook.pdf
Jockers, H., Kohnert, D., & Nugent, P. (2009). The Successful Ghana Election of 2008:
A Convenient Myth? Ethnicity in Ghana's elections revisited. GIGA - German
Institute of Global and Area Studies (June 2009). Retrieved from
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16167/
Johnson, M. (1965). Ashanti East Of The Volta Transactions of the Historical Society of
Ghana, 8, 33-59.
Joy News (Writer). (Nov 11, 2014). MC PAPA Linc The Ghanaian Economy Is
Kpakpakpa Movement ... In M. P. Linc (Producer): Youtube., accessed on 17
April, 2015 from www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2MeX9RrsYQ on

415

Kelly, B., & Bening, R. B. (2007). Ideology, Regionalism, Self-Interest and Tradition:
An Investigation into Contemporary Politics in Northern Ghana Africa. Journal of
the International African Institute, Vol. 77, No. 2 ((2007)), 180-206. Retrieved
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40026705
Kieh, G. K. (2009). The Roots Of The Second Liberian Civil War. International Journal
on World Peace, 26(1 (MARCH 2009)), 7-30. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752871
Kirby, J. P. (2006-2007). Ethnic Conflicts And Democratization New Paths Toward
Equilibrium Innorthern Ghana. Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana,
10(New Series), 65-107.
Konneh, A. (1996). Citizenship at the Margins: Status, Ambiguity, and the Mandingo of
Liberia. African Studies Review, 39(2 (Sep., 1996)), 141-154. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/525439
Kpessa, M. W. (2007). Students Activism and Ghanaian Politics in Retrospect. (Feature
Article of Sunday, 4 March 2007). Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=120199
Kudajie, J. N., & Mensah, R. K. A. (1991). The Christian and National Politics. Accra:
Assempa Publishers.
Kumbalonah, A. (2012, 14 December 2012). Reflections on Post-election Disagreements
in Ghana., Ghanaweb.com. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2593
10

416

Kwaku, K. (1976). Tradition, Colonialism and Politics in Rural Ghana: Local Politics in
Have, Volta Region. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne
des Études Africaines, 10(1), 71-86.
Kwankye, S. O., Anarfi, J. K., Tagoe, C. A., & Castaldo, A. (2009). Independent NorthSouth Child Migration in Ghana: The Decision Making Process Working Paper
T-29: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
Lamp, J. W., & Milton, S. K. (2007). Grounded Theory As Foundations For Methods In
Applied Ontology. Retrieved from
http://lamp.infosys.deakin.edu.au/pubs/07_qualit_ontcoding.pdf
Langer, A. (2007). The Peaceful Management of Horizontal Inequalities in Ghana ,
CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 25: Center for Research on Inequality, Human
Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Department of International Development
Langer, A., & Ukiwo, U. (2007). Ethnicity, Religion and the State in Ghana and Nigeria:
Perceptions from the Street CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 34: Centre for
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE.
Larsen, L., Harlan, S. L., Bolin, B., Hackett, E. J., Hope, D., Kirby, A., . . . Wolf, S.
(2004). Bonding and Bridging: Understanding the Relationship between Social
Capital and Civic Action. The Journal of Planning Education and Research, 24,
64-77.
Levy, M., Levy, H., & Edry, A. (2003). A Negative Equilibrium Interest Rate. Financial
Analysts Journal, 59(2), 97-109.

417

Lund, C. (2003). 'Ba wku is still volatile': ethno-political conflict and state recognition in
Northern Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(4), 587-610.
doi:101.1017/S0022278X03004373
Manu-Quansah, E. (2014, 17 Feb 2015). Volta NDC demands reinstatement of Prosper
Bani, Adom News Online. Retrieved from
http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2015/February-17th/volta-ndc-demandsreinstatement-of-prosper-bani.php
Markus, A. (2013). Mapping Social Cohesion The Scanlon Foundation Surveys 2013:
Scanlon Foundation.
Mazzucaw, V., Boom, B. v. d., & Nsowah-Nuamah, N. N. N. (2005). Origin And
Destination Of Remittances In Ghana. In T. Manuh (Ed.), At Home In The
World?: International Migration And Development In Contemporary Ghana And
West Africa (pp. 139-152). Washington D.C: Sub-Saharan Publishers.
McCoy, R. F. (1988). Great Things Happen. Montreal: Society of The Missionaries of
Africa.
McDonald, R. (2010, Saturday 31 October 1992). Ghana opposition groups seek to end
11 years of dictatorship, The Herald Scotland. Retrieved from
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/ghana-opposition-groups-seekto-end-11-years-of-dictatorship-1.786982
Meadows, D. H. (2008). Thinking in Systems - A Primer: Chelsea Green Publishing
Company.
Meehan, P. (2011). The 'problem' with Côte d’Ivoire: how the media misrepresent the
causes of conflict. OpenDemocracy Retrieved from

418

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/patrick-meehan/problem-withc%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-how-media-misrepresent-causes-of-conflict
Mesjasz, C. (1988). Applications of Systems Modelling in Peace Research. Journal of
Peace Research, 25(3), 291-334.
Midley, J. (2014). Youth unemployment a national security threat – Mubarak, TV3’s
Midday Live Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2009). Thematic Evaluation of Support by
Danish NGOs to Civil Society - Synthesis report Ghana and Ethiopia Retrieved
from http://www.oecd.org/countries/ghana/44152627.pdf
Morrison, M. K. C. (2004). Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics: A Path to
Democratic Consolidation. Comparative Politics, 36(4 (Jul., 2004), 421-442.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150169?origin=JSTOR-pdf
Morrison, M. K. C., & Hong, J. W. (2006). Ghana's Political Parties: How
Ethno/Regional Variations Sustain the National Two-Party. The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 44(4, Dec., 2006), 623-647.
Murphy, M., & Schulz, W. (2006). Sampling for National Surveys in Education.
Retrieved from
http://www.mceecdya.edu.au/verve/_resources/Sampling_for_National_Surveys_i
n_Education.pdf
Myjoyonline. (2013, 2013-08-14). Contempt charges: Sir John, Adorye fined by SC.
General News of Wednesday 14 August 2013. from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?

419

Myjoyonline. (2013). IGP deploys 32,000 police force ahead of SC ruling on election
petition. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201308/111984.php
Myjoyonline. (2013, June 25, 2013). Fix the road in one month; Ashaiman drivers issue
ultimatum to MP,MCE, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201306/108462.php
Myjoyonline. (2013). IGP deploys 32,000 police force ahead of SC ruling on election
petition. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201308/111984.php
Myjoyonline. (2013, 13 September 2013). Manhyia petitions NMC over 'grave,
malicious' media reports, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201309/113106.php
Myjoyonline. (2013). Otumfuo bares teeth over allegations he bribed Supreme Court
judges, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201309/112958.php
Myjoyonline. (2013, 13 September 2013). Manhyia petitions NMC over 'grave,
malicious' media reports, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201309/113106.php
Myjoyonline. (2014, Sunday, 11 May 2014). Politics has made us lazy – Otumfuo fumes,
Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=3089
76#

420

Myjoyonline. (2015, 28-01-2015 ). Kpakpakpa man angry with companies for 'stealing'
his slogan, Myjoyonline.com. Retrieved from
http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2015/January-28th/kpakpakpa-man-angrywith-companies-for-stealing-his-slogan.php
Nambiema, I. M. (2012). Counting Votes And Bodies,’ Election-Related Conflicts In
Africa: A Comparative Study Of Ghana And Kenya. (Master of Arts Program in
International and Comparative Politics), Wright State University. Retrieved from
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1341879131
Nathan, N. I. a. N. L. (2012). Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in
Ghana. (4 September 2012). Retrieved from
http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~nichino/Papers/IchinoNathan_localethnicgeo_2012
0904.pdf
Ndegwa, S. N. (1997). Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition
Moments in Kenyan Politics. The American Political Science Review, 91(3), 599616. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952077
Neufeldt, R., Fast, L., Schreiter, R., Starken, B., MacLaren, D., Cilliers, J., & Lederach, J.
P. (2002). Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual: Caritas Internationalis.
New Statesman. (2013). Victoria Hammah vindicates Gabby? Retrieved 11/17/2013,
from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2916
84

421

Nketia, Y. (2013). Radio In Ghana Did Not Have A Common Entrance, Modern Ghana
News Wednesday, October 16, 2013. Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/news/496913/1/radio-in-ghana-did-not-have-acommon-entrance.html
Noyes, A. (2013). Elections In Togo Unlikely To Resolve Political Crisis Africa Watch
(Vol. 1): Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).
Nugent, P. (1999). Living in the past: urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and
1996 elections in Ghana. Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(2), 287-319.
Nugent, P. (2001). Ethnicity As An Explanatory Factor In The Ghana 2000 elections.
African Issues 29(1/2).
Nugent, P. (2001). Winners, Losers And Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority And
Voting Patterns In The Ghana 2000 Election. African Affairs, 100, 405-428. doi:
10.1093/afraf/100.400.405
Ochill, J. K. (2012). Elections 2012: The Ghana Police and Politicians. ModernGhana,
from http://www.modernghana.com/news/425456/1/elections-2012-the-ghanapolice-and-politicians.html
Odamtten, S. K. (1978). The Missionary Factor in Ghana's Development (1820-1880).
Accra: Waterville Publishing House.
Odoi-Larbi, S. (2013). KONADU MAD @ SUPREME COURT VERDICT, The
Chronicle. Retrieved from http://thechronicle.com.gh/konadu-mad-supremecourt-verdict/

422

OECD. (2012). Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility:
Improving Learning for Results, DAC Guidelines and References Series,
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264106802-en
Ofori, D. (2013 August 15, 2013). Ghana’s Political Parties Creating Tensions - Expert
Retrieved 11/19/2013, from http://www.hracghana.org/ghanas-political-partiescreating-tensions-expert/
Ofori-Adeniran, R. (2012, 26 November 2012). Hints Over Threats To December
Elections, Daily Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=68534
Ojielo, O. (2007). Designing an Architecture for Peace: A Framework of Conflict
Transformation in Ghana. Paper presented at the First Biennial Conference and
General Assembly of the Society for Peace Studies and Practice, Abuja.
Oquaye, M. (1995a). The Ghanaian Elections of 1992--A Dissenting View. African
Affairs, 94(375, Apr., 1995), 259-275.
Oquaye, M. (1995b). Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in
Ghana. Human Rights Quarterly, 17(3, Aug., 1995), 556-573.
Osei, P. D. (2000). Political Liberalisation and the Implementation of Value Added Tax
in Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38( 2), 255-278.
Otchere-Darko, G. (2013). I said SC decision is corrupt; not judges – Gabby Ghanaweb,
(2 September 2013). Retrieved from Ghanaweb.com website:
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
Oxford University. (Ed.) (2014) Oxford Dictionary Online - English. Oxford University
Press.

423

Peace FM Online. (2013, Sun, 3 Nov 2013). Kufuor did nothing to fight corruption Appiah-Ofori, Ghanaweb.com. Retrieved from
http://mobile.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=290
834
Phiri, M. (2013). Ethnic politics on the Zimbabwean campaign trail: do voters really
care? . African Arguments. Retrieved from
http://africanarguments.org/2013/02/19/ethnic-politics-on-the-zimbabweancampaign-trail-%E2%80%93-do-voters-really-care-by-marko-phiri/
Pobee, J. S. (1988). Kkwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana 1949-1966. Accra:
Asempa Publishers,.
Portes, A., & Sensenbrenner, J. (2001). Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the
Social Determinants of Economic Action. In M. Granovetter & R. Swedberg
(Eds.), The Sociology of Economic Life (Second ed., pp. 112-118). Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press.
Positive Deviance Initiative. (2013). What Is Positive Deviance? , from
http://www.positivedeviance.org/
Poulson, S. C. (2005). Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology,
and Mobilizing Frameworks: Lexington Books.
Princeton University. (2014). Ghana 1992. Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution
Retrieved 13 March 2014, from
https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/ghana1992.html

424

Public Agenda. (2005, Tuesday, 25 January 2005). Genesis of Broadcasting in Ghana,
Public Agenda. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=74034
Public Agenda. (2013, 07 September, 2013). Tsatsu's comments undermine Supreme
Court verdict, Public Agenda. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2849
85
Pul, H. A. S. (2003). Exclusion, Association, And Violence: Trends and Triggers of
Ethnic Conflicts In Northern Ghana. (Master of Arts), Duquesne University.
(UMI Number 1414960)
Quashigah, K. (2009). Ghana National Report. Religion and the Secular State. Retrieved
from
http://www.iclrs.org/docs/RELIGION%20AND%20THE%20SECULAR%20ST
ATE%20-%20GHANA2.pdf
Radioxyzonline.com. (2014, 1 March 2014). Ghana Is A Nation Of Jokers; Time To Get
Serious – Otabil General News 2... ... Ghanaweb.com Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
Radioyzonline.com. (2013). SC Verdict Was Corrupt Judgment - Gabby, Ghanaweb.com.
Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
Ratković, V., & Wintersteiner, W. (2010). Culture of Peace A Concept and A Campaign
Revisited M. Gallob, S. M. Lenzberger & R. Schöffmann (Eds.), Yearbook Peace
Culture 2010

425

Reeskens, T. (2008). Defining Social Cohesion in Diverse Societies: How Generalized
Trust Relates to Social Cohesion. Paper presented at the Research Day of the
Faculty of Social Sciences, Leuven.
Republic of Ghana. (1992). Constitution of the Republic of Ghana - 1992: Ghana
Publishing Corporation.
Results, DAC Guidelines and References Series,
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264106802-en
Roberts, M. J. (2009). Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya.
Retrieved from http://www.williamtsuma.com/sites/default/files/conflict-analysis2007-post-election-violence-kenya-mara-j-roberts-2009.pdf
Rockson, K. (1990). Some Perspectives On The Mass Media Under A Military
Government: A Case Study Of The Mass Media Under Ghana's PNDC. African
Journals, (Africa Media Review). Retrieved from
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/africa%20media%20re
view/vol4no3/jamr004003004.pdf
Sakyi, K. A. (2013a). Have Ghanaians bought into Excellence or Team Z? Feature
Article of Tuesday, 26 March 2013, from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=268989
Sakyi, K. A. (2013b). Legacy of Danquah-Busia and Nkrumah Traditions – Part 2.
Ghanaweb.com Feature Article of Sunday. Retrieved from Ghanaweb.com
Retrieved from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
features/artikel.php?ID=282725#

426

Sakyi-Addo, K. (December 19, 2006). Ghana Appears United for Justice. BBC Focus on
Africa Magazine.
Sam, G. A., Boateng, F. O., & Oppong–Boakye, P. K. (2013). Remittances from Abroad:
The Ghanaian Household Perspective. International Journal of Business and
Social Science 4(1), 164-170.
Sangaparee, C. (2012, Monday, 12 March 2012). How The Culture Of Silence Started in
Ghana from 1983 to 1992, Ghanaweb. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=232026
Satya, A. C. (2004). Understanding Inter-Pastoralists' Conflicts In Uganda: The Cattle
Raiding Phenomenon In Kapchorwa District. European Peace University.
Retrieved from http://epu.ac.at/fileadmin/downloads/research/Satya.pdf.
Sharubutu, S. N. (2013). Dispense justice without fear - Chief Imam Retrieved 8/8/2013,
from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/
artikel.php?ID=281893
Simmel, G. (1908). The Stranger. In C. Lemert (Ed.), Social Theory: The Multicultural
and Classic Readings (4 ed.): Westview Press.
Sithole, M., & Makumbe, J. (1997). Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) Hegemony
and its Incipient Decline. African Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 122-139.
Skogseth, G. (2006). Côte d’Ivoire: Ethnicity, Ivoirité and Conflict Report: Landinfo.
Smit, B. (2002). Atlas.ti for qualitative data analysis. Perspectives in Education, 20(3),
65-75.
Smith, A. (2009). Indigenous Peoples and Boarding Schools: A Comparative Study:
Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples.

427

Sophism, Y. (2006). Remittances Policy That Works: The Case Of Ghana. Retrieved 10
January, 2014, from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=106354
Spreitzer, G. M., & Sonenshein, S. (2004). Toward the Construct Definition of Positive
Deviance. American Behavioral Scientist, 47(828). Retrieved from
doi:10.1177/0002764203260212
Starr FM. (2014, February 16, 2015). Reinstate Bani or face our wrath – Volta NDC to
Mahama, Daily Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.dailyguideghana.com/reinstate-bani-or-face-our-wrath-volta-ndc-tomahama/
Stewart, F. (2005). Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction. CRISE WORKING PAPER 7, (March 2005). Retrieved from
http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/13001/1/workingpaper7.pdf
Stoeltje, B. J. Asante Queen Mothers: Precolonial Authority In A Postcolonial Society
Research Review N$ 19.2 (2003) 1-19, accessed from
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20Afri
can%20Studies%20Research%20Review/2003v19n2/asrv019002002.pdf
Sutton, I. (1984). Law, Chieftaincy and Conflict in Colonial Ghana: The Ada Case.
African Affairs, 83(330), 41-62. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/721458
Tengan, A. B. (2000). Hoe-farming and Social Relations Among the Dagara of
Northwestern Ghana and Southwestern Burkina Faso: Peter Lang.

428

The Center for African Democratic Affairs. (2012, 30 June 2012). Election Violence In
Ghana, Modern Ghana. Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/news/403939/1/election-violence-in-ghana.html
The Center for African Democratic Affairs. (2012, 30 June 2012). Election Violence In
Ghana, Modern Ghana. Retrieved from
http://www.modernghana.com/news/403939/1/election-violence-in-ghana.html
The Chronicle. (2013, 10 November 2013). Oye Lithur Parries Victoria Hammah’s Jab,
The Chronicle. Retrieved from http://thechronicle.com.gh/oye-lithur-parriesvictoria-hammahs-jab/
The Chronicle. (2013, 10 November 2013). Oye Lithur Parries Victoria Hammah’s Jab,
The Chronicle. Retrieved from http://thechronicle.com.gh/oye-lithur-parriesvictoria-hammahs-jab/
The Chronicle. (2014, 09 June 2014). Curbing The Create-Loot-And-Share Craze, The
Chronicle. Retrieved from
http://news.peacefmonline.com/pages/news/201406/202900.php
The Herald Newspaper. (2013, Friday, 23 August 2013). Six days to Supreme Court
verdict; Aircrafts fully booked, The Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?...Ghanaw
eb.com
The New Crusading Guide. (2012, Wednesday, 21 November 2012). Plot to declare state
of emergency in election 2000 foiled!, The New Crusading Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2570
79

429

The New Statesman. (2013). Contradiction In Supreme Court Verdict? -As BaffoeBonnie grants and dismisses Voting Without Biometric Verification at the same
time, The New Statesman. Retrieved from
http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/index.php/politics/672-contradiction-insupreme-court-verdict-as-baffoe-bonnie-grants-and-dismisses-voting-withoutbiometric-verification-at-the-same-time
ThinkGhana.com. (2012). Northerners have not benefitted from NPP, NDC - Amin-Anta,
ThinkGhana.com. Retrieved from
http://www.thinkghana.com/tools/printnews/news.php?contentid=57950
Timmermans, S., & Tavory, I. (2012). Theory Construction in Qualitative Research :
From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis. Sociological Theory 30(3), 167 –
186. doi:10.1177/0735275112457914
Today's Newspaper. (2013, Saturday, October 26, 2013). Violence mars Madagascar
polls, Today's Newspaper.
Tokpa, J. L. (2006). Côte d’Ivoire: L’immigration des Voltaïques (1919-1960). Abidjan:
Les Editions du CERAP.
Tsikata, D., & Seini, W. (2004). Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana
WORKING PAPER: Cente4r for Research on Inequality, Human Security and
Ethnicity.
Tsikata, T. (2013). Tsatsu: I owe no one an apology; I spoke the truth Ghanaweb.com.
Retrieved from Ghanaweb.com website:
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=2845
99

430

Ultimate Radio. (2013, December 18, 2013). Mahama Urged to Do More to Rekindle
Memories of Ghanaians, Ultimate Radio Online. Retrieved from
http://ultimate1069.com/mahamah-urged-to-do-more-to-rekindle-memories-ofghanaians-2963/#sthash.dg268eEN.dpuf
Umbreit, M., & Armour, M. P. (2011). Restorative Justice Dialogue: An Essential Guide
for Research and Practice. New York: Springer Publishing.
Vinokor, M. A. (2015, 09 January 2015). Short-term prospects of economy gloomy —
Minority, Daily Graphic Online. Retrieved from
http://graphic.com.gh/news/politics/36637-short-term-prospects-of-economygloomy-minority.html
von Bertalanfy, L. (1969). General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development,
Application (Seventh Paper Back Printing ed.). New York: George Brazillier.
Weiss, H. (2005). Contested historical and geographical narratives: Succession disputes,
contested land ownership and religious conflicts in northern Ghana. Working
Papers on Ghana : Historical and Contemporary Studies (September 2005).
Retrieved from http://www.helsinki.fi/project/wopag/wopag6.pdf
Western Togoland General Assembly. (2015). History Retrieved 02/02/2015, from
http://westerntogolandassembly.org/index.php?pge=history
Williams, D. (1984). The Problems of Independence. In J. D. Fage, M. Crowder & R. A.
Oliver (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa (Vol. 8). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Willis, J. W. (2007). Foundations of Qualitative Research - Interpretive and Critical
Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

431

Wilmot, W. W., & Hocker, J. L. (2007). Interpersonal Conflict (Seventh Edition ed.).
New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
World Bank. (2010). REPUBLIC OF GHANA - Tackling Poverty in Northern Ghana
PREM 4 / AFTAR, Africa Region: The World Bank and Government of Ghana.
Yakohene, A. (2012). Talking to the Other: Peacemaking in the Alavanyo-Nkonya
Conflict. In L. Darkwa, P. Attuquayefio & A. Yakohene (Eds.), Peacemaking In
Ghana - Lessons Learnt, Options For The Future: Imagine Communications Ltd.
Yayra, A.-D. F. (2013, 2013-08-24). Rumours of War, Ghana’s day of Armageddon,
Ghana Home Page. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?
Yesufu, A. (2009). A Peace Paradigm in Social Work. Retrieved from
www.socialiststudies.com/index.php/sss/article/download/30/28
Zartman, William I (ed.), Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict
“Medicine”, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2001

432

Appendices
Appendix 1 Table of Presidential results from 2000-2012
YEAR

NPP

NDC

TOTAL

RESIDUAL

2000
2000 ROUND 2
2004
2008
2008 ROUND 2
2012

48.4
57.4
52.2
49.13
49.77
47.74

44.8
42.6
44.6
47.92
50.23
50.7

93.2
100
96.8
97.05
100
98.44

6.8
0
3.2
2.95
0
1.56

NO. OF
CANDIDATES
7
2
4
8
2
8

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, retrieved from various links to
http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php on 5 May, 2013. Links to data by year of election are:
2000 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2000%20PRESIDENTIAL%20ELECTION
%20RESULTS%282%29.pdf
2004 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2004PresidentialResults.pdf
2008 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/page.php?page=395&section=51&typ=1
2012 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php
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Appendix 2: Cluster Sampling Methodology and Determination of Sample Size

Sample sizes were calculated with the following formula:
n = z2(pq)/d2
where n = sample size; z = statistical certainty chosen; p = estimated prevalence/coverage
rate/level to be investigated; q = 1 - p; and d = precision desired.
The value of p was defined by the coverage rate that requires the largest sample size (p =
.5). The value d was based on the precision, or margin of error, desired (in this case d = .1).
The statistical certainty was chosen to be 95% (z = 1.96). Given the above values, the
following sample size (n) needed was determined to be:
n = (1.96 x 1.96)(.5 x .5)/(.1 x .1)
n = (3.84)(.25)/.01
n = 96
It takes much time to randomly select an identified individual from the survey
population, and then perform this selection 96 times to identify a sample of n = 96. Time
can be saved by doing a 30 cluster sample survey in which several individuals within each
cluster are selected to reach the required sample size. However, in order to compensate for
the bias from interviewing persons in clusters, rather than as randomly selected individuals,
experience has shown that a minimum sample of 210 (7 per cluster) should be used given
the values of p, d, and z above (Henderson, et. al., 1982). In general, when using a 30
cluster sample survey, the sample size used should be approximately double the value n,
when: n = (z x z)(pq)/(d x d). In this case, a sample size of 300 (10 per cluster) has
traditionally been selected using the JHU 30-Cluster method so as to ensure that subsamples would be large enough to obtain useful information.
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The estimates of confidence limits for the survey results were calculated using the
following formula:
95% confidence limit = p + z(square root of pq/n)
where: p = proportion in population found from survey; z = statistical certainty
chosen (if 95% certainty chosen, then z = 1.96); q = 1 - p; and n = sample size

Sample Size for the Study
As noted above, traditionally, the 30-cluster sampling methodology aimed for 300
respondents in a survey. However, in nation-wide surveys, such as the Afrobarometer
studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is determined to be adequate for ensuring
representativeness of the study population and validity of the outcomes. For Ghana, the
Afrobarometer’s “randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allow inferences to national
adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3
percent with a confidence level of 95 percent” (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p). In this study, a
sample size of 1,500 (i.e. n= 1,500) will be used. This “…substantially larger sample size
[is required] to achieve the same level of accuracy as a simple random sample” (Murphy
& Schulz, 2006, p. 6). The sample frame (N) will be the total registered voter population
for the 2012 elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).
Hence, the survey will use the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling.
This is because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the
population statistics per localities have not yet been published. However, the Electoral
Commission compiled a fairly detailed electoral registers, which provides population data
down to community levels in all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the
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country. The electoral register therefore provides a more accurate and up to date database
for the selection of respondents.
The 30-cluster sampling methodology developed for use in Knowledge, Practice,
and Coverage (KPC) surveys will be adapted for the selection of study. Given the wide
variation in population sizes between Polling Areas (ranging from n < 500 to n > 150,
000), instead of 30, this study will select 50 clusters out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas as
study sites. This larger number of study sites is also necessary to compensate for the
clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socioeconomic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban;
differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions,
cultural variations across regions, etc. (Murphy & Schulz, 2006).
The cluster sampling methodology was used to select the cluster sites or Polling
Areas from which respondents will be drawn, using the principle of sampling by
probability proportional to size of the Polling Areas. Under this method, all the 275
Polling Areas in the country will be listed with their respective numbers of registered
voters. The cumulative population of all the 275 Polling Areas will then be obtained by
successively adding up the registered voters of the Polling Areas from the first to the last.
The sampling interval will then be calculated by dividing by the cumulative population of
the Polling Areas by the number of clusters to be sampled i.e. 50 clusters. A random
number with the number of digits but is less than or equal to the sampling interval will be
selected from a table of random numbers or by a random draw of the serial numbers of
bills of the local currency. This number will determine the starting point of the selection
of the first cluster or polling station from which interviewees will be drawn. The first
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polling station which has a cumulative population less than or equal to the selected
random number will be selected as the first cluster or polling station for the interviews.
The second cluster or polling station will be selected by adding the sampling interval to
the random number, and the cluster whose cumulative population is less than or equal to
the sum of the two numbers will be selected as the second cluster or polling station for
the interviews. Subsequent Polling Areas will be selected by adding the sampling interval
to the previous number used in the selection of the prior cluster or polling station until all
50 clusters or Polling Areas are selected. The list of selected Polling Areas or clusters
will then be compiled and used as the interview sites.
Level two of the cluster selection process starts after the 50 Polling Areas are
selected. The electoral register for the selected Polling Areas will constitute the frame
from which interviewees will be selected. For each polling station selected, thirty five
(35) people on the electoral register for each polling station will be randomly selected for
interviews, using the voter identification numbers listed on the voter’s registers for the
draw of interviewees. The actual target number of interviewees per polling station is 30.
However, the additional 5 potential respondents are replacement respondents in the event
that some of the primary selected respondents are unavailable for interviews either due to
death, extended travel outside the area, refusal to participate in the interview or failure to
make contact after multiple rescheduling of interview sessions. Hence, the sample size,
(n) for the survey component of this study will be 1,500.
Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics, and given the legal challenge to
the 2012 Presidential election results that have pitched two major parties in a political
battle, it is essential that all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan
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bias in the selection of the interviewees be displaced upfront and transparently. In
fulfillment of this, Polling Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected
Polling Areas will be invited to participate in the selection of interviewees and
identification of their locations. They will be briefed on the purposes, as well as, the
apolitical and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all
political parties will not only eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of
the interviewees; it will also facilitate the identification of the whereabouts of selected
participants; their availability to participate (some may have travelled out of the area, or
deceased); and facilitation of access to the selected interviewees.
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Appendix 3: Procedure For Selecting Constituencies And Polling Areas For Survey
a) Procedure for Selecting Polling Areas for Survey
The Study used the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling process to select
prospective constituencies in which the study will be conducted.
Step 1: The national list of voters per constituency with the total number of voters
for each constituency for the 2012 general elections was obtained from the website of the
Electoral Commission of Ghana.
Step 2: the cumulative total of voter population was then obtained by adding
successive voter population from each preceding constituencies to the next one, in
accordance with the order in which they were presented in the Electoral Commission’s
spreadsheet that was downloaded in Step 1 above.
Step 3: the Sampling Interval (S.I) for the total voter population of

14,031,793

was computed using the formula S.I = Total Voter Population divided by number of
Clusters (or desired study sites). Since the research is using 50 Polling Areas nationwide,
the figure 50 was used as the denominator in the following computation:
14,031,680 = 280,635.86
50

The SI of 280,633.60 was rounded off to 280,634 as the SI. This was then used in
the following steps for selecting Polling Areas as the sites for the conduct of the study:
Step 4: A six digit random number less than or equal to the SI i.e. 280,634 was
generated using the

random

number generation function of

stattrek.com

-

http://stattrek.com/statistics/random-number-generator.aspx . The function produced one
(1) random number selected from within the range of 0 to 280,636. Duplicate numbers
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were allowed. This table was generated on 7/19/2013. The random number generated
through this process was 143,511
Step 5: The random number (143,511) was used to locate the first constituency
with a cumulative population greater than or equal to the random number. Accordingly,
the Bokakokole Axim Constituency with Code No. A030502 in the Western Region with
a total registered voter population of 469 and a cumulative population figure of 143,925
was chosen as the first constituency where the study will be conducted.
Step 6: The Sampling Interval of 143,511 was then added to the Random number
of 280,636 to obtain the figure 424,147. Hence, the second constituency for the study was
chosen by locating a constituency with a cumulative population total greater than or equal
to 424,147.
Step 7: To select the third Constituency from which a Polling Station will be
drawn for the study, the Random Number of 280,636 was added to the computed results
of Step 6 i.e. 280,636+424,147 to get the number 704,783, which was used to locate the
constituency with a cumulative population figure greater than or equal to this number.
This step was repeated until all the remaining 47 constituencies were selected. Appendix
3 includes the list of the 50 constituencies that were selected as study sites, based on the
procedure described above.
Step 8: Selection of Polling Area for Study. The Electoral Commissions list of
Constituencies used in the exercise above provides the number of Polling Station per
each Constituency. The list of Polling Areas is available at the regional offices of the
Electoral Commission.
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To determine the fifty Polling Areas in which the study will be conducted, the list
of Polling Areas with their code numbers in each selected constituency will be obtained
from the Regional Offices of the Electoral commission. Two Polling Areas per selected
constituency will be randomly drawn from a hat containing the codes of all the Polling
Areas for the Constituency. The first Polling Station to be drawn will be the primary
study site. The second Polling Station drawn will be the secondary study site.
Step 9: The researchers will random draw a list of 50 names from the voters’
register of the Primary Study Site (see step 8 above) from which the first 30 respondents
who agree to participate in the study will be interviewed.
Step 10: In the event that the Primary Study Site chosen in Step 8 has less than 30
persons who agree to participate in the study, the researchers will proceed to Study Site 2.
Step 9 will be repeated i.e. 50 people selected but only the first set of people who agree to
be interviewed to make up the balance on the 30 respondents required per constituency
will be interviewed.
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b) Sampled Polling Areas For Field Survey
No

Polling
Station Code

Polling Station Name

Region
Name

District Name

1

A030502

Bokakokole Axim

Western

Nzema East
Municipality

2

A080104

Western

3

A130502

Asawa Prim. Sch.
Mempeasem
Cath. Prim Sch Insu

4

A170505

5

A220701

6

B022603

7

B063702

D C Primary
School, Kwaku
Attakrom
D C Prim Sch
Antobia
C P B New Market
Adisadel
Catholic Prim
School, Abaasa

8

B110103B

9

B150902

10

C010111

11

C030202B

12

C041004B

13

C061023A

14

C071509A

15

C081416

16

C100305A

17

C120910B

Zongo 94
Odupongkpehe (B)
D C 'B' Pri Sch
Foso
Barbara Int'l Sch,
Top Town-Ngleshie
Amanfro
Golden Door Hotel
Tantra Hill (B)
Church Of
Pentecost Central
Taifa No 2 (B)
Ebony Restaurant 1
Pig Farm (A)
Alhaji Abbass
Mosque, Nii
Boiman (A)
E P Church
Lartebiokorshie
Fire Protection Co
Ltd (A)
Presby Church
Teshie Tsui Bleoo
(B)

Constituency
Name

Total
Voters

469

Western

Evalue Ajomoro Gwira
EssikaduEssikaduKetan Sub
Ketan
Prestea/Huni- Prestea
Valley
HuniValley
Aowin
Aowin

Western

Juaboso

Juaboso

977

Central

Cape Coast

666

Central

Ajumako
Enyan Esiam

Central

Awutu Senya
East
Assin North

Cape Coast
South
Ajumako
Enyan
Esiam
Awutu
Senya East
Assin
Central
BortianorNgleshie
Amanfro
Trobu

Western

Central

871
702

478

665

829
339

Greater
Accra

Ga South

Greater
Accra
Greater
Accra

Ga-West
Ga East

Dome/Kwa
benya

859

Greater
Accra
Greater
Accra

Ayawaso

Ayawaso
Central
Okaikwei
North

652

Greater
Accra
Greater
Accra
Greater
Accra

Ablekuma

Ablekuma
Central
Korle
Klottey
Ledzokuku

846

Okaikwei

Osu Clottey
Ledzokuku
Krowor

1082

835

978

743
649
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Polling
Station Code

Polling Station Name

Region
Name

District Name

Constituency
Name

Total
Voters

18

C132403

Ashaiman

TemaCentral
Ashaiman

674

C151702B

20

D011302

Greater
Accra
Greater
Accra
Volta

Tema

19

Tema Parent J.H.S
C.6
Amanier Hotel (B)

Keta

Keta

207

21

D041102

Volta

Akatsi South

524

22

D112702

Volta

23

D181401

Ho
Municipal
Jasikan

Akatsi
South
Ho Central
Buem

476

24

D251202

25

E053103

26

E100104

27

E150502

28

E200901

29

E253102

30

F040801

31

F082003

32

F120404B

33

F151013

34
35

F190314
F230601A

36

F260503

37

F331301

L A Prim Sch
Agorvinu
D/A Prim Sch
Ayitikope
R C Prim Sch
Taviefe-Deme
E P Prim Sch
Bodada
D A Jhs Abunyanya
No. 2

Volta

693

1013

Volta

Nkwanta
North

Nkwanta
North

1047

L/A Prim Sch
Okomeso

Eastern

New Juaben
Municipality

112

Temp Booth
Pampamso
R C Prim Sch
Ahenbronom
R/C Primary School
Asunafo
L/A Prim School
Kwaehunu

Eastern

Ayensuano

New
Juaben
South
Ayensuano

Eastern

Akyemansa

Eastern

Atiwa

Eastern

Afram Plains
North

R/C Prim Ofoase
Kokoben
L A Prim Sch
Ntensere

Ashanti

Bekwai
Municipal
Atwima
Nwabiagya

Tiger Bay Adoato
(B)
Americanus
Buokrom
Open Bible Church
D/A Prim School
Asenua (A)
Ataneata D/A Prim
School

Ashanti

Bantama

Ashanti

Manhyia

Ashanti
Ashanti

Asokwa
Kwabre East

Ashanti

Asante Akim
South

R/C Pri Sch Nintin

Ashanti

Mampong
Municpal

Ashanti

492

Ofoase/Ayi 910
rebi
Atiwa West 803
Afram
Plains
North
Bekwai

260

Atwima
Nwabiagya
North
Bantama

1088

Manhyia
North
Asokwa
Kwabre
East
Asante
Akim
South
Mampong

412

736

693

748
693
397

525
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Polling
Station Code

Polling Station Name

Region
Name

District Name

Constituency
Name

Total
Voters

38

F383602

Ashanti

G053001

Ahafo Ano
South
Tano South

Ahafo Ano
South East
Tano South

346

39
40

G110602

Dormaa East

G172202

Wenchi

Dormaa
East
Wenchi

466

41
42

G230301
H030803

Atebubu/
Amantin
West Gonja

Atebubu/A
mantin
Damongo

654

43
44

H100101

Zabzugu

Zabzugu

748

45

H172305

Karaga

Karaga

554

46

H195202A

Tamale

H260303

48

J061302

Akeriba Gunga

Tamale
North
Bunkpurug
u
Bongo

567

47

D/A Prim Sch
Potrikrom
L A Prim Sch
Asuboi
St James Jhs
Wamanafo
Presby Church
Nkonsia
R/C Church
Amantin
Forestry Quarters
Laribanga
Local Council
Offices Zabzugu
N0.1
Kpalsong L/A
Primary
Kanvilli Baptist
Church (A)
Temp Booth Kauk

49

J120601B

Garu

572

50

K063103

Garu Catholic J H S
(B)
Temp Booth
Potuoyiri

Jirapa

208

BrongAhafo
BrongAhafo
BrongAhafo
BrongAhafo
Norther
n
Norther
n
Norther
n
Norther
n
Norther
n
Upper
East
Upper
East
Upper
West

Bunkpurugu/
Yunyoo
Bongo
GaruTempane
Jirapa

216

552

547

490
357
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Appendix 4 Sampling Frame for Key Informants Interviews

Key informants are priced for their personal arcane knowledge of the subject
matter under study. However, for subject matters such as the quest of this research to
understand how and why Ghana has managed to be peaceful, it is essential to enlist
historical recalls of times and events that may have influenced the nature, direction, and
outcomes of the condition under study in its current state. In such cases, personal
memories alone become limiting, especially if the key informants happen to be relatively
new to a context. In particular, where institutions have played active roles in shaping the
current state of the subject matter, it is doubly essential to elicit institutional memories
that go beyond the times of current institutional representatives acting as key informants.
for this reason, this study chose to constitute its sampling frame from among the
following institution for the reasons assigned to each.
Professional Bodies and Associations: Professional bodies and associations have
been at the forefront of various engagements with state actors through dialogues,
demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of civil action either to demand better conditions
of service for their members or general political changes in the governance of the
country. They were particularly vocal in the 1970s when they constituted one of the
barriers to the attempts of the Supreme Military Council to transform the military regime
of General I. K. Acheampong into a civilianized Union Government. To tap into the
memories and perspectives from such engagements, the study targeted to draw
interviewees from among the leadership of Professional Groups and Associations such as
the:
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a.

Ghana Medical Association

b.

Ghana Bar Association

c.

Ghana Nurses and Midwives Council

d.

Ghana Association of Bankers

e.

Ghana national Association of Teachers

f.

Trade Union Congress and affiliate institutions

Students Unions: Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of
the governance systems of the country. Once presenting a unified front under the
National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), student political activism has been splintered
in recent times under the creation of rival national level associations, and the further
polarization of student movements along political lines. The sampling frame for this
category of respondents targeted the leadership of national students unions, which
includes:
a.

The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS)

b.

The National Union of Polytechnics Students

Faith-based civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing
national Christian and Islamic Councils: The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH),
Catholic Bishops’ Conference (CBC), the Islamic Council, and other affiliated faithbased organizations have been instrumental in shaping the political space in Ghana. As
the US Library of Congress records note:
The CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs function openly as
independent national lobbies to promote common rather than special interests. They insist on
negotiation and mediation in the management of national disputes, and they advocate policy
alternatives that stress the long-term needs of society. In the past, they have taken bold
initiatives to attain the abrogation of state measures and legislation that violate human rights
or that threaten law and order. All three bodies share a commitment to democracy, the rule of
law, and the creation of political institutions that reflect Ghanaian cultural traditions”
(Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm).
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The study therefore contacted the leadership of the following national level religious
institutions for interviews:
a.

Catholic Bishops Conference

b.

Christian Council of Ghana

c.

Pentecostal Council of Ghana

d.

Federation of Muslim Councils of Ghana

e.

Moderator, Presbyterian Church

f.

Moderator, Methodist Church

g.

Presiding Bishop, Anglican Church

h.

National Chief Imam

i.

Ameer of Ahmaddiya Muslim Mission
Traditional Leaders and the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs: As indicated

above, although the 1992 Constitution debars chiefs from participating in active politics,
they have nonetheless been instrumental in influencing dialogue and processes in the
public sphere. They represent an important political constituency as the “… National
House of Chiefs and the ten regional houses of chiefs represent more than 32,000
recognized traditional rulers who exercise considerable influence throughout Ghana,
especially in the countryside” (Library of Congress,
http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm) .
To ensure capture of the perspectives of the traditional rulers the study targeted to
interview some chiefs, especially those who also serve as representatives of their
respective localities in the national or regional houses of chiefs.
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Civil Society Organizations: Civil Society organizations have played very
prominent roles in the public sphere, especially in respect of shepherding the
transformation of the governance landscape since 1981. As the Library of Congress notes
these organizations:
played prominent roles in the transition to democracy [as they] took the provisional nature of
the PNDC regime quite literally, calling for a quick return to democratic national
government. Although NUGS and the GBA consistently demanded a return to multiparty
democracy, the CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs favored a
nonpartisan national government. While the NUGS and GBA leadership used methods that
frequently provoked confrontation with the PNDC, the CBC and the national and regional
houses of chiefs preferred a more conciliatory method of political change, emphasizing
national unity” http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm .

In this study, the leadership of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil
Society Groups and organizations, and community-based organisations constituted a
sampling bloc from which respondents were sought out and interviewed. The list of
institutions contacted included, but not limited to the following:
i.

Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA)

ii.

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)

iii.

Media Foundation of West Africa

iv.

Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition

v.

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)

vi.

Ghana Journalists Association (GJA)

vii.

Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII)

viii.

Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF)

ix.

Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB)

x.

Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD)

xi.

Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT)
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xii.

National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT)

xiii.

Teachers and Educational Workers Union (TEWU)

xiv.

Association of Ghana Industries (AGI)

xv.

Institute for Democracy and Governance (IDEG)

The study successfully recruited several interviewees from these institutions.

Independent Constitutional Bodies: The Constitution has prescribed functions for certain
institutions in respect of promoting democracy and good governance. Efforts were made
to recruit respondents from among the leadership of national Commissions and Councils
such as
a.

National Media Commission

b.

National Commission for Civic Education

c.

Electoral Commission

d.

National Peace Council

e.

Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)

Political parties: Political parties are the vehicles for articulating political views on
governance processes. They also represent the mobilizing force for political activities
across all regional and ethnic spectra. In this study, the National and regional
Chairpersons of political parties were targeted for interviews. The tentative list of parties
included, but was not be limited to the following:
1.

Convention Peoples Party (CPP)

2.

Great Consolidated Popular Party

3.

Ghana National Party
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4.

National Democratic Congress (NDC)

5.

New Patriotic Party (NPP)

6.

National Reform Party

7.

Peoples National Convention (PNC)

8.

United Ghana Movement

9.

Ghana Democratic Republican Party

10.

National Democratic Party

11.

Progressive People’s Party
The Media: The centrality of the media in shaping the public space cannot be

overemphasized. In particular, the proliferation of FM radio broadcast services since
1983 has had a considerable impact on the generation and dissemination of information
in various local languages. Community Radio Stations in particular provide avenues for
the development and broadcast of local content. The popularization of cell phone usage
has also afforded the inclusion of phone-in and SMS texting-in into radio programs. This
has given a voice to otherwise marginalized persons in public discourses. The extent to
which this liberalization of voices and views, through the combination of the liberalized
airwaves and cellphone access, has influenced the political discourse and Ghana’s peace
is yet undetermined. To gauge this impact, the study targeted and successfully
interviewed print and electronic media representatives (i.e. chief executives or editors of
TV, Radio, Newspaper editors). Hosts of popular political radio programs on selected
radio stations with nation-wide coverage were also targeted for inclusion as interviewees.
Other Opinion Leaders: Several think-tanks and research organizations influence
public discourses through their research and publications. Accordingly, the leadership of
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such groups were identified and targeted for interviews. The institutions included, but not
limited to:
i.

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)

ii.

Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA)

iii.

Ghanaian authors and representatives of academia in Ghana

iv.

The Danquah Institute

v.

Imani Ghana
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Appendix 5 Questionnaires Used in the Quantitative Survey
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION

Quantitative Survey Questionnaires For PhD Dissertation Research On
Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of
Peace
First schedule
Date ___/___/2013 Time: _________
(dd / mm /)
Tel: ________________, _____________
Region______________________

Rescheduled interview
Date_____/____/2013 Time: _________
(dd. / mm)
Tel: ________________, _____________

District _____________________

Name of Constituency_________________

Polling Station Number________________

Name of Community where interview takes place_____________________
No._______

House

Name of Interviewer __________________________Supervisor ______________________
I.

Profile of Respondents

I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask:
1. To which gender category would you say you belong?
1) Male [ ]

2) Female [ ] 3) Other (specify) ______________________________ [ ]

2. How old were you on your last birth day?
1)

(Please Indicate age in years) __________ 2)

Don’t know my age (please mark) [ ]

3. What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Never been to school
Less than six years of Primary Education
Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School
Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College
Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma
University Degree up to Bachelors level
University Degree up to the Masters level
University Degree up to the Doctorate level
Other (specify) _________________________________________

4. Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region?
1) Ashanti Region

[ ]

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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2) Brong Ahafo Region
3) Central Region
4) Easter Region
5) Greater Accra Region
6) Northern Region
7) Upper East Region
8) Upper West Region
9) Volta Region
10) Western

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

5. In what kind of locality are you normally resident?
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

National Capital City
Regional Capital
District Capital
Village or rural community
Town outside national, regional, or district capital
Other (specify)____________________________

[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]

6. What religion to you practice or are you affiliated to?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

African Indigenous Religion
Agnostic (I do not know if there is a God)
Aeithist (I do not believe there is a God)
Baha’i
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
Islam
Other (Specify)____________

7. How would you describe your current primary occupation?
No.

Employment Category

1
2
3

Farmer (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.)
House wife
Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament,
Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency, Region); Metropolitan,
Municipal or District Chief Executive
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive
of a Political Party)
Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, department
or agency)
Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an
Academic institution).
Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief
Executive
Officer,
Other
(specify)_______________________________________

4
5
6
7

Please
tick one
()
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No.

Employment Category

8

Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, Medical
Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, Other
(specify)__________________________________________
Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or
Village
Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional
Religion)
Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service,
Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and Preventive
Services
Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary level
Worker in the NGO Sector
Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman
Employee in the Private Sector
Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser,
Seamstress,
Trader,
Other
(specify)_____________________________________________
Other
(specify)
_________________________________________________

9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17

Please
tick one
()

8. Ghana has been said to be an oasis of peace in Africa. To what extent do you agree that
Ghana is peaceful?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
] Skip next question
] Skip next question
] Skip next question
] Skip next question
] Skip next question

Knowledge and Perceptions of the nature and sources of Peace in
Ghana
9. Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means even
though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive laws, rules, and
regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or can die silently. Positive
peace means there is no open fighting and there are no situations that make people suffer or
die in silence. Based on these concepts of peace, how would you describe the peace you
witness in Ghana?
1)
2)
3)
4)

Positive peace
[ ]
Negative Peace
[ ]
I don’t know
[ ]
Other (specify) ________________________________________________________
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10. To what extent do the following factors influence Ghana’s ability to avoid descending into
violent national level conflicts?
N
o

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Influencing
Factors

Assessment
Criteria
High level of
civic awareness
among
Ghanaians
High degree of
agreement among
political leaders
on important
issues affecting
Ghana
Presence of
strong, efficient,
and neutral
institutions such
as Parliament, the
Courts, and the
public and civil
Services
Cultures of all
ethnic groups
value peace
Strong influence
of religious
beliefs that value
peace
Prayers and
intercessions by
religious groups
Strong bonds of
intermarriages
between ethnic
groups
Ghanaians have a
high degree of
respect for the
rule of law
Fear of being
singled out for
punishment
Other

1
Very
Low
Exten
t

2
Low
Exten
t

3
Moderatel
y Low
Extent

4
Moderat
e Extent

5
Moderatel
y High
Extent

6
High
Exten
t

7
Very
High
Exten
t

8
No
t
At
All

9
Can’
t
Tell
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N
o

Influencing
Factors

1
Very
Low
Exten
t

2
Low
Exten
t

3
Moderatel
y Low
Extent

4
Moderat
e Extent

5
Moderatel
y High
Extent

6
High
Exten
t

7
Very
High
Exten
t

8
No
t
At
All

9
Can’
t
Tell

Assessment
Criteria
(specify)_______
_
_____________

11. To what extent do the following institutions and groups contribute to the peace that Ghana
enjoys? (Please choose one answer for each of the listed institutions or groups)
No

Influencing Factors

Assessment
Criteria
1

2

3
4
5
6

7

8
9

Civil
Society
(NGOs,
Community-based
Organizations, Farmer-based
organizations
women’s
groups, etc.)
Traditional leaders (including
chiefs, queen mothers, elders
at the community levels)
The National House of Chiefs
The Regional Houses of
Chiefs
The Council of State
Religious Bodies such as the
Catholic
Bishops’
Conference, the Christian
Council of Ghana, the
Pentecostal
Council
of
Ghana, the Federation of
Muslim Councils of Ghana,
etc.
Policy think thanks such as
Center
for
Democratic
Development, Institute for
Democracy E Governance
(IDEG), Center for Policy
Analysis (CEPA), IMANI
Ghana, among others
National Media Commission
National Commission for

1
Ver
y
Low
Exte
nt

2
Low
Exte
nt

3
Modera
tely
Low
Extent

4
Moder
ate
Extent

5
Modera
tely
High
Extent

6
Hig
h
Exte
nt

7
Ver
y
Hig
h
Exte
nt

8
N
ot
At
Al
l

9
Ca
n’t
Tel
l
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No

Influencing Factors

Assessment
Criteria
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24

1
Ver
y
Low
Exte
nt

2
Low
Exte
nt

3
Modera
tely
Low
Extent

4
Moder
ate
Extent

5
Modera
tely
High
Extent

6
Hig
h
Exte
nt

7
Ver
y
Hig
h
Exte
nt

8
N
ot
At
Al
l

9
Ca
n’t
Tel
l

Civic Education
Electoral Commission
National Peace Council
Professional
Associations
(such Ghana Bar Association,
Ghana Medical Association,
Trade Unions (such as TUC,
GNAT, NAGRAT, etc.)
Students
and
Students’
Unions such as NUGS.
The Judiciary (Supreme
Court, High Courts, and other
Courts in Ghana)
Parliament
Political Parties operating in
Ghana since 1992
Commission
on
Human
Rights and Administrative
Justice (CHRAJ)
Office of the President
Ghana Police Service
The Ghana Armed Forces
International
Development
Agencies (UN, World Bank,
IMF, etc.)
Governments and Embassies
of other Countries
Other
(specify)_________________
________________________
_

12. To what extent do you believe that Ghana can still descend into a violent national level
conflict such as a civil war, despite the peace it currently enjoys?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Very Low Extent
Low Extent
Moderately Low Extent
Moderate Extent
Moderately High Extent
High Extent
Very High Extent
Not at all

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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9. Can’t tell

[ ]

13. Which of the following would you say Ghanaians respect most in order to contribute to the
peace that Ghana enjoys?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Constitution of the Country
[ ]
Religious beliefs and values
[ ]
Traditional values and customs
[ ]
personal values and principles
[ ]
Other (specify)______________________________________ [ ]

Development and Peace
14. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is more peaceful than its neighbors because it has a
high level of economic development?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

15. To what extent would you agree that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the
country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

16. To what extent do you agree or disagree that transparently negotiated natural resource
management contracts contribute to Ghana’s peace?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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17. To what extent do you agree or disagree that equitable and fair returns to Ghana on the
exploitation of her natural resources contributes to the peace in the country?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

18. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the equitable allocation of revenue from natural
resources to development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

19. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because proceeds from its natural
resources are used in ways that benefit the whole country?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Human Rights and Rule of Law
20. To what degree do you agree that Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa
because Ghanaians have more freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree

[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
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7. Strongly disagree
[ ]
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]
21. To what extent do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians enjoy more political
freedom than their neighbors in other countries?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

22. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions,
torture, and disappearances of political opponents are minimal?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Ghanaians’ Respect for the Rule of Law
23. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because everyone respects the law?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

24. How far would you agree or disagree that Ghana’s peace is due in part to the fact that
government officials and public servants always make decisions and act in accordance with
the laws of Ghana?
1. Very strongly agree
2. Strongly agree
3. Mildly Agree

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]

25. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is at peace because Ghanaians have respect for
the decisions made the courts of law in the country?
1. Very strongly agree
[ ]
2. Strongly agree
[ ]
3. Mildly Agree
[ ]
4. Agree
[ ]
5. Mildly disagree
[ ]
6. Disagree
[ ]
7. Strongly disagree
[ ]
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]
Contributions of the Media to peace in Ghana
26. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that the ability of Ghanaians
to freely express themselves in the print media without fear of being cited for libel has
contributed to peace in Ghana?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

27. How far would you agree or disagree with the view that freedom of expression on radio
stations and televisions through broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and
interactive SMS and phone-in programs has contributed to the peace in Ghana?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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28. In way would you agree or disagree that unrestricted access to news and information from the
internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana’s peace?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Contribution of the Judicial System to peace in Ghana
29. To what extent do you agree that Ghana has peace because the courts are independent from
political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or favor?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

30. What is your level of agreement or disagreement to the assertion that Ghana is peaceful
because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

31. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because people from all backgrounds are
treated fairly and equally before the law?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]

462
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]

Gender and Peace
32. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and
women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

33. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that
women occupy in parliament?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

34. What is your degree of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana enjoys peace
because women have the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial
services, markets for their produce, etc.) as men?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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35. How far would you agree with the statement that Ghana is a peaceful country because women
have the same opportunities for education as men?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

36. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is enjoying peace because women have the
same employment opportunities in the public and civil services as men?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

37. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana’s peace is due to the fact that women
play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

38. To what extent do you agree or disagree that role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play
in the promotion of peace at the national level is an important contributor to the peace in
Ghana?
1. Very strongly agree
[ ]
2. Strongly agree
[ ]
3. Mildly Agree
[ ]
4. Agree
[ ]
5. Mildly disagree
[ ]
6. Disagree
[ ]
7. Strongly disagree
[ ]
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]
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Elections and Democratic Participation
39. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its elections are
usually free, fair, and transparent?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

40. Which of these factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary elections
do not spill over into national level conflicts?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ghanaians are afraid of war
Ghanaians do not really care about who wins an election
The courts are effective and efficient in handling such disputes
Political parties do not support such violence
Those who start the violence are usually ignored
Other (Specify)________________________________________________[ ]

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

41. Which of the following factors best explain why disputes over results of presidential elections
do not escalate into national level violence?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Political parties lack the capacity to mobilize people to fight on their behalf
[ ]
Political parties take their cases to the courts
[ ]
Traditional rulers usually intervene to stop any efforts to fight [ ]
Religious leaders usually mediate peaceful resolution of the disputes
[ ]
Ghanaians would not fight and die for any politician
[ ]
Other (Specify)______________________________________________________[ ]

42. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful
because everyone is free to run for office at any level within the governance structures of the
country (i.e. Unit Committee, District Assembly, and National levels).
1. Very strongly agree
[ ]
2. Strongly agree
[ ]
3. Mildly Agree
[ ]
4. Agree
[ ]
5. Mildly disagree
[ ]
6. Disagree
[ ]
7. Strongly disagree
[ ]
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]
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43. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its citizens can vote
freely in all elections?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

44. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because anybody can join any political party
of his or her choice?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

45. To what extent do you agree that Ghana’s peace is due to the fact Ghanaians do not consider
the ethnic backgrounds of candidates in any election important determinants of whom they
vote for?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Role of Government in promoting peace
46. To what extent do you agree that it is the deliberate and proactive actions of government that
has created the peace that Ghana enjoys?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Very Low Extent
Low Extent
Moderately Low Extent
Moderate Extent
Moderately High Extent
High Extent

[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
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7. Very High Extent
8. Not at all
9. Can’t tell

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

47. How far would you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is because Governments over the
years have created opportunities for civil society groups to work with State institutions to
promote peace?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

48. To what degree would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments over the
years have successfully helped to resolve conflicts before they escalate into large scale
violence?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

49. To what extent would you agree or disagree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments
have always been neutral in handling conflicts between different ethnic, political, or religious
groups?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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50. How far would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Government works very closely
with faith-based organizations in resolving major conflicts?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Religion and peace in Ghana
51. How important is religion in the lives of Ghanaians
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Not at all important
Not very important
Somewhat important
Important
Very important
I don’t know
Refuse to answer

52. What is your level of agreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because most
Ghanaians observe the teachings of their respective faiths to promote peace, not violent
conflicts?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

53. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians are very religious
people?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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54. What is the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement that Ghana is at
peace because people are not discriminated against on the basis of their religion when they
are looking for employment or admissions to schools?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

55. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that Ghana is peaceful
because people of different faiths can live together without any problem?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

56. To what degree do you agree or disagree with the statement that Ghana has peace because
families readily allow their relatives to marry people from different religious backgrounds?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

57. To what extent would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because politicians do not use interreligious differences in their campaigns?
1. Very strongly agree
[ ]
2. Strongly agree
[ ]
3. Mildly Agree
[ ]
4. Agree
[ ]
5. Mildly disagree
[ ]
6. Disagree
[ ]
7. Strongly disagree
[ ]
8. Very strongly disagree [ ]
9. No opinion
[ ]
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58. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because religious leaders of all
faiths and denominations always work together to ensure that conflicts are resolved
peacefully?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

59. To what extent do you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is due to the role that religious
leaders and various religious councils and committees have played important roles in creating
a culture of peace in Ghana?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very strongly agree
Strongly agree
Mildly Agree
Agree
Mildly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Very strongly disagree
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Culture, Tradition, Customs and Peace
60. To what extent do you believe that the values and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana
openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own citizens?
1) I very strongly believe
[ ]
2) I strongly believe
[ ]
3) I Believe
[ ]
4) I do not believe
[ ]
5) I strongly do not believe
[ ]
6) I very strongly do not believe [ ]
7) No opinion
[ ]
61. To what degree do you accept that the culture and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana
train people to be peaceful?
1. Very High Extent
[ ]
2. High Extent
[ ]
3. Low Extent
[ ]
4. Very Low Extent
[ ]
5. Not at All
[ ]
6. Can’t Tell
[ ]
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62. The cultures and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana have strong sanctions for those who
stir up violence or breach the public peace
1) I very strongly believe
[ ]
2) I strongly believe
[ ]
3) I Believe
[ ]
4) I do not believe
[ ]
5) I strongly do not believe
[ ]
6) I very strongly do not believe [ ]
7) No opinion
[ ]
63. Traditional rulers have a strong control on members of their ethnic groups and can prevent
them from going to war with other ethnic groups.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

I very strongly believe
I strongly believe
I Believe
I do not believe
I strongly do not believe
I very strongly do not believe
No opinion

[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]

64. How effective have traditional leaders been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and
religious groups living within their jurisdictions feel at home?
1. Very effective
[ ]
2. Somehow effective
[ ]
3. Effective
[ ]
4. Not effective
[ ]
5. Can’t tell
[ ]
Contribution of formal Education to Peace
65. To what extent would you agree that the formal educational system in Ghana created a
culture of peace among Ghanaians?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very Low Extent
Low Extent
Moderately Low Extent
Moderate Extent
Moderately High Extent
High Extent
Very High Extent
Not at all
Can’t tell

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
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66. To what extent do the following factors in Ghana’s Educational system contribute to the
peace that Ghana enjoys? (Please choose one answer for each of the listed institutions or
groups)
No

Influencing
Factors

Assessment
Criteria

1

2

3

4

5

The history
courses in
schools give
equal value to
the history of
all ethnic
groups
Educational
curricula
taught values
of cocitizenship
Centralized
posting of
students to
post primary
educational
institutions
promoted
inter-cultural
learning
among
citizens.
Boarding
school system
has promoted
cross-cultural
and cross
ethnic
friendships
that have
lasted into
working lives
of Ghanaians.
Boarding
schools
system has
decreased
ethnic and
religious
identity
barriers

1
Very
Low
Extent

2
Low
Extent

3
Moderately
Low
Extent

4
Moderate
Extent

5
Moderately
High
Extent

6
High
Extent

7
Very
High
Extent

8
Not
At
All

9
Can’t
Tell
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No

Influencing
Factors

Assessment
Criteria

among
Ghanaians
6 Past Students’
Associations
have created
strong crosscultural bonds
among alumni
of schools
7 Posting of
teachers to
regions or
districts other
than their
home ones
has increased
knowledge of
other cultures.
8 Inter-school
sporting
events have
increased
9 Interschool
quizzes,
debates and
other forms of
intellectual
competition
have reduced
the complexes
of inferiority
and
superiority
among
Ghanaians.
10 The
compulsory
national
service
scheme has
helped to
create a sense
of oneness
among
Ghanaians

1
Very
Low
Extent

2
Low
Extent

3
Moderately
Low
Extent

4
Moderate
Extent

5
Moderately
High
Extent

6
High
Extent

7
Very
High
Extent

8
Not
At
All

9
Can’t
Tell

473
Social Cohesion Behaviors
67. When I am in a meeting with people from other ethnic groups, I ______ try to ensure that
everyone has an equal chance to participate in the discussions.
1. Never

[ ]

2. Seldom [ ]

3. Occasionally [ ]

4. Frequently [ ] 5. Always [ ]

68. When I am in a discussion with people from other ethnic groups, I _______ want to show
why the values of my culture are important in assessing the issues being discussed.
1. Always [ ]

2. Frequently

[ ] 3. Occasionally [ ] 4. Seldom [ ]

5. Never [ ]

69. When I am engaged in activities with people from other cultures, I _____ insist on my views.
1. Never

[ ]

2. Seldom [ ]

3. Occasionally [ ]

4. Frequently [ ] 5. Always [ ]

70. Whenever I meet people from other ethnic groups, I _______ try to stay away from them for
fear of getting into trouble with them.
1. Always [ ]

2. Frequently

[ ]

3. Occasionally [ ] 4. Seldom [ ] 5. Never [ ]

71. When discussing important national issues with people from other parts of the country, I let
them know their views, feelings, or experiences are_______ mine
1. More important than [ ] 2. Equally important as [ ]
4. Less important than [ ] 5.

3. somewhat important as [ ]

Not as important as [ ]

72. When I listen to people from other ethnic groups express their views on national issues that
affect them directly, I______ put myself in their shoes in order to understand the issues from
their perspective.
1. Never

[ ]

2. Seldom [ ]

3. Occasionally [ ]

4. Frequently [ ] 5. Always [ ]

73. Whenever I vote in elections I______ consider the ethnic background of the presidential
candidates before I choose whom to vote for.
1. Always [ ]

2. Frequently

[ ] 3. Occasionally [ ] 4. Seldom [ ]

5. Never [ ]

74. When I vote for a parliamentary candidate, I _________consider the issues they talk about as
important as their personality and background
1. Never

[ ]

2. Seldom [ ]

3. Occasionally [ ]

4. Frequently [ ] 5. Always [ ]

75. I would _____ accept postings to any part of the country other than my home region
1. Very Willingly [ ]
Never [ ]

2.Willingly [ ] 3. Reluctantly [ ] 4. Seldom [ ]

5.
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Practice

76. If a relative of mine plans to marry a person from another ethnic group, I _____ support him
or her
1. Never [ ] 2. Rarely [ ] 3. Reluctantly [ ] 4. Willingly [ ]

5. Very Willingly [ ]

77. When I have a conflict with someone from a different ethnic group, I _____ prefer to take the
matter to the local chief, police, or court for resolution
1. Never

Thank you.

[ ]

2. Seldom [ ]

3. Occasionally [ ]

4. Frequently [ ] 5. Always [ ]
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Appendix 6 Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
Guiding Questions for Key Informant Interviews For PhD Dissertation Research On
Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace

First schedule
Date ___/___/2013 Time: _________
(dd / mm /)
Tel:________________, _____________
District _____________________

Rescheduled interview
Date_____/____/2013 Time: _________
(dd. / mm)
Tel: ________________, _____________

Name of Town ________________House

No._______
Name of Interviewer __________________________Supervisor
______________________
I. Bio-data of Interviewee
I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask:
1.

Gender of respondent (please indicate)
1) Male 

2.

2) Female  3) Other (specify) _____________________ [ ]

How old were you on your last birthday?
1) (Please Indicate age in years)________________)
2) Don’t know my age (please mark)

3.

What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one)
1) Never been to school
2) Less than six years of Primary Education
3) Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School
4) Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College
5) Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma
6) University Degree up to Bachelors level
7) University Degree up to the Masters level
8) University Degree up to the Doctorate level
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9) Other (specify)_________________________________________
4.

Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region?
1) Ashanti Region

2) Brong Ahafo Region

3) Central Region

4) Easter Region

5) Greater Accra Region

6) Northern Region

7) Upper East Region

8) Upper West Region

9) Volta Region

10) Western


5.

What is your nationality?
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

6.

I am a Ghanaian resident in Ghana
I am a Ghanaian resident outside but visiting now
I am a foreigner resident in Ghana
I am a foreigner on a short visit to Ghana
I prefer not to answer this question

How would you describe your current major occupation?

No. Employment Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

9
10
11



Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament,
Minister of a Sector, at Presidency, Region; District Chief Executive
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency
Executive of a Political Party)
Farmer
House wife
Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry,
department or agency)
Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Research, and Teaching Assistant in an
Academic institution).
Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief
Executive Officer, Other
(specify)____________________________________________
Professional (Certified Medical Officer, Lawyer, Banker, Teacher,
Nurse, Paramedic, Other
(specify)__________________________________________
Traditional chief or queen mother
Religious leader (Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion)
Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police
Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and

Choose
One
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12
13
17
18

20

Preventive Services
Student in Polytechnic, University or other Secondary
Worker in the NGO Sector
Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman
Employee in the Private Sector
Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser,
Seamstress, Trader, Other
(specify)_____________________________________________
Other (specify)
_________________________________________________

II. Key Informant Interview Guide
7.

What is your opinion on the view that Ghana is a peaceful country?

8.

Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means
even though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive
laws, rules, and regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or
can die silently. Positive peace means there is no open fighting and there are no
situations that make people suffer or die in silence. Based on these concepts of
peace, how would you describe Ghana’s peace?
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9.

What are the critical factors that influence your assertion of Ghana’s peacefulness?

10.

What role, if any, does the level of economic development in Ghana have on its
experience of peace?

11.

Ghana has had very tense moments in her political history since 1992 when
everyone thought the country would descend into nationwide violence but this
never happened. What in your opinion makes it possible for Ghana to stop short of
descending into nationwide violent conflicts?
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12.

Ghana has a high dependency on the export of raw materials; competition between
ethnic groups for political power; high differences in poverty levels between the
north and the south, and between rural and urban areas. These factors are said to
cause violent conflicts in some countries in Africa. What, in your opinion, has
Ghana done differently in managing the same issues to avoid violent national level
conflicts?

13.

Since 1992, elections in Ghana have been highly contested. What has made it
possible for Ghana to avoid election-related violent national conflicts despite the
high political tensions and electoral disputes?

14.

Ghana has witnessed several violent conflicts within and between various ethnic
groups in the country. What, in your opinion, has prevented these conflicts from
escalating into national level conflicts?
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15.

Competition for political power has created conditions for national level conflicts in
some countries. What in your opinion accounts for Ghana’s ability to avoid
nationwide violence as a result of elections and other forms of political
competition?

16.

What are some of the key factors that may have contributed to keep Ghana from
degenerating into violent national conflicts when it has faced similar internal
challenges as other countries that went to war?

17.

Strong institutions are credited with keeping countries at peace. What institutions
do you consider as key to keeping the peace in Ghana? How?
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18.

Culture plays an important role in all communities. Does culture play any part in
making Ghana Peaceful? How?

19.

Ghana is multi-cultural nation. What makes it possible for these cultures to avoid
the types of violent national conflicts that other states with the same mix of history
and cultures have experienced?

20.

Religion is an important factor for peace or war in the present world. What role, if
any, does religion play in Ghana’s experience of peace?

21.

How do you assess the role of the youth in Ghana on the peace of the country?
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22.

What role, if any, do women play in preserving the peace in Ghana?

23.

How do you see the role of political parties in the peace of the country?

24.

How do you assess the role of the media in Ghana’s peace?

25.

How, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in creating a culture of
peace?
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26.

In what specific ways do you believe the formal educational system in Ghana has
helped to create this culture of peace?

27.

Is Ghana at any risk of descending into a violent national level conflict such as a
civil war, violence?

28.

What would it take for Ghana to descend into violent national level conflict?
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29.

What makes you hold the opinion you have just expressed?

30.

Are there any other thoughts or closing comments that you would like to share on
why Ghana seems to have peace when other countries on the continent with the
same or similar backgrounds and issues have not?

Thank you for your time and responses.
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Appendix 7 Map Showing Distribution of Survey Interview Locations
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Appendix 8 Matrix Of Hypotheses, Variables And Indicators
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents
Gender
self-identified
Male, female or other

gender category of as self-assigned
(Q1)
respondent
Age
Self-report of age Age of respondents 18 
of respondent at
years and above as
(Q2)
last birth day prior calculated from last
to survey
birthday.
Educational
levels
(Q3)

Region of
origin
(Q4)
Locality of
residence
(Q5)

Religious
affiliation
(Q6)

Primary
Employment
category
(Q7

Highest level of
formal education
completed

Self report on highest
level of formal
education attained
ranging from no
education through PhD
and other.
Self-identified
One
of
the
10
region
administrative regions
respondents call
of Ghana respondents
their home region. consider their home
region
Place where
National capital,
respondents
regional capital, district
regularly live
capital, village, town
outside urban area,
others
Faith group to
Self report of faith
which respondents traditions that
considers self to
respondents consider
be a member of or themselves to be a
affiliated to.
member of or affiliated
to.
Description of
Respondent’s self
kind of work
placement in one of 17
respondent
occupational categories
currently does as
their main job.

% of respondents in
different gender
categories
% of respondents in
different ages 18 years
and above as of their
last birth day prior to
the survey
% of respondents in
different categories of
formal education obtained

 % of respondents who
select different regions
of Ghana as their home
regions
 % of respondents in
indicate the different
localities in which they
live
 % of respondents who
identify religious
groups to which they
consider themselves as
members of or
affiliated to.
 % of respondents in
different employment
categories

Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a
peaceful country (Q8)
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Perceptions of
Level of agreement
Degree to which
% of respondents of
different age
among respondents
respondents of
different age categories
categories of
of different age
different age
who agree or disagree
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people on why
Ghana is
peaceful

categories on
whether or not
Ghana is a peaceful
country

Perceptions of
respondents
from different
regions on
why Ghana is
peaceful

categories agree or
disagree that y
Ghana is a peaceful
country

that Ghana is peaceful
% of respondents of
different ethnic groups
who agree or disagree
that Ghana is peaceful
 % of respondents of
different regions who
agree or disagree that
Ghana is peaceful

Level of agreement
among respondents
originating from
different regions on
whether or not
Ghana is a peaceful
country
Perceptions of
Level of agreement
different
among respondents
gender
of different gender
categories of
categories on
people on why whether or not
Ghana is
Ghana is a peaceful
peaceful
country
Perceptions of
Level of agreement
respondents
between respondents
with different
of different levels of
levels of formal formal educational
education on
attainment on
why Ghana is
whether or not
peaceful
Ghana is a peaceful
country
Perceptions of
Level of agreement
respondents of among respondents
different
of different religious
religious
affiliations on
affiliations on
whether or not
why Ghana is
Ghana is a peaceful
peaceful
country
Perceptions of
Level of agreement
respondents of among respondents
different
of different
employment
employment
categories on
categories on
why Ghana is
whether or not
peaceful
Ghana is a peaceful
country

Degree to which
respondents of
different age
categories agree or
disagree that Ghana
is a peaceful country

Perceptions of
respondents
living in

Degree to which
% of respondents living
respondents living in in different localities
different localities
who agree or disagree

Level of agreement
among respondents
living in different

Degree to which
respondents of
different gender
categories agree or
disagree that Ghana
is a peaceful country

% of respondents of
different gender
categories who agree or
disagree that Ghana is
peaceful

Degree to which
respondents with
different levels of
formal education
agree or disagree
that Ghana is a
peaceful country

% of respondents of
different levels of
formal education
completed who agree or
disagree that Ghana is
peaceful

Degree to which
respondents of
different religious
affiliations agree or
disagree that Ghana
is a peaceful country

% of respondents of
different religious
affiliations who agree or
disagree that Ghana is
peaceful

Degree to which
respondents
of
different
employment
categories agree or
disagree that Ghana
is a peaceful country

% of respondents of
different employment
categories who agree or
disagree that Ghana is
peaceful
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different
localities on whether agree or disagree
that Ghana is peaceful
localities on
or not Ghana is a
that Ghana is a
why Ghana is
peaceful country
peaceful country
peaceful
Ho2 there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of
peace Ghana enjoys.
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Perceptions of
 negative defined as  Level of agreement
respondents on
% of respondents in who
absence of direct
or disagreement
the nature of
violence but
among respondents agree that Ghana has
peace in Ghana
negative peace versus
presence of
on whether
(Q9)
those who agree that
structural and
Ghana’s peace is
Ghana has positive peace
cultural violence
negative peace or
that can lead to
positive peace
open violence or
 positive peace
defined as absence
of direct,
structural, and
cultural violence
Factors
 Perceptions of
 Level of agreement % of respondents who
contributing to
indicate the extent to
factors that
on the extent to
peace
which various listed
contribute to peace
which different
(Q 10)
factors can influence
in Ghana
factors contribute
Ghana’s ability to be at
to peace in Ghana
peace.
Role of
% of respondents who
 Perception of what  Differences in
institutions on
identify different
institutions
perceptions of
Ghana’s peace
institutions listed in the
contribute to peace
what institutions
(Q 11)
in Ghana
contribute to peace question as the ones that
contribute to peace in
in Ghana
Ghana
Susceptibility
% of respondents who
 Belief that Ghana
 Degrees to which
to national
can easily descend
respondents belief belief that Ghana can
level violence
easily descend into
into violent
that Ghana can
(Q 12)
national level
easily descend into violence at the national
level versus those who
conflict
violent conflict at
do not belief.
the national level
Role of shared  Extent to which
% of respondents who
 Perceptions of the
values and
respondents
role of the national identify the constitution,
beliefs on
religion, tradition and
attribute Ghana’s
constitution,
peace in Ghana
customs or other factors
peace to shared
religion, tradition,
(Q 13)
as the ones contributing
regulations, values,
and customs on
to peace in Ghana
and beliefs.
Ghana’s peace
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Ho3
Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the
peace in the country
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Level of
% of respondents who
 Perceptions on the  Level of
economic
agree or disagree that the
contribution of the
agreement or
development on
current level of Ghana’s
level of economic
disagreement that
peace
economic development
development of
Ghana’s level of
contributes to the peace
Ghana on its peace
economic
(Q 14)
in the country.
development
contributes to the
peace it enjoys
Equality in
% of respondents who
 Perceptions of
 Variations in
geographical
agree or disagree that
impact of
respondents’
distribution of
difference in the
geographical
perception of the
development on
distribution of
disparities in the
extent to which
peace in Ghana
development services has
level of
disparities in
(Q 15)
an effect on the
development on
development
sustenance of peace in
the peace in Ghana
across different
geographical zones Ghana.
(north-south; ruralurban) affects the
peace in Ghana
Transparent
% of respondents who
 Contribution of
 Negotiations of
Management of
agree or disagree that
transparent and
contracts for
Natural
natural resource
equitable contracts
natural resource
Resource and
management contracts
for natural
exploitation are
Peace
that are transparently
resource
transparent
(Q 16)
negotiated contribute to
exploitation to
Ghana’s peace.
peace
Equitable and
% of respondents who
 Effects of
 Contracts for
fair returns on
agree or disagree that
perceived
natural resource
natural resource
equitable and fair returns
equitable returns
exploitation are
contracts on
to Ghana on the
on Ghana natural
fair and equitable
peace(Q 17)
exploitation of natural
resource contracts
for the country
resources contributes to
on peace
the peace in the country.
Equitable
% of respondents who
 Perception of
 Level of
allocation of
agree or disagree that
equitable
agreement on the
revenue from
equitable allocation of
allocation of
contribution of
natural
revenue from natural
revenue from
equitable
resources to
resources to development
natural resources
allocation of
development in
in all parts of the country
to development in
revenue from
all regions
contributes to the peace
all parts of the
natural resources
(Q 18)
country
to development in in Ghana.
all parts of the

490

Efficient and
Effective use of
proceeds of
natural
resources for
development of
all
(Q 19)

 Effect of
perceptions of
effective and
efficient use of
proceeds from
natural resources
on peace in Ghana

country the peace
in Ghana
 Degrees to which
respondents agree
or disagree on the
contribution of
Ghana’s
management of
natural resource
proceeds to peace

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
revenue from Ghana’s
natural resources is used
in ways that contribute to
peace in the country.

Ho4
The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no
effect on the peace that the country enjoys.
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Effect of respect
Respondents’
Extent of agreement % of respondents who
for freedom of
perceptions on the or disagreement on
agree or disagree that the
expression on
effects of respect
the impact of
ability of Ghanaians to
the peace that
for freedoms of
freedom of
express themselves freely
Ghana has.
expression on
expression of
contributes to the peace
(Q 20)
peace in Ghana
citizens on the peace in Ghana
the country enjoys
Impact of
Level of agreement The ability of
% of respondents who
political
on the impact of
citizens to freely
agree or disagree that the
freedom on
political freedom on choose their
level of political freedom
peace
peace in Ghana
political affiliations, in the country is a
(Q 21)
stand for elections
contributor to peace in
to public offices,
Ghana
and to vote
Effect of
Presence or absence Level of agreement % of respondents who
presence of
of extrajudicial
on the effect of the
agree or disagree that the
extra judicial
arrests, detentions,
presence or absence presence or absence of
arrests,
torture, and
of extrajudicial
extrajudicial arrests,
detentions,
disappearances.
arrests, detentions,
detentions, torture and
torture, and
torture and
disappearances have
disappearances
disappearances on
contributed to peace in
of political
peace in Ghana
Ghana
opponents on
peace in Ghana
(Q 22)
Ho5 There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for the rule of
law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Perceptions on
Level of agreement Contribution of
% of respondents who
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Citizens’
respect for the
laws of the land
(Q 23)

on the effect of
citizens’ willingness
to respect the laws
of the country and
peace

Public officials
respect for the
laws of the land
(Q 24)

Respect of the law
by elected
government leaders
and public officials

citizens’ willingness
to comply with the
law, rules, and
regulations without
coercion or fear
thereof.
Perceptions on
degree to which
government and
public officers act
and make decisions
in accordance with
relevant laws

agree or disagree that
citizens’ respect for the
laws contribute to peace

% of respondents who
agree or disagree Ghana’s
peace is in part due to the
fact that state officials
always to make decisions
and act in accordance
with laid down laws,
rules, and regulations.
Respect for
Respect for the
Perceptions of
% of respondents who
decisions of the decisions made the
degree to which
agree or disagree that
courts (Q 25)
courts of law on
decisions of the
adherence to the
peace in Ghana
courts are respected decisions of courts
contribute to peace in
Ghana
Ho6 There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana
has contributed to the peace of the country
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Contribution of Presence or absence  Ability of the press % of respondents who
freedom of the
of legal and
agree or disagree that the
to carry news
print media to
administrative
stories without fear ability of Ghanaians to
peace
controls on
freely express themselves
of repression or
(Q 26)
newspapers and
in the print media without
censorship by the
other print media of
fear of being cited for
state and other
information
libel has contributed to
interest groups
dissemination
peace in Ghana
 Abolition of libel
laws
Liberalization
Freedom of
Liberalized
% of respondents who
of the electronic expression on radio airwaves for radio
agree or disagree that
media
and television for all and TV broadcasts
freedom of expression on
citizens
of news, debates,
radio stations and
(Q 27)
hosted discussions,
televisions through
and interactive SMS broadcasts of news,
and phone-in
debates, hosted
programs
discussions, and
interactive SMS and
phone-in programs has
contributed to the peace
in Ghana
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Unrestricted
access to news
and information
from the
internet
(Q 28)

Citizens’ ability to
freely access and
share news and
views through the
internet

 Unrestricted access
to news and
information on the
internet
 Unrestricted use of
social media
platforms

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
unrestricted access to
news and information
from the internet and
social media platforms
has contributed to
Ghana’s peace
Ho7 There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a
major contributor to the peace of the country
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Independence of Ability of judges to Level of agreement % of respondents who
the judiciary on dispense justice
or disagreement that agree or disagree that the
peace
without interference courts are
independence of the
from state officials
independent from
courts from political
(Q 29)
or other influential
political interference interference is a
persons.
contributor to peace in
Ghana
Corruption
Perception on ability  Level of
 % of respondents who
judges and
of judges and court
agreement on
agree or disagree that
peace
staff to administer
impact of
the level of perceived
(Q 30)
justice without
perceived
corruption in the
being influenced by
corruption in the
judiciary is a contributor
personal interests or
judiciary and the
to peace in Ghana
gains
peace in Ghana
% of respondents who
 Level of
agree or disagree that the
agreement on the
fact that all citizens can
practice of equal
expect to be treated
treatment of all
citizens before the equally before the law
contributes to peace in
law and peace in
Ghana.
Ghana
Ho8 The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace
that Ghana enjoys
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Gender equality Equality of
Level of agreement % of respondents who
in participation participation of men on how gender
agree or disagree that the
in public
and women in
equality in
level of gender equality
decision-making public decisionparticipation in
in participation in public
process and
making processes
public decision
decision making
peace
and peace in Ghana making processes
processes in Ghana
(Q 32)
affects the peace in
contributes the peace of
Ghana
the country
Equality of
citizens before
the law
(Q 31)

 Effect of equality
of all citizens
before the law on
peace in Ghana
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 Level of
agreement on
whether or not the
percentage of
women in
parliament
contributes to
Ghana’s peace
Women’s
Effect of gender
Level of agreement
economic
equality in access to that Ghana enjoys
participation
economic
peace because
and peace
opportunities on
women in the
(Q 34)
peace in Ghana
country have equal
economic
opportunities
Gender Equality Effect of gender
Level of agreement
in access to
equality on access to among respondents
educational
education on peace
that Ghana’s peace
opportunities
in Ghana
is in part due to
and peace (Q
gender equality in
35)
access to
educational
opportunities
Gender Equity
Perception of effect Level of agreement
in access to
of gender equity in
among respondents
employment
access to
that Ghana has
opportunities in employment
peace due to gender
public services. opportunities in the equity in access to
(Q 36)
public and civil
employment
services on peace
opportunities in the
public sector
Women’s
participation in
parliament and
peace
(Q 33)

Role of women
in mediating
conflicts at the
national level
(Q 37)

Participation
of women in
traditional
systems of
governance (Q
38)

Level of
participation of
women in
parliament and
peace in Ghana

Perception of role of
women in mediating
conflicts at the
national level.

Perception of the
role
of
queenmothers and
female chiefs in the
promotion of peace
at the national level

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
percentage of women in
Ghana’s parliament
contributes to the peace
of the country

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana’s peace is in part
due to the equal
opportunities that women
in the country have in
economic life.
% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana has peace because
men and women have
equal access to
educational opportunities
in the country.

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana has peace because
men and women have
equitable access to
employment
opportunities in the
public sector of the
country.
Level of agreement % of respondents who
or disagreement on
agree or disagree that
the contribution that roles that women play in
women make in
mediating conflicts at the
mediating conflicts
national levels contribute
at the national level to the peace that the
to promote peace.
country enjoys.
Level of agreement % of respondents who
among respondents
agree or disagree that
on the role of
Ghana’s peace is in part
queenmothers and
due to the role that
women chiefs on the queenmothers and female
peace of Ghana
chiefs play in the
traditional systems of
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governance in the
country.
Ho9
The state of democratic practices in Ghana have no effect on the peace that
the country enjoys
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Contribution of The organization of Extent to which
% of respondents who
free, fair, and
elections declared to respondents agree or agree or disagree that the
transparent
be free, fair, and
disagree that the
regular organization of
elections to
transparent and
regular organization elections declared to be
peace
peace in Ghana
of elections declared free, fair, and transparent
(Q 39)
to be free, fair, and
affect the peace Ghana
transparent affect
enjoys.
the peace in Ghana
Limiting factors Factors that
Fear of war; apathy % of respondents who
on widespread
respondents
towards who wins;
choose or the other
violence over
consider important
courts handle
factors listed in the
parliamentary
in limit the spread of disputes effectively; questions as the reason
elections
violence over
political parties
why disputes over
(Q 40)
electoral results for
abhor violence; lack parliamentary elections
parliament
of support for
do not spill over into
violence-mongers;
national level violence.
Others.
Limiting factors Factors that
Inability of political % of respondents who
on national
respondents
parties to mobilize
choose or the other
violence over
consider important
fighters; recourse of factors listed in the
presidential
in limiting the
political parties to
questions as the reason
results
eruption of violence court; intervention
why disputes over
(Q 41)
over disputed
by traditional
Presidential election
Presidential election leaders; intervention results do not degenerate
results
by religious leaders; into national level
Ghanaians won’t die violence.
for a politician.
Absence of
Freedom of all
Freedom to stand
% of respondents who
restrictions on
qualifying persons
for Presidential,
agree or disagree that the
running for
to stand for
Parliamentary,
freedom accorded to all
office
elections at
District Assembly or qualifying citizens to run
(Q 42)
appropriate levels
Unit Committee
for elections at any level
elections and peace of their choice contributes
in Ghana
to peace in Ghana
Freedom of
Freedom of all
Effect of the ability % of respondents who
citizens to vote
qualifying persons
of all qualifying
agree or disagree that the
(Q 43)
to register and vote
persons to register
ability of all qualified
in elections
and vote on peace in Ghanaians to register and
Ghana
vote contributes to peace
in the country
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Freedom of
citizens to join
political parties
(Q 44)

Absence of
restrictions on all
citizens to join
political parties of
their choice

Freedom to join any
political party of
one’s choice and
peace in Ghana

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
freedom of all Ghanaians
to join any political party
of their choice affects the
peace in the country
Role of
Influence of ethnic
Level of agreement % of respondents who
ethnicity in
considerations in
of agreement or
agree or disagree that
electoral
voting behaviors of disagreement over
Ghanaians do not take
choices of
Ghanaians
the influence of
into account the ethnic
Ghanaians (Q
ethnic
background of the
45)
considerations in the candidates they choose to
way Ghanaians vote vote for during elections
at elections
Ho10 The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the
peace that Ghana enjoys.
Role of
Deliberate actions of Level of agreement % of respondents who
government in
Government that
or disagreement on
agree or disagree that the
creating peace
have created
whether the
government of Ghana has
in Ghana
Ghana’s peace
government of
deliberately taken actions
Ghana over the
that have created the
(Q 46)
years has taken
peace the country enjoys
concrete actions that
have created the
peace that Ghana
enjoys
Collaboration
Government of
Level of agreement % of respondents who
between
Ghana consciously
or disagreement on
agree or disagree that the
government and creates identifiable
whether the
government of Ghana
civil society for platforms and
government of
over the years
peace
opportunities that
Ghana over the
consciously created
for civil society
years created
identifiable platforms for
groups and
identifiable
civil society groups and
(Q47)
organizations to
platforms for civil
organizations to engage
engage in promoting society engagement in building a culture of
peace in Ghana
in building a culture peace in the country.
of peace in the
country.
Successful
Government of
Level of agreement % of respondents who
resolution of
Ghana takes
or disagreement on
agree or disagree that the
conflicts by
proactive action to
the extent to which
government of Ghana
government
resolve or prevent
the Government
over the years has taken
before they
conflicts from
over the years has
deliberate and proactive
escalate (Q 48) escalating into
taken deliberate and actions to prevent
violence
proactive actions to conflicts from escalating
prevent conflicts
into violence
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Neutrality of
Government in
managing ethnic
and communal
conflicts (Q49)

Collaboration
between
Government
and faith-based
organizations
(Q 50)

Government
officials and
agencies have
impartially
intervened in ethnic
and communal
conflicts to resolve
them or prevent
them from
escalating into
violence
Active engagement
of government with
faith-based
organizations or
groups to find
solutions to conflicts
at all levels.

from escalating into
violence
Degree to which
respondents agree or
disagree that
governments over
the years have been
perceived as
impartial in the way
they intervened in
ethnic and
communal conflicts

Degree to which
respondents agree or
disagree that
governments over
the years have
always actively
sought the
partnership of faithbased organizations
in resolving or
preventing conflicts
from degenerating
into violence.
Ho11 Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Definition
Importance of
Extent to which
Level of agreement
religion in the
religious beliefs and or disagreement on
lives of
values influence the how religious
Ghanaians (Q
attitudes of
beliefs and values
Ghanaians towards
influence attitudes
51)
the maintenance of
of Ghanaians
peace
towards the
maintenance of
peace
Faith practice
Extent to which
Level of agreement
and peace (Q
Ghanaians’
or disagreement that
observance of the
Ghana is at peace
52)
teachings of their
because its citizens
faith promote peace observe the
in Ghana
teachings of their
faith
Religiosity and
Extent to which the Degree of

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana enjoys peace
because the government
officials and agencies
over the years have been
neutral in the way they
intervened in ethnic or
communal conflicts

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana enjoys peace
because the government
has always actively
engaged faith-based
organizations to resolve
or prevent conflicts at all
levels from degenerating
into violence

Indicators
% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
religious beliefs and
values influence attitudes
of Ghanaians towards the
maintenance of peace

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that
Ghana is at peace because
its citizens observe the
teachings of their faith

% of respondents who
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peace
(Q 53)

Religions
discrimination
in employment
(Q 54)

Coexistence of
people of
different faiths
(Q 55)

Intermarriages
between people
of different
faiths and peace
(Q 56)

Exploitation of
religious
differences in
political
campaigns
(Q 57)

Interfaith
collaboration
for peace
(Q 58)

religious nature of
Ghanaians affect the
peace in the country

agreement or
disagreement on the
notion that Ghana is
at peace because its
citizens are very
religious.
Absence of
Degree of
discrimination on
agreement or
the basis of religion disagreement that
in employment
the absence of
practices and peace discrimination in
employment
practices has
contributed to the
peace in Ghana.
Ability of people of Level of agreement
different faiths to
or disagreement on
coexist in the same
that the coexistence
spaces and impact
of people of
on peace
different faiths in
the same
geographical spaces
contributes to peace
in Ghana
Absence of
Level of agreement
restrictions on
or disagreement that
marriages of people the unrestricted
of different faith
nature of marriages
traditions and peace between people of
different faiths
positively affects the
peace in the country
The use of religious Degree of
differences to
agreement or
canvass votes in
disagreement that
national and local
the use of religious
elections
differences to win
votes from the
electoral in all
elections contributes
to the peace in the
country
Leaders and agents
Extent of agreement
of different religious or disagreement on
traditions working
how leaders and
together for peace
agents of different

agree or disagree that
Ghana is at peace because
its citizens are very
religious.

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
absence of discrimination
in employment practices
has contributed to the
peace in Ghana.

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
coexistence of people of
different faiths in the
same geographical spaces
contributes to peace in
Ghana

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
unrestricted nature of
marriages between people
of different faiths
positively affects the
peace in the country
% of respondents who
agree or disagree that the
use of religious
differences to win votes
from the electoral in all
elections contributes to
the peace in the country

% of respondents who
agree or disagree that on
how leaders and agents of
different religious
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Role of religion
in creating a
culture of peace
(Q 59)

religious traditions
work together to
promote peace
Level of agreement
or disagreement on
the view that
religious leaders and
various religious
councils and
committees have
played important
roles in creating a
culture of peace in
Ghana.

traditions work together
to promote peace

Role of faith leaders
% of respondents who
(Christian and
agree or disagree that
Muslim) and
religious leaders and
religious councils
various religious councils
such as the Catholic
and committees have
bishops Conference,
played important roles in
the Christian
creating a culture of
Council of Ghana,
peace in Ghana.
Federation of
Islamic Councils,
etc. in promoting a
culture of peace.
Ho12 The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana
have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Relevance of
Extent to which the Degrees to which % of respondents who
values and
values and traditions respondents agree or agree or disagree that the
traditions of
of different ethnic disagree on the role values and traditions of
ethnic groups to groups in Ghana that values and different ethnic groups in
peace in Ghana promote peace
traditions
of Ghana promote peace
different
ethnic
(Q 60)
groups in Ghana
promote peace
Role
of Ways in which
Level of agreement % of respondents who
socialization on socialization
or disagreement
agree or disagree that
peace in all processes in all
among respondents
socialization processes
cultures
in cultures in Ghana
on how socialization within various cultures in
Ghana (Q 61)
inculcate the values within various
Ghana emphasize the
of peace in their
cultures in Ghana
promotion of peace
members
promote peace
Cultural
Extent to which Degree of
% of respondents who
sanctions for the cultural sanction’s agreement or
agree or disagree that the
breach of peace for the breach of the disagreement among invocation of sanctions in
peace
deter respondents on how various cultures in Ghana
(Q 62)
adherents
from sanctions for the
for the breach of the
promoting violence breach of the peace
instigation of violence
from various
help to create peace in the
cultures in Ghana
country
help to create peace
in the country
Control of
Extent to which
Differences in
% of respondents who
traditional rulers traditional rulers in
agreement between
agree or disagree that the
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on members of
their ethnic
groups
(Q 63)

Ghana exert their
authority on their
members to ensure
the promotion of
peace

respondents on the
ability of traditional
ability of traditional rulers in Ghana to exert
rulers in Ghana
their authority on their
exert their authority members to desist from
on their members to recourse to violence acts
desist from acts that contributes to the peace
breach the peace
the country enjoys.
Effectiveness of Ways in which
Levels of agreement % of respondents who
traditional rulers traditional rulers
or disagreement
agree or disagree that the
in promoting
promote peace
among respondents
ability of traditional
accommodation through
on the ability of
rulers in Ghana to create
of people of
accommodating
traditional rulers to
space for the
different faiths, people of different
promote peace
accommodation of people
political
ethnic groups, faith
through
of different ethnic and
affiliations, and traditions and
accommodating
faith traditions within
ethnicity within political affiliations people of different
their jurisdictions
their traditional within their areas of faiths, political
contributes to the peace
areas (Q 64)
jurisdiction
affiliations, and
that Ghana enjoys.
ethnicity within
their jurisdiction
Ho13 Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country
enjoys (Q 65)
Contribution of Extent to which
Assessed on a scale % of respondents who
formal
respondents believe ranging from Very
provide responses
education to
the formal
Low Extent, Low
corresponding to each
culture of peace educational system
Extent, Moderately
category of the grading
in Ghana has
Low Extent,
scale
contributed to the
Moderate Extent,
building of a culture Moderately High
of peace among
Extent, High Extent,
Ghanaians.
Very High Extent,
Not At All, to Can’t
Tell
Contribution of Content of history
Respondents’
% of respondents who
history courses
courses give equal
assessment of the
provide responses
in taught in
value to the history
extent to which
corresponding to the
schools to peace of all ethnic groups
history lessons
different extents to which
in Ghana
taught in schools in they assess that the
Ghana promote
history courses in schools
inclusiveness and
promote inclusiveness
unity among
and unity among
Ghanaians
Ghanaians.
Content of
Contribution of
Respondents’
% of respondents who
Educational
content of
assessment of the
provide responses
curricular and
educational
extent to which the
corresponding to the
peace
curricula to peace
curricula of the
different extents to which
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formal educational
system teaches
values of cocitizenship
Respondents’
assessment of the
extent to which
centralized posting
of students to
secondary and
vocational schools
promotes intercultural learning
among citizens.
Effect of the
Contribution of
Respondents’
Boarding school boarding school
assessment of the
system on peace system to peace in
extent to which use
in Ghana
Ghana
of the boarding
system in postprimary educational
institutions has
promoted crosscultural and cross
ethnic friendships
that have lasted into
working lives of
Ghanaians.
Contribution of Contribution of
Respondents
the boarding
boarding schools
assessment of the
school to peace system to interextent to which the
in Ghana
cultural prejudice
boarding school
reduction
system has
decreased ethnic and
religious identity
barriers and
prejudices among
Ghanaians
Role of Past
The existence of
Respondents’
Students’
Past Students or
assessment of the
Associations in Alumni
extent to which the
promoting
Associations has
activities of Past
peace
created strong cross- Students or Alumni
cultural bonds
Associations have
among alumni of the created strong crosssame schools
cultural bonds
Effect of crossregional posting
of teachers on
peace in Ghana

Contribution of
centralized posting
of students to post
primary educational
institutions to peace

they assess that which the
curricula of the formal
educational system
teaches values of cocitizenship
% of respondents who
provide responses
corresponding to the
different extents to which
they assess that
centralized posting of
students to secondary and
vocational schools
promotes inter-cultural
learning among citizens.
% of respondents who
provide responses
corresponding to the
different extents to which
they assess that the
boarding system in postprimary educational
institutions has promoted
cross-cultural and cross
ethnic friendships that
have lasted into working
lives of Ghanaians.
% of respondents who
provide responses
corresponding to the
different extents to which
they assess that the
boarding school system
has decreased ethnic and
religious identity barriers
and prejudices among
Ghanaians
% of respondents who
provide responses
corresponding to the
different extents to which
they assess that activities
of Past Students or
Alumni Associations
have created strong
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Effect of
posting of
teachers to
regions or
districts other
than their home
ones on peace

The practice of
posting teachings to
schools outside their
home districts or
regions has
increased
knowledge of other
cultures among
Ghanaians.

Contribution of
Inter-school
sporting events
to peace

The promotion of
sporting events
between schools of
different districts
and regions have
increased
intercultural
acceptance among
Ghanaians

Contribution of
Interschool
quizzes, debates
and other forms
of intellectual
competition to
peace

The role that
Interschool
intellectual
competitions play in
reducing cross
cultural stereotypes
and inferiority or
superiority
complexes among
Ghanaians

Contribution of
National
Service Scheme
to peace

The compulsory
national service
scheme has helped
to create a sense of
oneness among

among alumni of the cross-cultural bonds
same schools.
among alumni of the
same schools.
Respondent’s
% of respondents who
assessment of the
provide responses
extent to which the
corresponding to the
posting of teachings different extents to which
within the Ghana
they assess that posting of
Education Service to teachings within the
schools outside their Ghana Education Service
home districts or
to schools outside their
regions has
home districts or regions
increased
has increased knowledge
knowledge of other of other cultures among
cultures among
Ghanaians.
Ghanaians.
Respondents
% of respondents who
assessment of the
provide responses
extent to which the
corresponding to the
organization of
different extents to which
sporting events
they assess that
between schools of
organizing sporting
different districts
events between schools of
and regions have
different districts and
increased
regions have increased
intercultural
intercultural acceptance
acceptance among
among Ghanaians
Ghanaians
Respondents
% of respondents who
assessment of the
provide responses
extent the
corresponding to the
engagement of
different extents to which
students in quizzes, they assess that
debates, and other
intellectual competition
forms of intellectual have reduced the
competition have
complexes of inferiority
reduced the
and superiority among
complexes of
Ghanaians
inferiority and
superiority among
Ghanaians
Respondents
% of respondents who
assessment of the
provide responses
extent to which the
corresponding to the
posting of students
different extents to which
graduating from
they assess that posting of
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Ghanaians

secondary and
students graduating from
tertiary institutions
secondary and tertiary
to work in regions
institutions to work in
or communities
regions or communities
other than their own other than their own has
has helped to create helped to create a sense
a sense of oneness
of oneness among
among Ghanaians
Ghanaians
Ho14 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward people of other ethnic or
religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Variable
Operational
Dimensions
Indicators
Definition
Inclusive
Effort to ensure all
Extent to which
% of respondents
attitudes and
parties in a
respondents make
indicating various extents
behaviors
discussion have a
an effort to include
to which they consciously
chance
to
express
people
of
other
try to ensure that people
(Q 67)
their views
ethnic backgrounds of other ethnic groups
in group discussions participating in a
discussion are able to
express their views.
Ethnic
Tendency to show
Extent to which
% of respondents
superiority
that the values from respondents would
indicating the various
one’s culture are
go to ensure that
extents to which they
more important than others from different would go to ensure that
(Q 68)
those of others
cultural
their cultural values are
backgrounds accept accepted as more
their values as more important than those of
important
other cultures
Accommodation Insistence that one’s Extent to which
% of respondents
of alternate
cultural views
respondents go to
indicating various extents
cultural views
dominate in a
ensure that their
to which they insist that
discussion
cultural views are
their particular cultural
(Q 69)
accepted over others views be accepted in
in a group
discussions with others of
discussion
different cultural
backgrounds
Avoidance of
Intentional staying
Extent to which
%
of
respondents
people of other
away from people of respondents would
indicating the extent to
cultures
other cultures
go to intentionally
which
they
will
avoid mixing with
intentionally
avoid
(Q 70)
people of other
mixing with people of
cultures
other cultures.
Accommodation Giving equal value
Extent to which the % of respondents
of views of
and respect for the
views of others on
indicating the extent to
others on
views of others on
national issues are
which they would accept
national issues
national issues
considered
the views of other people
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important and valid

(Q 71)
Empathy
towards others
(Q 72)

Putting oneself in
the shoes of others
on
events
that
directly
affected
them

Extent to which
respondents will try
to understand issues
and events from the
perspectives of
those directly
affected by them.

Ethnic
considerations
in voting (Q 73)

Weight placed on
the ethnicity of
candidates in voting
during elections

Willingness to
accept job
postings to any
part of the
country (Q 74)

Willingness to live
and work in cultural
milieus other than
one’s own

Acceptance of
ethnic
intermarriages
(Q 75)

Extent of
willingness to
accept that family
members can marry
someone outside
one’s ethnic group

Mode of
addressing
disagreements
with persons of
other ethnic
groups. (Q 76)

Choice of medium
for addressing
conflicts with
people from other
ethnic groups

Criteria for
voting for
parliamentary
candidates in an
election (Q 77)

Choice between
issues and
personalities in
voting for
parliamentary
candidates in an
election

Extent to which
respondents
consider the ethnic
background of
candidates when
they vote in an
election
Degree of
willingness to
accept posting to
any part of the
country other than
in one’s home
region
Extent to which
respondents would
accept that members
of their families
marry to people of
other ethnic
backgrounds
Indications extent to
which respondents
would use the legal
means to address
their conflicts with
people of other
ethnic groups.
Indications of extent
to which the
personality of
candidates or the
issues they stand for
determine the voting
choices respondents
make at elections

on national issues as
important and valid
%
of
respondents
indicating the extent to
which they accept and
respect
the thoughts
emotions, and views of
people who are directly
affected by events in their
lives.
%
of
respondents
indicating the extent to
which they place value on
the ethnic background of
candidates when deciding
whom to vote for in an
election
% of respondents’
indication of the extent of
their willingness to locate
and work in cultural
milieus other than their
own
% of respondents’
indication of the extent to
which they would accept
that members of their
family marry people of
other ethnic backgrounds.
% of respondents’
indications of the extent
to which they would use
the legal means to
address their conflicts
with people of other
ethnic groups.
% of respondents’
indication of the extent to
which the personality or
issues candidates stand
for influence their choice
of candidates they vote
for during elections.
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Appendix 9 Significance Levels of Factors Influencing Ghana’s Peace
Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Value

Value

Significanc
e

Significanc
e

Value

Value

Influencing Factors
High level
Ghanaians

of

civic

awareness

Significanc
e

among

High degree of agreement among political
leaders on important issues affecting Ghana
Presence of strong, efficient, and neutral
institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and
the public and civil Services

81.755

.067

14.32
0

244.41
3

.000

.
.074

120.10
2

.000

18.56
7

194.23
0

.000

106.67
5

.000

33.53
0

65.842

77.555

.030

20.21
1

110.29
9

.000

216.05
3

Significanc
e

Significanc
e

238.92
5

.000

358.60
1

.000

.017

232.75
7

.000

320.14
1

.000

. 054

.000

89.672

.003

200.95
6

.000

92.472

.000

.005

140.78
8

.000

218.38
5

.000

20.78
8

91.410

.000

.004

116.76
5

.000

240.58
3

.000

.000

23.33
1

72.521

.000

.001

157.04
9

.000

191.54
1

.000

144.06
3

.000

12.41
1

60.856

.119

.088

87.377

.005

241.43
3

.000

89.553

.003

9.746

126.46
1

.000

.203

112.77
9

.000

199.43
5

.000

92.607

.002

10.27
9

130.25
7

.000

.173

117.85
5

.000

290.34
5

.000

Cultures of all ethnic groups value peace

Strong influence of religious beliefs that value
peace
Prayers and intercessions by religious groups

Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic
groups
Ghanaians have a high degree of respect for
the rule of law among
Fear of being singled out for punishment
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Appendix 10: Significance of Economic Development on Ghana’s Peace
Variable

Level of
Economic
Development
Geographical
Disparities in
Development
Transparency
of Contracts
for natural
resource
Exploitation
Returns on
Natural
Resource
Contracts
Allocation of
Revenue from
natural
resources
Use of
proceeds from
natural
resources

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

70.697

.264

10.733

.215

131.945

.000

156.729

.000

270.628

.000

75.857

.147

8.222

.412

139.571

.000

149.479

.000

166.530

.199

114.172

.000

4.543

.805

93.551

.001

74.057

.009

145.531

.632

100.849

.000

5.933

.548

69.818

.027

110.009

.000

182.176

.003

88.793

.022

5.557

.697

105.188

.000

90.179

.000

195.797

.010

112.294

.000

14.869

.062

79.579

.021

123.767

.000

186.531

.030
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Appendix 11 Significance of Respect for Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace
Variable
Freedom of
Expression of
Citizens
political
freedom
Respect for
Human Rights

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Residence

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

155.608

.000

15.347

.053

96.488

.005

514.444

.000

203.512

.003

383.833

.000

17.478

.026

161.696

.000

731.296

.000

212.523

.001

239.193

.000

20.136

.010

135.45

.000

760.013

.000

203.189

.004

Appendix 12: Significance respect for the rule of law on peace in Ghana
Variable
Citizen’s
respect for
the laws of
the land;
Public
officials act
in
accordance
with the
laws of the
land;
Citizen’s
respect for
decisions of
the courts
have
contributed
to the peace
in Ghana

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

80.932

.075

12.223

.142

75.447

.155

442.776

Significance
.000

Primary Occupation
Value
152

.000

98.103

.000

9.335

.229

101.343

.000

774.470

.000

221.269

.000

.000

8.569

.285

93.598

.002

805.980

Significance
.000

.001

187.379
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Appendix 13: Gender Perspectives on Respect for Rule of Law on Peace
Respect for Rule of Law

Very Strongly Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Mildly Agree

Mildly Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Very Strongly Disagree

No Opinion

Total

Gender
Male
Female
165
129
21.7%
19.9%
11.7%
9.2%
211
184
27.8%
28.4%
15.0%
13.1%
101
83
13.3%
12.8%
7.2%
5.9%
158
156
20.8%
24.1%
11.2%
11.1%
48
52
6.3%
8.0%
3.4%
3.7%
60
35
7.9%
5.4%
4.3%
2.5%
11
6
1.4%
0.9%
0.8%
0.4%
5
1
0.7%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
0
2
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
0.1%
759
648
100.0%
100.0%
53.9%
46.1%

Total
294
20.9%
20.9%
395
28.1%
28.1%
184
13.1%
13.1%
314
22.3%
22.3%
100
7.1%
7.1%
95
6.8%
6.8%
17
1.2%
1.2%
6
0.4%
0.4%
2
0.1%
0.1%
1407
100.0%
100.0%
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Appendix 14: Significance of the Freedom of the Press to peace in Ghana
Variable
Freedom of the
print media
Liberalization
of the
electronic
media
Unrestricted
access to news
and
information
from the
internet

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

144.492

.000

21.040

.007

171.811

.000

1073.05

.000

233.515

.000

93.126

.010

17.493

.025

129.604

.000

370.870

.000

232.173

.000

100.812

.002

20.689

.008

191.449

.000

324.152

.000

239.993

.000

Appendix 15: Significance of the Independence of the Judiciary to peace in Ghana
Variable
Independence
of Judiciary
Corruptibility
of the
Judiciary
Equality of
Citizens
before the law

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

161.181

.000

6.671

.575

117.709

.000

897.920

.000

228.095

.000

98.858

.000

6.657

.574

106.413

.001

745.613

.000

318.746

.000

105.327

.001

16.505

.036

110.923

.000

801.608

.000

272.011

.000
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Appendix 16: Significance of Gender-related factors to peace in Ghana
Variable

Equality in
Public Fora
Women in
Parliament
Equal
Economic
opportunities
Equal
Educational
Opportunities
Equal
Employment
Opportunities
Women in
Mediation
Queen Mothers

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

86.694

.031

8.211

.413

80.111

.084

656.718

.000

191.219

.017

66.447

.393

21.664

.006

144.117

.000

489.639

.000

287.314

.000

82.853

.057

11.374

.181

101.289

.002

561.726

.000

205.599

.002

86.672

.031

15.230

.055

289.369

.000

459.368

.000

218.421

.000

118.808

.000

12.733

.121

204.984

.000

574.678

.000

228.449

.000

13.063

.110

117.155

.000

454.390

.000

262.092

.000

17.299

.027

115.892

.000

562.660

.000

169.579

.156

129.109
144.666

.000
.000
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Appendix 17: Elections and Democratic Participation
Variable
Free, Fair
Elections
Parliamentary
Elections, no
war
Presidential
Elections, no
war
Freedom to
Stand
Elections
Freedom to
vote
Freedom of
Political
Association
No ethnicity
in Voting
Behavior

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

132.660

.000

18.492

.018

176.334

.000

946.458

.000

273.867

.000

45.724

.810

2.275

.810

94.668

.000

492.346

.000

213.556

.000

47.512

.193

20.542

.001

96.968

.000

517.840

.000

158.654

.000

141.258

.000

11.301

.185

88.722

.022

845.749

.000

267.295

.000

147.940

.000

19.526

.003

64.102

.060

756.079

.000

291.807

.000

113.571

.000

12.562

.084

69.232

.110

746.355

.000

178.767

.005

136.610

.000

25.672

.001

88.728

.022

475.798

.000

256.386

.000
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Appendix 18: Significance Levels Of Religion To Peace In Ghana
Variable

Importance of
Religion
Respect for Faith
Values
and peace
Religious nature of
Ghanaians
Religions
discrimination in
employment
Coexistence of
people of different
faiths
Intermarriages
between people of
different faiths and
peace
Use religion in
political campaigns
Interfaith
collaboration for
peace
Role of religion in
creating a culture of
peace

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Religious Affiliation

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

Value

Significance

154.99

.000

8.277

.142

30.956

.847

300.546

.000

99.053

.368

135.639

.000

149.903

.000

17.209

.028

75.139

.161

627.541

.000

325.384

.000

90.454

002

144.164

.000

24.270

.002

117.062

.000

538.724

.000

218.199

.000

134.152

.000

140.541

.000

28.623

.001

93.800

.043

706.111

.000

259.800

.000

84.368

.037

122.343

.000

15.816

.045

146.324

.000

588.267

.000

232.173

.000

73.114

.062

91.196

.014

10.923

.206

145.952

.000

407.204

.000

211.953

.001

58.895

.370

233.893

.000

23.105

.003

119.986

.000

646.095

.000

277.773

.000

73.624

.057

154.818

.000

13.833

.054

106.997

.000

677.945

.000

324.485

.000

65.104

.062

120.912

.000

8.802

.185

59.335

.126

598.492

.000

223.772

.000

56.737

.064
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Appendix 19: Significance of Traditions and Culture to Peace
Variable
NonXenophobic
Values and
Traditions
Cultural
socialization
for peace
Cultures
sanctions on
violence
Strong
Influence of
Traditional
Leaders
Effectiveness
of Traditional
Leaders

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Region of Interview

Primary Occupation

Religious
Affiliation
Value
P-value

Value

P-value

Value

P-value

Value

P-value

Value

P-value

Value

P-value

103.147

.000

7.869

.248

47.307

.501

381.866

.000

111.452

.550

49.233

.206

143.487

.000

8.910

.113

83.249

.000

394.202

130.218

.010

27.536

.812

170.101

.000

9.042

.171

53.622

.268

357.890

218.787

.000

69.177

.005

114.600

.083

48.138

.069

210.703

.000

56.129

.001

.000

.000

.000
127.767

.000

8.228

.144

51.974

.097

394.012

104.448

.000

7.049

.133

68.780

.000

680.627

.000
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Appendix 20: Summary of Agreements on Contribution of Education to Peace

Variable
Education system creates Culture of Peace (n = 1421)
Teaching of History Civic Education (n = 1394)
Teaching of Civic Education in Schools (n = 1429)
Role of CSSP (n = 1429)
Boarding Schools and cross cultural education (n = 1391)
Boarding schools decreased barriers (n = 1390)
Past Students’ Associations & cultural bonds (n = 1383)
Posting of teachers (n = 1429)
Inter-School Sporting Events (n = 1388)
Extracurricular academic engagements (n = 1380)
National Service (n = 1372)

Filtration at
Filtration at 
Filtration at 
Difference
6.5
7.5
between 6.5 and 8
8
80.3
47
33.3
47
64.9
37.4
27.5
37.4
66
46.7
19.3
46.7
68.6
47.9
20.7
47.9
82.5
57.3
25.2
57.3
80.7
59
21.7
59
63.6
34.2
29.4
34.2
78.9
56.3
22.6
56.3
69.4
42.3
27.1
42.3
67.8
32.9
34.9
32.9
77.8
61.6
16.2
61.6
Average

47.50909

Differences between 6.5, 7.5 and  8 Filtration Points of Mean Scores for Responses on The extent to which Various Factors In Ghana’s
Educational System Contribute to Peace
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Appendix 21: Significance of Personal Attitudes, Behaviors and Practices for Peace

Age Category

Gender Category

Educational Level

Variable
Value

Inclusive Attitude
Cultural Superiority

50.800
104.308

P-value

0.256
0.000

131.375
Dominant Personal Attitude
Avoidance
Valuing Views of Others
Empathy
Ethnic Affiliations in
Elections

25.185

0.000
73.552
50.835
86.245

0.005
0.255
0.000

73.649

2.672
6.500

106.7
109.505

0.005

0.254
0.988
0.772

0.000
0.000

64.936

189.622
78.042

19.367

0.004
0.013
0.036

373.011
761.631

0.006
0.000
0.002

134.064

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.005
0.000

Value

185.802
182.220

234.172
447.283

442.450
686.682

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
150.155
97.651
159.197

0.000
0.164
0.000

136.137
0.000

1052.72
9
738.487

P-value

168.473

480.267

0.000
73.461

P-value

Primary
Occupation

0.000
327.119

0.000

134.230

of

817.538

86.914
0.208

22.550

0.027

Value

0.000
72.422

0.591

26.006

0.000

115.351

13.298
0.000

86.316

P-value

123.191

8.383

0.000
136.909

0.855

Value

0.588
12.487

0.004

Voting Criteria

Support for intermarriages
Preferred Mediators in
conflict Resolution

5.502

P-value

8.422

134.897
Posting to other places

Value

Region
Interview

0.000

61.874
53.930
111.28
1
65.237
5.786
131.56

0.000

0.000

0.000

Value

0.000
197.243
142.497
238.493

P-value

0.121
0.327
0.000
0.073
1.000
0.000

74.781

194.528
0.000

Religious
Affiliation

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.013
231.26
0
65.300
24.131
98.552

0.000
0.072
0.999
0.000
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Appendix 22: Network View - Type of Peace

___________________________________________________________________
Nodes count:
10
Code Families (1):
CF:Type of Peace
Codes (9):
Contributions to peace - Affirmative sub {13-1}
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Appendix 23: Network View - Effect of Culture on Peace in Ghana

Nodes count:
27
Code Families (1):
CF:Effect of Culture on Peace
Codes (26):
Continued relevance of traditional leaders {3-3}
cultural change or loss of moral compass {5-1}
Cultural homogenization {7-2}
Cultural hybridization {1-4}
Culture is important {10-8}
Culture of peace {21-5}
Economic interdependencies {1-5}
Ethnicity - not a problem {11-5}
Fa ma Nyame {4-8}
Fear of reprisal attacks {1-3}
Indigenous religion {0-7}

Intercultural accommodation and assimilation {11-5}
Intermarriages {6-12}
Miscegenation {3-3}
Patriarchy {2-6}
Political culture of peace {1-7}
Politicians respect law {4-5}
Prayers {3-6}
Role of women {2-7}
Socialized behaviors {2-5}
The Ashanti Factor {1-5}
Traditional leaders {3-4}
Visible institutional efforts {1-3}
Women and peacebuilding in Ghana {1-3}
Women as peacebuilders {1-3}
Women as warmongers {4-4}
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Appendix 24: Network View - Contribution of Religion to peace

Nodes count:

14

Code Families (1):
CF:Contribution of Religion to peace
Codes (13):
Fa ma Nyame {4-9}
Faith in action {2-3}
FBO Interventions {8-4}
GOG, FBO, CSO Collaboration {2-5}

Good leadership {1-5}
Indigenous religion {0-6}
Interfaith actions {3-4}
Interfaith dialogue {1-4}
Intermarriages {6-11}
Invisible roles {1-5}
Prayers {3-6}
Religious leaders {4-6}
Religious nature of Ghanaians is important {11-5
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Appendix 25: Network View - Exit Strategies

Network View: Exit Strategies
Created by: Super 2015-02-26T07:05:26
_____________________________________________________________________
Nodes count:

7

Code Families (1):
CF:Exit Strategies
Codes (6):
Exit - disengagement/resignation {7-1}
Exit - Galamsey {1-1}

Exit - Migration {1-3}
Exit - Politics {2-1}
Exit - Private solutions {2-2}
Exit - Streetism {1-2}
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